


**ACCOUNTABILITY IN RELIGIOUS CIRCLES: CASE STUDY OF THE
KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE**

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work towards the M. Phil in religious Studies and that to the best of my knowledge; the content has not been previously published by another person or submitted for any degree in any University. Due acknowledgement has been made for all citations and references in the text.

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DEDICATION

To my children Memuna, Elham, Raihana, Jamila, Kauthar and Taha

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ABSTRACT

Muslims both from northern Ghana and beyond its frontiers, mainly from Nigeria and other West African States converged in Kumasi to subsequently form the Muslim community. This community however was not only composed of migrants but also those who are indigenes of Kumasi to become the Asante Muslims and commonly referred to as the Asante Nkramo. This Muslim community built the Kumasi Central Mosque which is the focus of our study since its inception in the early 1950s.

The Kumasi Central Mosque remains the symbol of unity and integration of the Muslim community. Yet despite the unity, it has undergone some disputes in terms of leadership as well as the control of the Mosque. Two personalities have dominated the politics of the Mosque for so long – Amadu Baba and Malam Mutawakilu who had both become the *sakin zongo* of Kumasi. Control over ownership of the Mosque had divided the front of the Muslim leadership in Kumasi that nearly marred the integration and unity of the community. Two blocs had fought over the leadership in terms of Imamship of the Mosque- the Muslim Mission and the Muslim Community- that led to court actions.

This thesis argues on the responsibility and accountability of the financial aspects as well as the leadership of the Mosque. It also suggests the mutual agreement between the Muslim Mission and the Muslim Community. The two blocs agreed to come to terms in an arbitration headed by the Busia administration that led to the selection of an Imam from the Muslim Community and the deputy from the Muslim Mission. The concession led to a relative peace and harmony in the Muslim community. The Central Mosque remains, despite all these disputes, the focal point and symbol of unity and perhaps disunity among the Muslim community in Kumasi

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents	Pages
Title page	i
Declaration	ii
Dedication	iii
Abstract	iv
Acknowledgement	v
Table of contents	vi
List of Abbreviations	vii
List of Akan, Arabic and Hausa words	viii

CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background Information	1
1.2 Statement of the problem	4
1.3 Objectives and Scope of the study	4
1.4 Study Approach and Methodology	5
1.5 Significance of the study	5
1.6 Limitation of the study	6
1.7 Research Ethics	6
1.8 Problems Encountered	7
1.9 Literature review	7
1.10 Organization of the work	11

CHAPTER TWO: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABILITY

2.1 Introduction	12
2.2 Accountability Defined	12
2.3 Accountability in Religious Circles	15
2.3.1 Christianity and Accountability	17
2.3.2 Islam and Accountability	19
2.4 Ethics and Accountability	27
2.4.1 The Divine Command Theory of Ethics	30
2.5 Conclusion	35

CHAPTER THREE: FORMATION OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN KUMASI

3.1 Introduction	36
3.2 The Muslim Community in Kumasi	37
3.3 The Zongo in Perspective	43
3.3.1 The formation of the Zongo	43
3.3.2 Politics in the Zongo	48
3.3.3 Muslim Organizations in the Zongo	52
3.4 The Kumasi Central Mosque	55
3.4.1 Brief history of the Kumasi Central Mosque	55
3.4.2 Leadership struggle in the Central Mosque	59
3.4.3 Mutawakilu's leadership of the Central Mosque	63
3.4.4 The Imamship impasse of the Central Mosque	64
3.4.5 The New Order for the Succession of the Imamship	76

3.5 Administration of the Central Mosque	78
3.6 Finance of the Central Mosque	82
3.6 .1 Sources of income	82
3.6.2 Properties of the Mosque	88
3.7 Summary of income and expenditure of the Central Mosque	88
3.8 Conclusion	92

CHAPTER FOUR: LEADERSHIP OF THE KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE

4.1 Introduction	94
4.2 Evaluation of the leadership of the Muslim Community in Kumasi	94
4.2.1 The leadership of Ahmadu Baaba and Mohammed Mutawakilu: An assessment	97
4.3 Evaluation of the Imamship impasse of the Central Mosque	102
4.4 Evaluation of the Administration of the Central Mosque	106
4.5 Evaluation of the finance of the Central Mosque	112
4.6 Analysis of the properties of the Mosque	116
4.7 Assessment of the summary of Income and Expenditure of the Central Mosque	116
4.8 Conclusion	119

CHAPTER FIVE: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Introduction	121
5.2 Summary of chapters	121
5.3 Issues emerging	125
5.4 Recommendations and Conclusion	127
Bibliography	132
Appendix	136

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CPP	Convention People's Party
GMM	Ghana Muslim Mission
GCMM	Gold Coast Muslim Association
KCM	Kumasi Central Mosque
KMA	Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly
KTC	Kumasi Town Council
MAP	Muslim Association Party
MYC	Muslim Youth Congress
NLC	National Liberation Council
NLM	National Liberation Movement
UP	United Party
SAW	Sallallahu alayhim Wasallam (Peace and Blessing Be Upon Him)



LIST OF AKAN, ARABIC AND HAUSA WORDS

A) AKAN WORDS

<i>asantehene</i>	King of Asante
<i>asantenkramo</i>	Asante Muslims
<i>kumasifo</i>	People of Kumasi

B) ARABIC WORDS

<i>Ahadith</i>	Sayings of the Prophet Muhammad
<i>amana</i>	Trust
<i>fiqh</i>	Islamic jurisprudence
<i>fiabilillah</i>	For the sake of Allah
<i>fuqaha' u</i>	Muslim Jurists
<i>hadith</i>	the Saying of Prophet Muhammad
<i>ijma</i>	consensus of the 'Ulamā'
<i>Imam al balad</i>	Town Imam
<i>jumu' ah</i>	Friday prayers
<i>khalifa</i>	Vicegerent
<i>kufr</i>	Polytheism
<i>masjid al haram</i>	the grand Mosque of Makkah
<i>masjid al rasul</i>	The Prophetic Mosque in Madinah
<i>masjid</i>	place of prostration (Mosque)
<i>minbar</i>	Pulpit
<i>nāib</i>	Deputy

<i>qibla</i>	Direction of the Ka'aba
<i>qiyas</i>	analogical reasoning
Qur'an	The Muslim Holy Book
Ramadan	Month for fasting
<i>sabilla</i>	Collections
Sunnah	The practices of Prophet Muhammad
<i>ulamā</i>	Muslim Clerics
<i>wasiya</i>	Will

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C) HAUSA WORDS

<i>Lalley</i>	henna
<i>Lafe</i>	gift to the bride
<i>maigida</i>	Landlord
<i>makaranta</i>	School
<i>makarantu</i>	Schools
<i>masugida</i>	landlords
<i>sabon zongo</i>	new strangers' Quarters
<i>sarkin fawa</i>	Chief butcher
<i>sarkin tuuba</i>	Chief of the converts
<i>sarkin zongo</i>	chief of Zongo
<i>tuubakaawa</i>	converts
Yelwa	place of abundance
Zongo	strangers Quarters

CHAPTER ONE


GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The Encarta World English Dictionary (1999,11) defines accountability as responsibility for something. To account is therefore to be responsible for something or to be an important factor in something. Asante (1999, 21) explains accountability as “to account” is to give a reckoning of something that they have entrusted into one’s hands. Accountability can also be perceived as “stewardship”. According to him “a steward” is an official who controls the domestic affairs of a household”. Looking at the above definitions of these two words: accountability and stewardship, they connote the idea of entrusting something valuable to a person and he/she is expected to take trusteeship of that thing and is expected to render an account of his/her possession at a given time. This can either be in the spiritual realm or in the physical realm.

In the spiritual terms, stewardship and accountability are emphasized both in the Bible and in the Holy Qur’an. In the Bible, the word which infers the notion of stewardship is the “*Oikonimos*” (stewards) and *Oikonomia* (stewardship). A person who holds in trust and disperses other people’s goods or manages an estate is an *Oikonomos*. Antwi, (1991, 25) takes the management of a household. “in Biblical times”, Antwi said, “every well-to-do householder had an *Oikonomos* to manage his household affairs, his property, farm or vineyard, his accounts and slaves” he further explains that, “in the Old Testament, the *Oikonomos* is found particularly on the noble families and royal courts of Judah, Egypt and Babylon”. A classical example of stewardship in the Old Testament is the role of Joseph who was in charge of his

master's household, providing water for their feats and fodder for their donkeys. He was responsible for their feeding and lodging. Antwi (1991, 25).

In the New Testament, *Oikonomos* and *epitropos* are two Greek compound words both means “ the management or caretakership or administration of a household” Asante (1999, 21). He further explained that: “ the person who manages or administer a household or is in position of trust or holds public office, is referred; to either by the term *Oikonomos* (1 Cor, 4:1-2; pet. 4:10-11; Rom. 16:23) or an *epitropos* (Malt. 20:8; Luke. 8:3 Galatians 4:2)”.

These two Greek compound words connote almost the same meaning: *Oikonomos* comprises of two Greek words: *Oikos* (house) and *nemo* (to arrange, administer, dispense, distribute or manage). *Oikonomos*, according to Asante (1999, 21) “ then, points to a manager, an administrator of a household, a person who dispenses the laws of a household, or a public official”. Whereas “ *epitropos* (epi: upon and trepo to turn or direct) refers to public officer. He is the person who takes care of something or serves as trustee over something. He further said:

The idea of stewardship has its grounding in the institution of slavery. In the institution of slavery, the master appointed a slave to administer its household which might include the teaching and disciplining of members of the household, especially to other slaves and children. Here stewardship means service of trust according to direction. It follows from the above that from the Biblical perspective, stewardship implies the function of delegated responsibility. The steward owes one's authority to the master who has delegated to him the responsibility the household administration or management. The steward then is not the owner of that which he or she administers or disciplines. He or she as the servant of a master, who owes all that he or she manages, is accountable to the master. Stewardship then appoints to an accountable service. Asante, (199, 21-22).

The Islamic route or basis of accountability and stewardship is enshrined in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The Qur'an is Islam's primary authority in all matters of individual and communal life, as well as theology and worship. It tells of an offer of

global trusteeship that was presented by God to the Heavens, the Earth, and the Mountains but they refused to shoulder the responsibility out of fear. But the humankind out of ignorance took advantage of the opportunity and bore the *amana* (trust) because they were unjust and very ignorant (Qur'an 33:72). Even so, God in his mercy and compassion has guided and "enabled humankind in bearing the responsibility of the *amana*". The Qur'an, however, is categorically clear that God is the ultimate holder of dominion over creation (Qur'an 2:107, 5:120) and all things return to him (Qur'an 24:42) and are therefore accountable each in their ways.

The Hadith and *Sunnah* are the sayings and examples of the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W). The *Sunnah* is preserved in a literally form known as Hadith. Denney, (2004), in one of such Hadith, the Prophet is reported to have said:

Behold! Each one of you is a guardian and each one of you will be asked about his subjects. A leader is a guardian over the people and he will be asked about his subjects; a man is a guardian over the members of his household and he would be asked about his subjects, a woman is a guardian over the members of the household of the husband and of his children... Behold! Each one of you is a guardian and each of you will be asked about his subjects, (Sahih ul Bukhari).

From the above Hadith, Muslims are enjoined to take responsibilities of their activities and not to apportion blame to others for their wrong deeds and shortcomings. "they should take responsibility and be accountable of it" Naceur (2005, 43). The Qur'anic injunction that explains the status of humankind as the *Khalifah* (vice-gerance) is entrusted with stewardship of the cosmos and is ultimately going to give an account of his/her stewardship.

All the Abrahamic religions; Judaism, Christianity, and Islam firmly teach the need for accountability and stewardship both here and the hereafter. Religion generally as postulated above has taken cognizance of accountability, individually, communally

or collectively and in the physical realm such as: the environment, wealth, power, education, and many others.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

It appears that accountability has become problematic in many religious circles in Ghana particularly among the Muslim groups since the late 1970's when oil rich Muslim countries began to send cash donations to Ghana in support of specific Muslim programmes and projects. Money thus received and that accrued locally are often speculated among the *Ummah* (community) to have been misused or misappropriated by the Muslim leadership. But is it true that donations received both locally and internationally come to various communities to support various programmes or projects in the various communities in Ghana? How such money does usually come in? Is it to a specific group bank account or to an individual bank account? How is such money usually dispersed? Is it true that money has never been used for the said purposes that it has been sent or gathered? If it is used, are the beneficiaries usually aware and or do they at all benefit from project?

1.3 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

To seek answers to the above question, we set ourselves three objectives which are interrelated. The first is to investigate the validity of the speculations and to discover whether the funds are indeed donated and received by Muslim communities and various Muslim groups in Ghana. Secondly, the study seeks to examine the structure of Muslim communities especially the Mosque administrative structures and how these structures contribute to or otherwise financial impropriety in the Mosque. Finally, to find out how the above two objectives apply to the Kumasi Central Mosque.

1.4 STUDY APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Historical methods of research were employed by the researcher. For the primary data, these include the among others, direct personal observation, interviews and scrutiny of official documents of the Mosque such as the constitution, minutes of meetings, cash books and the bank accounts. The researcher also interacted with people handling the affairs of the Mosque such as the Chief Imam, members of the Mosque committee and some notable officials, some members of the congregation such as men and women as well as the youth were interviewed.

For the secondary data, the researcher made use of the existing literature on the management, stewardship and accountability in religious circles. Religious materials with the information about the physical environment and any historical, economic and social factors that may have had some bearing on the situation were also used.

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The significance of the study cannot be overemphasized. In the first place, this study will be of great benefit to the Kumasi Central Mosque (KCM) and, to a greater extent, to the majority of Central Mosques throughout the ten regions of Ghana, in that it will serve as a document for the Mosque as far as its stewardship is concern. The analysis of the issues raised and the appropriate recommendations that emerged out of this study will help the leadership and Muslim Community on the significance of the Mosque which is of great concern to them.

The research will add to the existing body of knowledge for students, as well as those who will like to undertake a similar research programmes. It will also serve as a guide for Imams, clerics and individuals who may wish to embark on laying a

responsible structure in the Mosques across the regions and districts. Furthermore, the document will serve as a manual for the Mosque (KCM) leadership and a guide to other Mosques on how to function and grow holistically in the community in which they exist.

1.6 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

Any research work has a limitation. Just like any other, this work does not capture everything about the Kumasi Central Mosque. This work is limited in the sense that, it traces only the responsibility and accountability of the Mosque leadership. This implies that there is a room for future research into other areas of the KCM. The research also concentrated on the Kumasi Muslim Community and their Central Mosque in particular. It can not claim to be representative of the entire Muslim Community in Ghana.

1.7 RESEARCH ETHICS

The research has not been submitted, in whole or in part, for any academic qualification or award other than that for which it is here by submitted. The paper has been the result of the researcher's own independent study except where otherwise mentioned. References are made to acknowledge other sources of the work for explicit references, and a bibliography added.

1.8 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

Getting the KCM executive, leaders and others to make time to respond to questionnaire was a major problem. The researcher anticipated such difficulty though. Again, there was the feeling that all useful documents might not be made available for the researcher but some were made available. Finally, financial

constraint was another problem as a sound research cannot be done successfully without money yet the researcher was able to, irrespective of the envisaged challenges he will be able to finish the work.

1.9 LITERATURE REVIEW

Many great works had been done in the field of stewardship and accountability with regard to religion, and most of these are done in relation to Christianity. The few that treat Mosque issues are mostly historical and are briefly stated. But not much is done in the area of Mosque stewardship and accountability, the area which we intend to explore. The review of literature was to determine the *modus operandi* to adopt and to see how this could be applied to the Mosque. Important among such existing literature are the following:

Asante, (1999) *Stewardship, Essays on Ethics of Stewardship*, explored the issues of stewardship and accountability both in the religious circle (Christianity) and in the circular issues but mention was not made as regards to accountability in the Mosque which is the point of departure of our study, however, the work was of tremendous help to our study and it helped boost our work further.

Antwi, (1991) in his article “Christian stewardship is more than managing money” spoke extensively on the issue of accountability and stewardship in the Christian circle, here he challenged “Christian stewardship must be more than just managing money”, he went further to say “unquestionably it is stewardship of all of life lived in gratitude to God because salvation is a gift”. This statement, however, informed us of the need for accountability. This also greatly enhanced our work.

Al- Mubarakpuri, (2002) *The Life of Mohammed*, discusses the coming of Muhammad from Makkah to Madinah where he built the first Mosque in Islam. The prophetic Mosque served a lot of functions yet, the Mosque accountability that we are about to research on was not captured, yet it will furnish us with some historical aspect of the Mosque.

Subhani, (1984) *The Message*, catalogued the main duties and functions of the Mosque, he said: ‘the Mosque was not only a central place for worship. It was a place where all types of Islamic instructions and orders were given and every sort of religious and scientific education were imparted including reading and writing.’ Subhani further explained that, those were the functions of the Mosque up to the 4th century and that ‘most of the great scholars graduated from the educational circles which had been set up in the Mosque.’ Subhani’s work enumerated the major function of the Mosque which shall be a great source of our study yet it is short of coming out with the responsibility and accountability, despite that, it will be a tremendous help for our study.

Nkansah-Kyeremateng, (2004) *The Akans of Ghana their Customs, History and Institution*, narrated the story of the Akans and how Kumasi came into being. This work will further enhance our study because it will give us the setting of our study – Kumasi. Clarke’s historical narrative on the good relationship that existed, in the 19th century, in Kumasi, between the Asante kings and the Muslims will be of a powerful help to our study. He said:

Proving they were tactful and diplomatic, the relation between Muslims and rulers in metropolitan Asante were good. Joseph Dupuis, one-time British envoy and consul in Asante, wrote in his journal published in 1824 that many of the Muslims in Kumasi ‘enjoyed rank at

court, or were invested with administrative powers, entitling them even to voice in the senate, Clarke (1982, 176).

This work will further enhance our study greatly since the good relationship that existed between the Asante kings and the Muslims might have informed the offering of a large track of land by the kings of the Asante to the Muslims for the construction of the Kumasi Central Mosque.

Another work that was of great enhancement to our study is Samwini (2006) *The Muslim Resurgence in Ghana since 1950 its effects upon Muslims and Muslim-Christian Relations*, he established the reasons for which the good relationship between the kings and the Muslims in Kumasi were laid down. He said:

It seems that Kumasi Muslims by virtue of their social standing were influential in civic affairs. For example, Muslims were recruited into the king's army; they served as the king's secretaries and accountants, and in wider community they served as the medicine men manufacturing charms and amulets for the king and his people, Samwini (2006, 34)

Ruthven, (1984) *Islam in the World*, wrote on a point of view of the historical aspect of the prophetic Mosque. He explains the characteristics of the first Mosque in Islam. He went further to explain the structure and how the Mosque was constructed and its nature. He said:

Muhammad's first move on reaching Madina was characteristically astute. Instead of risking offence by accepting the hospitality of one of its many clans, he left the choice to Allah through the ambulation of his Camel. On the spot where the camel settled herself, the emigrants helped him build his house that will become, after the Ka'ba, the foremost Mosque of Islam. It consisted of the simplest of structure, or courtyard overlooked by a number of flat-roofed rooms or huts surrounded by a sun-baked mud brick. It was here that he received petitioners and visitors and conducted the thrice-daily prayers (sic) at which the whole of the Muslim community was present; it was here that he organized and directed the affairs of the infant Islamic state, whenever he was not actually campaigning in the field (which took up most of his time); it was to be in one of these rooms-beneath the floor of that occupied by his favorite wife, Aisha that he will be buried on his death ten years after arriving in Madina; the ten years of his active career that will transform Arabia and shake the world. Ruthven (1991:72).

His work served as a historical background of our work and it richly enhanced our study.

Another significant work that enriched our study is an article entitled “the Mosque, a revolutionary institution” by Da’vadi (1997). The Mosque according to him is a multi-purpose institution that serves the religious, social, educational as well as the political needs of the community at the grass root level. This narrative established the reasons and functions of the Mosque yet failed to touch on accountability, an aspect that brings trust into the administration of the Mosque.

In his book, *Islam and Management*, Jabnoun (2005) catalogued the Islamic concept of management, citing references from the Qur’an and the Hadith to establish the bases of management in Islam. He wrote extensively spoke on accountability and responsibility from Islamic perspective. Even though, he did not directly write on accountability in the Mosque, the work helped in enhancing our study.

1.10 ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK

The study is divided into five main chapters. The first chapter introduces the thesis, Background information, statement of problems, objective of the study, methodology and approach, significance of the study, limitation of the study, research ethics and problems envisaged as well as the literature review and the organization of the study.

The focus of the second chapter is on accountability in religious circles as well as ethical issues on accountability. The study narrows down on financial aspect of the Kumasi Central Mosque.

Chapter three covers Kumasi and the Muslim community and the establishment of the Kumasi Central Mosque (KCM).

Chapter four analyzes and evaluates measures of stewardship and accountability of the KCM and also identifies some of its strengths and weaknesses.

The last chapter will be recommendations and conclusions.

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CHAPTER TWO

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABILITY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter we discussed the background to this study. It also enumerated the processes of which the study is going to be undertaken such as the statement of the problem as well as the objective of the study. We also discussed the methodology to be adopted, the importance and structure of the work. This chapter is going to examine what accountability generally is, that is the basic principles of how accountability is expected in the religious circles. Ethics is so vital in the success or failure of every individual, nation or organization. On the bases of that ethics in accountability will also be discussed.

2.2 ACCOUNTABILITY DEFINED

According to Black's Law Dictionary (1999, 12), accountability is the process by which financial accounts are established or settled. It is also the way by which financial transactions of a business is recorded and are extracted from time to time and this is at times termed "financial accountability", It is also the purpose by which financial information is provided. In fact, it is also called, for example, as "the language of business" 'because the results of the accounting process – financial Statements – communicate essential information about the business" to a great number of people who are concerned. It could be individuals or organizations. Brock, Pamel and Price (1990, 4) explained the process of accounting as "recording, classifying, summarizing, interpreting, and commenting financial information about economic or social entity". They further explained that "an entity is something that can be recognized as having its own separate identity" that is, an individual, a town,

an educational institution, a place of worship or a business venture to them. A business venture is where the organization's main purpose is to make profit from its owners. Such organizations are usually referred as economic entities. Organizations that are non – profit-making are known and referred to as social entities, for example, schools, hospitals, and places of worship.

Accountability is more pronounced in respect to public resource management. This is also known as public accountability. Maimela (1999, 228) quoted Normanton (who made an extensive research on accountability) said “accountability, in its broadest sense, is an obligation to expose, to explain and to justify actions”. He went on to elaborate by saying, “in essence, accountability in the democratic states comprises more than just hierarchic or bureaucratic accountability. It is therefore termed public accountability”. Public accountability calls for the actions of organizations that are public ones to publish after being recoded, classified and summarized so as to encourage “public debate and criticisms”. These debates are to be carried up to the various institutions or their representatives and probably to the media. This is the means by which the various state agencies or stakeholders will be strongly empowered to exercise control over public resources on behalf of the public. Public accountability is the processes by which the public can have access to open debate and justify their actions. Public accountability does not present any effort or attempt of enforcing a rigorous financial discipline but rather it strengthens and gives “more positive role, evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of public organizations and contributing to their improved functions” Maimela (1999, 228).

Maimela continues to suggest that civil society is a key player in the sustenance of accountability. “If officials are held accountable for their actions then corruption will

be prevented”. Public and private institutions are to be empowered in order to enforce accountability and this cannot be done without the support of government. Government on practical purpose and no matter how many other institutions and structures are created cannot supervise entirely the operation of these sectors especially in this modern and “complex Government and private sector with all its branches.

It is in pursuance to this effect that the President of the Republic of Ghana in July, 2003 established the Office of Accountability to serve as a watchdog agency to monitor the activities of ministers of state and other executive appointees in the discharge of their duties. The office was set up as a body to make a decisive contribution towards achieving the avowed national objective for good Governance. “The mission of the office is to formulate policies and practices of accountable stewardship, dignified self comportment, and honest impartial service delivery. The office is also to encourage selfless devotion to duty, transparency and zero tolerance for corruption”. (Ghartey 2009:10).

The 1992 Constitution of Ghana, section 187 article (1), firmly established the office of the Auditor -General. He is the chief constitutional financial supervisor of all financial expenditure and transaction that are conducted by all government organizations and bodies. The constitution authorized the Auditor- General to conduct and audit the public accounts of Ghana and all public offices. These include the courts, the central and local authorities and government administration of universities and other public institutions. Furthermore, the same Constitution section 194 article (1) has established some institutional framework whose principal functions are to help give some measure of accountability within the national setup.

Such institutions among which are the Public Services Commission, the Commission on Human Rights And Administrative Justice, National Media Commission and others. The Constitution has spelt out in clear terms some very important guidelines which underlined the characteristics and operational framework of these institutions. The Constitution states that these institutions are independent and the remuneration of the officials is charged from the consolidated fund. This measure is to give these public institutions the mandate to work devoid of any political interference so as to maintain and to establish accountability.

Another constitutional provision worthy of noting is the second arm of government, that is, the legislature. The major function of the legislature is to make laws for the good administration of the state. These laws so enacted cover almost all walks of life, economic, social, political as well as, monetary policies of the state. The legislature works through committees and one of the most important committees, is the Public Accounts Committee (PAC).

The role of the Public Accounts Committee is very paramount in the maintenance of accountability. It is the agent by which government appropriation accounts are monitored to ensure proper disbursement of funds allocated for government spending. It also recommends for achieving economy in government spending. To ensure transparency in its function and duties, the Public Accounts Committee is always chaired by a member of the minority in parliament. To all intents and purposes, these Constitutional provisions are mechanisms set up to help preserve the core values of transparency, probity and accountability.

Within the secular set up, measures have been put in place for the purposes of maintaining and preserving accountability. Religion which has played a dominant role in the life of man since the dawn of time has also placed measures for mankind to be accountable in his deeds.

2.3 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RELIGIOUS CIRCLES

In the view of Brahma (2007, 3), religion, at every level of human society, has been present from the earliest time. It has been the attitude of man towards the Ultimate Reality and it is at times regarded as trans-human, “something more than man. There is hardly any race, any people which is devoid of the sense of religion in some form or order.”

Religion is defined by the Oxford English dictionary as “the recognition of superhuman, controlling power, and especially of a personal god, entitled to obedience’. “Belief in a god or gods is found in most religions”, Parrinder (1983, 11), has said, “but different superhuman powers are often revered, particularly those connected with the dead.” He continued: At all stages of human history and geography, religion has been universal, but in spite of that not all individuals are religious, or perhaps religious at the same degree. Even today there are some people who claim to be irreligious because they are either thoughtful or hostile to all forms of religion. The origin of religion has remained speculative because no one can precisely give how, when and why religion begins:

In medieval and modern Europe, it was assumed that the first human beings, or Adam and Eve, in the creation myth of Genesis, had received a perfect revelation from a divine being, or that they had worked out a pure religion based upon the principles of reason. Theologians held that this early religion was corrupted by sin and the fall from grace and rationalists declared that priests and ignorance had produced the idolatry and diversity of religion now found all over the world. In the nineteenth century the theory of evolution and the growth of critical science of history forced people to consider the evolution of religion and speculate upon its possible origins, (Parrinder, 1983, 11).

If religion is understood to be the recognition of a superhuman controlling power, and especially of a personal god or gods that is entitled to obedience then this entails and calls for accountability to the god or gods. Religion, thus, calls for and laid emphasis on accountability both here and the hereafter. And this research seeks to know how accountable religions are and for the purpose of this study: the Kumasi Central Mosque.

Religion is said to be a pursuit, and religious people must be prepared to make a sustained effort throughout their life, (Saint-Laurent 2000. 23). Religion is also an idyllic search for absolute Truth, Love, and Beauty, and it can also be a rigorous programmed of performance. “An authentic faith commitment usually engenders a practical way of life and can even create a whole culture”. This was why Jesus and Mohammed required that “their disciples not only hope in the future but also apply themselves to virtuous conduct here and now,” (Saint-Laurent, 2000 23).

2.3.1 Christianity and Accountability

Christianity is a way of life which is embodied in a society of fellowship and revolves around the worship of one God just like Judaism and Islam. This was revealed to the world through Jesus of Nazareth, “who lived as a human being for about thirty years in Palestine and was crucified by the Romans of Jerusalem between A.D. 29 and 33. In the early church the content of daily as well as the weekly worship was modeled on that of the synagogue. In both worships there were about four main elements: prayer, psalmody, scripture readings and a sermon or homily (on the Sabbath), this was done on the portions of the scripture which had

been read (Parrinder, 1983, 426). Originally, the church derives its revenues from voluntary offerings by the church members:

Tithes and first fruits are occasionally mentioned, but the biblical precedent (Deuteronomy xiv: 22-26) does not seem to have been exploited by the clergy until the second half of the sixth century in Merovingian Gaul. From Constantine's time the property and burial grounds – grew rapidly. He himself gave land and houses to the churches and his example was followed by many of his subjects (Parrinder 1983, 426)

Asante (1999, 74,) asserted that Christian accountability entails people vested with authority or power to be answerable and accountable “not only to those over whom they exercise their power but also to God,” It is He who has the absolute authority and control over his creatures. Accountability calls for the need of candidness, frankness and to a greater extent honesty in the use of power. And those whom over which power is exercised have the right to know how this power is wielded in their names as far as the use of their money, which they were able to accrue, through titles, taxes or possibly investment, but not what the authorities may choose to say or made known to them. This is so because those vested with power or authority must be cognizant of the fact that the day of reckoning and accountability before God will surely come, “more than anything else, we want to please him, whether in our home here or there, for all of us must appear before Christ, to be judged by him. Each will receive what he deserves, according to everything he has done, good or bad, in his bodily life” (2 cor. 5:9-10).

Asante (1999, 24) mentioned the theme of the final judgment which stated and concretize accountability in the Bible. He went further to state that the Credo of Christianity emphasis' Christ returns as a judge. The Christian expectation is that there will come a time when every individual (man or women) shall appear before Christ to render an account of his/her deeds. “For example”, he went on to explain,

“In Matt. 25:14 – 30, our responsible use of the gifts and talents God has given to us in service is the basis for the final judgment. This is precisely because, in biblical thought, one owes one’s being and possessions to God who is the Creator and Giver of all things and therefore Lord and Master of all”.

The place that human being occupies in creation explains the notion that the human is responsible and accountable to God. Man in relation to creation, is appointed the master of all things with the exception of himself, (Gen. 1:26-28). “Man is placed in the Garden of Eden to cultivate and guard it”, (Gen. 2:15). He is also given a limited freedom in the exercise of his right in relation to the creation and in the use of nature. “You may eat the fruit of any tree in the garden except the tree that gives knowledge of what is good and what is bad. You must not eat the fruit of that tree; if you do, you will die the same day” (Gen. 2:16-17). In his commentary to the injunction stated above, Asante has this to say:

The injunction to eat “the tree that gives knowledge of what is good and what is bad”, is the best both of the human’s acknowledgment of God’s ownership of all things and of the human’s position as God’s steward in the order of creation. The point of the injunction is that, the human is not the owner of all things so he or she can hardly do with created things as he or she pleases. The human must exercise his or her stewardship of creation according to God’s direction. Psalm 24: 1 reads: ‘The world and all that are in it belong to the lord; the earth and all who live on it are his’. We intend this statement to understand that the human owes his or her being and all that he or she has to God who owns all things (1999, 24-25).

From this perspective, man owes everything to God. Whatever he possesses, that is, his life, properties, wealth and all that gives meaning to life is given to him by God and he or she will be held responsible of this stewardship. He is ultimately going to render this accountability before God. This is so because men hold these properties in trusteeship but God is ultimately the owner

2.3.2 Islam & Accountability

Parrinder (1983, 462), stated that: “Islam is an Arabic word that, means ‘acceptance’, ‘surrender’; submission’ or commitment; and it expresses the innermost attitude of those who have hearkened to the preaching of Mohammed.” Those who follow or accept Islam are known as Muslims and this is an indication, from their name, that they have committed themselves entirely into the hands of a sovereign divine ruler, whose will it is their purpose to follow in every aspect of life. Islam, in another sense, can also be used as a name for a community, but most significantly, it is a religious word that signifies an inner attitude, that is renewed in every situation of life. It is also an attitude that gives a humble recognition of the human obligation to fulfill the purpose of the Majestic and All-Powerful Creator. Islam, as believed by Muslims, is the proper channel through which a person establishes a sound relationship with God and it brings in its train the fulfillment of human life here on earth and the reward in the Hereafter.

Muslims, according to Parrinder (1971, 473) believed that the Qur’an is the highest authority in all matters of faith, theology and law. It is also considered by theologians as the very words of God that was revealed to the Prophet of Islam Mohammed. The Qur’an, therefore, is the first source of accountability in Islam. It explains the “duties and obligations of Muslim life, as well as rewards or punishments, fall upon men and women alike” (Esposito, 1984, 2). “Whosoever does a righteous deed, whether man or woman, and has faith, we will give him (her) a good life, and we shall reward them according to the best of their actions” (Qur’an 16:97).

Zidan (1998, 19), narrated that at the time of creation God made a covenant with man which man accepted the “trust” which He (God) had offered to the creations but they

refused to bear that trust out of fear (the fear of rendering an account of that trust). In this direction the Qur'an (33:72) declares: "Indeed we offered the Trust to the heavens, the earth and the mountains, but they refused to bear it and were afraid of it, but mankind undertook to bear it, surely he was unfair ignorant".

Zindan further stated that the outcome of man's acceptance of the trust determined the significance of his existence as God's Khalifah (vice-gerent) on earth. Qur'an 2:30 affirms this claim. It is therefore incumbent on mankind to fulfill this divine mandate as he/she will fully account for this trusteeship.

It is, perhaps, from our point of view, this offer of trusteeship that informed Abdallah Omar Nassif, one time Secretary-General of the Muslim World League pointed out that Islam, as taught by the Qur'an "has three main concepts that may be regarded as the cornerstone of accountability". These are Unity, trusteeship and accountability", in other words, *Tawheed*, *Khilafah* and *Aakhrah*. These are among others the basic values of accountability in Islam. This observation was noted by Rev. Amoako a lecture at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology Kumasi in his lecture note (2009). Tawheed, according to Billal Philips (2004: 10), literally means "unification" (making something one) or "asserting oneness" and it finds its root from the Arabic verb "*wahhada*", meaning to unite or to consolidate. It is the belief that Allah is one without partner in his domination and his actions. He is also one without similitude in his essence and attribute and without rival in his divinity and in worship. "He created everything and therefore all is accountable to him on the day of resurrection" (Qur'an 39:62).

Khilafah (trusteeship) is the human status of Allah's vice regency on earth and the "substance of humanity's vice regency over the earth is primarily that of trust", (Joyner, 1996, 129). This was a global trusteeship offered by God to the Heavens, the Earth and the mountains but out of fear and their inability to render account of their trusteeship and stewardship of these creatures refused to take this responsibility. But because of his ignorance the human race took the opportunity to shoulder that *amana* (trust). Joyner (1996,129), remarked that a scholar Al-Hafiz Masri once said: "early Muslims regarded all elements of nature such as land, air, water, fire, sunlight, forest as the common property of all creatures." She went on to quote another Muslim legal scholar who argues that: "people do not in fact own things, for the real owner is their creature: they only enjoy the usufruct of things, subject to the divine law". The usage of these resources are clearly explained by the Qur'an thus; "Eat and drink, but waste not by indulging in excesses; surely, Allah does not approve of the intemperate" (Qur'an 7:31). The main duty of the Khalifa, in the view of Zidan (1998, 19-20) is not only to interpret the Shariah (Islamic law) and to see how religious matters are observed but rather to "administer" the law and to act as *Qadi* (Judge) within the given confines of the Shari'ah". "We have appointed you Khalifah on the earth, so judge between the people with justice, and do not follow vain desires, lest it leads you astray from the way of God" (Qur'an 38:26).

We have seen, in the foregoing, how the Qur'an categorically attested to the institution of Khalifah (trusteeship) since its inception. And it is understood that the Qur'an is the word of God that contains "the infallible revelation of Allah to Mohammed" (Kessler, 2003, 263). And this "divine mandate of the Qur'an took on form and substance in Medina under the guidance and direction of God's messenger, the Prophet Mohammed" (Esposito, 1984, 3).

For Islam, God is the ultimate holder or dominion of all things and over creation (Qur'an 2:107, 5:120) and at the end of every stewardship and whatever trust given to everyone, all things or whatever that may be, shall return to Him, (Qur'an 24:42), and since all things are going to return to Him, they are therefore going to be responsible of those trusteeship and thus "accountable each in their own ways", (Danny, 2008, n.p).

Jabnoun (2004, 166), asserted that, man from his creation is favored with the faculty of intellect, and it is only normal he/she be accountable for his or her deeds, and "every individual is responsible and accountable for every single deed" (Qur'an 74:38-39). This *ayat* (verse) indicates that every soul shall be held responsible and accountable for his actions and inactions. Jabnoun went further to explain that accountability is not only held here but also in the Hereafter, and this belief has contributed to the success of Muslims leaders in the ages past. In a Hadith the Prophet is reported to have said: "It is a responsibility, and it is a source of ignominy and regret in the Hereafter (Sahih al-Bukhari) vol. 2.

The second source of accountability in Islam is the *Sunnah*, or "Customs" of the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W). This was derived from his words and actions. Some of these materials, Kessler (2003, 263) noted has been recorded in the Hadith, which Muslims believe contains the authentic accounts of what the Prophet said and did", He went on to assert that, "Muslims consider both the Qur'an and the Sunnah of Muhammad (S.A.W) as divinely inspired sources".

It is one of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) (as quoted on page 3) that laid the principle of accountability. In that Hadith, narrated by Bukhari Muhammad categorically emphasized the need for accountability.

The Prophet stipulated by charging each and every individual as a guardian, that is a guardian to what he/she is given to take care of: for example, our children, our wealth or whatever is given to us. He also explained that a leader of a household, a mosque or any institution that one finds himself to lead, is a guardian over the activities of that place and he (the leader) is going to be held responsible and accountable of his stewardship.

Enjoying the divine appointment as a leader, Muslims believe that, Muhammad (S.A.W) is said to have exhibited starling qualities as a role model of accountability: “You have a good model in God’s Prophet” (Qur’an 33:21) and he therefore claimed that “all human activities was accountable not to a tribe’s customary law or to blood vengeance but to an overriding divine law challenge the very foundation of Arabian Society” (Esposito, 1984, 4).

The change of baton of the leadership of the Muslim’s *Ummah* (community) took place in 632 A.D. immediately after the death of Muhammad (S.A.W). The vacuum created by his death ushered in “the period of the Rightly Guided Caliphs” (Al-Khulafa’a Al-Rashideen) , (632-661). Rightly Guided Caliphate Period.

According to Esposito (1984, 5), the Rightly Guided Caliphate Period began in 632 when the Sunni Muslims believe, Muhammad (S.A.W) died without designating a successor. After a brief but tense period of indecision, finally, the leading members of the community, that is, the leading companions handed over the baton to Abu Bakr as their leader. Abu Bakr, Esposito said was a very close friend and adviser of Muhammad (S.A.W) and one of the earliest converts to Islam.

Abu Bakr resolved to execute this mandate of trusteeship to the best of his ability. He was able to quell the uprising that resulted after the death of Muhammad (S.A.W). According to Esposito (1984, 5) the death of Muhammad (S.A.W) precipitated series of Arab tribal rebellion. With the death of Muhammad (S.A.W), many tribal chiefs abrogated their political pact with Madinah hence the rebellions. These rebellions later came to be referred to as the *riddah* wars (apostasy or renunciation of Islam). Abu Bakr might have mustered such courage to quell this uprising simply because he was aware of this trusteeship and the *amana* bestowed on him as a leader and he was going to account for it.

Esposito (1984, 6), narrated that the first four caliphs were all companions of the Muhammad (S.A.W). Abu Bakr (632 – 634), Umar (634 – 644) and Uthman (644 – 656), Ali (656 – 661). Unlike Abu Bakr, Umar's selection as a Caliph was done by Abu Bakr, Umar on his deathbed appointed an election committee to select his successor. After due consultations, Uthman ibn Affan, from the Umayyad, a leading Makkan family, was elected.

Half way through his ascensions to power as the third Caliph, Uthman was accused of weakness in administration and nepotism. Accountability appears to have been lacking in Uthman's administration and the appointment of Marwan ibn Hakim (member of his household) as the chief secretary worsened the already volatile situation (Zidan, 1998, 194). These became the focus of the insurgence that eventually claimed the life of the Caliph Uthman. Uthman was murdered by a group of Muslims Mutineers from Egypt (Esposito, 1984, 6), for his inability to render an account of his stewardship.

The fourth Caliph was Ali bin Abi Talib, who took over after Uthman. According to Esposito (1984, 7-8) Ali was a cousin of the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W). He was also his son in law. He married the Prophet's only surviving daughter Fatimah. She gave birth to two sons Hassan and Husayn. Ali was viewed by the family of the Prophet as the legitimate successor. The election of the first three Caliphs who were seen as interlopers frustrated the household of the Prophet and therefore regarded their leadership as irresponsible and unaccountable. However the leadership of Ali was brief. His authority was challenged from two angles: the first was a coalition led by the Prophet's wife Aishah (who happens to be the daughter of the first caliph-Abu Bakr), and the second by the army of Mu'awiyah, the governor of Syria and a cousin of the Caliph Uthman.

Mu'awiyah resented Ali for his inability to prosecute Uthman's assassins and on that note called for vengeance for Uthman's murder. Mu'awiyah had also refused to accept Ali's appointment of another general to replace him as the governor to Syria. War was eminent as Ali led an army against his rebellious governor. It later became obvious that Ali's army will win the day, Mu'awiyah's men sort for some armistice and arbitration by raising copies of the Qur'ans on the tips of their spears calling for peaceful settlement in accordance with the Qur'an(49:9). They were crying "Let God decide!"

Esposito (1984, 6) concluded by saying:

The arbitration that then took place proved inconclusive militarily but had two important political results. A group of Ali's supporters, the Kharijites ("Seceders"), who were disgusted with Ali's vacillation, broke with him. For the Kharijites, Mu'awiyah had committed a grave sin by challenging Ali's authority. Anyone who did so was no longer a Muslim and therefore the lawful object of *Jihad* (holy war), given Muslims absolute duty to do good and prevent evil. In acquiescing to arbitration and not crushing Mu'awiyah, Ali had failed to perform his Islamic duty to subdue the rebels. The Kharijites were the first sect in Islam to express an uncompromising, egalitarian sociopolitical policy, namely, that leadership of the Islamic community belonged to the most observant of Muslims. Ali himself was no longer worthy of leadership since he had

failed to prove himself a true believer. The Alids (followers of Ali) on the other hand, felt, thwarted by Mu'awiyah's rustic. The rebel Mu'awiyah's, has not been subdued.

After the death of Ali, Mu'awiyah confirmed himself as the Caliph and left Siffin (where the battle took place in 657). He remained the undisputed governor of Syria. He extended his rule to as far as Egypt, and when in 661 after the assassination of Ali, by a Kharijite, Mu'awiyah's claim to the Caliphate became complete and thereby establishing his capital in Damascus. With this, the "Golden Age" of which Muhammad (S.A.W) and the four Rightly Guided Caliphs in Madinah established came to an end.

From the foregoing we can deduce that accountability has been firmly established since the advent of Islam. The Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet laid emphasis on it, and this was exemplified in his saying and deeds. The Prophet perhaps was able to excel himself on the issue of accountability simply because he had the divine mandate. Unlike the Prophet, the four Rightly Guided Caliphs especially Uthman and Ali could not or had failed, to some extent, in rendering the stewardship on which they were elected. Uthman was accused of nepotism and inefficiency and Ali could not account for the death of Uthman. This plunged the nascent Muslim Community into civil war.

Significantly, religion generally takes cognizance of both individual and collective responsibility and accountability and it charges man to assiduously bear in mind the need for the stewardship, trusteeship and accountability that rests on his shoulders. He is going to render this *amana* that he happens to bear out of his own greed, injustice and ignorance.

2.4 ETHICS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Ethics is the study of morality. It is man's internal form, such as the spiritual and innate instincts, habits and qualities which are present in man. These qualities are known as Ethics. It is the human nature to sustain his life and in that effort, he or she needed food, warmth, shelter, and other things that he or she thinks could provide him with some measure of satisfaction. These needs which are basic normally have value for the human being. In his quest for these basic needs the human resembles other animals. At a point in the history of mankind, people began to think about the things they valued. "With that, conceptualization began and the idea of goodness was born" (Holmes, 1998, 3).

Holmes (1998, 4), writes that: "This shift separated us from other animals. They need and want many things but (so far as we know) don't have a concept of value (or goodness)," adding that "by which to understand and think about such things or about the role they play in their lives". In the course of time societies came into being and this called for increased cooperation and division of labor which facilitated the satisfaction of the needs. Demands began to outstrip or overstretch needs and "interest extended beyond things that merely make survival possible to things that also enhance life". Issues such as entertainment, leisure, music, literature, science and philosophy became varied and learning was pursued beyond imaginable level not only for its own sake but also for the sake of survival.

These and other related issues gave the way for humanity to reflect on life and the world and this gave birth to the idea of goodness "in which an interest was taken eventually came to be invested with value, and the idea of goodness became pervasive" (Holmes, 1994, 4). As society developed, one major activity emerged;

guiding and directing of conduct. Groupings such as tribe, family and nations expanded and this necessitated some directive and guidance in the general as well as specific conduct of the communities. These started from the mother, the father as social relations evolved, “the kinds of direction, and the circumstance of its use, undoubtedly expanded as concepts of power, dominance, leadership, and eventually government formed” (Holmes, 1994, 5). Based on that, Holmes again stated that:

...’ Conduct contrary to established and approved ways of doing things came to be discourage and often punished , prohibitions grew up, and certain kinds of conduct were considered wrong others were permitted or even expressly required were demand right or obligatory. Directives for regulating conduct congealed over time into rules and principles, as settled habits became transformed into customs and practices. Our words “ethics’ and morals, in fact, derive from the Greek and Roman words ethics and morals respectively, signifying the customs, conventions, rules, standards, and distinctive characteristics of communal groups (Holmes, 1999, 6).

This poses the most important question human beings can ask of themselves, that is “How should one live” Socrates (470-399 B.C.E) once asked this question. Are human beings going to live according to the commands of God, submitting their will to the divine will or are they going to live a virtuous life that creates social harmony; or are they going to follow the Golden Rule, that is, doing unto others as they would have them doing unto them? Or just subject their lives to some moral natural law, “that is built into the structure of the universe?” (Kessler, 2003: 359).

In our view religion can give elaborate answers to these questions, for example, how man should live his life. In a broad sense, the answers are moral in providing norms or values for the conduct of human life. Kessler (2003, 259) stated that, “this moral viewpoint is based on a distinction between what is the case and what “ought” to be the case”. Distinction is always done between what is real and what is the ideal. “The real,” according to Kessler “is what is the case, and in the ideal is what ought to be the case”. Morality or ethics are connected in diverse ways with religion. It is

religion that identifies moral norms. It is the channel by which humanity is informed as to what is morally right and what is morally wrong and legitimize moral norms by justifying them in a way to inform human kind what they should consider moral and by so doing they fall under some obligation to follow the laid down moral rules. Religion can motivate people so that they can shape their lives according to the set up religiously transmitted moral rules.

Religion is the primarily conservative as far as moral issues are concern. It endorses and gave support to, in many cases, the conventionally accepted moral norms but it also criticizes some moral norms that are not accepted within the cultural set up of a particular society. As we can see, religion identifies and legitimizes moral norms and it also uses “retribution and guilt to motivate and renew moral commitments” (Kessler, 2003, 260). On this note, Hartman (2002, 8), observed that:

No theory or approach to the evaluation of actions is more rules based than religion. After all, the Ten Commandments are viewed by some as the most basic principles of behavior. Additional rules such as “Do on to others as you could have them do unto you”, also spring directly from religious thoughts or writings, rather than from reason or logic. The religious point of view is not different from Kent’s perspective, except that the conversely principles come directly from religious beliefs. Whether one is of Christian, Jewish, Moslem, Buddhist, or other faith, the deity’s laws are viewed as absolutes that must shape the whole of one’s life including work. Faith, rather than reason, intuition, or secular knowledge, provided the foundation for a moral life built on religion.

2.4.1 The Divine Command Theory of Ethics

Many religious traditions, especially the monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam, have a common belief in the theory of Divine Command ethics. The focus of this discussion will be on Islam and Christianity so that we shall try to see the correlation and connectivity of divine command ethics and accountability.

Kessler (2003, 273), noted that Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 1274) gave the Christian version of natural law theory which became influential for the identification and justifying of moral norms. "Natural law theory", instructs us to ask, "Is it (whatever "it" may be) natural?" if the answer is yes, it is morally good, and if the answer is no, it is morally wrong".

He divided all reality into "natural kinds", and he distinguishes each of these kinds by a unique essence. Each indicates the natural ends, or outcomes, for each kind. Aquinas gave an example of the natural and for an acorn is to develop into an oak tree, which by the virtue, excellence of goodness of the acorn is to achieve the said outcome. With this in mind, Aquinas' concern was the human being and not the arcons. He again cited an example of suicide as morally wrong because it goes contrary to the natural inclination of preserving life. For him, monogamy is morally right since it promotes the natural end of procreation and proper child care.

According to Kessler (2003, 273), natural law theory has found its place in the modern world which centered on sexuality. He said, "Roman Catholicism, using natural law theory, has condemned as immoral any use of artificial methods of birth control. And that homosexuality has also been denounced as immoral on similar grounds. "If the natural end of humans is to produce, any sexual activity that is not conducive to reproduction is morally wrong because it is "unnatural". Abortion is also attacked on the same grounds by Roman Catholicism since the "natural end of human embryo is to develop to become a human being, aborting that embryo is unnatural", the reason is that it will prevent the natural developmental process, "just as a squirrel that eats an arcon stops its natural development into an oak tree"

Aquinas maintained that, natural law is derived from the eternal law of God by which God governs the universe. For that reason only God knows the complete eternal law, but human beings can use reason to deduce natural law from the eternal law. Kessler (2003, 274), concluded this argument by saying:

Human law is, then, an extension of natural law in particular cases. It follows that the laws by which societies govern themselves should reflect natural law closely as possible. There will always be disagreements over specific applications, but the general principles should be clear enough. Following this line of reasoning, Pope Leo XIII argued in the encyclical letter “Immortale Dei” of 1885 that since both “nature and reason” command all people to worship God, it should be a public crime for people to act as if there were no God. A state with human laws that shows no concern for religion is, therefore, immoral.

Finally, both Christianity and Islam firmly established the need for stewardship and accountability. Christianity acknowledges the sovereignty of God and his ownership of things that we see and those that we do not see. Whatever we possess and the life that we live all belong to God. And that a day of reckoning is definitely coming where the expectation is that every man or woman shall appear before Christ to render an account of his/her stewardship.

Islam, on the other hand, entrusted the human being with the trusteeship or the *amana* which the Heaven, the Earth and Mountains refused to bear out of fear. But man out of ignorance and being the vice-regent of Allah bore this trust and he is going to render the account on the Day of Judgment.

Ethics, as already established, both from the Christian and Islamic perspectives derived its source from the Divine Command Theory and this command is the will of God. Therefore ethics firmly supports and calls for accountability in human endeavor.

Shari'ah is an Islamic idea which is often defined as “divine law”, but the literal meaning is “a path to water.” It refers to, “the entire body of moral, ritual, and legal directives that Islam claims is ordained by Allah” (Kessler, 2003, 261). Kessler again noted that the *Shari'ah* is the answer Islam gives to Socrates’ question about how we should live. He cited Al-Ashari (Founder of an Islamic School of theology named after him, (died 935). This Islamic theologian argued that Allah is an “Overwhelming Monarch” who is subject to no one or thing. That nothing whatsoever can be wrong on the part of this God. The *Asharites* (followers of this school of thought) argue that God’s commands and prohibitions are the only things that make something right or wrong. *Al-Ashari* argued strongly that morality is based on the divine will only. He does not content human reason or rationality. That the “bases for morality is not in human reason, but in Allah’s will” (Kessler, 2003, 262).

The position of *Asharites* is a typical example of a strong form of divine common theory of ethics which indicates that “we find the foundation of all morality in God’s will. In other words, the meaning of good is equivalent to what God prohibits” (Kessler pointed out that the basis for their argument is the Quranic injunction that states: “He will not be questioned as to that which He doth, but they will be questioned”, (Qur’an 21: 23). Some schools of theology such as the *Mu'tazil*’s and others refuted this claim.

The *Mu'tazilas*, a rival theological school to the Al Ashari argued that good and evil have a rational base. The *Asharites* firmly held that only God’s commands and prohibitions are the only things that make something right or wrong. The *Mu'tazila*, theologians asserted to the fact that God commands something because it is good. The *Mu'tazilas* were rationalistic and their argument was based on human reason.

God knows that something is good or bad and commands or prohibits it accordingly. “God does not command lying but prohibits it because lying is morally wrong. Its wrongness can be established on rational grounds” (Kessler, 2003, 262). Another school of thought, according to Montgomery Watt (1962, 31), who held the doctrine of “free will were known as the *Qadarites*”. They talk much about *qadar*. *Qadar* means “determination” and is mostly applied to God’s effective determination of events. The man who propounded this idea was the ascetic al-Hassan al-Basri. Al-Basri asserted that God’s determination was his command that is, “to do certain things and to avoid certain others”.

Rippin (1990,64), commented that the *Qadariyya* (people who believe in pre-determination) among the theological schools are more revolutionary because their support of free will was always connected to those agitating for new political order. They were opposed to the “Umayyad Caliphs and their appropriation of both political and theological authority under the guise of having been appointed by God (and thus destined to fulfill this function)” they (*Qadarites*) believe that “if individuals were accountable for their actions, then so were governments”.

The bases of morality with God’s command can be found according to Islam, in the *Shari’ah* or divine law. The *Shari’ah* is a broad concept and Muslims do not make critical distinction among what is moral or ethical, what is religion or what is legal. The *Shari’ah* is regarded as the totality of divine law. It contains all sort of religious duties such as prayer, moral and legal duties. The *Shari’ah* has four distinctive sources namely: the Qur’an, which contains the infallible revelation of Allah to Muhammad (S.A.W). The Second source is the “Sunnah” or “Customs” or traditions

of the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) (his words and actions), which is known as the “*Hadith*”.

The third source is “*qiyas*” or analogical reasoning. Analogies are derived from emerging issues or situations found in the Qur’an and the Sunnah and a trained jurist can deduce what should be done in new situations. The fourth and the last source is “*ijma*”. This is the consensus reached by the community, that is: by those who are learned and well versed in the interpretations of both the Qur’an and the Sunnah. “These religious authorities both interpret the *Shari’ah* and administer it. They serve as preachers, teachers, arbiters, judges, notaries, witness, prayer leaders, and heads of *Sufi* mystical orders”, (Kessler, 2003, 263).

2.5 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this exposition shall serve as a clarion call to all those who are in a position of authority to bear in mind the need for accountability from the foregoing we deduced that accountability is not a new phenomenon but rather a covenant made between God and man at the very time of creation. It is therefore incumbent on those vested with authority to learn lessons from the past as the inability to render an account could ferment discontent and unease, and ultimately the wrath of God could descend.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FORMATION OF MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN KUMASI

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter we discussed how religion established stewardship and accountability. The chapter laid emphases on accountability both in this world and in the Hereafter. Major religions in Ghana such as Islam and Christianity made efforts to inculcate the sense of accountability within their circles. In secular circles such as government institutions, universities and non-governmental organizations efforts were made to ensure the need for accountability. Some of the tools employed to ensure accountability include laws, byelaws, regulations and procedures as well as ethical codes of conducts. These serve as checks and balances with regards to duty in the work place. But within the religious circles, even though the scriptures (2 Cor.5:9-10 and Qur'an 16:97) categorically state the need for accountability in all human endeavors, yet this appears to be lacking among the Muslim community in Kumasi, particularly in the Kumasi Central Mosque. This chapter seeks to find the composition of the Muslim community in their heterogeneity, leadership structures and how responsible and accountable they are as far as the financial administration of the Kumasi Central Mosque is concerned.

The main aim of this chapter is to trace the reason for the settlement of Muslims in Kumasi since the 1800s, as well as the establishment and growth of the Muslim community in Kumasi. Efforts will be made to find out their relationship with northern Muslims who are incorporated into the Asante society commonly referred to as the Asante *Nkramo*. The Muslims in Kumasi were later referred to as the people of the *zongo*. The chapter will also trace the political as well as the social issues of the

Muslims that culminated in the establishment of the Kumasi Central Mosque. The Mosque which is the focal point of *zongo* had undergone three disputes which had necessitated its closure for some time. Leadership of the community as well as the stewardship of the Mosque remained to this day a major concern of the people.

3.2 THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN KUMASI

In 1874, the centralized power of Asante was defeated by the British. Salaga (a town in the middle of Northern Region of Ghana) and an important market centre began to decline. This era witnessed the dispersion of Hausa traders to the south. The Hausa occupation of Salaga helped the spread of Islam in Ghana. Until the involvement of the Hausa in trade with the Asante, Salaga and its trade were dominated by the Dyula Muslims. Salaga's position as a mid-way town between Kumasi and the northern parts of Nigeria, precisely the Hausa land made it possible for the Hausa to penetrate not only in Kumasi but other parts of the modern day Ghana, (Samwini 2006, 318).

Before 1874, however, Samwini (2006, 31) asserted that Asante had had an encounter with Islam. The kingdom of Asante had made diplomatic contact with the kingdoms of the north such as Ouagadougou during the 18th century. In the 1800s trade in kola nuts expanded rapidly and this attracted a great number of Muslim merchants and some notable personalities from towns of Hausa land and Borno to Kumasi. Other factors that motivated and attracted Muslims to Kumasi were, among others: gold, timber, kola nuts, salt, diamonds and some products from the forest of Asante. Between 1807 and 1830, Samwini (2006,32) argued that Muslim *Shuyukh* from *Katsina* and a notable *bornuman*, Sharif al- Hajj Ibrahim visited Kumasi. Similarly, Clarke (1982, 107/8) observes that by the 1800s, the Muslim community in Kumasi had been established. Muslims had then converged in the center of the

town near the market place which was close to the royal palace. The Muslims were made up of several hundreds of people some of whom were scholars, artisans and merchants. However, Samwini (2006, 33) is of the view that by the 1820s and 1830s it became difficult to come up with an appropriate estimation of the number Muslims in the area.

Nevertheless, by the 1800s Muslims in Kumasi had become a community with a leader or “head of community, Mohammed al-Gamba, a Mumprusi man by tribe”. Al-Gamba was then elderly and was affectionately referred to as Baba. He was the Imam and led people in prayers as well as the chief *qadi* (judge). According to Clarke (1982, 107) this Muslim community in Kumasi was endowed with a considerable amount of talent and expertise, something the Asantehene and the chiefs were not slow to recognize. These qualities enabled Muslims in Kumasi to become advisers to the Asantehene and his elders on matters of state importance and commerce, and they wielded considerable economic and political power.

In the view of Sckildkrout (1974, 114) the Kumasi Muslim community was divided into two distinct categories. This division reflected the “historical pattern of the settlement in Asante of immigrant Muslims from northern Ghana and the surrounding countries”. She further asserted that the oldest of these settlements of the Muslim community are known as the Asante Nkramo (Asante Muslims). These were the descendants of those Muslims who came from the northern part of Ghana to Kumasi. They settled in Kumasi in the mid-eighteen century shortly after the beginning of the expansion of the Asante kingdom in the north. This was so until the British conquered the Asantes in 1896. The position of these Muslims however changed from one king (Asantehene) to the other, but generally they were welcomed

and were given a protection as long as their services were welcomed. They enjoyed a great religious influence on the kings and on the population, through the manufacture of charms and amulets. They also trained Asante children in the Arabic schools and they intermarried with the Asantes. Schildkrout (1978, 69) added that by 1860 a personal Imam was chosen for the king: he was known as *Imam al Balad* (Imam of the town). Wilks (1993, 298) confirmed that the first to become the *Imam al-balad* was Imam Uthman Kamaghatey, also known as Kramo Tia. Schildkrout (1978, 69) says

Today this office still exists, and members of the present day Asante Nkramo community (Asante Muslims) trace descent to these early immigrants. By the time the British arrived, these Muslims had already become sufficiently incorporated into Asante's society so that, in the wars of 1874 and 1900 with the British, there were loyal to the Asantehene

The Muslim settlement in Kumasi was referred to as the *zongo* in Hausa meaning stranger quarters, (Schildkrout, 1978, 60). The settlement could be traced to the 15th century, a time when colonialism began. The earliest Muslim settlers in Kumasi were from the northern parts of Ghana, from the northwestern part of *Banda*, the kingdom of Gonja, Dagomba and Mamprusi. Some of the immigrants mostly came from the Hausas of Nigeria and from the Mosis of the Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). Most of the ethnic groups such as Fulani and Hausa came to Ghana to propagate the religion of Islam. They settled in isolated places where they set up their businesses and independent chiefdoms in the *zongos* known as the *Sarkin Zongos* (Samwini 2006, 36).

The Asante Nkramo, according to Schildkrout originated from *Mande* commonly referred as *Wangara*. This group has now become incorporated socially and politically into Asante society. She maintained that the Asante Nkramo during the 18th and 19th centuries “were an ethnically distinct “stranger” group in Kumasi”.

Around this period the Muslim community comprised of various ethnic strangers who came mostly from the northern parts of Ghana to the Asante territories. Their main objectives were trading, though they were also religious men and farmers. They stayed in and around Kumasi “under the patronage of the king; the Asantehene”. The Muslims provided diverse services in the fields of religion, economic and politics to the Asante king.

This development gave birth to conflict between the Asante Muslims, who were now sufficiently incorporated into the Asante society, and the stranger Muslim (mainly Hausas). Consequently, around 1844 a limitation was placed on the influx of strangers to Asante. After the resolution of this problem, that is, “stranger problem”, the Muslims were placed under the authority of the Nsumankwahene, the Asantehene’s medical adviser. He was responsible for the physical and spiritual requirements of the Asantehene Schildkrout (1974, 114). Till now, the Muslim community in Asante is under the authority of the Nsumankwahene. He also serves as the means by which the Asantehene communicates to the Muslim community. The close association of the Asantehene palace with the Muslim community led to the institution of an Imamate known as the Asante Nkramo Imam charged with the responsibilities of praying and advising the king.

In the late 1870s to the early part of the 1880s, the Asante kingdom recruited an army from the various ethnic groups to fight against the British domination. The Hausas outnumbered the other ethnic groups in this army, hence the Hausa language become the lingua franca among the soldiers. In the nineteenth century especially in 1844; the Asante authorities controlled trade and immigration in the sub region. They discouraged the rise of typical Asante merchant class but allowed stranger groups

without control. As a result of this, the latter part of the nineteenth century witnessed an influx of northern immigrants into the Asante society. The strangers subsequently assimilated with the Asante to the extent that they allied with them to fight the British, (Schildkrout, 1974, 116).

Even though the Asante Nkramo were incorporated into the Asante society yet they more often identified themselves, in religious terms with other stranger Muslims who settled in Kumasi and formed their own identity as the Muslim community or commonly referred to as the *zongo*. We may, hereafter, be using the Muslim or *zongo* community interchangeably for the purpose of this study. The Asante Nkramo identified themselves with the Muslim community (*zongo*) and worshiped with them on Fridays and on any Muslim festivities. The Asante Nkramo Imam after praying for the Asantehene also performs some important role with the northern and non Ghanaian settlers who formed part of the *zongo* community. After the restoration of the Asantehene in 1935 the Asante Nkramo Imam “resumed his pre- colonial role as intermediary between the king and the stranger *zongo* Muslims”, (Schildkrout, 1974, 116)

The influx of northerners into Asante at the turn of the century when the conflict between the Asante and the British was high constituted the origins of the second category of Muslims in Kumasi. At that time, northerners came to Kumasi as British soldiers who were recruited to fight for the British against the Asante. After the war, most of the northerners stayed back and engaged themselves into trade and laborers. They were composed of different ethnic groups that came together but distinct from the local Asante population. Because of their status as strangers in Kumasi and to a greater extent used Hausa as their “lingua Franca”, they became a community.

Schildkrout (1974,117) maintained that, the British encouraged the Zongo settlement and its growth for some reasons among which the first was that the strangers had no traditional rulers in Kumasi and were therefore under the authority of the government. At the same time, the intension of the British was to reduce and control the traditional powers of the Asante Chiefs. Therefore, they did not hesitate to create a strong leader among the *zongo* community.

Sckildkrout (1974,116) went on further to explain that, the 1960's Population and Housing Census in Ghana indicated that less than half of the total population of Kumasi (42%) were Asante, while about 26% were "stranger" that is non Asantes from southern Ghana such as Ewes, Gas, Fantes and others. This indicated that one-third of Kumasi population were northerners which included, Dagomba, Mamprusi, Frafra (tallensi), Dagarti and Kusasi as well as others from the northern savanna areas of Ghana and some foreigners like the Mossi, Hausa, Yoruba and Zabarma.

We may deduce from the above postulation that the *zongo* community in Kumasi was composed of varied ethnic groups with varied cultural and social backgrounds. These groups were made up of Ghanaian and non- Ghanaian tribes who formed the foundation of the Muslim community in Kumasi with a different worldview, politically as well as culturally distinct from their host society-the Asantes. This ethnic background information had a bearing on the establishment of the Kumasi Central Mosque and its leadership. In the years before independence and immediately after independence the issue of citizenship and the Ghanaian law with regards to who was Ghanaian and an alien played a major role among the strangers in Kumasi as far as their political and social persuasions were concerned, as well as the control and ownership of the central Mosque in years that followed.

According to the census classification, 20% of the Kumasi populations in 1960 were of “foreign origin”. This included people defined legally as aliens because they or one or both of their parents were born outside Ghana. Although the citizenship laws have changed several times during the greatest part of the most independence period, Ghanaian citizenship could only be confirmed on people with Ghanaian parents. This means that much second and third generation of immigrants’ ineligible for citizenship, was controlled by aliens, and was subject to all the pressures affecting aliens during the rise of nationalism, (Schildkrout, 1974, 107).

Despite the common status as strangers Islam had united the Muslim community and the northern settler Muslims alongside their Asante counter parts. However, diverse national identity and political inclination among Muslims brought about schism and affected the unity in the zongo. This cleavage had the blessings in 1969, of the Busia government during the Aliens Compliance Order. As a result of this policy demographic distribution of the alien group such as the Zabarma, Gao, Yoruba and others was drastically affected, because a large number of these people left Ghana as a result. These “citizenship and the official policy towards aliens have direct relevance to local politics in areas like Kumasi with large immigrant populations”. And it is this immigrant population that forms the basis of *zongo*.

3.2.1 The formation of the *Zongo*

The word “*zongo*”, according to Mohammed Sidi Adams, (interviewed at his home near St. Peter’s Cathedral on 23rd June 2011) an elder of the *zongo* community and a Hausa man by tribe, is a Hausa word which means strangers quarters. It is a place where strangers or iternary travelers normally stay for a while before they continue their journey. He again explained that the zongo of Kumasi was not created consciously as a town but as a settler community. The Hausa were the first to settle in the isolated parts of Kumasi and invariably referred to themselves as the people staying in the zongo hence the name. He further explained that most of the northerners who came to Kumasi either for trade or on visits to their relatives stayed in the community of the non-Asante. Eventually the *zongo* community became a unit

of Kumasi as a result of the colonial government's policy. But in the view of Schildkrout (1970, 73) the *zongo* developed as a result of the northern settlers as well as Muslim traders and those who came for economic reasons. These early settlers were able to establish themselves both politically and economically to the extent that they dominated and controlled the activities of the community. Most of these settlers were foreigners like Hausa, Yoruba and Mosis who came from a more centralized states outside the Gold Coast and who were Muslims. Others such as the Frafra, Gurma, and Kanjaga who were the minority also lived in the *zongo* but were not Muslims. Because of the dominance of the Muslims in the stranger's community, Islamic tradition became established in the *zongo*.

It has been narrated by Sidi Adam that the *zongo* community which was established in Kumasi was as a result of the economic expansion in trade by the Muslim settlers and the "camp-followers who came to Kumasi with the British forces around 1896". By 1900 when the Asante rose against the British there were a large number of people living in the *zongo* community. These people in the *zongo* community first settled in an area known as *Mmoromu* or *zongo tumi*. The area is now known as *Mbrom*, (Schildkrout, 1970, 74). The Muslim community at *Mmoromu* or *zongo tumi* was moved in 1905 to *Yelwa* (a place of abundance) or the old *zongo* by the colonial administration. (Mohammed Sidi Adams, 23rd June, 2011).

During the years 1905 and 1924 as a result of growing population, *Yelwa* (place of abundance) expanded to cover an area known as *zongo* extension. After the plague of 1924 that stroked Kumasi and most especially the *zongo* community due to overcrowding, a new settlement was created by the British where houses were built similar to those of the *zongo* and people were moved in. This area became known as

Sabon Zongo (New Zongo) situated not far from the Manhyia Palace (the seat of the Asante king) and the Kumasi Central Mosque. In 1948, a second government housing project at Asawasi begun. “Today, both areas are predominantly occupied by northerners” (Schildkrout, 1978, 77). However, Northerners or Muslims and for that matter people of the *zongo* can now be found in places such as Aboabo, Yaati Yaati (Ayigya), Ahinsan, Nhiaso, Tafo, Suame and others.

The *zongo*, since its inception by the British in 1902, was dominated by the Hausa, Sidi Adams, maintained. This was so due to their success as traders. They were able to control the long- distance trade mostly in kola and cattle. The most successful businessmen among them were called *Maigida* (singular, landlord) or *Masugida* (plural, landlords). They were recognized by the colonial administration as the political heads of the *zongo* community. Therefore the British had recognized the *zongo* as a community with a head known as *sarkin zongo*. Though, the *zongo* community was heterogeneous in outlook comprising different ethnic groups, but “not in religious orthodoxy” (Samwini, 2006, 33).

In the view of Sidi Adams which was accentuated by Schildkrout (1974, 117), the first Hausa settlers dominated the *zongo* community due to their success in business, Arabic and Islamic scholarship. Their knowledge in Arabic language and *Fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) seem to have helped them become political authorities in the *zongo* community. This however does not mean that they had the leadership without opposition from the other ethnic groups. By 1910, according to Schildkrout (1974, 117) other members of the various ethnic groups had not taken it kindly with the manner in which a single ethnic group, that is, the Hausa established its hegemony on them. They protested to the government against the “institutionalization of Hausa

dominance”. As a result, they (other ethnic groups) were given an informal recognition to select their own head of community. With a limited jurisdiction to resolve disputes and settle some civil cases amongst them.

In an effort to apply the principles of indirect rule in the administration of the local government in Ghana, the British tried to apply this principle within the *zongo* of Kumasi because of its Islamic and Hausa culture. And for the British this principle could be applied in the *zongo* as though it were “miniature emirate and could be administered through a hierarchy of rulers, in this case the tribal headmen”, (Schildkrout, 1974, 118). Consequently, the throne of *zongo* with its head as the *sarkin zongo* (chief of the *zongo*) was created and the headman of the Hausa assumed the office. He was the leader of the set-up of the *zongo* community. He had authority over and above all the other ethnic groups. And by 1927 under the amendment of the 1924 Ashanti Administration Ordinance, the *sarkin zongo* was recognized as the head of the *zongo* with powers to rule over the Muslim community.

The other ethnic heads were made the jury in the tribunal of the *sarkin zongo*.

According to Babal al- Waiz, the first Hausa headman to assumed the title of *sarkin zongo* and recognized by the British was Mallam Gardi in the 1900s. Mallam Gardi was the Imam of the British Army before he assumed the position of *sarkin zongo*. He became unpopular among the Hausa traders in due course and later left Kumasi around 1902. Soon afterwards, the strangers left their station at *Mmoromu* to settle in the old *zongo* or *Yelwa*. Maigida, a wealthy man from Kano became the new *sarkin zongo*. However, Maigida could not maintain the favor of the British and he was subsequently disposed and expelled from Kumasi in 1905. The reason for which he was disposed was that he had run into debts. Thus he squandered the funds given to

him in trust by the traders. He was jailed as a result of the suit against him by his creditors that resulted to his disposition and expulsion, (Kanzul Mufid, 1975, np). Mallam Uthman then succeeded Maigida and in 1919 Mallam Sallaw also succeeded Uthman as the *sarkin zongo*, Sidi Adams explained. Mallam Sallaw's selection however, was not without opposition from some section of the Hausa. Mallam Sallaw, Sidi Adams said was born of a Hausa father and a Dagomba mother. This was the base of resentment from some of the Hausa that he (Sallaw) was not a full-blooded Hausa and therefore could not head the community. But Sallaw despite the opposition became a strong leader who exhibited quality leadership to the admiration of the British. He organized labor to clean up the *zongo* when Kumasi was struck by a plague and an epidemic. He also supervised the building of the *sabon zongo* estate houses. He became the first *sarkin zongo* that had a "formal place in the Kumasi administration" (Schildkrout, 1978, 198).

In the 1920s, the British attempted to minimize the powers of the Asante kings. They sent the Asantehene Prempeh I and some leaders on exile without any explanation to traditional rules. Some of the non-Asante leaders were also sent on exile. However in 1924, Prempeh I returned from exile and his jurisdiction was limited only as the Kumasi *hene* in 1926. But in 1935, there was a change of policy by the British and as a result, Prempeh II who succeeded the first king was made the Asantehene. By this time however, it was clear that political central authority could not work well in the hands of the *sarkin zongo*. The office of the *sarkin zongo* was abolished after a riot against the British for giving absolute authority of *zongo* to the *sarkin zongo*. Each individual ethnic headman was then allowed to officiate over his ethnic group. The British then transferred some of the affairs of the community to the Asantehene. The Asantehene however, did not interfere with the affairs of the *zongo* nor involved in

the selection of any particular headman as the sarkin zongo. He only approves the person selected to head the community. This helped the Asantehene to maintain peace within the *zongo* for some years until party politics was ushered in the late 1940s, (Schildkrout 1978, 118).

3.2.2 Politics in the Zongo

Politics like history is said to repeat itself. Schildkrout (1978, 118) observed that shortly after independence in 1957 when the Convention People's Party (CPP) consolidated its powers, relationship between central government and the zongo seemed to repeat the pattern of the 1920s and 1930s. The Asante king was at loggerhead with the ruling party. He was opposed to the CPP and the leadership particularly Nkrumah, this time not with the British. The government of Nkrumah like the British before it, made an attempt to diminish the authority of the Asantehene and to promote a strong leader in the *zongo*. Schildkrout (1978,118) further explained that, the leadership of the *zongo*, among the Hausamen, split into two between Ahmadu Baba and Mohammed Mutawakilu. Ahmadu Baba was then the Hausa headman, who enjoyed unflinching support of other headmen from the various ethnic groups. Ahmadu Baba also strongly supported the Asantehene in opposing the CPP. The Asantehene was the leader of the National Liberation Movement (NLM), an Asante based political party opposed to the CPP. In giving their support to the Asantehene they were otherwise opposed to Nkrumah and the CPP.

Sidi Adam disclosed that, in 1953 an exclusive Muslim party emerged known as the Muslim Association Party (MAP) and aligned with the NLM. The CPP government in 1958 banned all political parties with regional, tribal or religious inclinations. As a result, the NLM and the MAP merged with some other smaller parties to form the

United Party (UP). Mutawakilu, at this time contested the leadership of the *zongo* community or rather the Hausa headman ship against Ahmadu Baba but lost. He afterwards joined forces with the CPP to use political influence or connections to snatch the leadership from Ahmadu Baba who by then supported the Asantehene thereby giving the NLM support base in the *zongo* against the CPP. Nkrumah's government according to Sidi Adam was strongly opposed to the Asantehene and the NLM. He then threw his support to Mutawakilu and appointed him as the co-chairman of the CPP constituency in Kumasi, and again gave his accent to Mutawakilu as the *sarkin zongo*.

Soon after independence in 1957, Mutawakilu consolidated his powers by running the day to day affairs of the *zongo*. He was able to perform those functions as a result of his support of the CPP. His powers emanated from the party headquarters in Accra or direct from the CPP government. Mutawakilu could remove or maintain, as headman or otherwise, whoever he wanted from office especially those from the *zongo* community who were not supporters of the CPP. The deportation of Alfa Usman Ladan, a notable Muslim Cleric and a strong NLM supporter as well as Ahmadu Baba, the then Headman of the *zongo* were cases in point. Soon after the deportation of his ardent "enemies" and his challenger to the headship of the *zongo*, Mutawakilu was acclaimed the *sarkin zongo* in 1958. This proclamation, according to Schildkrout had a direct line to the highest echelons of the CPP. Mutawakilu's powers were almost unlimited for a short time. In his capacity as a CPP official and as *sarkin zongo*, he placed CPP supporters in all *zongo* leadership positions and suppressed the activities of all anti-CPP associations, Schildkrout (1974, 119).

Mutawakilu's ascendancy to power was short lived as Usman Mohammed Badawiri, a notable *zongo* elder who was his admirer turned to accuse him of being an autocrat leader who never listened to his advisers. Mohammed Badawiri alleged that Mutawakilu used power arbitrarily during his reign and within two and half years he made enemies for himself especially among his own Hausa men who had supported him. Mutawakilu provoked opposition in the *zongo* beyond proportion that the cry for his removal as the *sarkin zongo* intensified and the government had to succumb.

The Muslim Council, which was a body organized by the CPP to canvass support for it in the *zongo* also called for Mutawakilu's removal from office. Some Muslim leaders like Muhammad Tanko (*sarkin fawa* – Chief butcher) and Alhassan Mailafia (an elder who later became *sarkin zongo*) also added their voices for the removal of Mutawakilu as the *sarkin zongo*. Their claims against him were that he was autocratic and had not also identified himself with the people from Nigeria. His refusal to take part in the celebration of Nigerian independence worsened the case. The Hausa people in *zongo* community who were members of the Muslim Council championed the call for his removal from office. Nkrumah was pressurized over the matter so the cabinet, in 1961, agreed to remove Mutawakilu from office. By this action, the office of the *sarkin zongo* was again abolished for the second time. On the removal of Mutawakilu from the office of *sarkin zongo*, Schildkrout (1974, 199) says:

Mutawakilu was still recognized as the Hausa headman (after much opposition from a powerful faction within the Muslim Council) and as joint constituency chairman of the CPP, but once his powers as *Sarkin zongo* were removed his blank check to rule the *zongo* disappeared.

As we have seen in (3.2), the office of the *sarkin zongo* was first established in the 1900s by the colonial authorities for their political interest but the office was

abolished in the 1930s. The trend repeated itself as Nkrumah for his own political interest and the need to suppress the Asantehene and the NLM, recreated the office of the *sarkin zongo*. Nkrumah could not also sustain that office due to pressure from the public due to the inability of the *sarkin zongo* to conduct himself to the tenets of the office.

However, after the second abolishing of the office of the *sarkin zongo* in 1961 by the Nkrumah government, the Muslim council which was dominated by the Hausa became prominent. The membership of the association largely comprised of the second and third generation of settlers who had considerable wealth and Islamic literacy with influence and power in the *zongo*. According to Schilkrou (1974,119) “the rise of the Muslim council marked a shift in the locus of political authority from individual headmen, who were mainly first generation immigrants representing ethnic groups, born to Kumasi immigrants”. Their status and prestige were as a result of their wealth, education (Islamic) rather than their ethnic identity. The Muslim council became the mouth piece of the CPP and it was in control of the *zongo* politics. The Association tried to efface the remnants of Mutawakilu’s power among the Hausa headmen. This had been the case until 1966 when Nkrumah was overthrown in a coup that brought the activities of the organization to an end.

The CPP government, like the British before it, had tried to centralize the authority of the *zongo* by instituting the office of the *sarkin zongo* under Mutawakilu through the Muslim Council. This effort proved futile after the overthrow of Nkrumah. The leadership of *zongo* was once again decentralized like in 1935 when Prempeh II resumed office as the Asantehene. The Asantehene again acted as the intermediary between the National Liberation Council (NLC) and the *zongo*. The *zongo* remained

decentralized where each ethnic group elected its leader or headman for the Asantehene's approval. The *zongo* was to some extent an autonomous community within Kumasi. Ahmadu Baba who was deported by Nkrumah returned to Kumasi and assumed the leadership of the Hausa community and once again united the *zongo* for several years afterwards.

3.2.3 Muslim Organizations in the Zongo

According to Sulemana Mumuni, (1994,96-100), the first Muslim organization that was formed among the Muslims and Ghana was the Gold Coast Muslim Association (GCMM) in the 1930's. The main objective for the formation of the GCMM was to cater for the religious as well as social needs of the Muslim community, but soon afterwards the GCMM took to politics thereby, neglecting its main objective- to cater for the social as well as religious needs of the Muslim community.

He went on further to suggest that during the struggle for independence the GCMM "metamorphosed into the Muslim Association Party (MAP) in 1954". Another Muslim organization, the Muslim Youth Congress (MYC) was formed and the organization came into the limelight during the reign of the Convention Peoples Party (CPP).

The Muslim Council which was a nationwide organization was perhaps the first Muslim organization to be set up in the *zongo*. It was affiliated to the Convention People's Party which Mutawakilu used to whip up support in the *zongo* community for the benefit of the Convention People's Party. This organization after gaining grounds, pushed for the removal of Mutawakilu as the *sarkin zongo* in later years. Another Muslim organization was the Muslim Association Party. Though an

association that became a political party, Ahmadu Baba and some notable *zongo* headmen belong to this organization that was opposed to the Convention People's Party as discussed in section (3.2.1) above. It was formed in 1953 and latter aligned itself with the National Liberation Movement that merged up with other parties to become the United Party in the 1960s.

Soon after the overthrow of Nkrumah, the various ethnic communities resurfaced with each headman focusing on economic activities. Their involvement in economic activities was perhaps intended to make them "powerful". Schildkrout (1974, 121) disclosed that they secured jobs and market stalls in all sectors of the economy for their members. Government officials met with some of their tribesmen (northerners) and urged them to form associations in order to effectively compete with the non Ghanaians like the Hausa, Yoruba and the Mossi in the trade of live stock and kola nuts. Though such associations proved ineffective, they were used by some politicians to create disunity within the *zongo* community by whipping the sentiment of nationalism. This schism was "clearly expressed in the 1969 phase of the Mosque crises", Schildkrout (1974, 121).

Sidi Adams (interviewed on 23rd June 2011) mentioned that, associations were formed mainly on ethnic lines but could not at that time unite the *zongo*. He added that many national or local organizations were formed and foremost was the National Liberation Movement. The National Liberation Movement was active by 1952 which was the period when the issue concerning construction of the Kumasi Central Mosque was discussed. When the CPP came to power in 1957, the National Liberation Movement was banned in 1958. It later merged with some smaller parties to become the UP. And the CPP had its support base from the Muslim Council

(discussed above). The Muslim Council dominated the affairs of local Muslim affairs during its peak in the 1960s. Its leadership just like the NLM was dominated by the non Ghanaian ethnic groups, Sulemana Mumuni, (1994,40) categorised the alien communities of Ghana as such; the non-Ghanaians who are referred as aliens mostly came from Nigeria or the French speaking West Africa states. The most dominant among them are the Hausas, Yoruba, Fulani, Nupe, Kanure from Nigeria, and others such as Mossi, Chamba, Zambrama, Kotokoli, Chokosi, Basari as well as the Wangara came from the French speaking West African countries. The main objective of the council was to take control of the affairs of the Muslim Community. After the coup d'état in 1966, the council became defunct and two opposing Muslim organizations contested with the Council; these were the Muslim Community and the Ghana Muslim Mission. They both claimed to have been in existence long before the Muslim Council but remained inactive until after the coup d'état in 1966.

The Muslim Community like the Muslim Council before it, was mainly made up of migrants. They were mainly the Hausa, Yoruba, Mossi and the Zabarma and other non Ghanaians. Despite its alien composition, some Ghanaian citizens like Abdullahi Shuiab who was head of the Mamprusi community and Imam Abdul-Mumin the Asante Nkramo Imam were members.

The Ghana Muslim Mission (GMM) was formed in 1957, Sulemana Mumuni (1994, 96, 100) maintained, The Mission was organized mainly by indigenous Ghanaians such as the Gas, Asante, Fante, Brongs, Dagombas and Gonjas. It was first organized by the Gas to champion their cause. The objectives of the organization (GMM) were, first and foremost, to bring indigenous Ghanaian Muslims under one umbrella in order to break the hegemony of the “alien” Muslims in the country. To again, review

the true teachings of Islam and “the catering for the needs of newly converted Muslims and providing educational facilities for the youth”.

In this regard, the Ghana Muslim mission has built several institutions for learning all over the country. A school complex and a Mission house as well as a Mosque are built in Korle Gonno in Accra with a Senior High School in Kumasi. A secondary commercial school was built in Gomoa Abosso in the Central Region as well as a girl’s school at Mankessem to train girls into vocational trade.

The Mission was first opposed to the Muslim Council and then later to the Ghana Muslim Community. It challenged the other Muslim bodies on various issues but foremost on citizenship and educational grounds. On citizenship, the Mission’s point was that, both the Council and the Community were aliens and therefore should not take the mantle of leadership in a country that was not theirs. The second point on education was that, basically, they were ignorant, superstitious and illiterates in English. The Muslim Community responded by alleging that the Mission’s “leadership was of western orientation and only represented a very small proportion of the Muslim community in Ghana. They alleged further that the Muslim Mission was an opportunist group and hungry for political power in Kumasi and Ghana at large (Schildkrout, 1974, 122). We shall discuss in the next section the activities of these Muslim associations and their involvement in the disputes of the Kumasi Central Mosque.

3.3 THE KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE

In this section we shall give a historical account of the Central Mosque since its inception in 1952 to its current status. We shall also be looking into the various

conflicts that it had undergone during its short history. The Central Mosque was established as a place of worship for Kumasi Muslims as a whole. But the struggles for leadership and to some extent ownership of the Mosque culminated into conflict which resulted in the closure of the Mosque for some time. Again, we shall be looking into the administration of the Mosque, especially its financial administration, an aspect which motivated this research.

3.3.1 Brief history of the Kumasi Central Mosque

Kumasi is not a Muslim city but it has a sizeable Muslim Community which is heterogeneous in character. It comprises of various ethnic groups mainly from the northern part of the country, hence, their names as Dagomba Muslims, Gonja Muslims, Sisala Muslims, Wangara Muslims (Samwini, 2006, 234). These communities converged in Kumasi during the first part of the last century and were commonly referred to as the zongo people. It is important to note that though, the majority of these settler communities were Muslims yet some of them were not Muslims. They were all perceived as Muslims because they were either from northern centralized states of the Dagomba, Gonja, Mamprusi and the non centralized states such as Frafra, Talensi and others.

They were regarded by the host community as Muslims once they all belong to the non-Asante society. However, there is quite a number of people among the native Asante who converted to Islam yet were not staying in the zongo community. These converts are mostly referred to as the *tuuba* that means converts to Islam. In spite of the ethnic diversity within the zongo community, they come together to perform congregational prayers in the Mosque. However, most of the Mosques established in Kumasi or in the *zongo* during the 1900s were along ethnic lines. The Mossi and the

Yoruba for example had their separate Mosques referred to by their ethnic identity as such; the Mossi Mosques or the Yoruba Mosque, (Samwini 2006, 82). A Mosque is known in Arabic as Masjid (Qur'an 5:109) which means "a place of prostration before God" (Dalla, 2009). He further explained that the "Mosque signifies physical information of the existence or the presence of the Muslim community".

It is also a place where Muslims converge for religious, intellectual and social, and to a greater extent, political activities. Subhani (1948,331) suggested that a Mosque was "not only a central place for worship but a place where all type of Islamic instructions and others were given", with all sorts of religious and scientific education imparted. The Mosque is a place where the five daily prayers are observed and to a greater extent the Friday congregational prayers. In this case, a large Mosque is normally needed for the purpose of the Friday prayers and in the case of Kumasi; it is the Kumasi Central Mosque.

According to Sidi Adam (interviewed on 23rd June 2011) the first Mosque to be built for the purpose of Juma`a (Friday) congregational prayers was in 1905 by Mallam Uthman, the then *Sarkin zongo* who succeeded Maigida. This was immediately after the resettlement of the Muslims from *Mmoromu* to the site of present *Yelwa* (Old zongo, see 3.2). Soon afterwards, the Mosque became filled up during Friday prayers. Sidi Adams indicated that patronage of the Mosque became so high that police permit had to be sought to allow part of the congregation to use the surrounding streets during Friday prayers. The Mosque was built not far from the Roman Catholic Cathedral quite adjacent to the Zongo Police Station, and about hundred meters away from the Central Market. It was and still referred to as the *Masalaachin Fada* (palace Mosque). The growing population of Muslim

worshippers necessitated the need for a larger Mosque. The leadership of the Zongo community could not get a suitable place for the Mosque until during the time of Ahmadu Baba.

Ahmadu Baba became the Hausa headman in 1948 and commonly referred to as the *Sarkin zongo*. The first thing he did was to appeal to the then Asantehene, Sir Agyemang Prempeh II, for land on which to build a Mosque. The Asantehene consented and offered a piece of land to Ahmadu Baba to build a Mosque for the entire Muslim community. Mustapha Kamil bin Saad, who was the secretary of the Muslim Community narrated this story and attested to by Abu-Bakr Abdidi, Imam of the Grunshie Community. They mentioned that the original place given to the Muslims was the current Asawasi Market. However, Alhassan Attah popularly referred to as Attah Commander, the then chief surveyor and draftsman at the Kumasi Town Council, (KTC) now the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) objected to that and indicated that the place was earmarked for a market , and secondly it was a marshy area and therefore not suitable for a Mosque.

Ahmadu Baba took the message back to the Asantehene. The Asantehene did not hesitate but offered or substituted it with the current location on which the Mosque was built. This event coincided with the first visit to Kumasi by a Muslim leader, Ibrahim Niasse in 1952, from Kaolack-Senegal. Niasse was a Tijaniyya leader in West Africa with a large number of followers across the sub-region. He came as a guest to Ghana's first President, Nkrumah and frequented Ghana ever after until 1965, (Samwini 2006, 73, Clarke, 1982, 207). Niasse was said to be endowed with Baraka (blessing) and it was he (Niasse) who oriented the Mosque towards the *qibla*

(direction of kaba in Mecca). Which is a major characteristic of a Mosque, (Dalla, 2009); he gave his blessings for the Mosque to be started.

Soon after the acquisition of the plot, a campaign to generate funds started. *Makaranta* boys (Arabic School boys) were organized to perform some concert to generate funds. Notable wealthy men were approached to donate *fisabilillah* (in the cause of Allah). The highest donation of 10 pounds came from Norgah, an Accra businessman who was an in-law to Ahmadu Baba. Probably Norgah made the donation to please his in-law but not necessarily ‘for the cause of Allah’. Sidi Adams reported that Ahmadu Baba himself made substantial contribution towards the construction of the Mosque. He was a transport owner, a businessman and a landlord. He took upon himself the responsibility of building the Mosque. He therefore made a sizeable contribution of the fund. However, most of the funds were raised from the public.

At the initial stages of the construction, the Mosque had no treasurer and so all the funds generated were entrusted to Ahmadu Baba for safe-keeping. Two years later in 1954, the layout for the foundation of the Mosque had taken off and the constructions started in earnest with Ahmadu Baba as the leader in charge of the project. There was no committee to oversee the work. Sidi Adams explained, during an interview with him on 23rd June 2011, so everything was in the hands of Ahmadu Baba but that had not gone down well with his opponents. The situation sparked the first major challenge of the leadership and accountability of the Mosque.

3.3.2 Leadership struggle in the Central Mosque

The construction of the Mosque started in earnest and Ahmadu Baba was determined to finish the work. He was assisted by some ethnic group headmen. Among them were the Mossi, Yoruba, Fulani, Kotokoli and Wangara headmen. Ahmadu Baba was the Hausa headman and the title of *Sarkin zongo* was conferred on him even though the office was proscribed by the British in the 1930s (3.1).

Ahmadu Baba was the leader in charge of the construction until party politics came into effect to turn the fortunes of Ahmadu Baba and the leadership of the Mosque. The opponents of Ahmadu Baba found a platform in the CPP to attack his leadership using his management of the Mosque fund as the base for accusations. Mutawakilu, who rivaled Ahmadu Baba for his position of headship of the Hausa community, soon after the commencement of the construction of the Mosque in 1954, accused Ahmadu Baba persistently of mismanaging the Mosque funds. The MAP faction that was led by Ahmadu Baba and others felt that the CPP faction, led by Mutawakilu, was using the Mosque fund to discredit or tarnish the image of Ahmadu Baba.

Ahmadu Baba in 1953 took the case to court and sued Mutawakilu for slander and won the case in the Kumasi Divisional Court. He was awarded an amount of 200 pounds for damages. The magistrate cleared Ahmadu Baba from misappropriation of the Mosque fund. Mutawakilu not satisfied with the court decision contested the case again but this time not to the ordinary court but rather the Asantehene's Court. The Asantehene set up a commission of enquiry, the Kyidomhene Commission, to investigate the allegation brought against Ahmadu Baba. Again the decision of the commission was in favor of Ahmadu Baba. The Muslim Youth Congress (MYC), a CPP affiliate headed by Mutawakilu however appealed against the case and

demanded for further investigations. Schildkrout, (1974, 129), mentioned that on October 9, 1953 the Ashanti Pioneer, a Kumasi newspaper, reported that there was a postponement of the hearing for a week. “On this day”, the paper said, “as the parties were leaving the Asantehene’s palace, ‘some sort of guerilla fighting started’. Four people were wounded, and ten were arrested.”

Ahmadu Baba counter-accused Mutawakilu of altering the accounts of the Mosque with evidence to that effect. Mutawakilu counted the allegation against him by producing the minutes book as evidence to substantiate his allegation. The commission became doubtful of the evidence and decided to end the investigation and not to pursue the inquiries into the findings of the commission.

This accusation and counter-accusation between these Hausa headmen rivaling the leadership of the community and using the Mosque and its funds as their bases for attacking each other indicated a clear case of lack of proper accountability. Supposed proper and efficient documentations on the income and expenditure of the Mosque fund were available; the acrimony between these two leaders could not have arisen. Again, leadership in the community had become problematic due to the nature of the society. The society had been heterogeneous and almost all the community, one way or the other, were settlers and did not have an established traditional system to govern their way of life.

In March 1957, Ghana became independent with the CPP as the ruling party. This turned the fortunes of Mutawakilu to the better and he confidently assumed the leadership of the *Zongo* community. Anyone who was not a CPP was targeted by Mutawakilu. Some of the tribal heads were removed by Mutawakilu to make room

for favorites or supporters of the CPP. The CPP government proscribed parties based on district, regional, tribal or religious bases and soon afterwards, deportation of opponents followed. In 1958, Ahmadu Baba and Alfa Uthman Ladan who were the two leaders of the MAP in Kumasi were deported according to Schildkrout (1974, 127). They made an appeal against their deportation on the grounds that they were Ghanaian citizens. Ahmadu Baba was born in Ejisu to a Dagatey mother from the northern part of Ghana and Alfa Ladan was born in Kumasi to a Nigerian father and a Ghanaian mother. With regards to the deportation Schildkrout (1974, 127) had said:

Although, they appeal against the order on the grounds that they were citizens of Ghana by birth, an act of parliament was passed (Act 1 OF 1957) during the court proceedings legalizing the deportation. Citizenship was henceforth defined so that birth alone did not confer Ghanaian nationality, and the two MAP leaders were deported to Nigeria before their case was concluded in court. Although these measures were ultimately intended to keep peace in the most troubled areas, the government declared a state of emergency in Kumasi immediately after the deportation.

By the time of the deportation of these leaders, the construction of the Mosque had reached a reasonable level that could allow for prayers in it, the Mosque was therefore open for prayers but hostilities and minor skirmishes occurred between the MAP and CPP members in the Zongo. Anytime there was prayers especially on Fridays, there was trouble and ultimately both factions refused to pray together, because anytime the two factions met for prayers fighting ensued. Each group felt the Mosque belonged to it. The MAP felt it provided the chunk of funds and laborers used for the construction of the Mosque while the CPP also claimed it has the right to use the Mosque for prayers regardless of the financier. The CPP argued that no matter who built a Mosque every Muslim has the right to pray in it and for that reason the Mosque was built for the entire Muslim community.

According to Schildkrout (1974, 127), soon after Mutawakilu assumed the title of the *Sarkin Zongo* which was conferred on him by Nkrumah and the CPP government in 1958, he declared the Mosque a protected place (under the state of emergency regulation). Thus, all the activities within the vicinity of the Mosque including prayers were suspended. In effect, the Mosque was closed down and people had to use the Yoruba Mosque at *Alahbar* (now Aboabo taxi station) for Friday prayers. The closure of the Mosque had become a matter of serious concern to all Muslims in Kumasi. Ahmad Ibrahim Gado (chief of wangara community) mentioned that Muslims are enjoined by God to come together on Friday to pray at a particular place assigned for that purpose ‘and in our case the Kumasi Central Mosque’, he further added that Mutawakilu was endowed with knowledge in the Qur’an and Hadith and he knew very well the consequences of the closure of the Mosque and therefore could not pretend to be the legitimate leader of the *zongo* while the Mosque remained closed, he sought for police protection to open the Mosque.

The Imam, Mohammed Chiromah was prevented by the MAP supporters to come and lead the prayers. Mutawakilu invited the *Mossi* Imam, Seidu to officiate. Permits were issued weekly for the Friday prayers in the Mosque for several weeks in 1958. Later, Chiromah switched allegiance from Ahmadu Baba to Mutawakilu to join the CPP. Henceforth, he led the prayers in the Mosque until his death in 1969. By this time, violence and the intermittent fighting had seized and relative peace was observed. Many who were supporters of the MAP now the united party (U.P.) refused to worship in the Central Mosque with the CPP. They rather used the Yoruba Mosque. Despite all these, there remained some occasional fighting that occurred in the Mosque and by 1959, most of the radical UP supporters refused to worship at the Central Mosque.

The open conflict that ensued between the supporters of both the MAP and the CPP had begun to resolve by the end of the 1950s. Now that Mutawakilu was firmly at the grip of the Muslim affairs as the *Sarkin zongo*, he used his office to coerce the remnant of the tribal headmen to renounce their allegiance to the MAP in favor of the CPP and their position. The stubborn ones were removed as headmen of their various tribes. This witnessed the changing trend of leadership of an individual headman to members of a group or association particularly members of a party or the local branch of the Muslim Council.

3.3.3 Mutawakilu's leadership of the Central Mosque

Soon after he became the *Sarkin zongo* in 1958, Mutawakilu became a leader who did not compromise his authority, Ahmed Ibrahim Gado mentioned. He ruled with iron fist in the *zongo* community. Mutawakilu consolidated his powers through the Muslim Council of which he was the head. His style of high handedness earned him enemies among his own Hausa men. Notable among his opponents was Mohammed Tanko who was the *sarikin Fawa* (chief butcher). The most outspoken and critic of Mutawakilu was Alhassan Mailafiya. After the disposition of Mutawakilu, Mailafiya was recognized as the acting Hausa headman and the *Sarkin zongo*. After the return of Ahmadu Baba from exile, Mailafiya gave way and Ahmadu assumed his former role as the *sarkin zongo* and continued with the work of the Mosque.

The members of the Muslim Council, most of whom were from the alien *Hausa* group strongly opposed Mutawakilu and demanded his removal as the *sarikin zongo*. In 1961, they succeeded in over-throwing Mutawakilu from the throne of *sarikin zongo* and government abolished the office as it had happened in the 1930s. Despite his dismissal, Mutawakilu did not relent. He tried in so many ways to re-establish

himself in the helm of leadership of both the Hausa group and the Muslim Council in Kumasi. In spite of these efforts, Mutawakilu could not regain his authority. Nevertheless, he was commonly referred to as the *sarikin zongo*, a title he enjoyed until his death in 1970. The Muslim Council however, continued with obtaining permit for the Friday prayers and the leadership of the group and the *zongo* shifted from among members of the Council until 1966. The Council controlled the activities of the Mosque Building Committee which was responsible for the collection and disbursement of the Mosque fund. The Building Committee was in charge of the building and maintenance of the Mosque and almost all its members drawn from the Council which was Hausa dominated. It was against this background that the impasse of Imamship resurfaced immediately after the death of Imam Mohammed Chiromah in 1968.

3.3.4 The Imamship impasse of the Central Mosque

Two major issues contributed to the crisis that affected the Imamship of the Central Mosque for more than two years. The first was the 1966 military take-over which caused the fall of Nkrumah and the CPP. The Muslim Council became defunct immediately after the coup. The Ghana Muslim Mission which was founded in 1958 harbored their resentment against the Hausa hegemony and dominance of Muslims affairs of the country. The Muslim Mission was formed by indigenous Ghanaian Muslims. Its members comprise of Muslims from indigenous Ghanaian tribes such as the Ga, Fante, Asante, Ewe and those from the Northern Region. They disagreed basically with the Muslim Council on several issues among which are divinations, use of talismans and the relegation to the background of indigenous Ghanaian Muslims on Islamic matters. The Ghana Muslim Mission also encouraged western type of education. In return, the *Hausas* accused the Mission as political opportunists

and agents of Western Powers. They Hausa offensively referred to members of the Mission as *Tuuba* (converts).

It seems resentment against the Muslim Council and the Hausa domination of Islamic leadership in Ghana warranted the formation or rejuvenation Ghana Muslim Mission. This was so because, as early as 1962 as observed by Schildkrout (1974, 128), some indigenous Muslims of Ghana as they were known at that time sent a petition to the government to object to the dominance of the Muslim Council by ‘‘alien’’ Hausa tribesmen. The Mission contended that the independence of Ghana meant independence from all sorts of foreign domination including colonialism and religion and for that matter, the Hausa hegemony should end. Their quest for the leadership of the Muslim Council and powers to control Muslim affairs failed as Nkrumah was not ready to completely do away with none Ghanaians in key positions in the affairs of the country. Yet, the sentiment that moved for the petition reasserted itself immediately after Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966.

The coup probably sounded the death knell of the Muslim Council and ushered in its place two rival Muslim groups: the Ghana Muslim Mission and the Muslim Community. However, their contention went to as far back as the era before Ghana’s independence and it involved many issues including the question of citizenship. Membership of the Mission was predominantly Akan. The *Imam Al-Balad* that is the Asante *Kramo* Imam had not supported the Mission but sided with the Community. He was assisted by a very prominent Asante *Kramo* member in the person of Alhassan DC who later became the *Sarkin tuuba* (chief of the converts) after Abu-Bakr Kweku deserted the Asante *Kramo* Imam and joined the Mission. Kweku was the first *Sarkin tuuba* and when he joined the Mission the office became vacant only

to be filled by Alhassan DC. Abdul Mumin Harun, the current chief Imam and a grandson of Abdul-Mumin Ismail former Asantenkramo Imam had narrated, according to Schildkrout (1974,128). Alhassan DC, according to this account, was a good organizer. He organized the Asante *Nkramo* and the *Tuuba* from village to village and district to district. His death in the late 1980s left a vacuum in the Asante *Nkramo* fold. Abdul-Mumin Ismail, the Asante *Nkramo* Imam, had not only supported the Community but he was also its vice president.

Schildkrout (1974, 128) maintains that the position of the Asante *Nkramo* Imam in opposing the Mission was significant in that the Mission was dominated mainly by *Akans* both from Asante and the Brong Ahafo which ‘‘had a long tradition of opposing the Asante.’’ At the peak of the conflict, the Brong Ahafo people rallied strongly behind the CPP whereas the Asante from Kumasi supported the NLM and later the UP. Schildkrout (1974) further explained that the dispute between the Brong and the Asante people can be traced to as far back as the pre-colonial era when Kumasi extended its control to the northwestern parts of the country. This control continued through after independence. Cleavage between these two Muslim factions intensified that in the late 1950s a case between the Asantenkramo Imam and the leader of the Mission in Kumasi was brought before the Asantehene for arbitration. The case was on high fees that the Mission schools in Kumasi charged. The Asante *Nkramo* Imam felt it was his prerogative to control the Muslims in the Mission, but the Asantehene ruled against him establishing that the Imam had no authority over the leaders of the Mission.

As a result of that the Ashantehene tacitly gave his consent to the split between the Ashante Muslim and the Brong Muslims. In that regard, the Asante kramo Imam

ostensibly failed to establish his control and authority over the Kumasi Muslims as a whole. Nevertheless, he maintained that the Muslim communities whose membership was mostly alien and were in the zongo were his strangers. He mentioned on several occasions that the strangers should be regarded as *kumasifo* (Kumasi people) who had a long standing right to live in Kumasi under the auspices of the Kumasi traditional authorities. Consequently the Imam then whole heartedly supported the Ghana Muslim Community in the impasse of the Imamship of the Central Mosque, this weakened the position of the Ghana Muslim Mission.

The Ghana Muslim Community is an organization believed to be formed in 1938 but came to the limelight in 1966. It was an organization comprising the entire Muslims of the *zongo*, both of the foreign and local (northern) descends until the Mission contested Imamship of the Central Mosque in 1967. The people of *zongo* and the northern Muslims were united for their common interest. However, conflict over succession of Imamship of the Mosque brought about disunity. Some Ghanaian tribes, especially the Gonja and the Dagomba broke allegiance with the Community and sided with the Mission in their struggle to make the leadership structure of the Mosque “purely Ghanaian”. The Community however, was able to unite all the former CPP and UP factions and brought them under the leadership of the organization. Ahmadu Baba was the president while the Asante Nkramo Imam was the vice president.

The Central Mosque had encountered several disputes before the impasse of the Imamship and almost all the disputes centered on lack of accountability. The first and perhaps the foremost was the accusation of misappropriation of the Mosque fund which resulted in the accusation and counter-accusation between the two Hausa

leaders, Ahmadu Baba and Mutawakilu. The second dispute was against the Mosque Building Committee which was charged with the responsibility of building and maintenance of the Mosque. Ahmadu Baba dissolved the committee and reconstituted a new one with a mixture of both the CPP and the UP supporters. Then, the differences that existed between Ahmadu Baba and the CPP supporters had been solved and a relative peace was enjoyed until the Mission took active interest in the affairs of the Mosque.

The third issue that the Mosque encountered was on ethnic basis. Not long after Ahmadu Baba reconstituted the Mosque Building Committee, some headmen of the *Molee-Dagbane* launched complain that they were not fairly represented on the Committee. They maintained that the committee was only dominated by the Hausa. So, their plea was conceded by the leadership of the Committee and two each of their representatives were accepted. The Committee now fully represented and well constituted mounted a campaign to raise funds for the Mosque, and labor was provided voluntarily by the various ethnic groups. According to Badawiri interviewed on 16th November 2011 at his home in Akwatia Line, the conflict that led to the change of the nature of the Central Mosque's leadership was the most severe conflict the Mosque had ever encounter. The two others were purely internal issues with the tribal heads and some ethnic groups who wanted some recognition within the affairs of the Central Mosque. The issue of the Imamship then overshadowed those minor and internal issues.

After the 1966 coup, the National Liberation Council (NLC) which comprised largely of the army and the police took over governance. The Ghana Muslim Mission which harbored its resentment against the Ghana Muslim Community again sent a

plea as it did during Nkrumah's regime (3.3.2) to the NLC. Their petition was that, the leadership of Islam should be in the hands of Ghanaians and not aliens, because to them, the Community had totally deviated from the teachings of the Holy Qur'an by introducing innovations and encouraged superstition, (Schildkrout 1974, 130). Musah Kofi Nuamah, the former assistant General Secretary of the Ghana Muslim Mission interviewed on 6th September 2011 at his home Abrepo junction, added that, government made an attempt to reconcile the two disputing groups: the Community and the Mission but to no avail. The NLC had wished that Muslims mended their differences and unite under a single body. Unable to reach a compromise, the NLC then recognized the two bodies individually but with the agreement that both bodies should stay out of politics.

At that point in time, the Mission had no political influence in the *zongo* community. Meanwhile, the death of Mohammed Chiromah, the *Juma'a* Imam on the 1st of August 1968 brought the long awaited opportunity for the Mission's intervention in the affairs of the Central Mosque. Two-and a half years had elapsed since the overthrow of Nkrumah and the country was preparing for a constitutional government. Various political aspirants were trying to canvas for support and they could team up with whoever they could find support from. In that regard, the Mission found favor with the politicians due to their western type of education.

Some of the Muslim politicians and public office holders were covertly members of the Mission. Several factors added to the fortunes of the Mission. Among them was the desire to elevate indigenous Ghanaians over aliens in economic and political fields of the *zongo* and the country at large. Northerners were encouraged to form cooperative groups and associations in order to advance their fortunes and status over

the aliens. Northerners were even motivated to form their own political party after the ban on political activities was lifted, but could not materialize because such a party would have been on regional basis. Immediately after the death of Chiromah, the Community resumed its tradition of installing a new Imam and *nāib* (Deputy) for the Friday prayers.

It has been a practice in the Mosque that the *nāib* is always elevated to fill the vacant position of the Imam and a new *nāib* installed. The *nāib* Abu-Bakr Garba Hakim a *Hausa* was elevated to the office of Imam and a Hausa *nāib* Issah Kataki was appointed. The *zongo* community consented to the appointments because that was the tradition for almost half a century. Nobody opposed the Hausa for appointing both the Imam and the *nāib*. It has since been the preserve of the Hausa community in the *zongo*. Schildkrout (1974, 131) observed that the succession took place at a time when politicians and the general public “were particularly sensitive to the criticism against the aliens because the press and certain politicians” were intent upon blaming them for the country’s ills.” It is important to note that, objection to the appointment of Hausa for the position of Imam and deputy did not generate there. Some discontentments were concealed only to surface when the Mission sparked the first flame.

The Imam and his *nāib* in the persons of Abu-bakar Garba Hakim and Issah Kataki were appointed and sent to the *Asantehene* for his approval, as the tradition has always been. Nuamah narrated that, the Mission sent a letter to J.A. Braimah, then chairman of the NLC’s Regional Committee of Administration, objecting to the appointment of the Friday Imam. They indicated that they had already chosen a candidate for the position. Schildkrout (1974, 138) added that, a member of the

Mission who doubled as a member of the NLC advised the chairman of the Administration to delay the ceremony for the Mission's concerns to be investigated. It had been the intention of the Mission to contest the Imamship long before the death of Imam Chiromah and their candidate for the position, then, was the Asante Nkramo Imam, Abdul Mumin Kamaghaty. The Asante *Nkramo* Imam strongly objected to that suggestion and maintained that the offices of the Imamship and the *nāib* were the sole preserve of the Hausa ever since Islam took root in the Kumasi *zongo*. He was accused of selling his birthright to aliens.

The Regional Administrative Officer, J.A. Braimah succeeded in preventing the Asantehene from recognizing the *Hausa* chosen Imam and subsequently closed down the Central Mosque to maintain peace in the *zongo* community. During *Ramadan* that year (1968), Braimah in an effort to open the Mosque for prayers, invited a "neutral Imam", the Imam of the Ghana Armed Forces, Mahmud Lampety to officiate the Friday prayers. The community protested strongly when the "Army Imam" came, and they refused to pray with him with the excuse that he was a member of the Mission, he was nearly lynched when a mob attacked him.

The Regional Committee of the NLC maintained that the call for investigation into the conflict was in order, and that the Community's claim for also having citizenship right was upheld. They were considered as citizens because they are half parented by Ghanaians mostly of the northern descent. The Mission was not satisfied with the decision as they maintained that the Hausa were not true citizens like the Dagomba, Gonja and Wala and therefore were not eligible for leadership over Ghanaians. The issue of the citizenship had now become a legal issue and the Mission failed to win the case, but the Administration worked hard to arbitrate and resolve the issue to the

satisfaction of both parties. However, in an interview with Salifu Yahya, the secretary to the Central Mosque narrated that, on 4th July 2010 the Community pressed hard for the case to be sent to the Asantehene to resolve but the Regional Committee of the NLC refused and the Asantehene was asked to stay out of the dispute even though he was the patron of the *zongo* community in Kumasi.

The Community then called for election to determine the Imamship because it was convinced that with its numerical strength it would win convincingly, but the Mission objected. Now, the conflict of the Imamship had become a national issue and the government of the NLC was said to have sent two of its members who incidentally, were northern Muslims and members of the Mission, for arbitration. They suggested that the Hausa candidate for the Imamship should be maintained and the Mission should file a candidate for the position of *nāib*. The Mission according to Nuamah assented, but the Community objected to that. Salifu Yahaya (secretary to the Mosque) reiterated that, the Hausa Imam was Abu-Bakr Garba Hakim and the Mission's candidate for the position of the *nāib* was Alhassan Nasirudeen, a Dagomba.

These two men incidentally were friends and they studied under one teacher, Abdullahi Dan Tano. Schildkrout (1974, 132) added that, the Regional Committee in trying to have a lasting solution for the impasse pointed out to the tradition of the Community that elevates the *nāib* to succeed the Imam. The Community rejected the peace plan and denied knowledge of any succession plan to the Imamship. It was the belief of the Community that the Regional Committee of NLC was rather trying by that suggestion, to let the Mission appoint the *nāib* and the Community feared that

such arrangement could bring instability within the Community and even could be ‘personally dangerous for the Hausa Imam’

After all efforts and avenues taken by the NLC Administration to find a lasting solution failed, the Community decided to fight the case in a court of law. The Community claimed the ownership of the Central Mosque and therefore sued the Mission for intruding into their affairs. They also accused the Mission of causing financial loss in terms of the Friday *fisabilillah* as a result of the closure of the Mosque. They again demanded that the Mission should be denied access and that, ‘the court should slap an injunction on the Mission from entering the Mosque and for interfering into the affairs of the Mosque. Mumuni Ayaye the chief of the Gonja community, who represented the Mission from the *zongo*, explained that the Mission was of the view that the Community only came into existence in 1966 adding that members of both factions are the same since they are all Muslims. Ayaye further said that, the suggestion of the ownership of the Mosque was not at all a matter of consideration because as a community of Muslims, no single person or a group of persons could claim ownership of a place of worship such as the Central Mosque.

Consequently, the late Judge D.F. Anan, who later became speaker of parliament in the 4th Republic ruled that, once the title of the Mosque was the Central Mosque and was in the name of the Muslim community of Kumasi, the Mosque belonged to all, irrespective of which party or organization built it, because at the time that the construction of the Mosque began, there was no separated Muslim organization. Therefore, the Mosque was for all. In February 1970, the case was referred back for out of court settlement. The arbitration committee reached to a compromise that the Community should accept the Mission’s candidate for the position of the *nāib*. The

Community refused and insisted on choosing both Imam and the *nāib* only from the Hausa tribesmen. The court action took about two years during which the political terrain of the country had taken a different course. Political parties were formed as the nation was preparing for the return to constitutional rule.

In August 1969 elections were held and the Progress Party (PP) under the leadership of Dr. B.A Busia emerged victorious. The zongo community supported the PP only to be disappointed when the government introduced the Aliens Compliance Order that called for ‘‘ Aliens’’ in this regard, non Ghanaians to obtain residence permit or working permit before they could be allowed legally to engage in any economic venture. The people of the *zongo* who had worked tirelessly for the victory of the PP felt betrayed and therefore lost confidence in the government. They again had the belief that the government and the general Ghanaian attitude was in favor of the Mission. In the opinion of Schildkrout (1974, 138), with the ‘‘citizenship policy and under the circumstances, they were fighting a losing battle’’. Ahmadu Baba, head of the Hausa and the *Sarkin zongo* had died and he was succeeded by Alhassan Mailafiya as the Hausa headman or commonly referred to as the *Sarkin zongo*.

The government of the Progress Party, Nuamah (the deputy secretary of the Mission) observed, took the initiative of the out of court settlement. Robert Ohene Amankwah, then Regional Minister of the Asante Region invited all the disputing factions to his office but the Community refused to honor the invitation and a report was sent to Busia who invited both factions through the regional office of the PP in Kumasi. It was in 1970 when they all met at the castle, Osu. The Mission was asked to send ten representatives and a similar number for the Community. Busia lamented over the way and manner things were going on in the *zongo* and promised to find a lasting

solution to the problem. He emphasized his preparedness to listen to each group after which he told them they were one people with a common creed and belief and therefore should not be quarrelling over issues that were of no serious significance. He urged them to concentrate more on education rather than fighting among themselves. After a long consoling speech, he descended on the main issue by upholding the earlier proposal of the Community to produce the Imam while the Mission takes the *nāib*. That is, the Imamship should be with the Community while the *nāib* ship rested with the Mission. The Mission accepted the proposal but the Community turned it down. Busia asked them to go and think over the issue, this was done for about three times and in each the result was negative. The spokesman of the Mission, Abu Banda presented on behalf of the Mission Alhassan Nasirudeen as the candidate for the *nāib*. The Community after series of consultations in and out of Dr. B.A Busia's office finally accepted the proposal.

Almost at the same time, a misunderstanding developed within the Community. Some youth and some notable leaders within the Community back in Kumasi thought that it was time to give peace a chance and therefore, the need for a compromise. They accepted the concession and called for the leadership of the Community to accept whoever was the nominee of the Mission to become the *nāib*. They sent a petition to the Regional Administration under the Chairmanship of Col. Yerboye. In the petition they wrote; "the recent decision by the high court that the Mosque is the property of both the Muslim Community and the Muslim Mission is right. We therefore, hold a strong view that, the only solution which will bring peace and harmony among Muslims is to accept the Vice-Imam chosen by the Muslim Mission". Finally a compromise was reached and the Community settled on the Mission's request for the position of *nāib*ship. The zongo for some time enjoyed

relative peace and harmony due to the peace pipe smoked by the factions. The pains that Muslims went through during the two and half years of conflict and the subsequent closure of the Central Mosque for ninety-nine weeks remained an experience no one wants to remember in the history of Kumasi *zongo*.

3.3.5 The New Order for the Succession of the Imamship

The Mission accepted the Imamship of Garba Hakim; chosen from the Community and Nasirudeen Alhassan became the *nāib* from the Mission. Nuamah stated that, Nasirudeen became incapacitated and died in 1975. Since Nasirudeen was from the Mission and the settlement was that the *nāib* should come from the Mission, Ahmed Ibrahim, a *Gonja* was selected to succeed Nasirudeen as the *nāib*. Two years later, Ahmed Ibrahim resigned from the post as *nāib* due to reasons unknown to the Mission. Following the convention, Muntaka Omar, a *Dagomba* was appointed, again by the Mission to become the *nāib*. At this time Alhassan Mailafiya was the *sarkin zongo*, after the death of Ahmadu Baba. On 25th April 1981, Garba Hakim the Imam died, and for the sake of maintaining peace, Muntaka was elevated to become the Imam. He became the first Imam of the Central Mosque, from the Mission since the establishment of the Mosque in 1954. Peace had then taken root in the Muslim Community and the succession to the Imamship had been smooth to the satisfaction of all.

In 1992 however, Muntaka died and Ahmed Muhammad Chiromah the son of the Hausa Imam, Muhammad Chiromah was appointed by the Community to become the Imam, and Imrana Musah a *Gonja* from the Mission became the *nāib*. The *Sarkin zongo* was Abu-Bakr Ali who succeeded his half brother Aminu Ali after Mailafiya. The succession to the Imamship was now in order and there was relative peace.

When Ahmed Chiromah died in the year 2002, Imrana Musah succeeded him as the Imam of the Central Mosque and Abdul Mumin Harun the grandson of the former *Asante Nkramo* Imam, himself the *Asante Nkramo* Imam, became the *nāib*. He is currently the Imam of the Central Mosque after the death of Imrana Musah in 2011.

It is worth noting that the Mission had fought a battle which they won. Though, their Initial target was the Imamship itself but the Community was not deterred and fought back for it's ‘‘heritage.’’ With the amicable solution reached on the Imamship struggle, they have come to appreciate that they are one people with common problem and therefore, need to unite their purpose for the common good of the religion and their own people. But the *Asante* side of the Mission had since left the *Zongo* Community to regulate their own affairs.

3.4 ADMINISTRATION OF THE CENTRAL MOSQUE.

From the above, we can deduce clearly that Ahmadu Baba was the administrator of the Mosque during its formative years. Ahmad Ibrahim Gado (the Wangara chief and a former chairman of the Mosque Committee) narrated that, Amadu Baba was assisted by some personalities in the *Zongo* such as Umaru Fello, Ibrahim Futa and Buremah Futa. Some tribal chiefs were also among his team of advisers as well as *Ulamā* (clerics) such as Alfa Ladan and Ahmad Babal Waiz. But the running of the day to day affairs and the activities as well as the building of the Mosque was done by and in the name of Ahmadu Baba. He contributed more of the funds towards the building of the Mosque. He was said to be a transporter, an estate developer and a businessman. He was a man with great wealth. Ahmadu Baba was able within four years after the commencement of the work on the Mosque to finish the building.

When Mutawakilu became the *sarkin zongo*, he also assumed the responsibility of administering the affairs of the Mosque. He secured the lease of the plot on which the Mosque was built. He managed to bring in his supporters that were the members of the Muslim Council to manage the Mosque. In fact, Musah Haruna (Na Aberewa) interviewed on 20th June 2011, an admirer of Mutawakilu said, “*Sarki* had worked tirelessly for the benefit of the Mosque; he was always at the Mosque premises. It was his determination, Musa Haruna maintained and completely finished the entire work on the Mosque but his leadership was very short-lived. And when Ahmadu Baba returned, Mutawakilu was relegated to the background until his death.

It appears from these accounts that the administration of the Mosque was not structured reasonably enough that could allow for people with expertise or competence to assist the administration of the Mosque. It was left in the hands of leaders who for their own personal interest and for the sake of being the head of the Community (Ummah) perhaps wanted to do something in the name of Islam but on the other way round, were trying to protect their images in the offices they occupied. Accountability was an issue they had not thought of.

According to Musah Haruna interviewed (20th June 2011), Ahmadu Baba entreated his half brother Garba Karami on his death bed, to take over the work of the Mosque and edged him “to be bold and impartial in order to do the work”. He should not listen to what is said of him. Garba Karami vowed to follow the footsteps of his senior brother. He invited some of his friends to assist him in that endeavor, but warned that he did not want any interference from anybody in the course of his duty as the administrator of the Mosque. He invited Uthman Sofo Salga, a transporter, estate developer and a businessman and Ibrahim Kure also a business man to assist

him. This three-man committee or administration assumed duties in 1975 until their resignation in 1986 on the grounds of probity and accountability. Ahmad Ibrahim Gado Chief Wangara and Former Chairman of the Mosque Committee interviewed on 17 November 2011 maintained that, these men (who were normally called the committee) worked hard. They extended the building of the Mosque to its present level. They built a school for the *ummah* and did a lot of maintenance as well as extensions for the Mosque.

They made monthly announcement as to the income and expenditure of the Mosque from the *fisabilillah* (for the sake of Allah) collected during Friday prayers. However, in 1986, Garba Karami resigned following an allegation of impropriety of the Mosque fund. Uthman Sofo Salga and Ibrahim Kure subsequently resigned because they could not work without their leader. The Mosque saw tremendous strides in its face lift during the tenure of Garba Karami and his team as administrators.

After the resignation of Garba Karami and his team, the tribal heads, then took over the administration of the Mosque and a Mosque Committee was formed but, it was only the building Committee. A separate committee in charge of finance was also created and the former Committees in charge of building and finance were dissolved. Aminu Ali was the *Sarkin Zongo* and all appointment to the Mosque Committee was made in the name of the Sarkin Zongo. A Central Committee was set up, known as the Mosque Committee alongside other subsidiaries or auxiliary Committees. The Committee was charged with the formulation of policies: finance, building, Planning and other related issues with the mandate of execution. A Board of Trustees was also created which was headed by Mohammed Amin (deceased) the then Gonja Imam,

Mohammed Sidi Adam (Tax) and Ahmed Ibrahim Gado (Chief of the Wangara Community in Kumasi) as chairman. They were and still are signatories to the Mosque's Account. Ahmed Ibrahim Gado became, as well, the Chairman of the Mosque Committee with Alhassan Barrau as his deputy whilst Salifu Yahaya became the Secretary. It was an eighteen member Committee represented by almost all the Zongo stakeholders. This measure was to give a fair representation of all the Muslim Community in the affairs of the Mosque. This was narrated by Ahmed Ibrahim Gado Wangara Chief and Former Chairman of the Mosque Committee on 17th November 2011. The one tribe hegemony was perhaps coming to an end.

The Committee was inaugurated in 1986 and it immediately embarked on the Mosque work. It started as maintained by Ibrahim Gado, where Garba Karami left off. The terrazzo floor of the Mosque as well as new ceiling was done by the Committee. The Committee worked with the resource accrued from the *Fisabilillah* every Friday. And anytime the money is enough for a particular work the Committee immediately did that work. The Committee renders monthly accounts to the public by announcing or reading its income and expenditure.

A major renovation was embarked, and all the windows: about seventy five (75) and thirty seven doors (37) in all were replaced. Seventy one (71) stores were built for Commercial purposes to raise revenue for the maintenance and up keeping of the Mosque. An additional prayer wing designed for women, as the main place assigned to them normally becomes filled was built. In 1996, almost a decade since its formation, the Committee's activities weakened as most of the members became dormant. Most of them were tribal heads (chiefs) and therefore became overburdened with other pertinent issues. By the end of 1996, the Chairman of the

Committee resigned following some misunderstanding and accusation of impropriety by the public.

The accusation was as a result of his frequent movements between Accra and Kumasi and his inability to perform his functions well as a signatory to the Mosque's account. He was also in possession of the Mosque's emergency fund, some cash kept with him for quick action when the need arise. This arrangement did not go down well with some people, hence the accusations followed. He resigned as the Chairman of the Committee and as a Signatory to the account, but he was prevailed upon to withdraw his resignation as a signatory to the account. However, they are still (the three mentioned above) the signatories to the account of the Central Mosque at the Barclays Bank. Even though one of them Aminu had died for nearly seventeen years, no effort is made to replace him and nobody cares to question why. People's attentions are drawn away from these issues.

Alhassan Baraw, who had been the deputy automatically assumed the Chairmanship and remained the Chairman until his death in 2002, Abu-Bakr Ibrahim Balla (Plywood) took over from him as the Chairman. The Committee was reconstituted with representation as before from all the stakeholders and this time the Imam of the Mosque is also asked to bring in a representative. Yet, since its reconstitution, no tangible work was embarked by the Committee apart from the *minbar* (pulpit) that was rebuilt in 2011. The activities of the Committee, according to Mohammed Yushau, Librarian of the Kumasi Central Mosque Library interviewed on 3rd March 2011, were not up to expectation even though weekly announcement of the funds raised from *Fisabilillah* is made public for accountability sake.

3.5 FINANCE OF THE CENTRAL MOSQUE

3.5.1 Sources of income

Mohammed Sidi Adams interviewed on 23rd June 2011 confirmed in an interview what Samwini (2006, 32) noted that by the beginning of the nineteenth Century, there was a well established Muslim Community in Kumasi. This teeming Muslim population used to observe their *Jum'ah* (Friday) congregational prayers at the Mosque that was built near the Palace (Fada) of the *Sarkin Zongo* Usman. The mosque was adjacent to the *Zongo* police station not far from the Catholic Cathedral (St Peters). As time went on, by 1949/50, the population of the Mosque swelled and people had to pray on the streets during the *Jum'ah* prayers and therefore the need for a large Mosque became necessary.

The *Fisabilillah* has been the major source of income for the Mosque since its inception in the early 1950s. Its characteristics however, varied from one person to the other and the mode of collections differed from the conviction of the person recruited to solicit for it. Under normal circumstances young men, mostly those who could recite some portions of the Qur'an or the *hadith* to encourage for the donations and the benefits that one (who donates) could get both here and the Hereafter. From the beginning as we have observed in section (3.3.1) above, the fund generated from the concerts of the *Makaranta* pupils was supported by individual outreach for *fisabilillah*. In a discussion with Tijani Alhassan Barau on 4th April 2011, a youth leader who in 2005, organized a campaign to screed the Mosque, stated that, he mobilized the youth and educated them on the need to embark on the work of Allah and "that was what *Fisabilillah* meant". They went on and solicited funds from the general public within the metropolis. Individual businessmen and women, organizations, non Governmental Organizations and philanthropists' were

approached and they all made meaningful contributions, both in cash and in kind towards the projects. Some of the money gained, he explained was used to support their Cash needs for the project. Whether all the funds collected through this effort went into the Mosque project or not remains questionable since records were not kept and the *fisabilillah* were solicited by open hand, open basket or polythene bag.

Women also contributed to the development of the Mosque. Women leadership in the Mosque headed by Bilkis Yakubu and Sandaliya Babal-waiz were the brain behind the screeding of the vicinity of the Mosque. When the Mosque Committee became inactive following the death of the Chairman in 2002, and the inability of the Committee to efficiently work to the satisfaction of the Community of Kumasi Muslims, the women leadership of the Mosque took the initiative to work for the sake of Allah. After obtaining permission from the Chief Imam, Imurana Musah (now deceased) the women mobilized themselves to solicit for funds to start the work. Bilkis Yakubu recounts that her group adopted house to house campaign to solicit for *fisabilillah* in 2004.

The money they generated was handed over to Tijani Alhassan Barau to start the project. After the work was started, donations were coming from individuals and organizations because they saw that the screeding was being done. Not long afterwards, Bilkis and her associates realized that the work that was undertaken was shoddy and the demand for money far exceeded the work done so far. They decided to call off the campaign and refused to hand over whatever money they gathered from the *fisabilillah* to Tijani. However, they rather embarked upon the work themselves. They turned their attention on the outmoded doors and windows and replaced them with modern tinted glasses.

In 2009, the Mosque Committee under the initiative of the Chief Imam Imurana Musah, formed a group of young people about twenty one in number known as the *masu fisabilillah* (Collection People) who go round during the *Juma'a* prayers, before the Imam ascends the *minbar* (pulpit) collecting *fisabilillah*. At the end of the *juma'a* prayers they gathered and counted all what had they collected. A group of about five people were appointed to do the counting and the amount was recorded to be made public the following Friday, that is a week after. This was to give some measure of accountability and to help build trust from among the contributors. Yushau Mohammed, a librarian of the Central Mosque, observed on 3rd March 2011 that this measure had brought some confidence, sanity and transparency in the collection of the *fisabilillah*.

It is important, to note that the *fisabilillah*, whatever method used to solicit for it was still is the main source of income for the Mosque. It is the means by which maintenance and renovation of the Mosque is carried out. Even though some donations were received from time to time from individuals either voluntarily or through appeal, the *fisabilillah* counts most. For example in January 2005, when the idea to screed the entire compound of Mosque was put forward and accepted, the first point of call for funding was to individual businessmen and women within the Muslim Community. Materials such as stones, sand and cement were donated by philanthropists towards the project. Tijani and his associates were able through the donations from such philanthropists to screed more than two-thirds of the total compound of the Mosque.

This was done in partnership with the women leadership of the Mosque. When asked about the total income and expenditure of the work, Tijani estimated the cost of

cement and sand to the tune of GHC 26, 869. 20. But he could not tell the exact amount paid for workmanship. Even this claim could not be substantiated by any written document. He only explained that most of the laborers were the youth recruited from the youth social club “who want to do the work of Allah and did not need any monetary reward.” Yet he confessed to have given twenty pesewas (0.20) to each worker at the end of each day’s work. Politicians also made some donations in kind or in cash from time to time.

Yushau Mohammed, the librarian who was critical about the ways and means the Mosque is being managed and how the money is administered, explained that, in 1988 and 1989; the Iranian Embassy in Accra funded the building of a place of convenience and an ablution place for the Mosque. The Embassy also provided additional ceiling fans and electrical bulbs both inside and outside the Mosque. He further stated that, on two different occasions the former Vice President of the Republic of Ghana Aliu Mahama donated an amount of fifty million cedis (GHC 5,000.00) and a cheque of forty million cedi (4,000.00) Ghana cedi to the Central Mosque. Again, he said, the former chief executive of Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly, Patricia Appiahgyei donated hundred bags of cement for work on the Central Mosque. “In the month of Ramadan, 2009” he added, “one Hajia Abiba a philanthropist (now deceased) renovated the entire edifice given it a new beautiful outlook.”

Other incomes such as foreign aid or assistance from countries outside Ghana or perhaps outside Kumasi for the Central Mosque have never been recorded. Ali Adam Ameer, who translates the *Khutba* (sermon) on Fridays said that on 17th April 2011 “outside Ghana no money had ever come for the construction, maintenance or

renovation of the Mosque.” He made mention that somewhere in the 1980s, some Arabs from Libya visited Kumasi and the Central Mosque. They asked if any Arab country had had a hand in the construction or otherwise of the Mosque and the answer was in the negative. He maintained that, the bulk of the funds for the maintenance of the Mosque come solely from the *fisabilillah*. It has been the main source of the Mosque’s income which must be “sustained”. The *fisabilillah* is done during the *Jum’ah* prayers before the Imam ascends the *minbar* (Pulpit) by a group of the youth and the money collected is counted after the prayers. This was done haphazardly, especially when the Mosque Committee became weak and inactive during Alhassan Barau’s Chairmanship. The collectors took advantage of that and the returns were very meager. Sidi Adams (Tax) on 23rd June 2011 who kept the money lamented bitterly about the way and manner the *fisabilillah* was done and the amount normally given to him at the end of the prayers.

He said that at the end of every Friday prayer an amount of one hundred and fifty thousand cedis (GH¢15.00) is given to him. The highest was two hundred thousand cedis (GH¢20.00). This situation was going on and the congregation became very bitter until in April 2009, some youth went and complained bitterly to the late Imam Imurana Musah. On Friday 22nd May, 2009, the Chief Imam, Imurana Musah mounted the *minbar* after a long absence due to ill health. His *Khutuba* (sermon) emphasized the need for stewardship, *Amana* (trusteeship) and accountability. The Imam again stressed that those in charge the *Amana* would be accountable for their deeds in the Hereafter. In the process, the Imam dissolved the *fisaabilillah* group which according to Sidi Adams accounted for only GH¢20.00 or in most cases GH 15.00 at the end of every week’s collection. They were replaced by a new *fisabilillah* group which was created by the Chief Imam and accountable to him.

They started work on Friday June, 5th 2009. On that particular Friday, an amount of GH¢280.00 was realized. And from 5th June, 2009 to 4th June 2010 an amount of GH¢13, 105. 00 was put in the coffers of the Central Mosque. By June 10, 2011, two years of their operation, the group was able to mobilize an amount of GH¢22,744.00. This is in sharp contrast to what the previous *fisabilillah* groups were making. It is a clear indication that the new *fisabilillah* group proved beyond reasonable doubt that the *fisabilillah* when organized well could be the most reliable source of income and could be able to take care of the entire management of the Mosque programs.

3.5.2 Properties of the Mosque

We have seen that the major source of income for the Central Mosque was and still is the *fisabilillah* (3.6.1). Effort was however made by the Gado led administration in 1986 to 1996 (3.5), to increase the level of development in the Mosque. The main building was expanded and a fence wall was built to help protect the compound from encroachment. It was along these fence walls, overlooking the Burma Street, that about seventy one commercial stores were built. This was to serve as an additional source of income for the Mosque. Ibrahim Abdul Rahman, the Mossi headman (Chief) of Kumasi and a member of the current Mosque Committee who had been with the previous administration, said when the Mosque Committee was formed headed by Ibrahim Gado, some tribal heads were included such as the Yoruba Chief Malik Alao (now deceased). The Committee undertook the building of the stores in 1978.

The main aim was that the rent from the stores would augment the *sabillah* and therefore the perennial begging from individual ‘rich men and women’ would cease. But he lamented that the purpose for which the stores were built was not

achieved due to the lack of transparency in the administration or regulation of the rent collected from the stores. Meanwhile, the stores are the only immovable property of the Central Mosque as far as our research has discovered.

3.6 SUMMARY OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURE OF THE CENTRAL MOSQUE

As indicated above (3.6.1), the income of the Central Mosque is generated mainly through the *fisabilillah*. Some contributors, at times, identify particular works or maintenance of the Mosque which they wish to personally embark upon without channeling the funds for the work through the Committee. The Mosque Committee usually uses the funds accrued through the *fisabilillah* to finance additional projects, pay the utility bills, do occasional maintenance and sometimes replace outmoded items with new ones. The Committee, in addition, caters for the labor and remuneration of the menial workers. It should be noted that almost all the cost of the works are borne out of the *sabillah*.

We give here a summary of the income and expenditure of the Mosque between 1984 and 2010. From January to December 1984, the *sabillah* collected was 9,353, 844 cedis (GH¢935, 38, 44) as the income. The figure for expenditure was not made available. “We state that the above statement of income and expenditure is true and correct in accordance with the transactions made during the year ended 31st December, 1984”. This was stated by Garba Karami in the company of Ibrahim Kure and Usman Sofo Salaga. It was certified by an Auditor’s report, “I certify that the above statement of income and expenditure is in accordance with the documents and statements presented to me in the preparation of accounts.” The statement bore the names of S. Obeng Mensah (accountant) and Ahmad Ibrahim Gado (Mosque

Committee Chairman). In this statement only the names were given but none of them appended his signature including the accountant. See appendix ix and x

Within a period of 15 months, ending 4th March, 1986, the income of the Mosque was 870, 050, cedis (GH¢ 87. 05) and the expenditure was 688, 581, (GH¢ 68. 86) and a balance of 182,318 cedis (GH¢ 18. 25) deposited at Bank. The name of the Bank was not stated. This statement was signed by Garba Karami, Ibrahim Kure and Usman Sofo with S. Obeng Mensah as accountant.

The statement of account from January to December 1988 was given as follow:

Income	1,729,096, 00 cedis (Gh 172.90)
Expenditure	1,713,150, 00 cedis (Gh171.31)
Balance	15, 946, 00 cedis (Gh 1.59)

This statement was signed by members of the Board of Trustees Ahmed Ibrahim (Gado), M.S. Adams and Mohammed Amin (Imam Gonja). The statement ended by saying, ‘‘In conclusion, I would wish to express our appreciation of the generous contribution and work of our staff during a period of stringent adjustment of the Mosque. Their efforts and positive response during the year has contributed to the satisfactory results achieved. All contributions could be reflected on the next subsequent release of statement of accounts for 1989’’. It was signed by Ahmed Ibrahim (Chief Wangara Chairman). But as far as this research is concerned, the 1989 report has not reached us.

The 1992 statement read as follows:

Income:	1,214, 930.00 cedis (GH¢ 121, 493)
Expenditure:	1,000,960.00 cedis (GH¢ 109)
Balance:	213,970.00 cedis (GH¢ 21.3 9)

It was also signed by Ahmed Ibrahim (chairman) and M.S. Adams (member). In 1993, the income was:

Income: 3, 591, 240, 00 cedis (GH¢ 359. 12)

Expenditure: 3,076,431.00 cedis (GH¢ 307. 63)

Balance: 514,809.00 cedis (GH¢ 51. 48)

This was signed by Ahmed Ibrahim (chairman) and M.S. Adams, same source. Then in year 2002, January to December the statement was;

Income: 8,617,400 cedis (GH¢ 861. 74)

Balance: 568.000 cedis (GH¢ 56. 80)

Total: 14,185, 400 cedis (GH¢ 1418. 54)

Less expenses: 8,196, 200 cedis (GH¢ 819. 620)

Balance: 5,986, 200 cedis (GH¢ 598. 62)

Store rent: 1,972, 000 cedis (GH¢ 197. 20)

Grand total: 7,961, 000 cedis (GH¢ 796 10)

The statement was signed by M.S Adams with Ahmed Ibrahim's name written without a corresponding signature. From the year 2002 there was no statement as far as this research is concerned. Since then there was no financial statement released until the year 2010 January to December as follows:

Total income: GH¢ 8,105.00 cedis

Expenditure: GH¢ 7,513.00 cedis

Balance: GH¢ 592.00 cedis

Cash balance at Agriculture Development Bank: GH¢ 10,138.00 cedis

Cash balance at Barclays Bank: GH¢ 1,200.00 cedis

Total cash balance: GH¢ 11,930.000. Cedis

This statement was written and signed by M.S. Adams only even though, there are other members of the Board of Trustees. It is also worth noting that we mention earlier that a member of the Board of Trustees Mohammed Amin died several years ago, but no replacement was made for him, (3.5). In the absence of the other members of the Board, the accuracy or genuineness of the above statement may be doubted.

3.7 CONCLUSION

The Muslim Community of Kumasi initially was not composed of indigenes of Kumasi. They were settlers who had for one reason or the other converged in Kumasi to become an identical Community from their various backgrounds as the people of the *Zongo*. Despite their heterogeneity, they found themselves in a common situation with a common language-Hausa as their lingua-franca.

Islam was their cause of unity as they united to build a prayer place referred to as the Kumasi Central Mosque. The Mosque became their focal point of identity, unity as well as their disunity. They unite as they converge for the *Jum'ah* prayers, and when they gather for funeral *Dua* (prayers) or wedding ceremonies. They also meet during the two annual festivals, the *eid ul Fitr* (end of Ramadan festival) and the *eid ul Adha* (the festival of sacrifice). It was as well the place where conflicts such as Imamship or some other related issues that disunite them erupt. It was this same worship place that witnessed accusations and counter-accusations with regards to who has the authority over the Mosque. Now that the crisis of the Imamship has subsided followed by a relative peace however, the question of accountability and who leads the Mosque or whom accounts to whom remain unanswered. It is on that issue that we now focus our attention.

CHAPTER FOUR

LEADERSHIP OF THE KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter, we discussed the historical background of the Muslim Community of Kumasi. We explained the reasons or factors that necessitated their coming to Asante particularly Kumasi and their subsequent settlement. Being Muslims, they were able to come together to establish a common place for worship which later became known as the Kumasi Central Mosque. The conflicts that followed as a result of leadership problems were also explained. In this chapter however, our purpose is to evaluate the consequences of the leadership problem. The chapter will also show the administrative lapses as far as the Central Mosque is concerned and to find out how accountable the leadership of the Mosque is.

4.2 EVALUATION OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN KUMASI

After the settlement the Kumasi Muslims founded a community by which they were identified. Hence, that community needed a leader to provide direction. Leadership has been described as a “process of social influence” in which one person can enlist the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a common task”(Wikipedia). Leadership in this sense moves people to a well planned direction to motivate them to enable them to embark on something that is for the benefit of the community. Good leadership, therefore as Islam entails, is to direct people to achieve a long term best interest.

The Muslim Community-setup of Kumasi seemed not carefully planned and has no traditional administrative procedure. The Community was heterogeneous in its composition and each ethnic group had its own headman to regulate the affairs of the group. However, the Hausa ethnic group which was dominant at the time selected a leader and was recognized as the leader of the Community. The office was created by the British in order to curtail the powers of the Asantehene, so it did not have a traditional rooting which when abolished could lead to a crisis in the community. That was why the office of the Sarkin Zongo was abolished twice first by the British during the reign of Mallam Sallaw in 1932 (3.2.1), and secondly by Nkrumah during Mallam Mutawakilu's time. The abolition of the office of the *Sarkin Zongo* and the crisis that at times characterized the selection of some of the tribal heads is also a manifestation of non-traditionalist foundation of the Muslim community.

Mallam Gardi, the first *sarkin zongo* became in-efficient, and as a result left in less than two years of his reign and his successor Maigida became corrupt and was therefore removed from office off. It was only in the reign of Mallam Sallaw that effective leadership was witnessed in the community. However, he became despotic and was destooled. This reflects the un-traditional mode of selecting a leader for a Chief as done in the Asante society. It must be noted however that, the Hausa dominated the leadership of the Muslim community ever since. No other ethnic group was given the chance to lead. This in itself contributed to the ineffectiveness of the leadership. The Hausa were traders, merchants and landlords. Education in the Islamic sciences also bestowed some influence on them over the others. That itself, could not serve as a criteria for the selection of a leader. It was even said that the selection of the *sarkin zongo* was not done in consultation with other headmen and invariably did not call for allegiance of the other ethnic groups to the *sarkin zongo*.

Secondly, it was not the totality of the Muslim community in Kumasi that belong to the *zongo*. The Muslim community principally was divided into two distinct groups. The Asante Nkramo, originally Muslim from the north who were incorporated into the Asante society. They have their own Imam, pay allegiance to the Asantehene and also served as the intermediaries between the other Muslims and the Asantehene. Their Imam is the *Imam al-balad*. Whiles the *zongo* community consists of the Hausa and some Muslims from other parts of the country and the sub-region.

The pattern of leadership in the community was not based on one ethnic group even though the Hausa dominated the office of the *sarkin zongo*, thus every ethnic group has its own leader with an Imam. The Imam usually officiates in all matters of religious activities such as, naming ceremony, marriages and funeral ceremonies. The ethnic headmen and elders arbitrate whenever there is a dispute among the groups. During the era of Mallam Sallaw as the *sarkin zongo* he had a tribunal which was recognized by the British but some of the tribal heads such as the Mossi and Wangara objected to a Hausa arbitrating over non Hausa. It appears that from the foregoing the Hausa had dominated the Muslim community for quite a long time.

The Islam that is practiced in the *zongo* is 'Hausa-related' and almost all the tradition and customs of the community are based on Hausa culture. For example, reading or recitation of The Qur'anic or Arabic alphabets is done, until recently; in Hausa. Students who study the Islamic sciences do it in Hausa. Explanations and expositions are done in Hausa instead of the Arabic or any other Ghanaian language. Therefore Hausa language had become prerequisite for learning. This could be of their earlier, economic, political, religious and numerical dominance in the community. They made Kumasi (today) a popular center for Islamic learning in the sub-region. There

are many Islamic/Arabic schools in and around the *zongo*. Despite their awareness for the need of education, they until now limited themselves to the Arabic schools (*makaranta*) and the leadership detested western education. To them, that was a means to convert their wards into Christianity and a way to adopting western life which is *Kufr* (polytheism) and contrary to Islamic teachings.

In spite of this; the leadership was only concerned with their own personal prestige and maintenance of their position to the detriment of the growth and development of the community in general. This could be the reason why when politics was introduced in the 1950s, the leadership threw their weight behind some political parties either for personal prestige or to have control over the Central Mosque, (3.3.2). If they had a common purpose for the betterment of the community Mutawakilu would not have orchestrated the deportation of Ahmadu Baba and Alfa Ladan only to become the *sarkin zongo* knowing well that, they all belong to the Hausa community.

This trend continued up to date and some of the tribal heads and chiefs are openly against the leadership of the *sarkin zongo* as the overall head of the Muslim community. They advocate a central leadership vested in the newly formed Council of *Zongo Chiefs*. Although some tribal chiefs are also calling for the maintenance of the status quo that is the *sarkin zongo* should assume the leadership of the community. If this should continue, the Muslim community of Kumasi would remain for some time to come at the periphery of socio-economic development of Ghana. In that regard, the community will be no better than a ball to be kicked around by politicians who will then continually subject them to all manner of political manipulations.

4.2.1 The leadership of Ahmadu Baba and Mohammed Mutawakilu: An assessment

Ahmadu Baba who was born in Ejisu in Ashanti Region in the early 1900s and moved to Kumasi as a teenager. He had a mixed parentage of a Hausa father and a mother from northern Ghana. Ahmadu Baba was a transport owner and also engaged in cattle trade, like most Hausa men in Kumasi. He became successful in his businesses and built numerous houses in Kumasi that were let out. He came to the limelight of the Muslim affairs in the 1940s when he became the *sarkin zongo* and head of the Hausa community. Ahmadu Baba used his influence as the *sarkin zongo* and his acquaintance with the Asantehene, Agyemang Prempeh II to acquire the land on which the central Mosque was built.

His style of leadership was to use his wealth and position to help bring some measure of development and change towards the betterment of his people. He engaged the services of his associates such as Musah Fulatiyu, Sambo Fulatiyu, Usmanu Fello, Adam Dogo and Ibrahim Futa. These, to some extent, were his ‘cabinet members.’ He made his consultations with them in almost all affairs pertaining to the Muslim community. He was a good listener and sometimes he descended heavily on whenever he became convinced of his opinion. His fame reached its peak when in 1952 he acquired a large track of land for the construction of the Central Mosque.

In spite of the money that came as the result of the *fisabilillah* for the construction of the Mosque, the bulk of the money was donated by Ahmadu Baba. He was even said to have sold some of his houses and the money was used, in whole, to support the building of the Mosque. The Mosque became the centre for Ahmadu Baba’s reign.

He was obsessed with the Mosque building. Even though, he was aided by the building committee.

By 1958, four years into the construction, the Mosque was sufficiently completed for prayers. Not long after the completion of the Mosque, Ahmadu Baba became popular far and near. His popularity might have earned him enmity from his own ethnic group-the Hausa. Notable among them was Mutawakilu who contested Ahmadu Baba in the headship position of the community. During the political activities that led to the independence of Ghana, Ahmadu Baba vehemently threw his weight behind the NLM an associate of the MAP local based party, with loyalty to the Asantehene.

This generated a tensed situation that led to the deportation of Ahmadu Baba shortly after independence in 1957 (3.3.2). He was exiled to Nigeria until the fall of the CPP in 1966. However, after his return from exile, Ahmadu Baba took over as the *sarkin zongo* and head of the Hausa community. This time round, the mild and consultative disposition of Ahmadu Baba turned to violent and intolerant one. And when he found that some supporters of the CPP were still members of the building committee, he disbanded the committee and formed a new one with members loyal to him but his generosity had never waned.

When some members of the defunct CPP renounced their membership of the CPP and joined the MAP/NLM, he offered them a cash amount of 5.11 pounds and demanded from those who witnessed the mass defection not to call them “names” like *Tuubakaawa* (converts). He was a magnanimous leader who could use his wealth for the benefit of the community in the interest of Islam. During the dispute of

the Imam-ship he led the Muslim community against the Muslim Mission. He lived and died for what he believed in the welfare of the community in which he was a leader.

On the other hand, Mohammed Mutawakilu was also a Hausa and a leader within the Hausa community. His parents were both Hausa from Nigeria though he was born in Salaga or Kete Krachi almost at the same time as Ahmadu Baba. Unlike Ahmadu Baba, Mutawakilu was not a wealthy man but was endowed with considerable Islamic knowledge and was very proficient in the Arabic language. He had his studies at Al-Azhar University in Cairo-Egypt. He contested the position of the Hausa headman and the office of the *sarkin zongo* but lost to Ahmadu Baba.

He rivaled Ahmadu Baba until his death in 1968. Unlike Ahmadu Baba, Mutawakilu ruled the Muslim community as though it was his personal property. He could not contain or tolerate opposing views and even those near him revered him with fear. Mutawakilu's authority emanated from outside the community as the title of the *sarkin zongo* was conferred on him from outside and not by the choice of his own people. As we elaborated earlier in (3.3.2), Mutawakilu fought for quite a long time to become the *sarkin zongo* but could not succeed. That was why he accused Ahmadu Baba for the misappropriation of the Mosque funds. He joined forces with the CPP and became co-chairman of the Kumasi branch of CPP. He was a leader from the Muslim council, a CPP affiliate body dominated by the Hausas, but refused to identify himself with them as Nigerians. He was an astute leader, an organizer and despotic in attitude who created enemies for himself among the people he led.

However, when he became the *sarkin zongo*, he took the affairs of the Central Mosque seriously. He was able to open the Mosque for prayers after it was closed down by the government of the CPP as a ‘‘ protected place’’ in 1958. As a knowledgeable Mallam (cleric) in the Islamic sciences, Mutawakilu managed to woo Chiromah the Imam, to his side. See appendix viii

As a leader of a community with varied political views and orientations, he was supposed to be neutral and contribute towards the benefit of his subjects, but Mutawakilu openly supported the CPP. Not only that, he took up positions and became a constituency co-chairman of the party in Kumasi. He was intolerant to his political opponents and very hard on his supporters and associates.

Looking at these two personalities, Ahmadu Baba and Mutawakilu, who had dominated the leadership of the Muslim community of Kumasi for almost two decades, we can deduce that both had not been accountable to the *amana* (trust) and responsibility bestowed on them as leaders. For Mutawakilu to accuse Ahmadu Baba of misappropriation of the Mosque funds could be valid since there was no document that recorded the returns of the funds.

Even though, the court cleared Ahmadu Baba from the accusation, they could have resolved the case amicably if documents were made available. Ahmadu Baba in turn sued Mutawakilu, won the case and was awarded some amount for damages. In spite of all that Mutawakilu again referred the matter to the Asantehene for arbitration. The Kyidomhene commission of enquiry also could not find any case against Ahmadu Baba and yet Mutawakilu was not satisfied.

In an attempt, perhaps to defend himself Ahmadu Baba also accused Mutawakilu of altering the accounts of the Mosque. The question here is, Ahmadu Baba was the sole administrator and all funds gathered was given to him for the work of the Mosque, how then could Mutawakilu get access to the accounts let alone altering it? Mutawakilu was not a member of the building Committee and so was not in charge of the accounts books, Perhaps those were the reasons why the Kyidomhene Commission (3.3.2) became doubtful of the evidence produced by Mutawakilu and subsequently put an end to the investigation. It was not prudent on their part as leaders of their community, and as Muslims whose exemplary life should be emulated to wash their dirty linins outside by referring their case on the Central Mosque to a non-Muslim to arbitrate.

These two personalities, however, had contributed their quotas in the affairs of Muslims and the development of their community. On his part, Ahmadu Baba acquires the land on which the Central Mosque was built and he had used his own personal resources and his time to build the Mosque. Until his death, he had identified himself completely with the Central Mosque and even at his death demanded from his half brother Garba Karami, to continue with the work on the Mosque.

Mutawakilu on the other hand made his presence felt on the issue of the Central Mosque. Though unable to make any significant monetary contribution, he used his influence to get the Mosque reopened after it was closed down. His style of leadership was violent and autocratic and he was obsessed of his own conviction and therefore could not listen to even his associates. Looking at the two leaders, we can say from the above that their leadership did not conform to the Hadith that “a leader

is a guardian over the people and he will be asked about his subjects” (See page 3). From the above we can deduce that these two leaders cognizant of the *amana* (trust) that they held on behalf of the community. They lost, perhaps, their sense of responsibility and accountability for their stewardship as leaders.

4.3 EVALUATION OF THE IMAMSHIP IMPASSE OF THE CENTRAL MOSQUE

The Muslim Community in Kumasi comprised of different ethnic groups. These include the Fulani, Hausa, Dagomba, Gonja and Dyula. These constituted the Muslim community. In the 1800s the Imam and the leader of the community was Mohammed al-Gamba. He was the *qadi* (judge) as well and led people in prayers, (3.2). He was a Mamprushi from Gambaga in the northern region of Ghana. Yet, the Hausas who came from either Nigeria or Niger dominated the affairs of the Muslim community for long. What made them dominate the other ethnic groupings? Were they the first to arrive in the region as Muslims? If yes, that could not serve as good reason enough for them to occupy all positions of leadership in the Muslim community.

Research could not establish with clarity the first Muslim migrants who had arrived in Asante. If by the 1800s, Muslims in Kumasi had become a community with their head from the northern part of Ghana as stated by Samwini (3.2), then this could be an indication that the Hausa were not the first Muslims to have arrived in the region. Though one may argue that the community of Muslims in Kumasi is referred to as the *zongo*, Sidi Adams is of the view that the Hausa were the first to establish themselves in the Muslim Community in Kumasi.

The zongo as explained by Schildkrout (3.2) was established by the colonial administrators in 1902, there appears to be a contradiction as to the assertion of Sidi Adams that the Hausa were the first Muslims to arrive in the region. Sidi Adams again maintains that, the Hausa were able to establish themselves because of their success in business. They were able to monopolize the cattle and kola trade that brought wealth to them. The language, Hausa, also contributed to their dominance as it became the language of trade as well as education. Islamic knowledge and Arabic language were taught in Hausa and this contributed to their higher status in the community.

Tumi, who first settled at Mmorom in 1905, cannot be said to be the first Muslim settler in the city. He settled in 1905 and by 1800s, there was a considerable number of Muslims in Kumasi. So Tumi could not be the first Muslim to arrive in Kumasi. The domination of the Hausa in the Muslim community could be attributed to the British Colonial policy to reduce the powers of the Asantehene. In that regard, they created and supported the office of the *sarkin zongo*, (3.2.1), in and around the beginning of the 18th century. Since then, the office of the *sarkin zongo* became the sole preserve of the Hausa and in the 1950s incorporated the Imamship into the Hausa fold.

As far as the Central Mosque is concerned, the first Imam to have been turbaned or inducted, to officiate the Friday prayers was Imam Chiromah. He was turbaned in 1951 after the death of Imam Suleiman. Suleiman was not Hausa but he led in *Jum'ah* prayers for almost twenty-five years at the former Friday Mosque, (3.3.1). Chiromah was a Hausa perhaps the first Hausa Imam for the Central Mosque and the Muslim community. It is clear from the above that the Hausa had not dominated the

Imamship as claimed by the Muslim Mission, but almost all the activities of the Muslim community were done in the context of Hausa Islam.

Marriage ceremonies were done the Hausa way, in the sense that after the proposal by the man the “greeting” is done by the parents of the bridegroom. Afterwards collections of clothes, shoes, veils, scuffs and other items are prepared by the would-be husband for the would-be wife which is not part of the conditions stipulated by Islam for contracting a marriage. Secondly, some few days (two or three) before the date for contacting the marriage the would-be wife is put into *lalley* meaning henna. This is to dye the feet and palms of the bride and some parts of her body to give her a “beautiful” outlook. Some items such as a piece of cloth and some chickens with rice (uncooked) are sent to the bride’s family as a token of goodwill. These are purely Hausa traditions but incorporated in the Zongo Islam.

The lingua franca of the community was Hausa and even the notion was that, if one could not speak Hausa he or she was regarded as a non-Muslim and therefore, being stigmatized by the community. This could also be seen when one converted to Islam, he/she is called *tuuba* or *Tuubakawa* (plural, 3.3.1). These terms or ‘names’ were derogatory in context and those who converted were not given leadership positions. These and some other reasons such as syncretism precipitated the Mission’s agitations against the Hausa hegemony and the struggles for Imamship. The office of the *sarkin zongo* could have been contested by the other tribes since they all belong to the *zongo* and the Muslim community.

From what we have discovered, the Imamship was strongly contested by the Mission because it was the place by which they could identify themselves truly with Islam.

Islam is bigger than any ethnic group and therefore if they had access to the Imamship, everyone would come under that umbrella.

Thirdly, the Hausa could have invited someone from the Ghanaian ethnic groups to occupy the vacant position of the *nāib* after the death of Chiromah with a subsequent elevation of Garba Hakim to the office of Imamship. Since the community was one and everyone was well acquainted to the other. They could have invited either a Dagomba or a Gonja willingly to provide one person to occupy the position of *nāibship*. But that was not considered possibly due to superiority complex of the Hausa. They rather brought in another Hausaman, Issah Kataki to become the *nāib*, (3.3.2). Why the Hausa dominance? Could that be an act of disregard or stigmatization on the indigenes whiles Islam which they all practise abhors any of such acts and calls for mutual respect among all people.

For the selection of the Imam, the *Fuqaha'u* (jurist) had made it categorically clear that the landlord should be preferred over the visitor or stranger in terms of Imamship. And since the Hausas were the guests of the indigenes as stated by the Asante Nkramo Imam, Abdul-Mumin (3.3.4), then, the Mission was right in their demand for the Imamship. And while the arbitration was going on, the regional administration committee urged the Muslim community to accept the Dagomba choice by the Mission. The Community however objected to that proposal. The question then is why have they rejected the proposals? In the first place, the man was a cleric and well versed in the Islamic jurisprudence also a colleague of the Hausa chosen Imam Garba Hakim, then what was the reason for the rejection? Perhaps, the normal stigmatization. When Busia, the Prime Minister of the republic mediated it took the Hausa several days to come to terms with him, (3.3.4).

Looking at all these, one can sum up that the agitation adopted by the Mission could be justified because that had led to the maintenance of peace, harmony and mutual respect within the Muslim Community. The trend of leadership and Imamship of the Mosque and the transfer and changing of baton from one organization to the other had brought in some sanity in the Imamship. Presently, everybody in the community has the feeling and belief that he has not been left behind.

The other side of the Muslim community in Kumasi, the Asante Nkramo had toed the line of the Muslim Community and had established their own distinct Muslim community with the Imam as both their chief and Imam. Those that had converted to Islam became part of the Asante Nkramo and had since chosen a leader known as the *sarkin tuuba*, (chief of the converts). The current *sarkin tuuba* is Alhaji Abdul Kareem, an Asante. Meanwhile, the Asante sides of the Muslim Mission have since left the affairs of the Central Mosque into the hands of the Dagomba, Gonja and Banda. However, they kept an eagle eye on the activities of the Central Mosque.

4.4 EVALUATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CENTRAL MOSQUE

The Central Mosque which became the centre and unifying pivot of the Muslim community in Kumasi was since its inception run by individual personalities, in most cases by the *Sarakai* (chiefs) or wealthy men. The Mosque however belongs to the entire Muslim community as the Court case during the impasse of the Imamship indicated, (3.3.4). Also during our field work, we circulated fifty questionnaire to fifty people out of which we received thirty-five, twenty-two of which maintained that the Mosque was owned by the Muslim community. Then in this regard, the Mosque must be managed by the community and not individuals or people of wealth.

We have observed that during the formative period of the Mosque, Ahmadu Baba the *sarkin zongo* was in charge of the administration and management of the Mosque. The people that he brought to assist him were also notable individuals in the community and mostly from the Hausa majority. At that point in time, people with expertise in administration could be recruited to lay down an efficient administrative and managerial procedure for the Mosque; they could have done that for *fisabilillah* or purely on altruistic purpose, because the Mosque is the "house of Allah." The money that was handed over to Ahmadu Baba either from *Sabilah* or donation for the work of the Mosque was not recorded. There was no record as far as this research is concerned, that could spell out the income and expenditure at that time for the construction of the Mosque. Sidi Adams in an interview could not give a rough estimation of the Mosque's expenditure from its commencement in 1954 to its completion in 1958 (a period of four years).

The inability, on the part of Ahmadu Baba and his assistants to record the income and expenditure of the Central Mosque perhaps resulted in the accusation of misappropriation of the Mosque's funds by Mutawakilu and subsequent court case against Ahmadu Baba. Though, the court and the Kyidomhene acquitted Ahmadu Baba that alone could not exonerate him from his inability to account for the *amana* (trust) entrusted on to him. After returning from exile and reclaiming his title and position as the *sarkin zongo*, Ahmadu Baba sacked some members of the Mosque building committee who did not share his political persuasion. Even though they were members of the Muslim community.

On his death, as indicated by Musah Haruna, Ahmadu Baba urged his half brother Garba Karami to take over the work on the Mosque, who was also a wealthy man

and his kin. Could that not be seen as a conflict of interest? Since there were others who could carry on with the work and moreover the work was for the community and not for a family. The community was suppose to be directly responsible for the selection of whoever they deemed necessary to lead.

The second issue was that, after Ahmadu Baba, Mutawakilu succeeded him as the *sarkin zongo*. He was also a Hausa. He took over the work on the Mosque and was directly responsible for the administration and management of the project including the financial aspect. Just like Ahmadu Baba before him, (3.5) for the two and half years, (1958-1961) that he reigned, Mutawakilu was in total control of the affairs of the Mosque. Though, he was able to lease the land for the Mosque yet no written account was left behind.

Following the *wasiyya* (will) he made on behalf of his half-brother, Ahmadu Baba bequeathed the Central Mosque to him. Garba Karami organized his team of administrators, Usman Sofo Salga and Ibrahim Kure; all the three were businessmen and transport owners. None of them had expertise in terms of finance, economic or even secretariaship was among them. They embarked on their duty in 1971 and Garba Karami, the leader warned that he was not going to entertain any interference from anywhere or anybody. This warning as stated by Musah Haruna (Na Aberewa) indicated that the committee was not accountable to the K.M.C was irresponsible which could lead to arbitrariness in the course of their work and as noted above (3.5).

The usual accusation of misappropriation and calling for accountability on the work emerged and Garba Karami and his team came under serious attack for the misappropriation of the Mosque funds. Despite all that, Garba Karami built a school

for the Central Mosque. However the school known as the Central Mosque Basic School could not save him. The accusation intensified and the claim that Garba could one day claim ownership of the school surfaced and as a result he resigned from the work of the Mosque and the two others (his co-administrators) also resigned.

For all the 15 years (1971 to 1986) leadership of Garba Karami in the Mosque, only two financial statements were made available: in the year 1984 and 1986. In those statements, the names of Garba Karami, Usman Sofo Salga and Ibrahim Kure appeared with one S. Obeng Mensah as the accountant but no signatures were appended. For all those years since 1971, when they assumed the leadership of the Mosque and were responsible for the funds, one wonders why only two statements were produced. It was probably because they came under severe scrutiny and criticism that they managed to come out with only two statements during their reign. For Garba Karami to warn that he does not want any interference in his work does not call for accountability on his part.

The Mosque now (2012) has a new administration, after the resignation of Garba's administration. The various tribal heads of the community and not only the *sarkin zongo*, now take charge of the affairs of the Mosque. It is important to note that, even though, the tribal heads took over, yet all things are done in the name of the *sarkin zongo*. That is another indication of the Hausa hegemony in the *zongo*. The *sarkin zongo* mallam Aminu Ali in consultation with the other "Chiefs" constituted a new administration to administer the Mosque affairs. It was called the Mosque committee. The former committees such as the Finance, Building and other committees were dissolved in favor of the Mosque Committee. It had about 18 members and all the major stakeholders were represented and this appeared to be a commendable

innovation in the administration of the Mosque. The Committee was outdoored in 1986 and promised to continue with the good works of Garba Karami As stated by Mallam Gado: ‘‘The Garba administration terrazoed the floor of the Mosque and a new ceiling was put on’’. Ibrahim Gado commended Garba Karami for that work, but that considering the period he reigned, (1971-1986) it may be argued that he did not do enough and did not deserve much commendation.

The new administration also known as the Mosque committee under the chairmanship of Ahmed Ibrahim Gado promised to continue with ‘‘the good works’’ done by Garba Karami and his colleagues. The Committee vigorously embarked upon the work of the Mosque revitalizing the *sabilah* collection. One innovation the committee brought in, initially, was accounting for the money gathered from the previous *sabillah*. Monthly announcement was made to the general public on the income and expenditure bringing some form of openness and transparency in the administration of the Mosque. As a result of the innovations brought about by the new administration of the Mosque, some renovation works took place as all the windows were replaced with new ones. About 71 Stores were also built for commercial purposes in addition to women’s worship place.

Despite all these efforts, and the good work carried on by this Committee, yet there was no written constitution or regulatory document to spell out the rules or procedures that could serve as a guide for the committee to work with. In the event that the chairman or any member of the committee should resign or die, there was no procedure for replacements. We have seen that when Garba Karami resigned and the subsequent resignation of Ahmed Ibrahim Gado as chairman, there was no procedure for selection. The position was immediately occupied by the vice chairman Alhassan

Barau and when he died, Abu Balla (plywood) was acclaimed as the new chairman, (3.5.).

The second issue of lack of proper administrative procedure was that when Mallam Aminu a member of the Board of Trustees died, over the past seventeen years no one had been appointed to fill that vacancy. We shall see in the next section, (3.6.1) where one person signed the statement of account instead of three members whereas one of the members is still alive and active but could not append his signature. Out of the thirty-five questionnaires received from the fifty circulated, thirty respondents expressed their worry for the inability of the leadership to draft a constitution or a working document for the Mosque. Being the Central Mosque and not only for Kumasi but the region as whole, Ali Adam Ameer, a cleric and translator of the Imam's khutabah to Hausa, interviewed at his house Alabar on 17th April 2011, observed, "we should at least put up something to guide our operation of the Mosque". He went further to explain that "even in Saudi Arabia the two grand Mosques, the Ka'bah in Makkah (Masjid al Haram) and the prophetic Mosque, (Masjid al Rasul) in Madinah are controlled ostensibly by the government; they have a working constitution with guiding principles."

This he maintained is a manifestation of responsibility and a sense of accountability. Being one of the oldest persons serving in the administration of the Mosque, Sidi Adams (Tax) lamented bitterly during an interview with him on 23rd June 2011 the inability of the "founding fathers of the Mosque to formulate a constitution for the Mosque, this he said could have averted a lot of controversies that ensued during the past years, especially the Imamship impasse. We have discovered that an attempt was once made to prepare a constitution for the Central Mosque but could not come

on. Sidi Adams could not explain why there was no constitution for the Mosque. If efforts to produce the said constitution proved futile then, it indicates that there was some irresponsibility and lack of *amana* and accountability on the part of the founding fathers and to those who came after them. There should be a constitution for the Mosque.

In its complex nature, the Muslim community that owns the Mosque is heterogeneous and its characteristics are sometimes volatile. It is therefore imperative for the community to have a working document for the Mosque as society is dynamic and now becoming complex. This will help to establish some responsible and transparent leadership. Checks and balances therefore are necessary tools for the development and stability of any organization or institution.

4.5 EVALUATION OF THE FINANCE OF THE CENTRAL MOSQUE

Since its inception, the Central Mosque had not kept any proper record of its finances. The money that was solicited for the construction of the Mosque had not been recorded. Efforts to trace the accounts records proved futile. That was perhaps the main reason why the question of accountability became a hot issue between Ahmadu Baba and Mutawakilu in the initial stages of the Mosque, (3.3.2). The *fiabilillah* that accrued were put in to the work directly without first recording it into the accounts book. In most cases the *fiabilillah* was collected with open containers such as, pans, boxes, polythene bags which were subject to pilfering by those involved in the collection. (See appendix vii).

The fact that the construction, maintenance and renovation of the Mosque is the work of Allah as observed by Tijani Barau, a youth leader interviewed on 4th April 2011

does not mean that everyone can do whatever he/she pleases. The mode of collecting the *fisabilillah* in the initial stage was not properly organized as every individual who wished to be part of the *fisabilillah* group could join without any scrutiny to ascertain his/her ability. The only qualification is to be able to recite some portions of the Qur'an and some ahadith that encourages the need for donations and in most cases. The most often recited is: "The likeness of those who spend their wealth in Allah's way is as the likeness of a grain which growth seven ears, in every ear a hundred grains. Allah gives manifold to whom he wills. Allah is all embracing, all-knowing" (Qur'an 2:261).

Apart from the *fisabilillah* which had been and still is the primary source of income for the Mosque, individual financial outreach programs had been encouraged. Non-governmental organizations and philanthropists were also approached to contribute. They made handsome contributions however according to Tijani, the amount such organizations and individual philanthropists donated remains questionable since what they ever donated, they were not recorded and receipts were not given to the donors for record purposes. Some people think the donations were purely for Allah's sake and for others it was altruistic and therefore could not be thanked either verbally or in a written form.

When the women's group decided to screen the compound of the Mosque, they could have done that through the Mosque committee, but for the fear that the money might not be used for the intended purpose, they called on Tijani and the youth groups to do the work. This was laudable, but in the course of the work, (3.6.1), they found out that, it was done far below the standard they had expected so they called off the project. The work was done haphazardly without the consultation of a qualified

engineer to supervise the work. The women then took over the work. They abandoned the screeding work and embarked on changing the outmoded wooden windows and doors with modern tinted glass.

This action perhaps manifested the inability of the Mosque Committee to hold the trust *amana* bestowed on them. Also the youth who could not work to the satisfaction of the women and could not properly account for their stewardship also indicated the lack of responsibility and accountability.

If there had been regulations and proper checks and balances, suspicion of the misappropriation of funds could have been averted. This assertion is justified by the fact that Tijani could not come out with the total income and expenditure of the work they had done during the screeding of the Mosque compound. He only gave a verbal estimation of cement and sand to the tune of GH¢26,869.20. How many bags of cements and how many trips of sand were used was unknown since records were not kept. As he indicated, the token given to the youth (laborers) was too meager that they merely worked for the sake of Allah and therefore did not need any monetary reward. This could not be substantiated since most of the youths who had worked there could not be traced to ascertain or refute the claim. Again, most of the cement and the sand was donated by individuals, organizations or politicians as was the case of Patricia Appiagyei (mama pat) former KMA Chief Executive (3.6.1).

Inside the Mosque, the *fisabilillah* was collected by some group of men. They carried polythene bags, baskets, and sometimes with their bare hands, stretching their palms for the collection. At the end of the prayers, they counted what they had and normally the amount did not exceed GH¢15.00. The highest was GH¢20.00 as

explained by Sidi Adams (tax). This trend continued for some time due to ineffectiveness of the Mosque Committee and the Board of Trustees. It continued until in 2009 when some individuals became critical of the affairs of the Mosque as there seemed to be nobody in charge of it.

The group went to the Imam, Imurana Musah (now deceased), and complained about the deteriorating situation of the Mosque. For all this period, the Imam had no stipulated role in the running of the Mosque and people felt he should do something about it. Out of the thirty-five respondents, thirty knew the Imam personally or by name. He became the most popular personality in the community. Only five out of the thirty-five could mention the name of the chairman of the Mosque Committee.

The Imam after hearing the plea of the group, mounted the *minbar* on Friday, 24th April 2009 after a long absence due to poor health, he reminded the congregation in a *khutba* (sermon) of the consequences of *amana* and accountability. He called the Mosque leadership to be circumspect, diligent and responsible in the stewardship of the Mosque and in the process dissolved the *fisabilillah* group. He formed another group from various parts of the community. They were the Mallamai (teachers) of *Makarantu* (Arabic schools).

In their first collection, (Friday, 8th May 2009) an amount of GH¢280.00 was realized. Sidi Adams who kept the money said “this group has cleared us from any allegation”. The first group accounted for only GH¢20.00 as the highest collection, and the new group accounted for GH¢280.00 at the first start, one would see a vast gap between these two collections. The first group accounted for only GH¢20.00 and the new group GH¢280.00, a colossal difference of GH¢260.00. In two years of their

operation, (5th , June 2009 to 10, June 2011) the new group mobilized an amount of GH¢22,744.00 from the Mosque only and this was an indication that the *fisabilillah* alone if organized well could cater for the total expenditure and as well as help reduce the burden thrown on individuals, businessmen and the women.

4.6 ANALYSIS OF THE PROPERTIES OF THE MOSQUE

The Mosque has seventy-one stores built solely for commercial purposes to serve as additional source of income for the Mosque. These stores were rented out. The rent was supposed to go to the account of the Mosque but, it was only once in the statement of the year, 2002 that an amount of GH¢197.20 recorded and referred to as store rent. But in the subsequent statements, there was no mention of the stores income. Effort has been made to speak to the Secretary of the Mosque Committee Yahaya Salifu, on the issue of the stores income and expenditure but the researcher could not get him to speak on that. Thus, how much is paid on each store is not made available for the researcher and there was no record on the stores.

4.7 ASSESSMENTS OF THE SUMMARY OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURE OF THE CENTRAL MOSQUE

It is evidently clear from this research that there is no written or oral record as to the income and expenditure of the Mosque since its inception in 1952-54, when the foundation was laid. We were made to know that even the land on which the Mosque was built was donated by the Asantehene, Sir Agyemang Prempeh II, to Ahmadu Baba, for the benefit of the entire Muslim community of Kumasi, (3.3.1). In effect, it was not purchased, so it is not necessary to find out how much the land could cost.

Donations in cash were made by many individuals such as Norgah, an Accra merchant and an in law to Ahmadu Baba. He donated at that time, 10 pounds being the highest donation, (3.3.1). In addition to that, *fisabilillah* was also done to fund the building. The amount realized where not entered into any records but only orally announced. Also, the amount that was accrued from the *fisabilillah* of the drama performance by the *makaranta* children was also not recorded. What the researcher was told was that the money gathered out of the performance was the seed money that was used to start the work of the Mosque.

A record of the income and expenditure of the Mosque was only stated in the year 1984, (more than twenty years). When Garba Karami became the administrator of the Mosque, he was able to record the income from January to December 1984 but failed to produce the expenditure. Could that be an oversight on the part of Garba Karami or may be the expenditure note got missing before it could reach us. Whichever way, this is an indication of lack of effective mechanisms and proper administration and the lack of competent expertise of book-keeping. It is also an act of negligence and the inability to care for the trust bestowed on them.

Secondly, the income note was in the names of Garba Karami, Ibrahim Kure, and Sofo Salga as the administrators without specifying their various roles; such as chairman or secretary. In this regard, It will be difficult to point out who to be blamed for any short falls or who to take responsibility for the misconduct on the part of the administrators. Again, the name of an accountant, S. Obeng Mensah was put down but his signature was not appended. With this the income could not be accepted as a genuine one or false. That was the trend or nature of Garba Karami's administration. It is worth noting that he became chairman of the Mosque Committee

since 1971, after the death of his half-brother Ahmadu Baba, which under normal circumstance should not be so, because the Mosque was not the personal property of Ahmadu Baba for his kin to inherit it after him. Since 1971 until 1986, when he resigned, (3.5), Garba produced only two summaries of financial report of the Mosque, (3.7), in 1984 and in 1986. What happened in the years preceding these, no one can tell. Probably Garba Karami and his team were under intense pressure for accountability and that made them act quickly to exonerate themselves from the attack by producing only two summaries of the financial reports.

The third statement of the account was done during the reign of Ahmed Ibrahim Chairman of the reconstituted Mosque Committee. In the statement, an improvement upon the previous ones was evident. It produced the income, expenditure, and the remaining balance. This statement was signed by all the three members of the Board of Trustees (3.7) and they made a promise that ‘all contributions would be reflected on the subsequent release of statement of account for 1989’. This was a laudable innovation that could set a standard of accountability in the Mosque. Ahmed Ibrahim, M.S. Adams and Mohammed Amin were and are still the members of the Board of Trustees. The Board only produced the 1988 statement of accounts while the 1989 statement was promised in a written form but Board failed to fulfill its promise.

It was in 1992 that another statement of account was made available. The statement was signed by Ahmed Ibrahim as the chairman of the Board, and M.S. Adams as member. The other member, Mohammed Amin had died before the statement was produced. A year later, in 1993, another statement was made available and signed again by the two mentioned above.

Since then, there was a lapse and nothing was made available for the consumption of the public or at least for the sake of accountability until the year 2002. It was only in this year's (2002) statement that mention was made about the store rent since the stores were built and occupied by tenants who made monthly payments. The issue of the store-rent appeared only once in the yearly statement of accounts. The 2002 statement was signed only by M.S. Adams but the name of the chairman of the Board of Trustees, Ahmed Ibrahim was written with a pen (not typed) without appending his signature.


From then onward, there was no statement of account until the year 2010, January to December. This statement was the best among the others since it covered the income, expenditure, and the remaining balance. It was the best because it stated the bank at which the balance was deposited and it also gave the cash balance at hand; even though, the major lapse of this statement was that it was written and signed by M.S. Adams only.

In the final analysis, we have so far seen how the administration of the Mosque started with no specific laid down regulations as a guiding principle on which the Mosque could be run. The Muslim community in Kumasi was well endowed with scholars and experts in the field of secretariship, record keeping, accounting, administration, and counseling. This earned them positions of influence in the courts of the Asante kings as Samwini (2006, 34,) Clarke (1984, 175) and Schildkrout (1978, 68) have all shown. If these assertions were why was the Muslim Community negligent of their responsibility to Allah and the people? Why could they not come up with a written administrative structure for the Central Mosque, at least for the

sake of posterity?, As Muslims, they were aware of the need of record keeping as enshrined in the Qur'an 2:283.

4.8 CONCLUSION

The Kumasi Central Mosque belongs to the entire Muslim community and is the symbol of their unity. The *jum'ah* prayers, is the main reason for which the Mosque was built. Other activities such as the *Eid ul fitr* and *Eid ul adha* are celebrated annually in the Mosque. Marriages and naming ceremonies are also held in the Mosque and all these activities could be sources of generating funds for the up-keep of the Mosque. But this could not work well and the hue and cry on misappropriation will continue unless a proper mechanism is set up to monitor and control the management for proper accountability. If this is not done the same anomalies and inconsistencies shall continue to impede the progress and development of the Kumasi Central Mosque.



CHAPTER FIVE

RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In chapter four, we evaluated and analyzed the findings of chapter three which is the core of our study. We evaluated the convergence of the Muslim community in Kumasi and the activities that led to the establishment of the central Mosque. We also evaluated the conflict of the succession to the Imamship that led to a protracted conflict for more than two years among the two groups that claimed ownership of the Mosque. We have also looked into the finance of the Mosque which had been, since the inception of the Mosque, a source of accusations and counter-accusations between two leading contenders to the office of the *sarkin zongo* – Ahmadu Baba and Mutawakilu. The inability of the “founding fathers” of the Mosque to put down written regulatory guidelines for the running of the Mosque has also been looked into. In this chapter we intend to summarize the findings of our study and the issues that have emerged, make our observation and suggest some recommendations for the future stability and development of the Mosque.

5.2 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

The main purpose of this study has been to trace the nature and consequence of the accountability in the religious circles. The study has drawn its materials from both Christian and Muslim perspectives. Accountability has been established by these religions and emphasized upon their followers are urged to be accountable and responsible in their stewardship. Islam and Christianity call for stewardship and accountability in all human endeavor and they call for greater awareness in the

execution of “trust” or *amana* that is entrusted to them because they will account for it in the Hereafter.

In chapter two, we presented the general principles of accountability. It was established that accountability took firm ground in all human endeavors and it is the means by which people who were entrusted with public property could be held accountable for their deeds. We also discovered that Islam and Christianity had established the need for accountability here and the Hereafter. We cited as an example, the role of the rightly guided caliphs and how they were able to account for their leadership and the negative consequences of their inability to account for the stewardship and their duties as God’s vicegerents.

The chapter also explored how religion generally maintained the issue of accountability. Christianity, like Islam, acknowledges God’s stewardship and sovereignty over things that we see and those we cannot see. Islam in addition, emphasizes the trusteeship and *amana* which other creatures could not bear but the human race bore this *amana* with all its implications and consequences. Man was not made to forget this *amana* and he being the *Khalifa* (vicegerent) of Allah on the earth and therefore accountable to God for all his deeds. We also discussed the issue of ethics without which proper accountability will be rendered worthless.

Chapter three focused on the historical development of the Muslim community in Kumasi. It focused on the convergence of the Muslims in Kumasi and how they became a community or a society of identical values different from the values of the host people – the Asante. As a comprehensive chapter, it showed the factors that brought Muslims to Asante. It also examined the composition of the Muslims from

various regions in the sub-region as well as various tribes within Ghana. Their heterogeneity did not prevent them from becoming a community. Though, they were dominated by one tribe, the Hausa, yet they formed the core of Muslims with a common purpose.

Being the core of the study, the chapter brought reasons for the building of the Mosque that became known as the Kumasi Central Mosque. We also assessed the roles played by the leading players in the construction of the Mosque (Ahmadu Baba, Mallam Alfa Ladan and Mohammed Mutawakilu). The accusations and counter-accusations of misappropriation of the Mosque's fund that ensued in the course of the construction of the Mosque were also discussed. The style of leadership in the community was also explained with specific reference to Mohammed Mutawakilu's style of leadership. The role played by politics and political parties as well as Muslim organizations such as the NLM, MAP and the UP (which became deeply involved in politics) were also explained and discussed. The conflicts between the Muslim Mission and the Muslim Community in the late sixties over Imamship were looked into.

The administration and management of the Central Mosque was discussed and the role played by Garba Karami, (3.5) and Ahmad Ibrahim (Gado), were examined. This notwithstanding Ahmadu Baba being the first administrator and the founder of the Central Mosque played a major role in the administration of the Mosque before and after his deportation. Mutawakilu was an administrator but his contributory role as compared to Ahmadu Baba was insignificant. All the same, he also played a role that was worth mentioning. The way and manner the Mosque got its funding was also discussed. The *fisabilillah* been the major or main source of income for the

Central Mosque was mentioned. Its mode and criteria were narrated and expatiated in the chapter. The financial aspect of the Mosque which has been the source of worry for many Kumasi Muslims and beyond has been explored. We presented aspects of the income and expenditure of the Mosque. The summary of the statement of account was also adequately highlighted. The source of the summary that we enumerated was from the Board of Trustee of the Mosque.

Chapter four showed the effects of Muslim leadership in Kumasi and how it led to personality attacks instead of taking the affairs of the community seriously. Ahmadu Baba however, used his influence as a leader to secure land for the construction of the Central Mosque for the benefit of the entire community. Yet, he was unable to realize from the beginning that the Mosque could one day be the centre of communal conflicts. Mutawakilu who rivaled Ahmadu Baba as the leader of the Hausa and Muslim community used his political influence for his own benefits instead of the community. This earned him enmity from his own folk and the community.

The chapter also analyzed the impasse that followed as a result of the death of the Friday Imam, Mohammed Chiromah and the selection of a Hausa to fill the vacant position of Imam and also a Hausa for the position of the Na'ayib without due consideration and consultation with the other ethnic groups. This generated tension and conflicts in the community for some time. Finally, we weighed up the monetary aspect of the Mosque and we found out some anomalies and defects on the part of the administration and shortcomings on the monetary management of the Mosque's funds.

5.3 ISSUES EMERGING

From the evidence presented in this study, it shows that accountability has been firmly established, not only in the secular circles, but also in the religious circles. Both Islam and Christianity, the most popular religions in Ghana have called for accountability in the various aspects of human endeavor. The Qur'an and the Bible are very emphatic on the issues of accountability and teaches that one day, Humankind would be called to account for his or her deeds in the life after death.

We have also discovered that, the Muslim communities of Kumasi were mostly settlers, that is: migrants and they were entirely different in respect of tribe, culture, and religious affiliation from their host – the Asante. Again these Muslim communities were heterogeneous as they came from different places to converge in Kumasi, firstly as traders. Some were from the northern part of Ghana and were entirely assimilated into the Asante tribe and became known as the Asantenkramo. They are now more or less Asante but share the religious beliefs of the other migrants as Muslims.

The study also revealed that the Muslim Community was dominated by one tribe – the Hausa. They occupied the leadership of the Community commonly referred to as the zongo with a Hausa leader known as the *sarkin zongo*. It was this tribe under the leadership of Ahmadu Baba that managed to build the Friday prayer Mosque known as the Kumasi Central Mosque. The Hausa leadership however, could not hold to the leadership structure which they purported to have led. It became disintegrated when it was abolished firstly by the colonial authorities and secondly by Nkrumah.

Politics must have been the cause of total disintegration of the zongo community as rivalry among the leadership reached its peak when a faction of the Hausa under the leadership of Ahmadu Baba became supporters of the NLM and later the UP whilst the other group: the Muslims under Mutawakilu supported the CPP. This led to accusations and counter-accusations of misappropriation of the Mosque funds between these two groups.

The study also found out that the Central Mosque was founded on a baseless structure. That is to say, there was no constitution to regulate the affairs of the Mosque as an entity. The absence of a constitution led to the protracted Imamship conflict that marred the communal relationship which existed in the community for a long time. Even though eventually, it ultimately led to a peaceful succession, of the Imamship as is the situation now.

The administration of the Mosque was also problematic because, people with relevant expertise were not involved in the administration. Rather, people without management skills were put in charge of the Mosque's affair. Such an institution as the Central Mosque needed people with expertise to manage it. The Board of Trustees comprises of older people. Board members who are in their late 70s or early 80s (e.g. M.S. Adams who is 84 years old) were in control of the Mosque affairs. In our effort to get information from him (the secretary) about the Mosque, it took us several months yet, he could not hand over to us a single report pertaining to the Mosque. Most of the documents were kept in the Central Mosque's library. There is no office for the Mosque where official documents could be kept. This led to the haphazard manner in which the official documents of the Mosque were kept.

Finally, the *fiṣabilillah* had been and still is the source by which the Mosque gets its primary funding. It is also the means from which the maintenance of the Mosque is done. The utility bills are paid out of the *fiṣabilillah* and most of the maintenance is borne out of the fund accrued through the *fiṣabilillah*. We have found out that accountability is seriously lacking in the administration of the Central Mosque because no one accounts to another. The members of the congregation who are the people to be accounted to are content with what they hear during the weekly announcement of the Mosque account but do not question the perceived shortcomings. Because, for them, it is “Allah’s money and whoever tampered with Allah’s money will face His wrath”.

5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Having established from the study, that accountability has been lacking in the Central Mosque with no proper structure or system that could help bring some measure of efficiency and effective leadership, we recommend the following:

1. The world is changing and the pace of change is fast. Institutions, organizations, groups and communities all over the world are now becoming aware of the need of informed transformation and proper documentation. Probity and accountability have become the slogan of international and national institutions. Islam is therefore not left behind in these global efforts therefore the Muslim Community of Kumasi should first of all start with education. In this process, the leadership of the Muslim community should organize a conference to invite all stakeholders and the Kumasi Muslims in the Diaspora. Such as Asumah Banda a successful businessman and politician. Alhaji Yusuf Ibrahim another successful businessman who hails

from Kumasi but based in Accra and a host of others who have the expertise, to come together in a “Home Coming Summit” to look into the general affairs of the Central Mosque which is now becoming more complex. At the end of “Home- Coming Summit”, a constitution drafting committee should be put in place to come out with draft constitution which will spell out how the administration of the Mosque should be run. For example,

- i. the type of committee
 - ii. Who heads a committee?
 - iii. Who qualifies to belong to the committee?
 - iv. The duration of each office.
 - v. who should constitute the membership of constitution drafting committee.
2. The administration should be made efficient and people with expertise in economics, finance and administration should be brought on board. The older folks should make way for the younger ones who are educated in the universities or institutions of higher learning to take up the affairs of the Central Mosque.
3. An effective Board of Trustees is necessary for the maintenance of transparency and efficiency with regards to the regulation of the income and expenditure of the Mosque. The Regional Chief Imam, the Sarkin Zongo and the President of the Council of Zongo Chiefs should be brought on board to form the core of the Board of Trustees. These three stakeholders are the custodians of the Central Mosque and are therefore responsible and accountable for smooth administration of the Mosque.
4. A record book for the Friday *fisabilillah* is also necessary for the purpose of recording the income as well as the expenditure before the statement of

account is made available. Rents collected from the stores should be recorded in a different record book and the special donations from either individuals or organizations should be separated from the normal *fisabilillah* for records purposes and this may call for separate bank accounts for the Mosque.

5. An independent committee should be formed aside the Mosque committee to be charged with the responsibility of the funds accruing from the rented stores and that committee must be made responsible to the Board of Trustees. The composition of the Mosque committee should be revised and opportunity must be given to the young Muslim professionals who would be able and capable of using their expertise to the betterment of the Mosque. The vicinity of the Mosque could also be used for commercial purposes, since activities such as wedding ceremonies; funeral and occasional festivities belonging to some sections of the community are carried out in the compound of the Mosque. Levies from such some ceremonies will then be additional income to the Mosque.
6. The Board of Trustees must be made accountable to the congregation and the general Muslim community.
7. The Trustees must render quarterly accounts and weekly announcements, and a notice board should be mounted either at the main entrance of the Mosque or inside the vicinity enumerating the weekly or monthly income and expenditure. The Mosque should have a website where all announcements, weekly accounts, events etc can be posted.
8. A competent administrator with a requisite expertise should be engaged and must be made independent but accountable only to the Board of Trustees. The

administrator should serve in the capacity of secretary to the Mosque committee.

9. A qualified accountant who would be responsible for the accounts of the Mosque should be appointed. He should also be accountable to the Board of Trustees. These measures are to ensure transparency, bring about checks and balances, probity and accountability in the administration of the Mosque.
10. Finally, both the administrator and accountant should be paid competitive salaries. This will go a long way to enhance efficiency, effectiveness and responsibility.

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5.5 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Kumasi Central Mosque since its inception has been the symbol of unity among the Muslim community. It has become the centre by which each individual, group, tribe, and Muslim organization as well as political affiliations identify themselves. It is also the centre for which leadership, power and authority are found in the community. For these reasons, it has become the place of leadership struggle. This became so, because of the nature of the community that converged to establish the Mosque as a place of worship.

As a result of these, the Mosque had experienced leadership crisis among the Muslim grouping: the Muslim community, Ghana Muslim Community and Ghana Muslim Mission beyond imagination. Other ethnic groups resented the Hausa hegemony and their claim of ownership to the Mosque. These and other reasons contributed to the dragging the community into series of conflicts. These conflicts undermined the strength of the Community and their sense of Islamic belongingness. Now it is time for them to come together to renounce whatever superiority or inferiority complex is

among them in order to move the Muslim Community forward. The Muslim community needs to come together to forge ahead for the betterment of the community as, “indeed, Allah will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves” (Qur’an 8:53). The Kumasi Muslim community must change its attitude, perception and worldview in order to match up with the current wave of globalization. This will help ingrain the sense of responsibility and accountability in those who are called to serve in various capacity at one time or the other.



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Abdul Rahman, Ibrahim	Mossi Chief	17 th May, 2011
Adam Ameer, Ali	Elder of KCM	17 th April, 2011
Adams Mohammed, Sidi	Member, KCM	23 rd June, 2011
Alhassan Barau, Tijjani	Youth leader, KCM	4 th April, 2011
Ayaye, Abdul Mumi	Chief Gonja	30 th Nov, 2011
Harun, Abdul Mumin	Imam, KCM	15 th Oct, 2011
Haruna, Musah (Na'abrewa)	An elder of the KMC	20 th June, 2011
Ibrahim Gado, Ahmed	Former Chairman, KCM	17 th Nov, 2011
Ibrahim Issaka (Kotoko)	Caretaker, KCM.	22 nd March, 2011
Iddi, Jibreel Ballah <i>Wulana</i>	Elder KCM	29 th Nov, 2011
Mohammed Usman, Badawri	Member, KCM	16 th Nov, 2011
Mohammed Yushau	Librarian, KCM Library.	3 rd March, 2011
Nuamah, Musah Kofi	Former Secretary, GMM	6 th Sept, 2011
Sa'ad Mustapha Kamil	Former Secretary, <i>Ulama</i>	2 nd January, 2011
Sandaliyya, Babal waiz	Women's Leader, KCM.	22 nd March 2011
Yahya Salifu	Secretary of the KCM	4 th July, 2011
Yakubu, Bilkisu	Women's Leader, KCM	22 nd March, 2011

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
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APPENDIX I

AHMADU BABA AND WORKERS AT KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE



Source: Kumasi Central Mosque Library

APPENDIX II

AHMADU BABA, CHIEF WANGARA AND OTHERS AT K C M

CONSTRUCTION SITE



Source: K C M Library

APPENDIX III

AHMADU BABA INSPECTING WORK AT KCM IN 1954



Source: K CM Library

APPENDIX IV

THE CURRENT FRONT VIEW OF KCM



Source: KCM Library



APPENDIX V

INSTALLATION OF IMAM AND HIS NĀIB AT KCM



Source: Alhaji Abdul- Mumin Harun' Library



APPENDIX VI

IMAM ABDUL- MUMIN HARUN ON MINBAR AT KCM



Source: Alhaji Abdul- Mumin Harun' Library



APPENDIX VII

SABILLA COLLECTION AT KCM



Source: KCM Library

APPENDIX IX

KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE
FRIDAY COLLECTIONS FROM 1ST JANUARY 1984 TO 31ST
DECEMBER, 1984

30/1/84	Friday Collections	¢ 10,822.00
14/2/84	" "	13,300.00
24/2/84	" "	16,995.00
13/3/84	" "	15,174.00
21/3/84	" "	1,200.00
26/3/84	" "	19,300.00
2/4/84	" "	8,071.00
2/4/84	" "	16,280.00
11/4/84	" "	200.00
25/4/84	" "	20,123.00
11/5/84	" "	15,920.00
18/5/84	" "	15,363.00
8/6/84	" "	11,218.00
26/6/84	" "	13,239.00
29/6/84	" "	2,018.00
9/7/84	" "	17,701.00
2/8/84	" "	11,505.00
14/8/84	" "	15,500.00
4/9/84	" "	20,790.00
21/9/84	" "	19,907.00
19/10/84	" "	11,300.00
23/10/84	" "	17,833.00
26/10/84	" "	7,000.00
13/11/84	" "	12,015.00
30/11/84	" "	9,767.00
14/12/84	" "	15,700.00
24/12/84	" "	<u>15,603.00</u>
		¢353,844.00

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Source: KCM Library

APPENDIX X

We satisfy that the above statement of Income and Expenditure is true and correct in accordance with the transactions made during the year ended 31st December, 1984.

1.
ALHAJI GARIBA KARAMI

KNUST

2.
ALHAJI IBRAHIM KURE

3.
ALHAJI HUSANI SOFO

ACCOUNTANT'S REPORT

I certify that the above Statement of Income and Expenditure is in accordance with the documents and statements presented to me in the preparation of the accounts.

.....
(S. OBENG MENSAH)
ACCOUNTANT.

Source: KCM Library

APPENDIX XI

THE PICTURE OF THE OLD MOSQUE NEAR THE PALACE



Source: KCM Library