

KWAME NKRUMAH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,

KUMASI

COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES

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DEPARTMENT OF SILVICULTURE AND FOREST MANAGEMENT

**ASSESSING DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN MULTI-STAKEHOLDER
PLATFORM DESIGN. A THE CASE OF A EU-CHAINSAW MULTI-
STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUE PROCESS IN GHANA**

By

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KWAME NKRUMAH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,

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**Assessing Democratic Representation in Multi-Stakeholder Platform Design. The
Case of a EU-Chainsaw Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Process in Ghana**

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Resources in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of**

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

Nelson Owusu-Ansah

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis report is my original work towards the MPhil and that to the best of my knowledge it contains no material previously published by another person, nor material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree of the university, except where due acknowledgment has been made in the text.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the Almighty God for His faithfulness and provisions and for granting me the strength to soldier on throughout the period of study.



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ABSTRACT

There has been an increased advocacy across the globe for greater participation of stakeholders in the management of natural resources. In the forestry sector of Ghana, this is evident in the design and implementation of several multi-stakeholder platforms such as the National Forest Forum, Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue, and so on. The assertion is that grassroot involvement in decision-making will lead to more responsive policies and programmes, as well as improved governance in the sector. For multistakeholder dialogue to be democratic and effective, it has been advocated that representatives should be responsive and accountable to their constituents. This study examined how designers of the Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue process contemplated democratic representation. The study used qualitative techniques to enable detailed understanding of the discourse; contemplation and design of democratic representation processes in Ghana. The study used structured and semi-structured interviews, participant observation and desk study. Content analysis was used in the analysis of the data. The study, contrary to initial hypothesis, established that designers of the MultiStakeholder Dialogue process adequately contemplated democratic representation. However, the involvement of the grassroot in the decision making process was merely symbolic. The transaction cost of engaging the stakeholders at the lower level of the process was not catered for by the project, and therefore activities there were not facilitated by the organizers. Disorganized stakeholder groups impeded exchange of information between the platform and the participating stakeholder groups, thereby alienating the Grassroot from the engagement process. Even though the discourse shows there was symbolic democratic representation, in practice there was no substantive engagement of stakeholders especially at the lower level platforms.

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ACRONYMS



CSMD	Community Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue
DMSD	District Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue
DOLTA	Domestic Lumber Trade Association
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FC	Forestry Commission
FLEGT	Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade
FORIG	Forestry Research Institute of Ghana
GTA	Ghana Timber Association
GTMO	Ghana Timber Millers Organization
MMDA	Metropolitan Municipal District Assemblies
MSD	Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue
MSP	Multi-Stakeholder Platform
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMSD	National Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue
NREG	Natural Resource and Environmental Governance
REDD	Reducing Emission of Deforestation and Degradation
RMSC	Resource Management Support Center
TBI	Tropenbos International
TC	Transaction Cost
TIDD	Timber Industry Development Division
UN	United Nations
VPA	Voluntary Partnership Agreement

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The principle of democratic representation has gained increased international and local attention in the sustainable management of natural resources. Ribot et al (2010) assert that “representation is democratic when responsiveness is driven by accountability of that authority downwardly towards the concerned population” (pg. 36).

Before the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, issues concerning the environment were managed mainly through legislation and law enforcement. There was minimal participation of stakeholders in the decision making processes both at local and international levels in the management of natural resources. However, since 1992 international environmental policy discourses and programmes like the United Nations Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) initiative, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), European Union's Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade all evoke democratic principles and espouse collective efforts in the management of natural resources and the environmental sectors (Marfo et al 2013, Marfo 2014). This paradigm shift in the management of natural resources across the globe focuses on increased participation of stakeholders in mitigating the challenges confronting the natural resource and environmental sectors.

Currently, Ghana has adopted many participatory processes in the management of its natural resources particularly in the forest sector. McKeown et al. (2013) reports that in

2009 there were ten such initiatives in the country's forestry sector: the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT)/Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) process; the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) initiative; debate on the United Nations Forum on Forests Non-Legally Binding Instrument (NLBI); the Natural Resources and Environmental Governance (NREG)-and its related KASA ("Speak out" in Twi) civil society project; the Global Witness Forest Transparency Reporting; Pro-poor REDD (IUCN/Danida); the World Wide Fund for Nature's Forest Certification support; an EU civil society project; the National (and District) Forest Forum (supported by the FAO); and the Growing Forests Partnership.

To sustain these multi-stakeholder processes, the government has taken steps to incorporate democratic principles into sector policies and legislations to institutionalize participatory governance in the sector. For instance, both the 1994 and the more recent 2012 Forest and Wildlife Policies highlight the need to involve stakeholders in the management of the forest and wildlife resources. The revised forest and wildlife policy (2012) for example, aims at consolidating good governance through accountability and transparency and enhance active participation of communities (Ghana Forest And Wildlife Policy, 2012). These policy instruments serve as a framework for managers of the sector to design participatory processes that will seek to synergize the views of all stakeholders in addressing issues in the sector.

A Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue (MSD) platform created through an EU funded chainsaw programme is being implemented in Ghana to engage stakeholders in the forestry sector to address illegal chainsaw milling and the supply of legal lumber into the domestic market (Marfo et al. 2013). The MSD has become a flagship programme because it has brought

together all major stakeholders in the forestry sector onto a common platform to dialogue on the way forward to the issue of illegal chainsaw milling. Again, government and other private stakeholder organizations have come to accept this as a good mechanism to address the challenges in the forestry sector and have advocated for its institutionalization (Mckeown et al 2013). The argument is that institutionalizing of the platform would help sustain the continuous engagement of stakeholders in finding solutions to the problem. The next section therefore examines the problem with these multi-stakeholder platforms in Ghana and assesses whether its adoption as a management approach has proven to be a better alternative with regards to it being responsive and accountable to those for which the platforms were designed.

1.2 Problem Statement

Following the global call for the inclusion of stakeholders in the management of natural resources, democratic representation has become an integral part of the governance structure of the forest and wildlife sector in Ghana. Indeed, since the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy came into being, stakeholder involvement in decision-making has seen increased recognition, and this can be seen in the numerous stakeholder processes that the country has signed up to at the global level or initiated locally. It has been asserted that stakeholder participation will help improve the governance system in the natural resource sector, mitigate conflict, create greater integration and ensure that policy and programmes are responsive and accountable to the needs of stakeholders, and consequentially address the numerous challenges that have plagued the sector (Ribot, 2014). However, in spite of the implementation of several stakeholder processes, the forestry sector is still challenged with degradation, deforestation, illegal chainsaw activities and so on. The discourse has

not translated into actual practice (Marfo 2014), which may have accounted for the perpetuation of the aforementioned challenges. The argument is that the involvement of stakeholders has been symbolic (Edelman 1998; Colebatch 1998; Emerson 2002; and Marfo 2014); policy designers and implementers have not substantively moved the discourse from the rhetoric to actual practice on the ground (Marfo 2014). It has been argued that stakeholders, especially those at the grassroots level, have not been truly included in decision-making processes, leading to the conclusion that the processes have not been effective in terms of ensuring responsiveness and accountability. It is therefore argued that the design of democratic representative platforms have been superficial and illusionary.

Linked to democratic representation is the issue of transaction cost and resource allocation. Even though some recent studies have looked into the effectiveness of MSDs in relation to democratic representation (McKeown et al. 2013; Obeng et al. 2013), how transaction cost plays out in the representation process has not received much systematic analysis. Marfo (2014) observed that, in terms of allocation of resources for democratic representation, stakeholder representatives in the REDD Readiness consultation process in Ghana, for example, were not adequately supported to be responsive and accountable. At best, the process only supported their participation in consultation meetings. Thus, to a large extent, in the REDD consultation process design for example, the transaction cost for the representatives to be responsive and accountable to their larger group was overlooked and discounted. However, understanding the influences of transaction costs informs both the ex-ante selection of a policy and ex-post policy refinement (Coggan et al. 2010). In the light of this, the researcher intends to assess the design of democratic

representative processes in Ghana and how transaction cost in the project design reinforced the concept of democratic representation using the Multi-Stakeholder

Dialogue as a case.

1.3 Aim and Objectives

1.3.1 Aim

The main objective was to examine how designers and organizers of Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue platforms conceptualized democratic representation.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

- a. Assess how organizers contemplated democratic representation in the design of multi-stakeholder dialoguing process.
- b. Assess how transaction cost was conceptualized in the design of the multistakeholder dialogue process.
- c. Assess how resources were allocated in the organization of the MSD at different stages of the engagement process.

1.4 Research Questions

In the light of the above objectives, the study assessed democratic representation in a multi-stakeholder platform by answering the following research questions:

- a. How did designers contemplate democratic representation in the design of multistakeholder dialogue process?
- b. To what extent does the design compare with actual practice?

- c. How did designers conceptualize transaction cost in the design of the Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue process?
- d. How did organizers allocate resources in the organization of the MSD?

1.5 Significance of the Study

Notwithstanding the challenges with the design and implementation of stakeholder processes, it still holds the promise of addressing the challenges and promoting better governance in the natural resource sector. Therefore, this study will be critical to policy designers and organizers of stakeholder participatory processes to improve on the design and implementation of democratic representation processes. In this case, it will provide far-reaching understanding of the problem with participatory processes in Ghana especially in the forestry sector. This will help to bridge the knowledge gap between discourse and practice of stakeholder engagement processes. Stakeholder groups will also find it useful as it can guide their expectation of stakeholder participatory processes and promote better representation.

Additionally, scholarly works have not advanced knowledge on how the design of democratic representative platforms compare with practice. Thus, the study will contribute to existing body of knowledge on democratic representation. This will be useful to academia, researchers and managers and also stimulate further research on the subject and other related areas especially in the context of natural resource and environmental governance.

1.6 Limitations of the Study

1. The subject of study has not been well researched. Therefore, there was not much literature to support the study.
2. One weakness of the peer coding used was that since the independent coder did not read the entire cases document, there may possibly be text that refers to responsiveness or accountability which might have been missed by the researcher and that could go unaccounted for.

1.7 Chapter Organization

This report is organized in six (6) chapters. Chapter one provides a general introduction to the research. It gives the background, analyzes the research problem, state research objectives and questions, and addresses the significance of the study, as well as state the limitation to the study. Chapter two examines existing literature on democratic representation and transaction cost. It also provides the conceptual framework of the study. Chapter three focuses on the methodology used in gathering data. The data gathering tools included face-to-face interview, participant observation and questionnaire survey. Chapter four provides results of the analysis of the data. This was done qualitatively using content analyses. Chapter five discusses the results and it is organized in three sections; conceptualization of democratic representation, conceptualization of transaction cost and resource allocation in the organization of the MSD. Chapter six provides conclusions and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The management of natural resources has evolved from law enactment and enforcement to good governance and active participation of stakeholders. Participation in its various forms; co-management, consultation, negotiation has been argued to have higher likelihood to ensure effective decision making in the management of natural resources; thereby reducing the myriad of conflicts and other challenges that have distressed the natural resource sector. However, while proponents drive the attention of the managers of natural resources to increased participation of stakeholders in decision making processes, its form and consequences have not been addressed adequately. This chapter reviews the literature on participation, democratic decentralization stakeholder engagement, multi-stakeholder engagement, and transaction cost in the management of natural resources. It was the view of the researcher that these areas of review would sufficiently give theoretical and empirical information for the study. The chapter concludes with a summary of key lessons learnt from the review and a conceptual framework that guides the study.

2.2 Participation


The broad conceptualization of participation in the context of natural resources management allude to any effort to inform, involve, consult, dialogue and negotiate with stakeholders in a decision making process in the management of natural resources (Reed

2008; Pomery and Douvere, 2008). Pomery and Douvere (2008), assert that there are different typologies of participation. In their assertion, “participation ranges from communication where there is no actual participation to negotiation where decision making power is shared among the various stakeholders” (Pomery and Douvere, 2008 p1). At its lowest level, participation is seen as a one-way process where stakeholders only receive information from their representatives or organizations. However, a more advanced participatory process creates a two-way process. Stakeholders participate in the decision making process from the planning phase to the post-implementation phase of a project (Pomery, Douvere, 2008). Based on their conception of high level participation, participatory process can be assessed at three main levels; preparticipation; participation; post-participation. Pre-participatory process is conceptualized as the first phase of the process where stakeholder representatives engage the represented in an effort to be more responsive to their needs and interest. This phase is particularly important because it is the stage where representatives articulate the views of their members on a dialogue platform. The post participation phase concerns itself with activities that ensure that representatives are accountable to their members. The International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) model of engagement has five levels (inform, consult, involve, collaborate and empower) of public participation in a spectrum (see table 2.0 below). According to their model, „inform“ is the lowest level of participation. At this level information is passed on to the community for the purposes of getting them informed about a decision taken. The „empower“ is the highest level of participation. The empowered community or stakeholder shares responsibility for making decisions and are accountable for the outcomes of those decisions (IAP2, 2013).

Table 2.1: Public Participation Spectrum

Inform	Consult	Involve	Collaborate	empower
Public participation goal				
To provide the public with balanced and objective information	To obtain feedback on analysis, alternatives and/or decisions	To work directly with the public throughout the process to ensure that public concerns and aspirations are consistently understood and considered	To partner with the public in each aspect of the decision, including the development of alternatives and identification of the preferred solution	To place final decision-making in the hands of the public
Participation Tool				
Fact sheet		Workshops	Citizen advisory committees	Citizen juries
Web sites	Public comment	Deliberate polling	Consensus-building	Ballots
Open houses	Focus groups		Participatory decision-making	Delegated decisions
	Surveys			
	Public meetings			

Source: IAP2 (2013)



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2.3 Representation

The theory of representation and its relation to democracy has been well studied (Pitkin 1967; Mansbridge 1996; Beckley, 1999; Ribot, 2004, 2011; Wellstead et al. 2005; Saward 2008) and what it should mean for policy and research continues to engage political theorists (Saward, 2006). Largely elaborating the work of Pitkin (1967), representation has been conceptualized as „standing for“ (descriptive) or „acting for“ (substantive) a given constituency (Mansbridge, 1996; Wellstead et al. 2005). In the former, the analysis has focused more on the identity and socio-political attributes of the representatives and the represented while in the latter, the focus of analysis is on the substantive interest of those being represented (Marfo, 2014). Wellstead et al. (2005) asserted that the kind of representation conceived in natural resource literature is descriptive. They described descriptive representation as the process of being like something for somebody (standing for). However, Pitkins argues that representation should rather be conceptualized as acting for; a substantive representation of the interest of the stakeholders represented. She further asserted that representation should embody series of action behaviours rather than embodying merely the characteristics of the represented (Pitkins, 1967).

Largely influenced by the liberal culture of representative democracy, emphasizing the need for representation to reflect the collective interests of individuals in the polity, „democratic representation“ has been conceptualized as the responsiveness and accountability of the representative to the represented (Ribot et al.2008; Mainin et al. 1990; Ribot, 2004, 2011). Ribot 2004, asserts that representation is the institutionalized form of participation. Pitkins (1967) defined political representation as acting in the interest of the represented in a manner responsive to them. She further delineated

representation as making something present which is nevertheless not literally present; the representative acts in the interest of the constituents by articulating their views in a manner that can affect policy outcome. To some extent, it has been argued that democratic representation is a function of power as representatives need material and discursive resources to be able to effectively execute their functions and exercise discretion (Mensah 1998; Ribot and Larson 2005; Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina 2008). A key power resource, following Marfo (2006), is access to economic resources to enable representatives identify group's concerns, participate in the dialogue process to articulate those concerns, and negotiate and to provide feedback to the group. However, this theoretical assertion may not be the practice (Larson et al. 2008). They argue that democratic representation is rarely practiced in the way that is required. Their assertion is that government officials are reluctant to redistribute power and resources and frequently find ways to restrain these even when policies and discourse suggest otherwise (Larson et al 2008).

2.4 Democratic Representation

Democratic representation is delineated as being accountable and responsive to the needs of the represented (Menin, et al. 1999). Ribot et al. (2010) argues that representation is democratic when responsiveness is driven by accountability „downwardly“ towards the concerned population. Responsiveness delineates how representatives act for (Pitkins, 1967; Wellstead; 2002; Disch, 2012) and express the interest, goals and aspirations of stakeholders (Ribot, 2010). Ribot (2010), asserted that “responsiveness is the relation between signals and policies”. It involves meeting with the community and understanding their needs so that their concerns would be carried on the platform for it to be considered in a policy decision. It enables authorities to translate local

needs and aspirations into policy (Ribot, 2010). Accountability refers to the counter power (Ribot, 2004) held by the represented to ensure that their interest is served by their representatives through positive and negative sanctions. This is what is referred to as downward accountability (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Ribot 2004; Ribot et al. 2008). A key determinant of effective democratic representation is accountability to the people for whom they are making decisions (Ribot, 2004). However government authorities, international donors and NGOs may have other reasons accounting for the institutionalization of democratic representation for the implementation of their environmental programmes and policies other than effective decentralization; legitimizing state projects, incorporating break-away groups and regions, garnering popular support, obtaining an electoral base, cultivating patronage networks were some of the reasons eluded to by (Schroeder 1999; Ferguson 1996; Bariskar 2002; and Ribot 2004). Ribot (2004) further argues that within grassroot groups, stakeholder groups, and NGOs, internal democracy is not assured. His argument is that these groups may also not be accountable to or representative of their constituents in a systematic manner (Ribot, 2004).

2.5 Stakeholder Involvement

Stakeholder involvement in policy planning and implementation has gained the attention of policy planners and implementers especially in the natural resource sector where issues are complex and conflicts abound (Jeffery 2009, Catactan and Tauni 2007; Reed et al. 2009; Reed 2008). This increasing paradigm is borne out of the fact that organizations are advocating for bottom-up all inclusive approach to sustainable management of natural resources. Stakeholdering has been described as a process by which stakeholders are

actively involved in the design, delivery, review and improvement of products (including political and social service). Though some argue that the concept of stakeholders predates Freeman's (1984) seminal work on stakeholders, his definition of stakeholders as those who affect or are affected by decisions and actions, set the foundation for real intellectual and academic work and discourse on the concept (Rowley, 1997; Reed et al. 2009). Building on Freeman's definition, the African Development Bank (2001) delineated Stakeholders as people or communities who may directly or indirectly, positively or negatively affect or be affected by the outcomes of projects or programs. In the context of natural resource management, however, Rolling and Wagemakers define stakeholders as „natural resource users and managers (Rolling and Wagemaker, 1998).

From the environmental perspective, Coarse (1960) also narrowly defined stakeholders as polluter and victims. Polluters could affect change (in this case creating pollution) and the victims were those who were affected (Coarse, 1960; Reed et al. 2009). Perhaps the more comprehensive definition of stakeholders was given by Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb and Pomeroy and Douveere. They described stakeholders as individuals, groups or organizations, who are in one way or another, interested, involved or affected (positively or negatively) by a particular project or action toward resource (Pomeroy and RiveraGuieb 2006). It can therefore be argued that everybody is a potential stakeholder especially in the natural resource and the environmental sectors where everybody appears to affect or are affected either directly or indirectly by these two sectors mentioned. Pomeroy (2008) gave a pictorial view of stakeholder groups and what interest they represent. He explained that “stakeholders may include groups affected by management decisions, groups dependent on the resources to be managed, groups with claims over the area of resources,

groups with activities that impact on the area or resources and groups with, for example, special seasonal or geographic interests. Pomeroy continues by stating that stakeholders often hold considerable political and/or economic influence over the resource, based on their historical dependence and association with it, institutional mandate, economic interest, or a variety of other concerns” (Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb 2006; Pomeroy 2008).

Gavin and Pinder (2001) and AfDB (2001) put these interest-based stakeholder groups into categories; primary and secondary stakeholders. Primary stakeholders are those who are ultimately affected, i.e. those who expect to benefit from or be adversely affected by the intervention. Secondary stakeholders on the other hand are those with some intermediary role, bringing or testing knowledge or carrying mediation and facilitation skills (Warner 2005).

However, Marsh (1998), further categorized these two main groups of stakeholders into four typologies; core stakeholders, customers, controllers and partners. The Core stakeholders are people essential to the organization or process. In the natural resource area, farmers, land owners, traditional rulers are common examples of this typology. The African Development Bank (2001) describes them as primary stakeholders and those that are most marginalized in a multi-stakeholder consultative process. Customers are conceptualized as those who receive product or service (for example, community members, interest groups etc). Controllers are explained as individuals who regulate, and influence the organization or process. These include legislators, regulators, providers of capital, government services, media, and trustees. The partners however, are stakeholders through whom part or all of the service is provided. Examples include suppliers, temporary staff, distributors, agents, consultants etc.

2.6 Transaction Cost

There is a plethora of literature defining and setting out frameworks for measuring transaction cost (Coggan et al, 2010). Matthews (1986) define transaction cost as the costs of arranging a contract ex ante and monitoring and enforcing that contract ex post. Transaction cost occurs both at the level of organizing and participating in multistakeholder engagement process. With this conceptualization, the most useful definition was provided by Gordon (1994) who explains transaction cost as the expenses of organizing and participating in a market or implementing a government policy. This definition was amplified by Marshall (2013: 118) as the costs incurred to “define, establish, maintain, use and change institutions and organizations; and define the problems that these institutions and organizations are intended to solve”. Even though not much work has been done in the area of transaction cost in multi-stakeholder processes, these two definitions encapsulate the context within which this research was organized. McCann (2004) asserts that policy choice and policy design need to take into account transaction costs in order to increase the efficiency and sustainability of policies. Transaction costs typically occur as goods and services, travel costs, labour and time expended in a transaction (Coggan et al, 2010). The researcher’s definition for transaction cost in a context of democratic representation encompasses all costs related to the performance of the expected actions to obtain information from representative’s constituency, participate in the multi-stakeholder dialogue meetings and provide feedback to constituency.

Although transaction cost inclusion in the design and assessment of natural resource policies and programmes promises good outcome, McCann (2005) narrates that in practice, transaction costs are not usually included in empirical evaluations of alternative

environmental or natural resource policies, although they are recognized in some theoretical work (Stavins, 1995; Fullerton, 2001). Advantages of incorporating transaction cost in alternative policy design in the environment and natural resource sectors as asserts by McCann (2005) are to improve preliminary comparison and screening across alternative policy instruments; enhance effective design and implementation of policies to achieve particular objectives; evaluate current policies in order to improve their effectiveness; and assess the budgetary impacts of policies over their life cycle.

Most studies on transaction costs are related to costs incurred by public agencies organizing or implementing specific action (Coggan et al. 2010); only few have actually included costs to the private parties participating in environmental policies (see Kuperan et al. 2008 ; Mettepenningen et al. 2009). Coggan et al. (2010) reported that across studies that included public and private transaction costs, transaction costs ranged from 21% to 50% of total policy costs.

Coase (1960) posited that identifying relevant parties, collecting pertinent information, conducting negotiations, enforcing agreements, and so on, could be sufficiently costly to prevent many transactions from being achieved (Coase 1960; Adhikari, 2001). Blore (2013) also reported that the cost of implementing, monitoring and enforcement is higher than in co-management, while stating that the cost of programme or project design in co-management is higher than centralized management (Falconer and Saunders, 2002; Hanna and Munasinghe, 1995; Mettepenningen et al., 2011).

Kuperan et al. (2008) however argues that since implementation cost is incurred almost on perpetual basis, the cost of centralized management may be potentially higher than co-

management. This hypothesis of Kuperan in the view of Blore (2013) needs to be tested before it can be accepted. He explained that since the settings of organizing participatory processes are not the same, such postulations cannot be absolute.

There are fewer attempts in assessing transaction cost in participatory decision-making processes such as MSPs in natural resource management literature (McCann et al. 2005). The increasing use of MSPs for natural resource management portends that there is an opportunity to explore transaction cost in this context (Blore, 2013). It is also imperative to critically examine the issue of transaction cost and how it affect the design and implementation of stakeholder processes in the context of natural resources.

2.7 Multi-Stakeholder Platforms

Multi-stakeholder platform (MSP) has become a popular phenomenon in organizations across the globe. It is a gathering of people with different interest and perspectives in the management of resources (Warner, 2006). It has been defined as “Decision-making bodies (voluntary or statutory) comprising different stakeholders who perceive the same resource management problem, realise their interdependence for solving it, and come together to agree on action strategies for solving the problem” (Steins and Edwards, 1999: 244). Faysse (2006) posit that the objective of MSP is to enable the empowered and active participation of stakeholders in the search for solutions to a common problem.

The „empowered and active participation“ refers to the highest rungs of the ladder of participation as defined by (Arnstein 1969; Faysse 2006). There are two expectations of multi-stakeholder platforms as recounted by Faysse (2006). First, and according to Hemmati, (2002), MSPs are expected to lead to better decisions that are more accepted

than decisions resulting from State-led processes with no stakeholder participation. The second expectation is that they lead to better and more acceptable decisions than those arising from one-to-one negotiations Faysse (2006). These expectations as has been stated go to support a popular axiom that says that *people support what they help create*. To explain the increasing interest in the use of MSP concept in the management of resources, Warner (2006) enumerated three key categories of rationales for MSPs: (1) alternative dispute resolution, (2) adaptive management and (3) democratization and empowerment. As earlier on intimated in this chapter, issues surrounding natural resources are quite complex and thus, the area is rife with conflict, MSP can be convenient vehicles for managing the conflict among stakeholders without resorting to the law court (Warner, 2006). Jaspers (2001), for example, holds the perspective that multi-stakeholder platform primarily serve as a forum for dealing with conflicting interests and may also play a vital role in conflict prevention and resolution (Warner, 2006). However, a divergent view as was postulated by Frey (1993) was that MSPs hold the potential for creating coalitions of stakeholders to engage in conflict with other entities (Frey 1993).

Though adaptive management as a rationale cannot be said to be absolute on a MSPs looking at how it is practically difficult for ideas of all stakeholders to converge, in a situation of complexity, actors are advised to leave their sectoral perspective behind to develop a shared perspective. Habermas view is that through dialogue perceptions and problem definitions will change and converge (Habermas, 1984; Poncelet, 1998, 2001). Arguably, a key rationale for the MSPs is to ensure democracy in the governance of natural resources and the empowerment of stakeholders in the management of these resources. Smaller groups, NGOs, marginalized and weaker groups are given the platform and the

voice to articulate their interest, contribute to decision making processes (Warner, 2006), and in some instances form integral part of implementing these decisions.

2.8 Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue

A variant of multi-stakeholder platforms is the multi-stakeholder dialogue (MSD) process. Dodds and Benson (2001) describe a Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue (MSD) as a process which aims to bring relevant stakeholders or those who have a „stake“ in a given issue or decision, into contact with one another. It is also explained as an interactive, working communication process that involves all types of stakeholders in decisionmaking and implementation efforts (CommGAP, UN, 2009). Pederson (2006) identified five dimensions of stakeholder engagement and this is summarized on the table (2.2) below:

Table 2.2: Dimensions of Stakeholder Engagement

Dimension	Description
Inclusion	If important stakeholders are left out of decision-making the benefits of dialogue can be limited. Dialogue should include important groups and individuals affected by the issues
Openness	Dialogue should be open so that all stakeholders have a chance to voice their opinions. Organizations should not have a predetermined agenda or plan.
Tolerance	One opinion should not take precedence over others, no arguments should be considered more legitimate. Stakeholders and organizations must be open minded

Empowerment

Stakeholders should feel that they have the ability to affect the structure, process, and outcomes of dialogue (p. 142). Stakeholders will be less committed if they sense an imbalance of power

Transparency

All stakeholders involved in the dialogue should be given information needed to make decisions and implement outcomes.

Source: Comm GAP, (2009)

The dialogue process focuses primarily on enhancing levels of trust between the different actors, share information and institutional knowledge, and generate solutions and relevant good practices. MSD processes acknowledge the fact that, all stakeholders have relevant experience, knowledge and information that eventually will inform discussions and advance the quality of all decision-making and policy directions that will emerge from the process.

From the perspective of IUCN (2012), MSD process is classified as a collaborative approach that brings state and non-state actors together in a collective decision making forum to engage in consensus building. Hammati (2002) goes further to explain that MSD is based on the importance of achieving equity and accountability in communication between stakeholders, and equitable representation based on democratic principles of transparency and participation, with the aim of developing partnerships and strengthening of networks among stakeholders. The MSD process can therefore be described as an important tool that promotes better decisions from a wider input by bringing together

principal actors with diverse viewpoints. The process can be used at the local, national, regional, and international levels for a number of different situations and often involve small groups representing different experiences and areas of expertise. Two reasons have been adduced for the adoption of the MSD process in decisionmaking, that is, to discuss the management of common pool resources, and negotiate about a potential or existing conflict (Faysse, 2006). For instance, in a Uganda water dialogue process, the platform was seen as an independent and innovative process, which sought to resolve conflicts, attempt to get different perceptions together to influence policy and ensure that it is responsive to the needs of the community (Pangare, 2007).

An effective approach of MSD process therefore recognizes diversity of expertise, talents, interests, variegated experiences, cultures and viewpoints among stakeholders and individuals in as much as they contribute to a creative process of finding innovative solutions. MSD tends to be an open-ended or bound process where discussions are linked to decisions and actions and does not exist simply to inform, advice or recommend but also possesses some degree of formal decision-making power (Faysse, 2006; Tyler, 2009). Among the many advantages that can be derived from MSD are stakeholder empowerment, networking, conflict resolution and distribution of responsibilities for resource management. Dialogues are therefore viewed as a means to work together as an organized group and to “achieve something” as a group.

Advantages notwithstanding, Faysse, (2006) have outlined five main issues to be considered when setting up MSP: power relation within the MSP; choosing the composition of the MSD and its effects on invited stakeholders’ decision to participate; stakeholder representation and capacity to participate meaningfully in debates;

decisionmaking powers and mechanisms of the MSD; and cost of setting up an MSD. He argues that addressing these five issues is critical to the success of any MSD process. However, some also argue (Hemmati, 2002; Faysse 2006) that the five issues are ancillary issues that only have to be considered at some time during the process.

2.9 Assessing Broad National Framework on Participation in the Forestry Sector

The broad policy framework governing the management of the forestry sector espouses participation of stakeholders in the decision-making process. There is a paradigm shift from government taking the center stage and leading the management effort to the observance of the principle of subsidiarity; a principle that ensures that the power of decision making emanates from the grass root. This is enshrined in both the 1994 and 2012 forest and wildlife policy. The policy recognizes multi-stakeholder interests in the forest sector and encourages collaborative resource management among communities, government and other stakeholders.

The 1994 forest and wildlife policy had an objective which sought to promote public awareness and involvement in forest and wildlife conservation. It had public participation as one of the key strategies in the implementation of the policy. Under its public participation strategy, it stated that: Initiate and maintain dialogue with all interests through a national advisory forum (i.e. forestry commission) and related district conservation committees to ensure active public participation in forestry and wildlife matters (Forest and Wildlife Policy, 1994).

In furtherance of the 1994 policy, the objective 4 of the new Forest and Wildlife Policy, 2012 also has an objective of promoting and developing mechanism for transparent

governance, equity sharing and peoples participation in forest and wildlife resource management. Its collaborative forest management overview intimated that:

“Due to the strong interest and rights of local communities in forest resource management, the Forestry Commission has modified the focal point of its management system to ensure greater consultation with stakeholders, especially local communities that are dependent on the forests and are willing to ensure its maintenance. Thus, the focus of forest management in Ghana is shifting from a government-led system to a community-government collaborative management approach” (Forest and Wildlife Policy, 2012, pg. 13, 14).

Therefore within the broad national policy framework, participation of stakeholders in the management of the forest and its resources was anticipated by policy makers and implementers.

Following the broad policy frameworks, the sector has implemented programmes and initiatives that sought to move the discourse from policy into practice. According to McKeown et al. (2013), there were 10 of such initiatives that were being run in Ghana.

These included; Forest Forum, Natural Resource and Environmental Governance (NREG) and its related KASA, Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade/Voluntary Partnership Agreement, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) Initiative, the World Wide Fund for Nature’s Forest Certification Support, Pro-poor REDD (IUCN/Danida), and the Global Forest Transparency Reporting. Though all these programmes were geared towards ensuring greater participation of stakeholders in the management and conserving of forest resources, the Forestry Sector was still challenged in terms of depletion of its resources through illegal activities especially illegal chainsaw milling. The EU-Chainsaw project

was therefore an initiative that was meant to find solution to the issue of illegal chainsaw activities.

To solve the issue of illegal chainsaw activities, the designers of the EU-Chainsaw project contemplated democratic representation approach to developing alternative illegal chainsaw lumbering and this was done through the multi-stakeholder dialogue process. The MSD as a participatory approach was the main mechanism through which the project was implemented. By this, the MSD plan saw the platform as a new initiative to addressing the problem with the aim of creating a mechanism for stakeholders to interact and form part of the decision-making process.

2.10 Overview of the MSD Process in Ghana

Ghana has been saddled with the issue of illegal chainsaw milling activities since the coming into force of the law banning illegal chainsaw activities in 1998. Before the coming into force this law, a chainsaw operator only needed to register a chainsaw machine with the Forestry Commission to secure a concession and begin to operate, and this led to a fast degradation of the forest resources. To nib the issue of illegal chainsaw milling in the bud and to ensure a more sustainable utilization of the forest resources, the existing forest laws prior to 1994 (e.g. Forest Protection Act 1974, NRCD 243) were reviewed. This and other legislations were put in place to curb the depreciation of forest resources; the Timber Resource Management Act 1997 (Act 547), the Forest Commission Act (1997), Forest Plantation Development Act, (2000) and several other administrative measures as reported by Marfo et al (2013) were put in place to regulate the forestry sector. The administrative measures included the log export ban, the inclusion of stools and communities in the consultative processes leading to the allocation of forest concession,

empowerment of farmers to decide on whether to allow a tree to be felled on their farms or not, and the introduction of conveyance certificate for logs in transit.

In spite of these local efforts, illegal logging continued to escalate (Marfo, et al, 2013). Indeed, FAO reported that Ghana's rate of deforestation as at 2011 stood at 2.1% (FAO, 2011). The persisting illegal logging and its associated socio-economic challenges made Ghana to readily accept the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (FLEGT/VPA), and in fact became the first country to sign onto the VPA. The main objective of the VPA which was to contribute to timber-producing countries' commitments to promote sustainable forest management by supporting improvement in Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade, was also to allow Ghana to export only legally certified timber to the EU-market. Simply, the agreement specified that any timber exported from Ghana to the EU market must be legal. However, to holistically address the issue of illegal timber on both international and domestic markets, Ghana opted to add domestic component to the VPA it signed with the EU. This meant that if the domestic issues were not addressed, that component of the VPA cannot be satisfied. Therefore the coming into force of the VPA meant that no illegally sourced timber and its product can be sold on the domestic and the international market. The challenge however was that in spite of the attempts at addressing the domestic issues, the problem still persisted; the top down approach at addressing the problem proved ineffective. The EU-Chainsaw project offered an alternative through which the issue of illegal chainsaw could be addressed and this was implemented through the Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue (MSD).

The project sought to secure legal domestic lumber supply through multi-stakeholder dialogue in Ghana and Guyana. The MSD brought all stakeholders to dialogue and fashion out the appropriate alternative solutions to the illegal chainsaw milling activities. McKeown et al. (2013) reported that 28 different stakeholder groups were brought together on the platform to dialogue.

Tropenbos International (TBI) and its partners, Forestry Research Institute of Ghana (FORIG), and the Forestry Commission (FC), came together to facilitate the dialogue process in Ghana. The objective was to create a platform for stakeholders to interact by the use of focus group, stakeholder meetings, workshops that enable direct communication (Reviewed Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Plan, Ghana, 2010). According to the engagement plan, the MSD was organized at three levels; the community level, the District Level (DMSD), and the National Level (NMSD).

2.10.1 Community Level

Meetings at the community level were mainly among members of a stakeholder group (e.g. lumber sellers, chainsaw operators, machine owners). The purpose was to ensure that representatives met with their constituents and sought their views, concerns, interest and present same on the district and/or national platforms. Also, the meeting at this level also saw members receiving feedback from their representatives on district and national platforms. Even though the process at this level formed part of the MSD structure, its activities were not facilitated by the organizers.

2.10.2 Representation on District Level MSDs

The DMSD brought together all the identified stakeholders within each of the 10 forest districts piloted for the project. At this level, the platform was designed to have a maximum of 30 representatives, with at least one from each stakeholder group within the particular district (McKeon et al. 2013). As was reported by McKeon et al. (2013), even though district level meetings were not originally planned for, it was felt by stakeholders at the preparatory stage that instead of having only a national MSD informed by stakeholder meetings, it was better to also hold MSD meetings at the district level that would inform the national meetings. Stakeholders therefore agreed that national meetings should be preceded by district meetings. Even though the original design of the process was to have the district platform feed into the national platform, there was no such direct link- the district platform did not have elected representatives to represent the interest of the constituents. It was the project facilitators who acted as representatives of the various districts on the national platform. The district platforms discussed outcomes of previous meetings, received reports from national meetings and discussed agenda for next national meeting. FSD staffs, CFWs, who were attached to the project, facilitated the process at this level.

2.10.3 Representation on National Level MSD

The NMSD platform was constituted by stakeholder representatives from all the districts and others concerned with the forestry sector. This was to ensure that no stakeholder group was left out at the highest level of the dialogue process where decisions were finally made to affect policy and practice. A total of 28 stakeholder groups were identified and participated on the national platform (refer to table 3.4). The Stakeholders agreed that a

maximum of 70 members from National and Community Forest Forum, Chainsaw Operators and Associated Workers, State Institutions and Security Services, Land Owners and Local Authorities, Lumber Traders and Carpenters, and Research and Academia participate on this platform (Obeng et al, 2013)

KNUST



Table 2.3: Identified Stakeholders on the MSD Platform

No.	Stakeholder Group	No.	Stakeholder Group
1	Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources	15	Carriers
2	Forestry Commission (FC)	16	Lumber Brokers (DOLTA)
3	Forestry Services Division (FSD)	17	National Forest Forum (NFF) and District Forest Fora (DFF)
4	Resources Management Support Center (RMSC)	18	Furniture and Wood Workers Association of Ghana (FUWAG)
5	Timber Industry Development Division (TIDD)	19	Wood Workers Association of Ghana (WAG)
6	Judicial Service	20	Charcoal Producers
7	Law Enforcement (Police, Customs, Immigration, and Army)	21	Community Forestry Organization
8	Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) Office	22	Farmers
9	District/Municipal Assemblies (MMDAs)	23	Land-Owners
10	Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA)	24	Non-Timber Forest Products Collectors
11	Individual Members of Ghana Timber Millers Organization (GTMO)	25	Traditional Authorities
12	Ghana Timber Association (GTA)	26	Research and Academia (such as FORIG and KNUST)
13	Civil Society Groups (Forest Watch, WWF, IUCN)	27	General Public (The Timber Consumers)
14	Chainsaw Operators, Machine Owners, Transport Owners	28	Media

Source: Mckeown et al. 2013

Each stakeholder group elected its own representative to substantively represent its interest on the national platform, and also carry outcomes and decisions on the platform to their constituents. The challenge however, was that some of the stakeholder groups (e.g. chainsaw operators, machine owners, transport owners, lumber sellers, farmers, carriers) were not organized into any formal associations. Therefore, it was practically impossible for members of these stakeholders to meet and select their own representatives. As a result their representatives were selected by the organizers of MSD. Therefore there was no mechanism for representatives of these stakeholder groups to communicate with their constituents to provide feedback.

The process at the national level was facilitated by the national facilitator, who was a Forestry Commission (FC) staff seconded to the programme.

2.11 Conceptual Framework of Democratic Representation

From the literature, there is increased participation of stakeholder in decision-making processes, policy formulation and implementation in the management of natural resources and this is a result of broad international and national policy framework supporting the initiative. There are different levels of participation-at the lowest level, participation appear as passing of information to stakeholders, to the highest level were stakeholders are actually empowered to actively participate in a decision-making process. Democratic representation as a participatory process is conceptualized in this study as being responsive and accountable to the represented. Responsiveness is explained as representatives having the requisite capacity to ensure that it is the views, interests, and concerns of their constituents that are espoused on the MSD platform.

Accountability denotes that there is a reporting mechanism in place for representatives to give feedback of decisions and outcomes of MSD meetings to their respective constituents.

The study follows the conceptual framework designed by Marfo and Owusu-Ansah (2014) as shown in fig.2.1.




Fig. 2.1: A Framework for conceptualizing Democratic Representation in a MSD

Process. T= transaction; C=cost

Source: Marfo and Owusu-Ansah, 2014

From Fig. 2.1 above, democratic representation in a multi-stakeholder process is the focus of the framework for this study. The process is conceptualized as consist of three main

stages; the Pre-participation, Participation and Post-participation. Each stage has its own set of transactions (T) or activities that take place. The first stage of the process, which is the pre-participation stage; the relevant activities that take place are within the stakeholder community. It is at this stage that stakeholder groups organize themselves and are expected to receive training from organizers of the process in order to build their capacities to enable them effectively represent their constituents on the platform. Again, stakeholder representatives are expected to be responsive to their constituents. Thus, consult with their constituents and seek their interest and views and present same on the MSD platform for deliberations and consideration. The second stage is the Participation Stage. At this stage, stakeholder representatives carry the views of their constituents to the MSD platform, where they are engaged for issues to be debated, consensus reached and final decisions taken. The final stage has two main activities that take place; feedback preparation and feedback meeting between representatives and their constituents. This stage constitutes the accountability stage of the participation process- representatives“ report on decisions taken on the platform to their members.

Each stage of the process also represents bundles of cost (C); pre-participation cost, participation cost and post-participation cost. The cost which can be expressed in direct cost and/or opportunity cost is defined at the pre-participation stage as the cost incurred by the organizers and participants of the process in ensuring responsiveness. At the participation stage, it is the cost (direct cost and opportunity costs) incurred by organizers and representatives of stakeholder groups in relation to a particular MSD meeting to engage stakeholders on the platform; for example, travel cost, boarding and logging etc. the last bundle of cost in this framework is the post-participation cost. It is the cost incurred

by organizers and participants of the process for ensuring accountability (providing feedback to constituents).

The conceptual framework above therefore shows that the two main operational objectives of any democratic representative process are to achieve (1) responsiveness and (2) accountability.



CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The study aimed at establishing the democratic intent of the organizers of multistakeholder dialogue and how that reflected in their transaction cost. Following Marfo (2014), the general approach was to study the discourse and practice of MultiStakeholder Dialogue (MSD) process in Ghana. The choice of this approach allowed the researcher to determine what the MSD literature says and juxtapose it with what is actually being implemented. In the light of this, the study gathered data from several sources using varied techniques. To capture the discourse, the researcher focused on documents, actor narratives and participant observation. Survey was also conducted with stakeholder representatives as the main respondents for the purposes of triangulation.

The next section discusses the methodology in details.

3.2 Study Area

The multi-stakeholder dialogue (MSD) process took place in the forestry sector in Ghana. The country has two predominant ecological zones: the high forest zone mainly in the south-western part constituting a third of the country (about 35 percent of the country) and the savannah zone occupying the rest of the country. The forests are classified as *on-reserved* and *off-reserved* and there are 282 Protected Areas covering a total area of 23,729 km² with 216 of them located within the high forest zone. Forest and wildlife conservation areas constitute about 16.2 percent of the total land area. Two types of Protected Areas exist - Production reserves exploited for timber (75 per cent) and Protected forests (25 per

cent) established for conservation purposes (Forest and Wildlife Policy, 2012). At the beginning of the 20th century, Ghana had about 8.2 million hectares of high forest of which 1.8 million hectares has been designated as permanent forest reserves. About 400,000 hectares of the permanent estate is heavily degraded to exploitation of timber and agriculture encroachment. The off-reserve forest area has declined significantly as a result of over-exploitation of timber, competing land uses such as agriculture, mining, settlement expansion and so on.

The MSD study area covered 10 forest districts in the high forest zone in Ghana cutting across 6 political regions in the country (Ashanti Region, Brong Ahafo, Central Region, Eastern Region, Western Region and Volta Region). The forest districts included Akyem Oda, Juaso, Nkawie, Begoro, Tarkwa, Kade, Goaso, Assin Fosu, Nkwanta and Sunyani. Even though most of the country's sawmills are located in these regions, illegal chainsaw activities are also rife in these areas. Other economic activities for the inhabitants are farming (mainly peasant), wood selling, small scale mining, animal husbandry, trading and other formal occupation. The people heavily depend on the natural resources for their livelihood.

3.3 Data Collection

3.3.1 Primary Sources

The field data was collected through survey, and participant observation. The survey was conducted using face-to-face interviews and questionnaires. These sources provided the basic qualitative and quantitative data needed for scientific analysis by the researcher and also helped validate the secondary data obtained.

3.3.1.1 Questionnaire

The questionnaire was used to collect data from participants of the MSD at the national level. The purpose was to triangulate the data from the discourse and the responses from the face-to-face interview with key informants for the purpose of validation. 18 out of the 28 stakeholder groups on the national platforms were purposely selected for the interview. The 18 stakeholder groups were selected based on their consistency in participating in MSD meetings.

3.3.1.2 Sample Size Determination

Since this was an exploratory venture, the researcher followed the recommended sample size of 30 (Bernard, 2005). A total of 30 respondents were purposely selected representing 18 different stakeholder groups. At least, 1 representative was selected from each of the stakeholder groups. These respondents were representatives of their respective stakeholder groups that have participated in the national MSD at least 5 times. As Table 1 shows, the stakeholder groups were selected to represent all the 6 main categories of stakeholder groups; National and Community Forest Forum, Chainsaw Operators and Associated Workers, State Institutions and Security Services, Land Owners and Local Authorities, Lumber Traders and Carpenters, and Research and Academia (Obeng et al, 2013).

Table 3.1: Distribution of stakeholder group on the MSD platform

Stakeholder category	Stakeholder group	Number of respondents	
National and district forest forum	National forest forum	3	
	District forest forum	1	
	Community forest committee	3	
Chainsaw operators and associated workers	Machine owners	4	
	Chainsaw Operators	1	
	Carriers	1	
	Artisanal Millers	1	
State institutions and security services	District Assembly	1	
	Fire Service	1	
	Collaborative Resource Management Group	1	
	Police	1	
	Forestry Commission	1	
	Land owners and local institutions	Traditional Authorities	3
		Farmers	1
Lumber traders and carpenters		Lumber Dealers	3
	Carpenters	2	
	Dolta	1	
Academia and research	Academia	1	
Total		30	

3.3.1.3 Informant Interview

Face-to-face interviews were conducted to collect data from key stakeholders as far as the Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue (MSD) process was concerned. This was done through purposive sampling. This sampling approach is recommended when the researcher wants to identify particular cases for in-depth investigations (Neuman, 2007). Stakeholders interviewed were experts and individuals at the core of the development of the project concept and the organization of the MSD process in Ghana, and expected to have in-depth understanding of the project design. The sampling unit included the following: the Programme Director, the National Coordinator, the National Research Team Leader, the National Facilitator, 3 Steering Committee Members and 2 Project Assistants.

The type of interview method selected was semi-structured, because it was flexible and allowed new questions to be brought up during the interview. It also allowed the respondents to talk about the themes or topics in detail and depth. Hence, it allowed the researcher to ask probing questions to elicit information (including how the MSD was contemplated and organized, budget for the organization of the MSD, and stakeholders response to resource allocation) needed for the study. The researcher used an interview schedule (see appendix A), which had a set of prepared questions designed to be asked exactly as worded. The researcher recorded the interviews and the data was written up as a transcript for analysis.

3.3.1.4 Participant Observation

The researcher participated and observed the organization of meetings of the MSD at all the three (national, district and community) levels of the dialogue process. Following

Dewalt and Dewalt, (2002), participant observation as a process enabled the researcher to learn about the activities of people under study in the natural setting by observing and participating in those activities. Dewalt and Dewalt (2002), explain the goal for participant observation as helping to develop a holistic understanding of the phenomenon under study. The objective of using this tool to collect data was to allow the researcher to immerse himself in the process to understand and follow the discourse, validate the data collected with other tools and to examine the general understanding of the content and concept of the MSD.

In view of the above objective, 3 national level MSDs were attended in Kumasi and Accra, 3 district level MSDs were attended in Juaso, Akyem Oda, and Assin Fosu. Additionally, 2 stakeholder group meetings involving chainsaw operators at Atronie, in Brong Ahafo Region and wood sellers at Sokoban in Kumasi were attended. The researcher engrossed himself with the activities on all these platforms as part of the organizational team and as a facilitator. This enabled him to fully understand the process and also collect the necessary data for analysis.

3.3.2 Desk Study

Data were obtained from articles, books, and other information collected on the internet. Since the MSD process was research driven, the many researched articles on the project were accessed and reviewed. Additionally, data were obtained from project documents prepared by Tropenbos International and its partners; Forestry Research Institute of Ghana (FORIG) and the Forestry Commission (FC). These documents include, 2 Project Proposals submitted to the EU, MSD Implementation Plan, Project Reports, Minutes on MSD Meetings, Payment Vouchers, published articles and books on the project. The two

project proposal documents were useful to this research because they gave the researcher some understanding of the rationale behind the project and how the MSD fed into it. The MSD implementation plan was a very important document the researcher relied on; it spelled out the MSD objectives, detailed strategies of implementation and the MSD overall budget estimate. These were important information needed by the researcher to assess how the MSD was contemplated and what was actually the practice on the ground. To establish the expenditure pattern on the various aspect of the project, the project budget as well as the various expenditures were obtained and analyzed by assessing the payment vouchers of MSD meetings at all levels of the project implementation. The vouchers contained actual payments and the specific items that they covered. This afforded the researcher the opportunity to assess the main transactions in the MSD implementation and how they were financed. The intent firstly, was to establish whether the project budget covered stakeholder group and community meetings, and secondly to review how much budgetary support was given to stakeholder groups to organize their “pre” and “post” MSD meetings for their members. The MSD strategic communication plan was another document that was obtained and analyzed. The communication plan contained strategies on how information flowed within the structure of the MSD and to the larger public. The researcher therefore had the benefit of analyzing out how the project intended to give feedback on activities to its stakeholders. Also, information from previous study conducted by Obeng et al, (2014) to assess the effectiveness of the multi-stakeholder dialogue process was used for the analyses in this study. The report of their study contained information on how responsive and accountable the process was. Even though their focus was on participant stakeholder groups on the MSD platforms, it nevertheless provided information that was used as proxy data in this study. Another study conducted

by McKeown et al (2013) titled “The Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue in Ghana: towards a negotiated solution to illegal chainsaw milling” was helpful in this study. The study gave a general overview of the MSD in Ghana and provided insight on how the dialogue process was implemented. This helped the researcher in terms of understanding how the process was designed and actually implemented.

3.4 Data Analyses

Content analysis was adopted for the analysis of the data. Krippendorff (1969) defines content analysis as the use of applicable and valid method for making specific inferences from text to other states or properties of its source. From the conceptual frame (refer to fig.2.1), democratic representation was conceptualized with two main indicator variables; *responsiveness* and *accountability*. These two variables were therefore analysed to establish the extent to which democratic representation was conceptualized. The measurement and analysis were done by the following procedure:

- The project documents and transcripts of interviews conducted were thoroughly read and the necessary notes were made to extrapolate the data needed for the analysis. To analyse, each of the material sources of data was treated as a case. The researcher followed the recommended sample size of 30 (Bernard, 2005). However, after sampling all the possible sources (cases), the recommended sample size for an exploratory work was not achieved. With no other possible sources of data, the researcher concluded that the entire population should be sampled for the analysis. Table (3.2) shows the summary of the number of cases that served as data sources.

Table 3.2: Sources of texts that formed the cases to assess the discourse on representation

Case No.	Description of case	Ref. Code
1	EU-Chainsaw Project plan proposal phase 1	DRD 1
2	EU-Chainsaw Project plan proposal phase 2	DRD 2
3	Draft MSD Plan, 2009	DRD 3
4	Draft MSD Plan phase 2	DRD 4
5	Plan for MSD draft reviewed	DRD 5
6	2013 MSD Plan	DRD 6
7	2014 MSD Plan	DRD 7
8	Preparatory meeting report-final draft	DRD 8
9	Communication strategy for MSD	DRD 9
10	Assessment of the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder dialogue	DRD 10
11	The multi-stakeholder dialogue in Ghana-towards a negotiated solution to illegal chainsaw milling	DRD 11
12	The formalization and integration of domestic market into LAS: Ghana	DRD 12
13	Informant one	DRD 13
14	Informant two	DRD 14
15	Informant three	DRD 15
16	Informant four	DRD 16
17	Informant five	DRD 17
18	Informant six	DRD 18
19	Informant seven	DRD 19
20	Informant eight	DRD 20
21	Informant nine	DRD 21

- The next step was to review the case summaries in order to search for „responsiveness“ and „accountability“.

- To do the review, codes were assigned based on the researcher's own deduction of whether a text connotes a sense of responsiveness or accountability. To achieve that, the responses from the cases regarding these key variables were coded as depicted in tables 3.3:

KNUST

Table 3.3: Sample code sheet

Variable	Responses from case materials analyzed	Case/source of data
Responsiveness	1. summary of texts from case materials containing „responsiveness“	Draftpg....
	2.summary of texts from case materials containing „responsiveness“	Plan.....pg.....
	3.summary of texts from case materials containing „responsiveness“	2013 MSD...pg..
	Up to case “n”	
Accountability	1 summary of texts from case materials containing „responsiveness“	Draftpg....
	2.summary of texts from case materials containing „responsiveness“	Plan.....pg.....
	3. summary of texts from case materials containing „responsiveness“	2013....pg.....
	Up to case “n”	

- To ensure the reliability of the codes, the contents were coded by the researcher and an independent coder; the independent coder was a member of faculty who has knowledge about the subject matter. Since the independent coder could not read all the cases of this research, the research's text deductions were presented

for the coder to either agree or disagree to the attributions of responsiveness and accountability and other variables so coded.

- An intercoder reliability check was then conducted to compare the two codes. Intercoder reliability is usually done to assess the extent to which independent coders evaluate characteristics of a message or artifact and reach the same conclusion (Lombard et al. 2010). In this study, two indices were used to test the reliability; the Percentage agreement and Holsti's coefficient. The researcher used the two because it is reported that percentage agreement could be a misleading measure that overestimate true intercoder agreement (Lombard et al. 2010), albeit it is the most popular index used by researchers.

- The Percentage Agreement (PA) was calculated by the formular;
 $PA = \frac{\text{total agreements}}{n} \times 100$, where PA is percentage agreement, and n is the total sample of codes.

- The Holsti's coefficient index was selected for the test for the two reasons asserted by Mouter and Noordegraaf (2012). First, it was not necessary to use a sophisticated coefficient like Krippendoff's Alpha, which is not easy to replicate because the chance that the two coders coded the same quote of respondent by chance is negligible. Second, Holsti's coefficient gives a more comprehensive insight into the intercoder reliability than percent agreement. The Holsti's coefficient method is given as:

$C.R. = \frac{2M}{N_1 + N_2}$, where M is the number of coding decisions on which the two coders are in agreement, and N_1 and N_2 refers to the number of coding decisions made by coders 1 and 2 respectively.

- The next step was to establish the acceptable coefficients for the two indices. Lombard et al. (2010) report that coefficients of 0.90 or greater are nearly always acceptable, 0.80 or greater is acceptable in most situations and 0.70 may be appropriate in some exploratory studies for some indices. Due to the liberal nature of percentage agreement index a higher coefficient of more than 90% was chosen, while a coefficient of 80% or more was chosen for Holsti's index because of its higher level of reliability compared to percentage agreement.

3.4.1 Peer coding of responsiveness

In the case of responsiveness, the percentage (%) agreement was 93.3%. The second test of the same codes using a more reliable index, Holsti's coefficient index, to validate and ensure more reliability had coefficient of 0.93. Thus, the two tests showed strong reliability and acceptable codes since they all had a coefficient more than 0.90.

3.4.2 Peer coding of accountability

In the case of accountability, the percentage (%) agreement was 100%. A second test conducted of the same codes using a more reliable index, Holsti's coefficient index, to validate and ensure more reliability had coefficient of 1.0. Thus, the two tests showed strong reliability and acceptable codes since they all had a coefficient more than 0.90.

3.5 Data Presentation

The narrative strategy was used to present the data. This approach was adopted because it has the advantage of capturing a high degree of complexity and convey a nuanced understanding of how particular events or factors mutually affecting each other, which is

what the researcher sought to do in this study. It also allowed the researcher to assemble very specific concrete details (i.e. the names, actions and words of specific people and detailed descriptions of particular events) (Neuman, 2007).

3.6 Scope of the Study

Contextually, the study focused on the multi-stakeholder platforms at the national and community levels. The choice of these levels for the study was informed by the fact that all the 28 different stakeholder groups were represented on the platform at the national level and participated in the decision-making process (Obeng et al., 2014). Again, it was at the national level that final policy decisions were taken (McKeon et al. 2013), and subsequently expected to be reported back to the respective stakeholder communities. Democratic representation is very crucial to community participation, therefore the choice of the community level for the study was to allow the researcher to answer the research questions guiding this study. These two platforms therefore afforded the researcher the opportunity to track the decision-making path from the community to the national level. Geographically, the study covered the entire country of Ghana. This is because the platform had representatives of stakeholders across the country participating in the MSD.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the results of the study. The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section presents the results on how democratic representation was contemplated by the organizers. Specifically, the results centered on responsiveness and accountability; the two fundamental indicators of democratic representation and how they were contemplated in the design of the MSD process. The second section also presented the results on how transaction cost was contemplated in the design of democratic representation process. The final section focused on the results of the assessment on how resources were allocated to the organization of the MSD at different levels of the engagement process.

4.2 Contemplation of Democratic Representation

4.2.1 Assessing Responsiveness

A case by case analysis of the responses indicated that majority of the cases depicted that organizers contemplated responsiveness in the design of the MSD. As it is shown in table 4.1, out of the 21 cases analyzed, 17 articulated responsiveness. This represents 81% of the cases. All the two main data sources, that is, project documents and informants that provided responses for analysis articulated high level of responsiveness. Of the 12 project documents analyzed, 10 articulated responsiveness, and out of the 9 informants, 7 also articulated responsiveness.

Table 4.1: Cases and their responses to responsiveness

Case	Description of case	Response
1	EU-Chainsaw project plan proposal phase 1	+
2	EU-Chainsaw project plan proposal phase 2	+

3	Draft MSD Plan, 2009	-
4	Draft MSD plan phase 2	+
5	Plan for MSD draft reviewed	+
6	2013 MSD Plan	+
7	2014 MSD Plan	+
8	Preparatory meeting report-final draft	-
9	Communication strategy for MSD	+
10	Assessment of the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder dialogue	+
11	The multi-stakeholder dialogue in Ghana-towards a negotiated solution to illegal chainsaw milling	+
12	The formalization and integration of domestic market into LAS: Ghana	+
13	Informant one	+
14	Informant two	+
15	Informant three	+
16	Informant four	-
17	Informant five	+
18	Informant six	+
19	Informant seven	+
20	Informant eight	-
21	Informant nine	+

Key

+ = Articulated responsiveness

- = Did not articulate responsiveness

The project document sources that articulated responsiveness are; EU-Chainsaw project plan proposal phase 1 and phase 2, draft MSD phase 2, draft MSD plan reviewed, 2013 MSD plan, 2014 MSD plan, communication strategy for MSD, research report on the

assessment of the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder dialogue, research report on the multi-stakeholder dialogue in Ghana-towards a negotiated solution to illegal chainsaw milling, and the research report on the formalization and integration of domestic market in LAS: Ghana. Informants DRD 13, DRD14, DRD15, DRD17, DRD18, DRD19, and DRD21 are the seven (7) informant sources that also clearly articulated responsiveness. This results indicates a high level of contemplation of responsiveness in the design of the engagement process

In this study, the analysis of responsiveness was based on two (2) indicators, namely; capacity building of stakeholder representatives for effective representation, and the representatives meeting with constituents to solicit views of their constituents before attending MSD meeting. On a multi-stakeholder platform where there are diverse capabilities, literates, illiterates and so on, there is a need for the organizers to train the representatives to create equal playing field for fair representation. Project organizers anticipated this scenario on the MSD platform and therefore integrated training in the project implementation process. One of the informants in justifying the need for training and education of stakeholder representatives said that:

“.....we expect all of them (stakeholders) to be well informed. It’s a very crucial part of any such process. If the person is not knowledgeable, he cannot contribute much. So as part of the MSD, a lot of education goes on. We pass on a lot of information for them to be updated. I mean broken down to their level. Such a gathering you are not likely to have highly literate representatives-some have half-baked education, others are highly educated. And therefore once they are well informed, once they know nobody is going to harass them, everybody is free to state their position (DRD13)”.

Again, considering the illegality of the chainsaw milling activities in the forestry sector, there is a possibility of antagonism among some stakeholders (e.g. Forestry Commission and illegal chainsaw operators) such that it may be practically difficult to have an effective dialogue without the organizers offering some level of education to key stakeholders involved in order to create a free environment devoid of any form of intimidation. Project designers anticipated this difficult and therefore articulated in the initial project proposal document a remedy. The document stated that:

“...Due to the antagonistic relations amongst some stakeholders as a result of illegality associated with CSM, the capacities of stakeholders such as the chainsaw operators, carriers, farmers and transporters will be built in methods and techniques to participate effectively in dialogue mechanisms. The capacity building will focus on public speaking, negotiation and conflict management techniques, as well as communication with stakeholder constituencies” (Reviewed Multi-Stakeholder Plan, 2009, pg. 15).

McKeown et al. (2013) further reported on how the MSD was implemented. They stated that by the design of the process the training of stakeholder representatives actually took place at the district level and formed part of MSD meetings. This is how they reported it: “...CFWs build the capacity of stakeholder representatives in their respective forest districts. Training often takes place at the same time as preparing for district MSDs (to save cost)” McKeown et al. (2013, pg. 14).

In spite of the above articulations establishing the contemplation of responsiveness in the form of training, a survey conducted by Obeng et al. (2014) to assess the effectiveness of the MSD reported that significant number of representatives on both the DMSD and the

NMSD did not actually receive any form of training before participating on the platform.

The report captured that:

“...As many as 42 percent and 28 percent of respondents at the district MSD and national MSD respectively indicated no training was offered prior to the dialogue process. A few however were not sure if a prior training was conducted” (Obeng et al., 2014 pg. 27).

It was also observed in the study that the platform adopted descriptive representation. This meant that representatives were selected based on ones membership or affinity with a stakeholder group irrespective of ones capabilities. For instance, chainsaw operators, machine owners, and lumber sellers had representatives who were members of their respective stakeholder groups. Again, the observation showed that discussions on the platform were mainly driven by the representatives of the more organized and formal stakeholder groups such as those from the Research and Academia, Forestry Commission (e.g. TIDD, and FSD), Ghana Timber Association, and National Forest Forum. Representatives from stakeholder groups such as farmers, charcoal producers, farmers, machine owners, and chainsaw operators were literally not active contributors on the platform.

The second indicator of responsiveness was based on whether project designers imbued in the process a mechanism for stakeholder representatives to consult with their constituents before attending an MSD meeting. Pre MSD meeting with constituents to draw their inputs (i.e. their views, concerns, interest and positions) is critical to effective representation. The revised MSD plan recognized this and emphasized that:

“...District and community level meetings will be organized prior to MSD meeting. This was to allow them (constituents) to make input and state their positions on the impending MSD agenda/issues” (Revised MSD plan 2010, pg.15).

This articulation by the MSD plan was confirmed by an informant interviewed: “...The expectation was that these guys (representatives) will be true representatives of their stakeholders and they will represent the views of the people and not themselves. For instance, before any meeting we send agenda to all stakeholder groups that we are coming to discuss A...B...C...D. So they will meet and discuss it. So the person who is coming does not come with his own view, he comes with the views of the stakeholders” (DRD18).

The mechanisms that were put in place to facilitate a meeting of representatives and their constituents were further elaborated in the MSD plan 2012. The plan emphasized that: “...Special attention would be paid to facilitating representatives of stakeholder groups at the MSD in consulting their constituencies on the discussions at the MSD, through e.g. the provision of info/fact sheets in local languages, timely distribution of MSD minutes and research reports, support for discussions, newsletters, videos of the MSD-process and through different media, such as radio and TV” (Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Plan, Ghana, 2012 pg. 13).

A study by Obeng et al. (2014) to assess among other things, how well stakeholder representatives consult with their constituents had this result:

“...Majority of respondents at both the districts (75 percent) and national (78percent) levels indicated group members are usually consulted in a meeting to solicit for opinions before attending MSD meetings” (Obeng et al.2014, pg. 15). Again, the results of a survey of representatives of stakeholder groups at the national level MSD indicated that majority

(83.3 percent) of the respondents meet with their constituents and solicit their views before attending a meeting, with 16.7 percent indicating that they don't consult their constituents before attending a meeting. The above results validate the findings of Obeng et al. (2014) and indicate that indeed majority of the representatives hold meetings and consult their constituents before participating in an MSD meeting.

4.2.2 Assessing Accountability

For accountability, majority of the cases (19 out of the total of 21 cases), representing 90% of the total number of cases analyzed, depicted accountability (see Table 4.2). This result from the 2 data sources; project documents and informants, used in the analysis indicated that both sources highly anticipated accountability in the project design. Out of the total of 12 project documents analyzed, all the 12 depicted accountability; 7 out of the 9 informants also articulated a sense of accountability of the process towards the constituents or stakeholders.

Table 4.2: Cases and their responses to accountability

Case	Description of case	Response
1	EU-Chainsaw project plan proposal phase 1	+
2	EU-Chainsaw project plan proposal phase 2	+
3	Draft MSD Plan, 2009	+
4	Draft MSD plan phase 2	+
5	Plan for MSD draft reviewed	+
6	2013 MSD Plan	+
7	2014 MSD Plan	+
8	Preparatory meeting report-final draft	+

9	Communication strategy for MSD	+
10	Assessment of the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder dialogue	+
11	The multi-stakeholder dialogue in Ghana-towards a negotiated solution to illegal chainsaw milling	+
12	The formalization and integration of domestic market into LAS: Ghana	+
13	Informant one	+
14	Informant two	+
15	Informant three	+
16	Informant four	-
17	Informant five	+
18	Informant six	+
19	Informant seven	+
20	Informant eight	+
21	Informant nine	-

Key

+ = articulated accountability

- = did not articulate accountability

The project document sources that articulated accountability were; EU-Chainsaw project plan proposal phase 1 and phase 2, MSD plan 2007, MSD plan phase 2, MSD plan reviewed, 2013 MSD plan, 2014 MSD plan, MSD preparatory meeting, communication strategy for MSD, research report on the assessment of the effectiveness of multistakeholder dialogue, research report on the multi-stakeholder dialogue in Ghana towards a negotiated solution to illegal chainsaw milling, and the research report on

the formalization and integration of domestic market in LAS: Ghana. Informants DRD 13, DRD14, DRD15, DRD17, DRD18, DRD19, and DRD20 are the seven (7) informant sources that also clearly articulated accountability.

The main indicator used to assess accountability in this study was based on post MSD meetings held between stakeholder representatives and their constituents to provide feedback on decisions, actions and outcomes of meetings on the NMSD platform. The feedback meetings were expected to take place at 2 levels (community level and district level) of the MSD process, and this was clearly articulated by the revised MSD plan. The Plan generally stated that:

“...To ensure good feedback mechanism, district and community level meetings will be organized prior to or after each MSD meeting....This is to allow representatives at the National MSD to communicate outcomes of the meetings to representatives of stakeholders at the District level and then to communities and constituencies/group” (Revised Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Plan, Ghana, 2009, pg. 15).

Again, at the preparatory meeting of the MSD which involved the representatives of all the stakeholder groups, it was generally agreed that the Process should provide a mechanism for representatives to provide feedback to their constituents. This was captured in the preparatory meeting report (2007). The report intimated that organizers of the MSD will: “...Conduct meetings at the district and community level to present outcome of the MSD meetings” (MSD preparatory meeting report, 2007, pg. 9). In promoting feedback delivery to the grass root, organizers saw the need to strengthen the link between the

management bodies (steering committees) of higher and lower level MSDs. This was emphasized in the 2013 MSD plan. The plan stated that:

“...A stronger collaboration will be built between the National and District level MSDSCs to ensure and enhance feedback to all stakeholders and constituencies” (MSD plan 2013 pg.4).

In the assessment report of the MSD, Obeng et al. (2014) reported that 75 percent of respondents at the district level and 64 percent at the national level indicated that they organize group meetings after MSD forum to provide feedback to their members. The results of the survey conducted in this study were to validate the report by Obeng et al. It also indicated that majority of the respondents organize post NMSD meetings to provide feedback to their constituents. The results indicated that 83.3 percent of the respondents report back decisions made on the MSD platform to their constituents, with 16.7 percent reporting that they do not provide feedback to their constituents.

Even though reporting on the district level platform was contemplated as the discourse so far has shown, the analysis presented different results in terms of implementation. The analysis indicated that there was no established reporting mechanism linking the district platforms and the national platform; the various districts did not have representatives on the national platform who report directly to their respective districts. The project facilitators and project assistants played the role of district representatives on the national platform and reported on the outcome of NMSD on DMSDs. This gap in reporting was well articulated by an informant who emphasized that:

“.....The district MSD is more or less separate; there is nobody who comes directly to report. It is the project facilitators who go to these MSDs and those are the ones kind of synthesize the views of the various lower level structures and come to the national level to report on what is happening at the lower level” (DRD15).

The managers of the MSD process generally admitted that the accountability mechanism has not worked out so well. They indicated that they have not been able to track down how information flows from the platform to the grassroots, and whether indeed information and decisions get to the grassroots through the organization of feedback meetings. An informant put it this way:

“.....We realized that has not been very smooth or it hasn't worked out too well, but fortunately with the project we also have the facility and opportunity to hold the district level meetings where the outcomes are being shared. So we try to compensate for inadequate feedback mechanisms by also re-organizing meetings at the district level to share the information from the national meeting” (DRD18).

The discourse so far has indicated that democratic representation was highly contemplated in the design of the multi-stakeholder dialogue process in Ghana. This means that organizers intended to ensure that the engagement process was responsive and accountable to its target stakeholder groups. To sum up how Democratic Representation was conceptualized, an informant gave an elaborate articulation of our how the process was organized. He asserted that:

“.....because if I represent you, am I speaking for myself or speaking for the group? If I'm speaking for the group then what then I come to say should also come from the group.

So there should be a system that should ensure that there is feedback mechanisms where you meet your constituents pick up their ideas for national discussions and again pick up whatever is transpired at the national level and give it back to the stakeholders. And now you can also see how this was embedded in the structure where you first have to do consultation at the local level, then you have the district level where the discussions that are made feed back at the national process, and again what is decided at the national level, goes back to the district, and to the local level, and subsequently to the grass root (DRD13)".

4.3 Assessing Transaction Cost of Organizing a Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Process

The analysis of the overall MSD budget indicated that there were five (5) main transactions in the MSD process that were budgeted for by the organizers. These are; administrative and remuneration, conduct of MSD meetings, research, communication, and workshop (Table 4.3). The „Conduct of MSD Meetings“ is the main item that sought to directly facilitate the participation of stakeholder groups in the dialogue process. The remaining items can be classified as auxiliary transactions to the process. The administrative and remuneration component of the transactions received the biggest allocation (43.6 percent) of the total budget of the MSD process. This was significantly higher than the total allocation (33.9 percent) given to the conduct of MSD meeting at all levels (community, district and national) of the engagement process (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3: Budgetary allocation to the transactions in the MSD process

Transaction	Expenses	Sub-total €	Percentage (%) of total budget
-------------	----------	-------------	-----------------------------------

Administrative and remuneration	Community Forestry Advisor / National Facilitator remuneration, community forestry workers allowances, field allowances, participation cost of MSD task force, local transportation, fuel, maintenance costs, office suppliers, stationery, internet services, telephone services	101,475	43.6
Conduct of MSD meetings	Participation cost: stakeholder meetings, local transportation costs of stakeholder meetings, reports, conference cost	78,900	33.9
Research	Researcher, field support staff, daily labour casuals, reports preparation and distribution	31,250	13.4
Communication	Dissemination costs	15,000	6.4
Workshops	Participation cost consensus outcome meeting, local transportation costs, outcome workshops, reports, workshop about consensus outcomes	6,300	2.7
Total		232,925	100

Source: MSD Process Budget, 2009 obtained from the project secretariat

The aggregated budget allocation to the auxiliary MSD processes (administration and remuneration, research, communication and workshops) constituted 66.1 percent of the entire MSD budget, while the conduct of MSD meetings (community MSD, district MSD and national MSD) had the remaining 33.9 percent allocated to it (Fig 4.3).




Figure 4.1: Budgetary allocations to MSD transactions compared with auxiliary (in percentage terms) activities

4.4 Analysis of Resource Allocation to the Organization of MSD Meetings

To ensure democratic representation in a multi-stakeholder dialogue process, organizers may have to consider the cost involved. In this regard, compensation payment may be one such cost that organizers can consider. Compensation has positive influence on participation, and reduces cost burden on participating stakeholder groups. As indicated in the Table 4.4, the organizers of the MSD paid compensation to participants on the MSD platform. The compensation was paid at two levels of the process; the district and the national levels. Four main items constituted the compensation portfolio of the MSD. These included transportation, refreshment and lunch, lodging and per diem. The transportation component of the compensation covered a return journey to the meeting place. The per diem is a payment made to compensate for the time spent by representatives on the day of the meeting, and refreshment and lunch was provided to participant on the day of the meeting, albeit not in cash. Compensation payments were made on the day of the meeting, which meant that participants pre-financed their transportation cost to the meeting

grounds. Provisions were also made to cater for the lodging of participants who travelled from long distances and needed to sleep overnight.

These were well articulated by an informant: “.....so you cater for transport, if the person is coming to sleep either you provide the accommodation or you give the person money enough to look for accommodation. And also meals are served and then a token money is given for participation” (DRD18).

Table 4.4: Compensation payment at each level of the MSD process

ITEMS	CMSD	DMSD	NMSD
Transport	-	+	+
Refreshment/lunch	-	+	+
Lodging	-	-	+
Per diem	-	-	+

Source: MSD payment vouchers obtained from the project secretariat

Key

+ = compensation paid

- = compensation not paid

Participants at the national MSD received the highest coverage in terms of compensation payment. All the four items in the compensation portfolio, that is, transport, refreshment and lunch, lodging and per diem, as indicated on Table 4.4 were covered in the organization of national level MSD meeting. This translates into 100% coverage. Out of the four (4) items, the DMSD covered only two (2). These included; transportation and

refreshment and lunch. At the CMSD, no compensation was paid to stakeholders for their participation on the platform.

The analysis of payment vouchers at both district and national level MSD meetings also indicated that the average compensation paid to stakeholder representatives for attending a national level meeting was significantly higher (GH¢278) than what participants at the district level received (GH¢44.5) (Table 4.5).

Table 4.5: Average compensation payment per participant for attending an MSD meeting

ITEM	LEVEL OF ENGAGEMENT		
	Comm. MSD	DMSD (Gh¢)	NMSD (Gh¢)
Transport	–	35.5	183
Refreshment/lunch	–	10	10
Lodging	–	–	85
Per diem	–	–	50
Total	–	44.5	328

Source: MSD payment vouchers obtained from the project secretariat

The disparity between compensation payment at district and national levels both in terms of coverage in the compensation portfolio and actual payment may be attributed to budgetary constraints. McKeon et al. (2013) explained this to mean that the original budget in the project proposal that received funding did not include MSD at the district level, which meant that funding activities at this level was a challenge. In their publication

titled; Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue in Ghana: Towards a negotiated solution to illegal chainsaw milling, it was reported that

“.....While district level meetings were not originally planned for; participants felt that instead of having only a national level MSD informed by stakeholder meetings, it was better to also hold MSD meetings at the district levels that would inform the national meeting. This would enable stakeholders at the district level to learn from each other and ensure that wide geographical differences between the districts were acknowledged (DRD 11)”


This admission was further elaborated by an informant. He also emphasized that the inclusion of district level MSD was only considered at the implementation stage of the whole MSD process. In supporting the above assertion by McKeon et al., he stated that: “.....Those who were coming for the national MSD it was different, in the sense that right from the preparation of the project proposal the cost was factored into the proposal. But for the district level MSD it was a latter day thing; it was when the project started that we realized that there was a need for us to get to the grass root to get more participation” (DRD19).

Even though CMSDs formed an integral part of the MSD structure, its transaction cost was not catered for by the project. As the analysis has shown, none of the components in the compensation portfolio was catered for by the organizers in the organization of Community Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue meetings (Tables 4.4, 4.5). In the view of the organizers, organizing stakeholder group or community meetings relative to the MSD are purely local issues and therefore its transaction cost should be borne by the respective stakeholder groups. An informant had this to say when asked how feedback meetings of stakeholder groups were financed:

“...We encourage the stakeholders who participate to send feedback to their constituents but we don’t have any budgetary allocation for that” (DRD16).

Another informant also reported that no payment was made to compensate stakeholders who participate in pre and post MSD meetings which are collectively referred to as CMSDs. He emphasized that:

“.....We pay for the organization of the MSD, getting the meeting itself in place, but we don’t pay for pre and post MSD meeting preparation” (DRD18).



CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the results of the study, and has been divided into three sections. Each of these sections addressed the research questions that guided this work. The first section discusses the extent to which organizers of the MSD contemplated democratic representation. The second section also discusses how transaction cost was contemplated by the organizers of the engagement process, and the third and final section discusses how resources were allocated to the various transactions in the MSD process.

5.2 Extent of Contemplation of Democratic Representation

The results from the analysis indicate that democratic representation was highly contemplated in the design of the MSD process. It is apparent that designers aimed at letting the process be responsive and accountable to its target stakeholder groups through a democratic representative process where decision emanates from the grass root. The discussions in this section therefore focused on responsiveness and accountability and the extent to which they were contemplated.

5.2.1 Responsiveness

Responsiveness delineates how representatives „act for“ or „stand for“ and expresses the interest, goals and aspirations of stakeholders (Pitkins 1967; Wellstead, 2002; Disch, 2012). This study expanded this definition to include the capacity of representatives to effectively represent their constituents. Warner (2006), has indicated that on MSPs smaller groups, weaker groups, marginalized groups, NGOs, as well as a more stronger and powerful groups converge on a decision table to contribute to the decision making process. In a descriptive representative process (Pitkins 1967) as the case was in the MSD, selection

of representatives was not necessary based on ability and skills but rather the identity of the representative; ones membership or affinity with a stakeholder group is the prime consideration in the selection process. Therefore, the tendency of having representatives with a considerable low capacity representing their constituents cannot be overlooked. It was therefore imperative for managers of the platform to respond to these imbalances by building the capacities of all these diverse stakeholder groups in order to make-up on their differentiated capacities to ensure effective participation in the dialogue process. Even though the results have indicated that capacity building of representatives was contemplated, the previous survey conducted by Obeng et al. (2014), suggests that 42 percent and 28 percent of participants at the district and national MSDs respectively did not receive any form of training from the organizers before participating in the dialogue process. Also, training was offered at the preparatory stage of the engagement process, which suggests that those who joined the platform in the course of the dialogue process did not actually benefit from such training even though the expectation was that they effectively represent their constituents. Linked to this is the fact that MSDs can extend over a long period, which means that the discourse and the focus of the dialogue may change, which would require a new set of knowledge and skill to be able to effectively participate. For example, under the Phase 1, the MSD focused on alternative to illegal chainsaw. In Phase 2, it was integrating the domestic market into a VPA regime. Hence, one-time training may not satisfy the capacity needs of participants as the dialogue progresses. Therefore imbalances among stakeholder groups in terms of the capacity to dialogue on the platform may have the tendency of having only those with higher skills and ability to dialogue driving the process. Fayse (2006) has postulated that the objective of MSP is to enable the empowered and active participation of stakeholders in the search

for solutions to a common problem. The empowered stakeholders should feel that they have the ability to affect the structures, process, and outcomes of dialogue. Stakeholders will be less committed if they sense an imbalance of power (CommGAP, 2009). As was observed by the researcher, stakeholder groups such as farmers, chainsaw operators, machine owners and carriers, who may generally be considered as less literate and skilled in dialoguing in the chainsaw value chain, were particularly not active contributors to issues on the platform. Following this, Pitkins (1967), Wellstead (2003), and Marfo (2014) argue that representation in the natural resources management processes should rather be substantive instead of descriptive; stakeholder representatives must be selected to represent a constituency based on their ability to dialogue and also ensure that their constituents' interests are well represented. Until managers of natural resources get to this point, the remedy to this apparent imbalance may be to offer constant training to all stakeholder groups involved in the process in order to ensure equity in dialoguing.

As indicated earlier in this section, another indicator of responsiveness is the meeting which takes place at the pre-participation stage of the dialogue process where representatives meet with their constituents to solicit their views, interest and concerns and present it on the platform for consideration. This meeting which takes place at the level of stakeholder groups is generically referred to as community multi-stakeholder dialogue by the organizers of the MSD. From the results, it is apparent that designers of the process contemplated such consultations between representatives and their constituents. The study however observed that such meetings were not organized or facilitated by the organizers. In this study, even though as high as about 80% of representatives said they consult with their constituents before attending MSD meeting,

organizers do not have any record to support this claim, and therefore could not tell whether indeed CMSDs take place or not. It can therefore be inferred that the CMSDs were alienated from the rest of the process. How can such an important stage of the dialogue process where the grass root interfaces with the platform not be given any priority attention? This may give credence to postulate by Marfo (2014) that the apparent lack of commitment to the grassroots engagement may lead to a conclusion that democratic representation processes in the management of natural resources is mere rhetoric and that in practice they are not designed to achieve democratic outcome.

Secondly, for such consultative meetings to take place there should be formal organization of stakeholder groups into one homogenous recognizable constituency. In the case of the MSD, some stakeholder groups were spread across geographically and did not have any formal organizational structure to enable real grassroots consultations to take place. For instance, representatives of stakeholder groups like traditional leaders, farmers, chainsaw operators, machine owners and so on may have symbolically represented their constituents but in reality the views they expressed on the platform may be local and limited to a geographical area and not that of the entire constituents. An observation made by the study on an MSD platform was that 6 representatives represented farmers but each of them came from a different community and expressed varied interest specific to each community and not necessarily the collective interest of their stakeholder group. This phenomenon may likely lead to what can be termed as „fragmented interest“; a situation where the interest espoused within a particular stakeholder group on the platform may be heterogeneous and conflicting. Marsh (1998) classified stakeholders (traditional leaders, farmers, chainsaw operator etc.) whose geographical spread pose a challenge to consultation as „core

stakeholders” in the natural resource sector, thus, lack of unanimity in their front may jeopardize the group”s interest and impinge on the outcome of the entire dialogue process.

5.2.2 Accountability

A key determinant of effective democratic representation is accountability to the people for whom they are making decisions (Ribot, 2004). It has been defined as the counter power held by the represented to ensure that their interest is served by their representatives through positive and negative sanctions (Ribot 2004; Ribot et al. 2008 Agrawal and Ribot, 2009). Largely basing the discussion on the conceptual definition of accountability in this study as reporting back decisions and outcomes (feedback) on the platform to constituents, designers of the MSD platform largely contemplated the provision of feedback to constituents. Despite the fact that survey conducted in this study and previous survey by Obeng et al. (2014) have indicated as high as about 80% of representatives on the national platform reporting back to their constituents on activities on the platform, stakeholder activities after MSD meeting were largely unattended to by the organizers. The results also indicated that post-participation activities that are meant to promote accountability were alienated from the mainstream dialogue platform. How can accountability be achieved if the very process or meeting that is meant to ensure its actualization is not facilitated or managed and there are no formal structures in place to make it functional? Some experts have argued that democratic representation in natural resource management is a mere rhetoric, and that the processes are not actually designed to achieve accountability (Marfo, 2014), and the results (Refer to chapter 4) reinforce this notion. Schroeder (1999); Ferguson (1996); Bariskar (2002); and Ribot (2004) assert that government authorities, international donors and NGOs may have other reasons

accounting for the institutionalization of democratic representation for the implementation of their environmental programmes and policies other than effective decentralization. They stated reasons such as legitimization of state projects, incorporation of break-away groups and regions, garnering popular support, obtaining an electoral base, cultivating patronage networks as some of the motivation behind these democratic processes.

Feedback provision completes the circle of representation. Therefore any multistakeholder dialogue process that fails to ensure that the platform, where decisions taken affect policy direction, links up to the grass root through the provision of feedback may not be considered as being wholly democratic.

Ribot (2004) further argues that within grassroots groups, stakeholder groups, and NGOs, internal democracy is not assured. His argument is that these groups may also not be accountable to or representative of their constituents in systematic manner (Ribot, 2004). The correlate between internal democracy within stakeholder groups and the overall accountability of the process to its stakeholders must be underscored. Accountability of the process may not be assured if accountability within target stakeholder groups is less. Thus, a democratic process that alienates the activities of the grass root in its design may not be aiming at substantive outcome of accountability.

5.3 Transaction Cost Conceptualization

Following the conceptualization used, this research defined transaction cost in a context of democratic representation to encompass all costs related to the performance of the expected actions to obtain information from representative's constituency, participate in the multi-stakeholder dialogue meetings and provide feedback to constituents. Even though the results apparently indicates that designers of the process contemplated

transaction cost to include the cost of meeting with stakeholders, the percentage (34%) of the overall budget allocated to that process appear to be far less than the budget allocation (66%) to the auxiliary activities of the MSD process. Though the ancillary activities such as research, communication, and administrative expenses may be necessary to achieving the overall goal of the process, allocating a higher percentage of the budget to it may be insidious to the actual engagement process.

There are fewer attempts in assessing transaction cost in participatory decision-making processes in the natural resource management literature (McCann et al. 2005). However, Blore (2013) has indicated that the cost of implementing, monitoring and enforcement in multi-stakeholder management is higher than centralized management. Therefore, transaction cost inclusion and assessment of natural resource policies and programmes may lead to a more acceptable outcome.

5.4 Assessing Resource Allocation at Different Levels of the Engagement Process

The MSD was structured at three main levels; community, district and national levels. The rationale was to ensure greater engagement of the grassroots in the decision-making process (McKeown et al. 2013). The process was designed such that decisions taken at the lower level MSDs (community and district) feeds into the national platform where decisions taken were meant to affect policy and practice. Resource allocation to each level of the process was therefore equally important. A key result from the analyses indicates that organizers of the MSD did not commit much resource to facilitate the activities at the lower level MSDs. For instance, no resources were given stakeholder groups to support the engagement activities at the community level in spite of the fact that it is at that level

that the dialogue interfaced with the general membership of the stakeholder groups, and therefore formed the base of the whole process. How come resources were not made available to facilitate the lower level engagement activities despite its importance to achieving the desired democratic outcomes? It is apparent that even when designers contemplate democratic representation they transfer transaction cost to lower level participants. Larson et al (2008), argue that democratic representation is rarely practiced in way that is required. Thus, the inclusion of stakeholders in the decision-making process may not portend democracy if the necessary resources are not provided to support the democratic process at all levels.

Stavins (1995), Fullerton (2001), and McCann (2005), have asserted that even though transaction cost inclusion in the design and assessment of natural resource policies and programmes promises good outcome, in practice, transaction costs are not usually included in empirical evaluations of alternative environmental or natural resource policies. In the case of Multi-Stakeholder Platforms, the exclusion of transaction cost in the design of the process may put the cost burden on participating stakeholders; a situation where transaction cost (goods and services, travel costs, labour and time expended) borne by participating stakeholder groups is high; there is a tendency of limiting or discouraging participation.

Mensah (1998), Ribot (2004), Larson (2005), Ribot, et al. (2008), have argued that democratic representation to some extent is a function of power. Marfo (2006; 2014) has further stated that a key power resource is access to economic resources to enable representatives identify group's concerns; participate in the dialogue process to articulate

those concerns, and negotiate and to provide feedback to the group. Inadequate access to resources may affect the quality of engagement at the grass root level and by extension the entire process. As was postulated by Coarse and Adhikari, identifying relevant parties, collecting pertinent information, conducting negotiations, enforcing agreements and so on could be sufficiently costly to prevent many transactions from being achieved (Coarse 1960; Adhikari, 2001).

Furthering the discussion, it is imperative to highlight how inadequate provision of power resources to stakeholders may tend to affect substantive representation especially on a descriptive representation platform in the natural resource sector. The more organized and resourceful stakeholder groups (as the case may be in the natural resource sector) may tend to engage their members at the grassroots level better than the less resourceful ones in order to effectively drive their interest on the dialogue platform; imbalance among stakeholder groups in terms of access to power resource may create a condition of inequity in the engagement process; the more resourceful stakeholder group may tend to drive the dialogue process, thereby disempowering and crowding out the less resourceful stakeholder groups.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

Based on the results and discussions in chapters four and five of this report, the study provides conclusions and recommendations. The conclusions and recommendations

reflect those of the author of this report and not that of the experts interviewed or the literature consulted for this study.

6.2 Conclusion

Against the hypothesis that designers of MSPs do not contemplate democratic representation, this study shows otherwise. Yes, in terms of discourse in the design of the MSD process, democratic intent was clearly established but in practice it was found wanting. The apparent dichotomy between discourse and practice has rendered democratic representative processes more rhetorical than substantive.

The apparent alienation of the grassroots engagement from the actual implementation of MSD attests to the largely held assertion that democratic representation is rarely practiced in multi-stakeholder platforms.

The symbolic selection and labeling of stakeholder representatives apparently fragmented and weakened the front of the stakeholder groups on the platform, thereby creating a communication gap between representatives and their constituents.

The imperatives of considering how transaction cost would play out in the implementation and institutionalization of the MSD was not sufficiently considered by the designers of the process even at the level of discourse. Consequentially, the study has shown that the discourse on democratic representation in the natural resource sector did not feature transaction cost as evidenced even in the budget design of the MSD. Programme designers discount transaction cost especially at the lower level of the scale of engagement. National level engagement platform gets attention because it is where the symbolic value of participation impliedly seems to be high, and stakeholder groups with strong power resources actively participate in the process and exert their influence. How can the MSD

develop a position on the illegal chainsaw milling without the substantive involvement of stakeholders especially at the lower level? If transaction cost is contemplated as participation cost of representatives, then discounting their substantive role and cost before and after the national platform engagement fly in the face of democratic representation.

6.3 Recommendations

To move the discourse on democratic representation from the rhetoric to actual practice on the ground, the researcher recommends the following measures for effective organization of any multi-stakeholder process that is intended to achieve democracy outcome:

6.3.1 Substantive Representation as against Descriptive Representation

Representation on a multi-stakeholder platform should be substantive; „acting for“ and not „standing for“. Descriptive representation in an MSP have the potential of causing disillusionment among stakeholder groups especially those on the platform that are less powerful, less resourceful and less knowledgeable. The recommendation is for organizers to facilitate the selection of representatives that can „act for“ their constituents and not just „stand for“ in future MSP. Substantive representation may reduce the tendency for the more powerful, resourceful and knowledgeable to take control and drive the process on the platform to the exclusion of other stakeholder groups. This will create equity and equal playing field for all stakeholders in the decision-making process.

6.3.2 Continuous Training of Stakeholder Representatives

Training of stakeholder representatives should be continuously provided throughout the period of implementing an MSP. This is crucial for three reasons; firstly, the capacity levels of representatives on the platform are different; some have higher capacities than others. In the light of this, building their capacities through training would offer the representatives equal playing field and leverage to dialogue effectively. Secondly, the discourse on the platform may change with time which may require a new knowledge base and the capacity to dialogue effectively on the new and emerging issues. Thirdly and most importantly, due to the long period of running such process, the attrition rate among representatives may be high, which will call for the replacement of those who have left the platform with new representatives. New representatives would therefore require training so that they would be able to effectively participate and follow the discourse on the platform.

6.3.3 Organization of Stakeholder Groups

Organizers should make the organization of stakeholder groups a part of an MSP planned programme; fragmented stakeholder groups should be put together into a formal organization with a clear structure of communication, and that represent a common interest on the MSP. The view here is that the organization of the stakeholder groups should be a precursor to the actual commencement of any dialogue process. The imperatives are that it will help focus organizer's interaction with stakeholder groups. Again, it would be easier to get feedback across to members of the stakeholder groups through their representatives. Also, it will enable the stakeholder groups to present a common front with a common interest.

6.3.4 Proper Integration of Lower Level MSDs into the Dialogue Process

The exclusion of the community level engagement from the formal implementation of the process may render the whole MSD process ineffective, considering the fact that responsiveness and accountability are assessed at that level. Thus, it is important for organizers of multi-stakeholder platforms (MSP) to fully integrate the stakeholder meetings at the community level into the formal structure of the process. Hence, project organizers would be in a better position to facilitate and assess activities at the grass root level, and ensure that the platform is properly interfaced with the larger stakeholder groups. Again, district MSDs should have their selected representatives to represent their district's interest on the national platform and report back to them. This would make the district platform more relevant to the process by ensuring that issues raised at the community level feed into the district and then to the national platform.

6.3.5 Transaction should be Incorporated into the Design of MSPs

Policy planners and implementers of multi-stakeholder engagement processes must consider in their discourse the issue of transaction cost. High cost in democratic decentralization management approaches may impinge on the achievement of its goals. Therefore factoring the issue of cost in the design and implementation of an MSP would substantively and positively impact on the expected democratic outcome. Also, resource allocation to such a process must consider critically the lower engagement platforms where the process interfaces with the larger stakeholder groups; the engagement meetings between representatives and their constituents must be resourced to avoid a situation where the financial burden would be largely borne by individual stakeholders.

6.3.6 Research

Research should be conducted to determine stakeholder groups who drive the discussions on the platform. Such a research is necessary because it will help diagnose activities on the platform in determining which stakeholder group dominates discussions, and establish how power resource imbalances may affect the dialogue process. Findings from such a study would help improve in the design of multistakeholder platforms in future.

Again, research should be conducted in future to assess transaction cost of participating in MSP. Multiple case analyses should be done to establish the minimum threshold of transaction cost to participants at each level of the engagement process. Such a study would be necessary because the effective implementation or institutionalization would also depend on the cost of participation. Higher cost of participation may be a deterrent and may undermine effective representation.

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APPENDIX 1

TEXT AND CODES THAT DENOTES RESPONSIVENESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Operational conceptualization of democratic representation

Democratic representation as a participatory process is conceptualized in this study as being responsive and accountable to the represented. Responsiveness is explained as representatives ensuring that it is the views, interests, and concerns of their constituents that are espoused on the MSD platform. It also denotes that representatives have the Capacity and skills to consult their constituents and effectively participate on the dialogue platform.

Accountability denotes that there is a reporting mechanism in place for representatives to give feedback of decisions and outcomes of MSD meetings to their respective constituents.

RESPONSIVENESS

Researcher		Independent coder
Codes	Cases/sources	codes

Much effort will be spent on facilitating the establishment of a more organized stakeholder groups/associations by building their capacity	MSD plan 2013 pg. 7	Agree
District and community meetings will be organized prior to meetings. This is to allow them (stakeholders) to make input and state their positions on impending MSD agenda/issue	Plan for MSD-Revised 2010. Pg. 15	Agree
Special attention would be paid to facilitating representatives of stakeholders groups at the MSD in consulting their constituencies on the discussions at the MSD through different media (e.g. info/fact sheet in local languages	Plan for MSD, Phase 2, pg. 13	Agree
Meeting with stakeholders to address concerns raised during MSD	MSD communication strategy pg.4	Agree
Action research into critical issues that information is not available may be recommended by the MSD	Preparatory meeting report, pg.9	Don't agree
Representatives are sufficiently prepared to represent their constituencies; these representatives must be capable of drawing inputs from their constituents before attending MSD meeting	The multi-stakeholder dialogue-towards a negotiated solution to illegal chainsaw milling pg.13	Agree
It is the responsibility of the national facilitator and even more importantly, the facilitators at the district level to build the capacity of local stakeholders so that they can take part in the process in a meaningful way	The multistakeholder dialogue-towards a negotiated solution to illegal chainsaw milling, pg13	Agree
Representatives consult group members in a meeting to solicit for opinion before attending MSD meeting	Assessment of the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder dialogue, pg.15	Agree

Capacities and skills are built to empower stakeholders particularly those at the community level to participate effectively in the MSD	The formalization and integration of the domestic market into LAS: Ghana, pg.17	Agree
Build capacity of various stakeholder groups to participate in multi-stakeholder learning platforms. Due to the antagonistic relations between some stakeholders regarding chainsaw lumbering issues, several stakeholders may need to be strengthened in methods and techniques to participate effectively in dialogue mechanisms.	EU ENV. 2007 ANNEX 1 pg.12	Agree
Stakeholders must have the capacity to participate in MSD in a meaningful way. Certain stakeholder groups, particularly at the community level, may need to be strengthened in methods and techniques to participate effectively in the MSD.	Annex A TBI CSM 2009 pg. 12	Agree
Eventually, the success of the MSD depends on the degree to which its outcomes adequately represent the viewpoints of stakeholders and are accepted by them. This requires a strong emphasis on internal, two-way stakeholder consultation and communication processes between the forum and the wider forest sector	Annex A TBI CSM 2009 pg. 11	Agree
Information needs will be identified at the stakeholder platform and data collection will be carried out jointly by stakeholders with support from FoRIG research scientists. This approach of stakeholder-driven research will increase the ownership of the outcomes.	Reviewed Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Plan, Ghana, 2009, pg.15	Agree
Enhancing the capacity of stakeholder groups to effectively participate and send feedback accurately and timely.	Draft MSD plan 2009, pg. 10	Agree
Due to the antagonistic relations amongst some stakeholders as a result of illegality associated with CSM, the capacities of stakeholders such as the chainsaw operators, carriers, farmers and transporters with built in methods and	Reviewed Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Plan, Ghana, 2010, pg.15	Agree

techniques to participate effectively in dialogue mechanisms		
Information needs will be identified at the stakeholder platform and data collection will be carried out jointly by stakeholders with support from FORIG research scientists. This approach of stakeholder-driven research will increase the ownership of the outcomes.	Reviewed Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Plan, Ghana, 2010, pg.15	Agree
Information needed to support stakeholders in discussing options will be gathered and results communicated back and forth with constituencies and other stakeholders.	Revised Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Plan, Ghana, 2012, pg.11	Agree
Much effort will be spent on facilitating the establishment of a more organized stakeholder groups/associations by building their capacity and supporting them to legally register.	Revised Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Plan, Ghana, 2012, pg.12	Agree
Capacity of stakeholders would be built during MSD sessions as they are introduced to various stakeholder and participatory planning and analytical tools	Revised Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Plan, Ghana, 2012, pg.12	Agree
Effort will be spent on building capacities of members of the DLMSD-SC and leaders of key stakeholder groups to enable them support the project implement actions aimed at institutionalizing the MSD into the forestry sector. The project will continue to support organized stakeholder groups/associations by building their capacity and supporting them to legally register.	Draft 2014 Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Plan, Ghana, pg.7	Agree
Consultations are made at the community level then you the district level where the discussions that are made feed into the national process	Informant 1	Agree

There should be a system that should ensure that there is feedback mechanisms where you meet your constituents pick up their ideas for national discussions and again pick up	Informant 1	Agree
whatever is transpired at the national level and give it back to the stakeholders.		
There was a self-selection process for stakeholders to select their own representatives to represent them on the MSD platform	Informant 2	Don't agree
The assumption was that stakeholders who come on board will be selected through a democratic process in the sense that their respective constituents will have a voice in choosing them, so that whatever they will come and discuss will be what the larger constituents have said	Informant 3	Agree
We don't interfere with the local stakeholder meetings so it gives them the freedom to discuss all the issues and pass whatever information they have to the national MSD through their representatives.	Informant 3	Agree
People who wouldn't have been consulted come to the platform to so that they also put up their own various positions and they are able to get their voice heard on the platform	Informant 4	Agree
Stakeholders are expected to be well informed to enable them fully participate in the process and this is done through education	Informant 5	Agree
Before any meeting we send agenda to all stakeholder groups that we are coming to discuss ABCD. So they will meet and discuss it. So the person who is coming does not come with his own view, he comes with the views of the stakeholders	Informant 6	Agree
Representatives are expected to carry the views of the district and members to the national MSD platform	Informant 6	Agree
Stakeholder representatives would have to meet with their members before attending any meeting	Informant 8	Agree

ACCOUNTABILITY		
To ensure that all actors (MSD-participants, stakeholders not directly participating in the dialogue and the general public) support and accept the MSD and have equal access to the relevant information, it is important to create a mechanism for information sharing and a common knowledge base for the process	EU-ENV Annex A TBI CSM 2009 pg. 11	Agree
Create a communication mechanism to document and disseminate findings. The stakeholder platform should not become an isolated activity for some, but a continuous flow of information will be created between those who participate to and from those who do not participate. This will create the required constituency for any decisions taken at the platform.	EU-ENV 2007 pg. 13	Agree
A stronger collaboration will be built between the National and District level MSD-SCs to ensure and enhance feedback to all stakeholders and constituencies	MSD plan 2013 pg. 4	Agree
Since CSM has become a national, regional and global issue, it is anticipated that the outcome of an effective MSD with transparent and accountable representatives should influence forest policy reforms	Reviewed multi-stakeholder plan, 2009, pg.16	Agree
A communication and feedback mechanism would be enhanced. Various channels of communication will be used. The project team, led by communication officer, together with the MSD-SC will develop a plan for 2014 to implement the communication strategy developed in 2013. The plan will reflect current communication needs for participants, stakeholders not directly participating in the dialogue and the general public.	Draft 2014 Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Plan, Ghana, pg.8	Agree

Since CSM has become a national, regional and global issue, it is anticipated that the outcome of an effective MSD with transparent and accountable representatives should influence forest policy reforms	Reviewed Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Plan, Ghana, 2010, pg. 16	Agree
To ensure good feedback mechanism, district and community level meetings will be organized prior to or after each MSD meeting. This is to allow representatives at the national MSD to communicate outcomes of the meetings to representatives of stakeholders at the district level and then to communities and constituencies/group. This is also to allow them to make input and state their positions on the impending MSD agenda/issues	MSD plan 2009, pg. 15	Agree
To provide updates and key messages accurately and promptly to stakeholder groups/constituencies and feedback into the MSD process	MSD communication strategy, 2009 pg.1	Agree
Timely distribution of MSD minutes and research reports, newsletters, videos of the MSD process to stakeholders	Plan for MSD, Phase 2, pg.13	Agree
District and community level meetings will be organized after each MSD meeting. this is to allow representatives at the national MSD to communicate outcomes of the meetings to representatives of stakeholders at the district level and then to communities and constituencies/groups	Revised MSD plan 2010, pg. 15	Agree
A stronger MSD collaboration will be built between the national and district MSD steering committees to ensure an enhanced feedback to all stakeholder constituencies	MSD plan 2014, pg.5	Agree
Conducting meetings at the district and community level to present outcome of the MSD meetings;	Preparatory meeting report, pg.9	Agree
Outcomes and discussions at the MSD are disseminated to stakeholders particularly those in the project districts and communities	MSD communication strategy pg.4	Agree

Representatives are trained to provide feedback after an MSD meeting	The multi-stakeholder dialogue-towards a negotiated solution to illegal chainsaw milling, pg13	Agree
National and district representatives are expected to provide feedback to their constituencies, although it is very difficult to measure the effectiveness of this endeavor	The multi-stakeholder dialogue-towards a negotiated solution to illegal chainsaw milling, pg.28	Agree
Representatives report back information form the MSD platform at a meeting	Assessment of the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder dialogue, pg.15	Agree
It also requires stakeholders to be sufficiently prepared to represent their constituency; these representatives must be capable of drawing input from their constituency before a meeting and providing feedback afterwards	The multi-stakeholder dialogue-towards a negotiated solution to illegal chainsaw milling, pg13	Agree
A communication mechanism needed to ensure that information is provided to stakeholders within the process	The formalization and integration of domestic market into LAS: Ghana, pg.17	Agree
The fact that it is representative individuals standing in for a group of people with a collective interest there should clearly be a system for feedback. Because if I represent you, am I speaking for myself or speaking for the group?	Informant 1	Agree
What is decided at the national level goes to the district and to the local level and subsequently to the grassroots	Informant 1	Agree

There should be a system that should ensure that there is feedback mechanisms where you meet your constituents pick up their ideas for national discussions and again pick up whatever is transpired at the national level and give it back to the stakeholders.	Informant 1	Agree
The key expectation is that people who represent different stakeholders will go back and report on the findings	Informant 2	Agree
We try to compensate for inadequate feedback mechanisms by also re-organizing meeting at the district level to share the information from the national meeting.	Informant 2	Agree
It is expected that when they have come to the MSD they will also go back and give feedback to their constituents	Informant 3	Agree
The MSD was also contemplated as a platform that should allow the voice of different stakeholders to be respected and that will increase transparency and increase accountability of those who are managing forest resources to the stakeholder group.	Informant 3	Agree
When there is consensus everybody agrees, we arrive at consensus alright and the decisions are carried to stakeholder groups	Informant 4	Agree
A lot of information is passed on to stakeholders for them to be updated	Informant 5	Agree
Representatives are expected to carry decisions that are made on the MSD platform back to their constituents	Informant 6	Agree
Stakeholder representatives reporting back proceedings of MSD to their respective stakeholder associations	MSD preparatory meeting report pg.9	Agree
To provide updates and key messages accurately and promptly to stakeholder groups/constituencies and feedback into the MSD process	MSD communication strategy 2009, pg.1	Agree

APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANTS

1. What is the MSD all about?
2. Do you think MSD should deliver any democracy outcome?
3. If yes, by democracy outcome what were your expectations?
4. How did you contemplate the representation of stakeholders?
5. What are your expectations about stakeholder representation at your MSD?
6. What main activities are undertaken in the organization of MSD meeting?
7. Do you spend any budget on participation?
8. What considerations inform your budget allocation? (push till you get all the relevant answers)
9. Are participants given any payments for participation?
10. If yes, what is the purpose of the payments?
11. Do participants complain about the payments they receive?
12. If yes, what are the complaints about?
13. How has the complaints affected participation?

APPENDIX III

DEPARTMENT OF SILVICULTURE AND FOREST MANAGEMENT

FACULTY RENEWABLE NATURAL RESOURCES

COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES

Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi

M.Sc. Natural Resource and Environmental Governance

ASSESSING DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN MULTI-STAKEHOLDER

PLATFORM DESIGN: THE CASE STUDY IN GHANA

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STAKEHOLDER REPRESENTATIVES

Hello, my name is _____ and a student of the department of Silviculture and Forest Management (Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology), conducting a study to assess democratic representation in multi-stakeholder platform design and using the MSD as a case study. The purpose of the survey is to gather information on whether stakeholder representatives meeting their constituents before and after MSD meeting to collect their views and provide feedback respectively. I would very much appreciate your participation in this survey. All of the answers you give will be confidential. There are no risks to you or your family in answering these questions. Participation in the survey is completely voluntary. If we should come to any question you don't want to answer, just let me know and I will go on to the next question, or you can stop the interview at any time. However, we hope you will participate in the survey since your views are important. If you have any questions about the study or the survey at a later

date, you may contact Nelson Owusu Ansah, the Researcher at 0244691601. At this time, do you want to ask me anything about the survey? May I begin the interview now?

Stakeholder Group..... Underline position in group (member, executive)

1. How long have you been involved in this group..... (Indicate no of years)
2. Which of the MSD meetings do you attend? a. DMSD b. NMSD
3. How many National MSDs have you attended?
4. Are you a representative of your group on the MSD platform?
a. Yes b. No

ACCOUNTABILITY

5. Is there any mechanism/arrangement by the organizers for reporting back to your constituents? a. Yes b. No
6. How do you report back to your constituents?
 - a. Organize meeting of group
 - b. Organize meeting of executives
 - c. Provide group members with minutes
 - d. Report to individual members of the group
7. How frequent do you report back feedback?
 - a. After every MSD meeting
 - b. Sometimes
 - c. Whenever executives call for meeting

RESPONSIVENESS

8. Is there any mechanism/arrangement by the organizers for meeting your constituents?

- a. Yes b. No

9. Do you meet your group members before attending MSD meeting?

- a. Yes b. No

10. Who do you meet?

- a. Executives
b. Group members
c. Individual members of the group

11. How frequent do you report back feedback?

- a. before every MSD meeting
b. Sometimes
c. Whenever executives call for meeting

12. Do you discuss the agenda of the impending meeting at the meeting?

- a. Yes b. No c. Sometimes