**REGULATION OF STREET FOODS IN KUMASI: STAKEHOLDER PRACTICES**

**AND PERCEPTIONS**

**By**

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## DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work towards the PhD Degree in Sociology and that, to the best of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published by another person nor material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree of the University, except where due acknowledgement has been made in the text.

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# DEDICATION

This research is dedicated to my mother Janet Ama Afra Thornton, and my parents Jerry Wayne Thornton and Mary Frances Thornton, for sacrificing their time, money, and resources to support me throughout my education.

This research is also dedicated to my wife Rhoda Forkuor and my daughter Mary Frances Forkuor for understanding the challenge and for supporting me emotionally and psychologically throughout my study period.

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May the good Lord bless all of you.

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# ABSTRACT

Street foods serve as an important source of employment and food for urban residents. Consequently, the effective regulation of street foods has been identified as crucial in satisfying the health and food needs of consumers, the income and employment needs of vendors, and the well-being of urban communities in general. Nonetheless, very little research has been conducted in Ghana focusing primarily on the regulation of street foods. This research complements existing knowledge on street foods in Ghana by focusing on the regulation of street foods and the practices and perceptions of stakeholders in regulation. This research employed the qualitative research tools of observation and interview to investigate the legal and institutional framework of street food regulations, the practices, perceptions, and interactions among stakeholders and, the challenges involved in the regulation of street foods in Kumasi, Ghana. This research revealed that the laws and policies guiding regulations are not specific to street foods and the body charged with the regulation of street foods faces significant resource challenges and performs other non-street food regulatory functions as well. The involvement of stakeholders was found to be mostly centered on the education of food vendors, leaving important functions like inspection to be performed by only the street food regulatory body. Even though the relationship between regulators and street food vendors was found to be marked by distrust and, occasionally by hostility, the relationship was also mediated by informal relations and agreements. This research makes recommendations for the improvement of communication between regulators and vendors in order to develop trust, and the adoption of inclusive approaches towards improving regulations that address the needs of both vendors and regulators.

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| | |
|---|---|
| ARI | Agric Research Institute |
| A.T.O | Assistant Technical Officer |
| CAC | Codex Alimentarius Commission |
| CRI | Crop Research Institute |
| DANIDA | Danish International Development Agency |
| DFID | Department for International Development, United Kingdom |
| EHO | Environmental Health and Sanitation Officer |
| EHU | Environmental Health and Sanition Unit |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations |
| FDA | Food and Drugs Authority |
| FRI | Food Research Institute |
| FSU | Food Safety Unit |
| GHS | Ghana Health Service |
| GSA | Ghana Standards Authority |
| GTA | Ghana Tourism Authority |
| IRF | Institutional and Regulatory Framework |
| INFOSAN | International Food Safety Authorities Network |
| KMA | Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly |
| KNUST | Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology |

| | |
|---|---|
| MAFFAG | Maggi Fast Food Sellers Association of Ghana |
| MFV | Mobile Food Vendors |
| MHD | Metropolitan Health Directorate |
| NESTAG | Nestle Tea Sellers Association of Ghana |
| NGOs | Non-Governmental Organisations |
| OICG | Opportunities Industrialisation Centres Ghana |
| QRTs | Quick Response Teams |
| SFs | Street Foods |
| SFS | Street Food Sector |
| SFV | Street Food Vendor |
| SFVs | Street Food Vendors |
| TCAG | Traditional Caterers Association of Ghana |
| TO | Technical Officer |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| WHO | World Health Organisation |
| WIEGO | Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organising |

Map of the Kumasi Metropolis showing all the Sub-Metros

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background to the Study

Street Food (SF) has been an essential aspect of urban living for years, especially in developing countries (Abdussalam and Kaferstein, 1993). It is estimated that 2.5 billion people world-wide consume SF on a daily basis, mainly as a result of its low cost and ease of access (Fellows and Hilmi, 2012). In addition to its importance as a source of food and nutrients, SF also serve as an important source of employment for urban residents (Meagher, 1995). In the South American countries of Brazil and Mexico for instance, approximately one million people are directly employed in the Street Food Sector (SFS). Furthermore, in India, approximately 3 million people are directly involved in the SFS (Fellows and Hilmi, 2012).

Similarly, sub-Saharan African countries have experienced a steady growth in SF, with the SFS playing an important role as a source of food, nutrients, income, and employment for urban residents (Muleta and Ashenafi, 2001; Riet, Hartog, Mwangi, Mwadime, Foeken, and Steveren, 2001; Acho-chi, 2002; Mitullah, 2003; Ohiokpehai, 2003).

In view of the important role played by SF, researchers and academics (Draper, 1996; Ekanem, 1998; Maxwell, Levin, Armar-Klemesu, Ruel, Morris, and Ahiadeke, 2000; Mensah, Yeboah-Manu, Owusu-Darko, and Ablordey, 2002) have emphasised the need for all stakeholders to ensure that SF are safe for consumption by urban residents. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) emphasise that the collaborative and active participation of all stakeholders (including Street Food Vendors and food regulators) is a crucial element in ensuring, promoting and sustaining the safety of SF and the wellbeing of Street Food Vendors (SFVs) (FAO and WHO, 2004). All players and stakeholders need to play their part and to collaborate with one another in ensuring food safety

(Bessy, 2009). In the absence of effective participation of all stakeholders and an integration of policies regarding the SFS, national and municipal authorities risk having weak food regulatory systems that fail to address problems of food safety, fail to promote food vending businesses and ultimately fail to ensure the well-being of urban residents (FAO and WHO, 2004).

One of the major challenges facing the SFS in Africa is how to develop regulatory and institutional practices that ensure collaboration among stakeholders in the provision of safe and affordable foods at locations that are convenient for SFVs, customers, city authorities and cities as a whole (Abdussalam and Kaferstein, 1993). Mitullah (2003:9) also explains that because "*inappropriate regulations raise the cost of business entry, growth and distort markets*", SFVs in Africa mostly do not operate from and within the set down rules and regulations, a situation that sometimes results in conflicts with city authorities. Another challenge facing the regulation and control of the SFS in Africa is the fact that mandates and responsibilities of regulatory agencies and other stakeholders are poorly defined and thus often overlapping and uncoordinated (Bessy, 2009).

In Ghana, Johnson and Yawson (2000) have argued that as a result of the important contribution of SFs to urban livelihoods, it is essential that the SFS is regulated and developed into a hygienic, safe and sustainable sector to promote the socio-economic wellbeing of urban Ghanaians. In order to achieve this however, there have been calls for a greater collaboration, interaction and communication among key stakeholders working within the SFS (Johnson and Yawson, 2000). To promote collaboration, interaction and beneficial relationship among stakeholders, it is essential to first understand who these stakeholders are, the nature of their involvement and the broad institutional framework within which they operate (Fellows and

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Hilmi, 2012). A better understanding of this institutional framework is also essential for the development of policies and regulatory practices that addresses the needs of all stakeholders (Fellows and Hilmi, 2012). Consequently, it is important that research investigates the regulatory, institutional and organisational set up of the SFS in Ghana, with an aim of developing the sector into a sustainable and hygienic source of nutritious food, employment and income through appropriate policies and regulations.

This study adopted the qualitative research tools of participant observation and semistructured interviews to investigate and analyze the SFS in Ghana. With the theory of

"negotiated order" as the overarching theoretical lens, and the sociological concepts of power, social networks, and gender, as organizing concepts, this study focuses on the laws, policies and procedures that guide SF regulation, and the nature and form of interaction, collaboration, and power dynamics among stakeholders involved in the regulation of SF. The study also analyzes how SFVs perceive and respond to food regulations and the dynamic relationship that exists between SFV and food regulators in Ghana. By focusing on these aspects of the SFS, this study promotes a comprehensive understanding of the social and institutional context of the SFS in order to inform effective policies and decision making (Golder, and Gawler, 2005). This study also contributes to the broader literature on the sociological concepts of power, gender and social networks.

## 1.2 Problem Statement

Street foods have been an important area of research in Ghana over the years, with the sector attracting the research interest of academics, research bodies, government agencies, and other international and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (Johnson and Yawson, 2000;

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King, Awumbila, Canacoo, and Ofosu-Amaah, 2000; Ntiforo, 2000; Mensah et al., 2002; Afele, 2006; Rheinlander, Olsen, Bakang, Takyi, Konradsen, and Samuelsen, 2008). However, the available research has focused largely on the safety and hygiene of street vended foods. For instance, Mensah et al. (2002) assessed the microbial and lead content of street foods, while Rheinlander et al. (2008) investigated the social perceptions of safety of street vended foods. Other studies have focused on food handling practices and their implications for food-borne diseases (King et al., 2000), called for an improved hygiene for SF and SFV (Afele, 2006), and discussed ways of improving the safety and quality of SF with an aim of promoting the safety of SF for the urban poor (Johnson and Yawson, 2000). Such a focus for research is important and provides a valuable tool for policy makers to use in evidence-based decision making and policy development. Nonetheless, available research in Ghana, most of which was conducted in Accra (Ababio and Lovatt 2015), does not provide in-depth information on how SF are regulated, the involvement of stakeholders in regulation, and the challenges faced in the regulation of foods. This is a major weakness in the available literature on SF since an in-depth knowledge on regulations enhances the development of effective regulatory policies, which in turn has positive implications for the hygiene and safety of SF (Bessy, 2009; Fellows and Hilmi, 2012). In the light of the weakness in literature outlined above, this study sought to describe the legal policies guiding street food regulations, to explore and explain the governmental institutions mandated to regulate SF and their responsibilities, to analyze the relations and interactions among these governmental institutions and other non-governmental stakeholders and then to analyze the challenges for regulators in regulating SF and for SFVs in adhering to regulations.

The literature is awash with information on the stressful relationship between regulators and street vendors, often portraying regulators as bullies who use the formal power vested in them to bully or evict poor, weak and helpless vendors and in so doing, prevent vendors from making a living (Drummond, 2000; Rajagopal, 2001; Anjaria, 2006; Donovan, 2008; Alfers and Abban

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2011; Milgram, 2011). Thus, researchers have often investigated the relationship between street vendors and city authorities from the point of view of street vendors, demonstrating how the lives of street vendors have been negatively affected by the activities of regulators. However, very little is known about the fears, concerns and challenges of regulators. This is an important limitation because, if the fears, concerns and challenges of regulators are understood and addressed alongside those of street vendors, it creates a platform for improving street food regulations, for reducing harassment and for effective performance. Consequently, this research explored the circumstances, challenges and the fears of regulators in working with and regulating SFVs. It further explored some of the key challenges that street food regulators have faced and the various negotiating strategies they have employed to respond to and overcome these challenges. The implications of the regulatory challenges and negotiating strategies for food regulations and food safety were also explored.

By their presence and activities, street vendors in different parts of the developing world have been in confrontation with city authorities or regulators over space for business, conditions of work, sanitation and licensing (Popke and Ballard, 2004; Anjaria, 2006; Asiedu and AgyeiMensah, 2008; Skinner, 2008a; Milgram, 2011). Thus, these two groups (street vendors and city authorities) have interests that often contradict or compete (Austin, 1994). Sometimes, the confrontation between regulators and street vendors result in the death of both vendors and regulators, as has been reported by Zhouxiang (2013) in Beijing, and Abdelrahman (2013) in Cairo. Despite the reported cases of harassment against vendors, in urban Ghana, street food vending continues to grow as a major source of income for a significant proportion of urban Ghanaians (Osei-Boateng, 2012). As a result, this research investigated the various strategies that SFVs in Ghana have used to negotiate SF regulatory requirements and with SF regulators. This study analyzed how informal relationships established over time among SFVs and

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between SFVs and regulators are used to negotiate street food laws. Through this analysis, the study explored the possible opportunities or challenges that the various negotiating strategies could provide for the effective regulation of SFs in Kumasi.

Street food vending in Ghana is traditionally regarded as an occupation for women (Nimura, and Eisen, 2010). Nonetheless, the changing economic conditions mean that men are negotiating this cultural requirement and engaging in food vending (Overå, 2007). However, usually, men vend fried rice and women vend Traditional Foods (TFs) (Fufu[1], Banku[2] and Kenkey[3]) and operate chop bars[4] (Overå, 2007). This segregation of the sexes within the SFS and its implication for the wellbeing of SFVs and for street food regulations has received very little research attention in Ghana. For instance, how does being a male or a female food vendor affect one's relationship and interaction with consumers and regulatory authorities? Does being a male or a female SF regulator have any implication for regulatory approach and effectiveness? In light of the above, this research investigated the differences in experiences and perceptions of male and female regulators in terms of implementation of SF laws and male and female vendors in terms of adherence to SF laws. By focusing on these aspects of the SFS, this research contributes to a further understanding of the effects of gendered perceptions on informal sector occupations and on urban regulations.

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[1] Fufu is prepared by boiling plantain and cassava and pounding in a mortar with a pestle, while turning it over with the hand.

[2] Banku is fermented maize dough dumplings prepared and served with either soup or stew.

[3] Kenkey refers to fermented maize dough dumplings wrapped in cornhusk, boiled, and served hot with pepper sauce and fish.

[4] A chop bar  refers to a local eating place usually serving Banku, Fufu, and Kenkey

**1.3 Objectives of the Research**

The main objective of the study was to investigate the regulation of street foods in the Kumasi metropolis and to analyze the practices and perceptions of key stakeholders regarding street food regulations.

The specific objectives of the study were:

1.  To describe and analyze the legal and institutional framework for street food regulation in Kumasi.

2.  To analyze the practices, interactions, and power dynamics among regulators, SFVs and other stakeholders in regulating street foods in Kumasi.

3.  To investigate the challenges of food regulators and food vendors in implementing and adhering to street food laws.

4.  To examine the implications of the interactions, relationships, beliefs and perceptions of food regulators and food vendors, for effective implementation of street food laws.

5.  To analyze the implication of gender for street food regulation.

**1.4 Research Questions**

In order to achieve the research objectives, the following research questions were explored:

1.  What legal policies exist and which institutions are mandated by law to regulate street foods in Kumasi?

2.  How do regulators, street food vendors, and other stakeholders interact and relate with each other in regulating street foods?

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3.      What implications do the interactions, relationships, beliefs and perceptions of regulators and street food vendors have for the effective implementation of street food laws?

4.      What are the challenges for regulators in regulating street foods and for food vendors in adhering to street food laws?

5.      How does gender affect street food regulations?

## 1.5 Theoretical Perspectives of the Study

The theory of 'negotiated order' was used as the over-arching theoretical lens for this research. Within this over-arching theoretical lens, this research used the concepts of 'power', 'social networks', and 'gender' to analyze the literature and field data. The following sections discuss the theory of negotiated order, why it is appropriate for this particular research and how negotiations may manifest among various actors in the SFS. This is followed briefly by a discussion of the key concepts identified and why they are important concepts for this study.

### 1.5.1 The Negotiated Order

The negotiated order theory emerged out of the symbolic interactionist perspective within the discipline of Sociology (Day & Day 1977; Fine, 1984). One of this theory's earliest and prominent contributors and writers is Everett C. Hughes (Day & Day, 1977; Fine, 1984). Among other factors, the theory developed as a reaction to Weber's studies of bureaucracies and the rigid conceptualisations of organisations presented by Weber (Allen, 1997; Day & Day, 1977). Weber discusses bureaucratic organisations as made up of specific statuses and roles, occupied by specific individuals with precise rules and regulations determining how work was carried out (Dzorgbo, 2013). Hughes and his students found this as providing unsatisfactory

explanations of the organisations they observed. Thus they set out to explore alternative theories that could accurately capture the reality of the organisations they observed (Day & Day, 1977).

According to the theory of negotiated order, the reality of an organisation depends, not only on formal rules and regulations, but also on informal interactions among organisational members and the resulting informal contracts, agreements and norms that come to shape their work (Fine, 1984). The theory thus, focuses on and highlights the importance of informal interactions and processes, alongside the formal laws and regulations within organisational settings (Fine, 1984;Nathan and Mitroff, 1991). Formal rules, according to this theory, do not adequately and sufficiently regulate all activities, instances and contingencies that may occur within an organisation (Day & Day, 1977). They (formal rules) are inadequate in this respect: they are not known entirely by all members of an organisation, they do not cover all possible scenarios, they are selectively quoted and applied, they are often not explicit and extensive and these create challenges for organisational performance, which are not easily resolved through a simple application of the law (Day & Day, 1977). These deficiencies of formal rules inform and enhance the emergence of informally negotiated contracts or agreements, negotiations which promote the continuation of work. The social context within which interaction takes place, and the power available to the parties in interaction determines the nature and extent of these negotiations (Fine, 1984;Nathan and Mitroff, 1991).

Three main assumptions underlie the negotiated order. Firstly, negotiated order depends on the way in which actors understand their situation (Fine, 1984). People respond and react to events based on the meanings that situations and actions have for them, and this in turn shape their reality and how they act within such a reality (Fine, 1984). The second assumption underlying

the concept of negotiated order is that individuals and groups constantly make changes to the situation in which they find themselves through negotiation (Fine, 1984).

Thirdly, the theory of negotiated order assumes that change is inevitable and continuous (Fine, 1984).

In sum

> "*The negotiated order theory downplays the notion of organisations as fixed, rather rigid systems which are highly constrained by strict rules, regulations, goals and hierarchical chains of command. Instead, it rather emphasises the fluid continuously emerging qualities of the organisation. The changing web of interactions woven among its members, and it suggests that order is something at which the members of the organisation must constantly work*" (Day & Day, 1977: 132).

Although the negotiated order has been criticised for paying too much attention to negotiations and neglecting power, politics and other structural factors that may constrain and influence negotiations (Day and Day, 1977; Hall and Spencer-Hall, 1982), such concerns have over the years been acknowledged and incorporated into the theory. Consequently, power and power dynamics are considered as essential in influencing the extent to which negotiation can occur within an organisational environment (Hall and Spencer-Hall, 1982).

## 1.5.2 The Negotiated Order of the Street

The street food sector can be characterised as a negotiated setting, where negotiations are ongoing among the various stakeholders on a daily basis (Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah, 2008). Negotiations may be for physical space, economic opportunity and power, and may involve the general public, urban regulators, and law enforcement agencies (Asiedu and AgyeiMensah, 2008). Negotiations may be among individuals (among SFVs, or between SFVs and customers) or may be among organisations or larger scale units (among formal regulatory bodies and stakeholders). While negotiating for space has received significant attention in the literature, there are other negotiations on-going as well. Among street vendors, regulators, pedestrians, and the general public, negotiations occur regarding what can be considered an acceptable and

unacceptable use of space, as well as what can be considered rights of the vendor to vend and earn a living against the rights of the state to keep city streets decongested (Drummond, 2000). Similarly, the norms regarding gender appropriate occupations are continuously being negotiated and renegotiated in response to changing socio-economic conditions (Overå, 2007). As an overarching theory then, 'the negotiated order' in this research served as an important lens in exploring, understanding, and analyzing the relationship and interaction among various stakeholders involved in the SFS and SF regulations in Kumasi.

**1.5.3 Key Theoretical Concepts of Study**

Within the broad theoretical lens discussed above, four key concepts were focused on and guided the study. The theoretical concepts of 'power', 'self-regulation', 'gender' and 'social networks', were used to explore and offer a deeper understanding of the interrelations and interactions among stakeholders in regulating street foods. These concepts and their relevance to this study and to negotiations are briefly explained below.

**1.5.3.1 Power**

Power is an important concept in sociological discourse. Its nature, form and content have been debated in various ways. Max Weber contributed significantly to the sociological analysis of power. He conceived of power as the ability of actors, either as groups or as individuals, to get what they want despite resistance from other actors (Dzorgbo, 2013). He further explained that there are two main avenues to gaining power: legitimate and illegitimate. Legitimate power is said to exist when those on whom power is being exercised acknowledge that those exercising the power have the right to do so (Dzorgbo, 2013). Power is illegitimate however, when those on whom power is being exercised view those exercising power as having no right to do so (Dzorgbo, 2013). By establishing these distinctions, Weber laid a solid foundation for a further

discussion of the concept of power within Sociology. Unlike Weber however, Foucault who contributed significantly to the analysis of power presented a different perspective (Kannabiran & Petersen, 2010). Foucault's analysis shifted from a focus on the source, ownership and use of power to a focus on the manifestation of power within the day to day interaction and subsequent negotiation among individuals within a system (Kannabiran & Petersen, 2010). He argued that power is not a fixed entity and neither does it reside in an individual but rather it is dynamic and fluid, with different individuals coming to possess power at different points (Kannabiran & Petersen, 2010). Power according to Foucault (1982) is exercised in a relationship and is evident when certain actions modify and constrain the actions of others. Power then must not be perceived as a fixed and independent entity but rather must be understood to exist through action (Foucault, 1982). Within a social negotiated setting, some actors, be they groups or individuals, may wield more power and control over others. Who has power and who does not may depend to a large extent on the social situation and relationship within which negotiation takes place (Fine, 1984). Thus, those who are in need of something are usually constrained by the conditions laid down by those who can satisfy their needs. "*When an individual has a need that must be satisfied, he or she is severely constrained by the wishes of those who can satisfy it*" (Fine, 1984: 251).

Foucault (1982) admonishes though that in studying power, it is essential to acknowledge that the person on whom power is being exercised is an active rational person, who within a power relationship, has different options in terms of responses, reactions and inventions. Thus, it is possible for the actions of the 'powerless' to constrain the actions of the powerful since power relations and influences are not expressed only in a single direction (Fine, 1984).

The balance and structure of power may change or be modified through negotiation such that groups and individuals who traditionally did not wield power may come to possess a lot of influence and power within a negotiated setting (Day and Day, 1977).

SFVs, working with limited or no infrastructural facilities and limited access to competitive space for business may be constrained by the conditions and terms laid down by city authorities and regulators who are in a position to provide vendors with certain infrastructural facilities and who, at the same time, control vital public space. Nonetheless, it is also possible that SFVs, under certain conditions and through certain actions, inactions, defiance and refusals of theirs, may possess power and influence in negotiating their situations. Since the concept of power is defined in a relationship, the concept of power was useful for studying the SFS in the Kumasi metropolis, especially when various stakeholders, both formal and informal, are in interaction with each other with unclear rules and overlapping mandates (Sefa-Dedeh, 2009).

### 1.5.3.2 Social Network

A social network can be perceived as "*a category of actors bound by a process of interaction among themselves*" (Bandyopadhyay, Rao, and Sinha, 2011:3). A social network approach to studying social phenomenon emphasizes the network of relations between and among actors (groups, organizations or individuals), rather than focusing on individual actors in isolation (Marin and Wellman, 2011). This perspective focuses on the interconnectedness of actors through direct and indirect interactions and relations at various levels and social situations (Social, Economic, and Political) (Bandyopadhyay, Rao, and Sinha, 2011).

Relationships between or among actors in a network, also known as ties, may be looked at and analyzed to consider the nature and direction of flow of the relationship, the strength of the network, and where weaknesses occur in the network (Marin and Wellman, 2011). Directed ties or relations

go from one actor to the other while undirected ties exist between two actors but in no particular direction (Marin and Wellman, 2011). Both directed and undirected ties may be stronger when they transmit more resources and involve more or frequent contact among actors or may be weaker when they transmit or exchange fewer resources and have less frequent contact among actors (Marin and Wellman, 2011). Because actors in a network have differential access to important resources, there often emerge interdependencies among actors which can lead to either collaboration or competition (Ritzer, 2008). Social network approach can be employed at various levels of study. At the systems level, it can be used to study how a network of organizations and groups function together or in relation to undertake a task or activity (Lazer, 2008). At the positional level, it can be used to focus on how actors are placed or positioned within a network of relations that affect their being (Lazer, 2008). At the relational level, it can be used to explore what motivates the make-up and existence of the network in the first place (Lazer, 2008).

In light of this study's focus on various stakeholders and their contribution to street food regulations, the social network approach served as an important organizing tool for this study. The social network approach was employed at both the systems and positional levels in this study. At the systems level, it was employed to demonstrate how a network of governmental and non-governmental organizations collaborate and relate with each other in performing various regulatory activities within the SFS in Kumasi. At the positional level, it was used more to demonstrate how SFVs are positioned in the network of relations among all stakeholders in the SFS and how they interact with governmental and non-governmental organizations and the power implications resulting from such interaction. The nature of the relations among stakeholders, the direction of relations between particular stakeholders and the strength of existing relations were explored as part of this study. A social network approach was also used

to understand how SFVs make use of the social networks available to them as a tool for negotiating for opportunities.

### 1.5.3.3 Gender

Gender refers to the socially constructed attitudinal and behaviour expectations, prescribed by culture and society as appropriate for the specific sexes, those behaviours that meet what society expects of males and females (Kornblum, 2003; Schaefer, 2004; Ritzer, 2008). Gender has become an important concept in sociological studies of organizations and organizational behaviour. Concepts such as the 'glass escalator' and the 'glass ceiling' have been used to explain how gendered perceptions serve as an advantage and disadvantage under different circumstances for men and women (Williams, 1992). Several researchers (Evans, 1997; Lupton, 2000; Heilman, 2001; Cross and Bagilhole, 2002; Simpson, 2004; Simpson, 2005) have also demonstrated how gendered perceptions have implications for the socioeconomic well-being of both men and women in formal sector occupations in different parts of the world. In studies of the informal sector, gender, according to Horn (2014) remains an important concept to be considered in any study of the street vending sector. This is because there is an inherent gendered division among street vendors, with women usually engaged in the sale of lower income earning goods (Horn, 2014). Bass (2000) in a research of the negotiating strategies of street vendors in Senegal, draws attention to how gender may define the influence and success of negotiating strategies by particular groups. Bass (2000) found for instance that, because female street vendors had less social authority to assert themselves, they were less able to negotiate for their interests and often made their interests secondary to that of their male counterparts. The concerns specific to female vendors who often sell different products from the males and thus often have some challenges specific to their situation are often left

unaddressed during macro level negotiations with state officials (Bass, 2000). Bass goes on to emphasise the importance of gender in any studies of street food vendors.

Consequently, given this study's focus on the street food sector, made up predominantly of women, but with an increasing number of men, gender served as an important organizing concept for this research. Accordingly, this research explored how the gendered perceptions and biases emerging from the socio-cultural context of the research setting influenced the relationship between SFVs and regulators and the implication of such gendered perceptions for regulations.

### 1.5.3.4 Self-Regulation

Bandura (1991) acknowledges that even where formal and rigid rules and regulations exist, human action, reaction and behaviour depend, to a large extent, on internal thoughts, feelings and beliefs. These motivate and modify human action. Day and Day (1977) in a review of the theory of negotiated order, emphasise that despite the existence of formal rules and regulations, there always emerge an informal structure, norms and agreements that shape the interactions, actions and reactions of actors within a negotiated order. The authors argue that negotiations are therefore influenced by both external laws and regulations and internal beliefs and perceptions (Day and Day, 1977). This study used this concept to explore how personal relationships, beliefs and perceptions of both regulators and vendors affect the implementation of street food laws in the Kumasi metropolis. The formal regulatory set up of SF informs the actions and inactions of street SFVs. However, as Bandura has argued, human action, reaction and behaviour are also regulated by internal thoughts, feelings, beliefs and interpretations (Bandura, 1991). Similarly, the International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN) asserts that the tradition and culture of a particular context often have implications for how

SFVs prepare and sell SF (INFOSAN, 2010). This clearly indicates that SFVs, operating within a formal regulatory set up, possess certain beliefs, standards and interpretations that regulate their actions as well. The behaviour of SFVs, their actions and inactions, are therefore the result of a combination of formal regulatory requirements and self-regulatory or internal influences on behaviour (Bandura, 1991). Food regulators are not passive human beings either. In implementing food laws in day to day practice, they make modifications to these laws based on their perceptions, beliefs, interpretations, experiences and relationships of and with SFVs (Anjaria, 2006; Skinner, 2008a). In other words, the perception, beliefs, relationships and experiences of both food regulators and food vendors can influence the way laws and policies are implemented and adhered to in practice (Anjaria, 2006; Skinner, 2008a).

## 1.6 Significance of the Study

The importance of promoting the SFS as a source of safe and nutritious food, and sustainable and empowering employment for Ghanaians has been well documented (Johnson and Yawson, 2000; Mensah et al. 2002). This study, with its qualitative focus on regulations and stakeholder relations complements the existing literature on street foods in Ghana, most of which have focused on the safety and hygiene of street foods (Tomlins et al., 2000; King et al., 2000; Mensah et al., 2002; Moreno and Tomlins, 2006; Rheinländer et al., 2008). This is because in-depth qualitative research evidence, as has been provided by this study, plays an important role in influencing the development of appropriate policies that are of relevance to the needs or challenges of a particular context like the SFS in Kumasi (Rist, 1994). The indepth understanding that this study has provided, places policy makers in a better position to develop policies that ensures the safety of street vended foods, enhance the well-being of SFVs and ultimately protect the consuming public.

Furthermore, by providing contextual information on key stakeholders and how they collaborate, this study gives policy makers key information to be used in planning and implementing policies aimed at promoting inclusive participation of all stakeholders. By understanding the institutional and regulatory environment of SFVs and the interaction between food vendors, customers and other stakeholders within such an environment, policy makers are better placed to direct policies at problem points in the interaction chain to ensure that all stakeholders work towards a unified goal or desired change. In addition to its contribution to an understanding of the SFS in Ghana, this study also contributes to the broader literature on the power dynamics between city regulators and street vendors in urban areas and the implications of gender for urban regulations and for informal sector occupations.

This research is also significant since it can contribute to the empowerment of the high percentage of women (Mensah et al., 2002) who are employed in this sector both as vendors and as regulators. Thus, since majority of SFVs are females, any improvement in the SFS, resulting from improved collaboration, communication and inclusive participation among stakeholders, means an improvement in the life of women and that of their dependants. This is important since "*providing access to decent employment for African women is a major step toward economic empowerment and freedom*" (Berhane, 2008:3).

## 1.7 Definition of Concepts

**Street Foods**:  Street foods refer to meals, excluding snacks and beverages, that are sold by the side of streets, at street junctions, in or near markets, lorry parks, businesses and organisations, from either stationary locations with less than four permanent walls, or from mobile vendors who move from one location to the other, for consumption either

immediately or at a later time without further processing.

**Street Food Vendors:** Street food vendors refer to individuals, either males or females, who are directly involved in the day to day preparation and sale of street foods, either as owners or as employees, to the general public.

**Mobile street food vendors:** Mobile street food vendors refer to those street food vendors who, during the course of a working day carry their street foods on trays, pans, bicycles, trolleys and other such movable containers, from one location to the other in search of customers and consumers.

**Stationary street food vendors:** Stationary street food vendors refer to those street food vendors who during the course of a working day remain and sell street foods from a particular location, operating from stalls, and shops with less than four permanent walls, or from tables, trolleys, plastics, or other movable devices that can be removed and stored at the end of the working day (Fellows and Hilmi, 2012).

**Stakeholders:** Stakeholders refer to individuals, groups, and organisations, formal or informal, governmental or non-governmental, who are directly involved in, affected by, and or maintain an interest in the street food sector and the activities within this sector. Formal stakeholders refer to all the governmental and non-governmental organisations or institutions that are directly or indirectly involved in the street food sector. Governmental institutions include the various ministries and boards as well as the local authorities mandated to regulate the street food sector. Informal stakeholders may include street food vendors and food vendor associations, customers and customer associations of street food vendors.

**Street food sector:** The street food sector refers to that part of the informal economy dealing with the regulation, sale and consumption of street foods.

**Regulation of street foods:** It refers to the totality of the laws, policies, and procedures used in managing, controlling, and organising the sale of street foods in Kumasi. In this sense, formal regulators are used to refer to individuals, groups and organisations, mandated by law to regulate, at least an aspect of street food vending businesses.

**Institutional and regulatory framework:** The institutional and regulatory framework is defined to include all the formal government and non-governmental organisations, laws, regulations, and procedures, as well as the informal groups, conventions, customs and norms that broaden, mould and restrain socio-economic activity and behaviour within the street food sector. Thus defined, this institutional framework includes Street Food Vendors (SFVs), their norms, customs, conventions, practices and perceptions on the one hand, and regulatory authorities, with their laws, policies, practices and procedures on the other hand.

## 1.8 Organization of Study

This thesis is organized into six chapters. In chapter one, a brief background to the study has been provided and the main problem that necessitated the study revealed. Subsequently, the specific objectives and research questions guiding the study have been outlined. This was followed by a brief overview of the theoretical assumptions informing the research. Chapter two reviews the existing literature on street foods. The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one briefly discusses the urban informal sector and places street trading and food vending within this sector. Section two focuses on issues around formal regulation and licensing of vendors, self-regulation and self-organization, the challenges that regulators have faced and some of the suggested recommendations

for improving regulations. In section three, the review explores the dynamic relationship between SFVs and urban regulators. Chapter three explains thoroughly the processes followed and the methods used in conducting this research. A detailed overview of the study area is first presented. This is followed by an overview of the research design, the sampling procedure, and the particular instruments used in collecting data. Finally, how primary data was stored and analyzed are explained. Chapter four is divided into five main sections. The first section presents data on the legal and institutional framework for street food regulations. The second section explains the key aspects of regulations, how they are carried out in practice and the stakeholders involved. Section three analyzes the challenges involved in regulations. Section four investigates how personal beliefs and perceptions mediate the implementation of street food laws. The chapter ends with section five which investigates the implication of gender for street food regulations. Chapter five discusses the key findings that emerged from the major research areas. Existing literature and theoretical concepts are used to draw out the implications of the research results that were revealed. Chapter six, the final chapter of this thesis provides a summary of the entire work, makes recommendations based on the findings and concludes the thesis.

## CHAPTER TWO

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a review of literature on the SFS. The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one briefly discusses the urban informal sector and places street trading and food vending within this sector. By so doing the argument is made to use literature on street trading in general to support the review of literature on street food vending. Subsequently, the section is organised thematically to answer the following questions: what are street foods; who are street food vendors; what led SFVs to vend food; and under what circumstances do they

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vend food? Section two of the review focuses on formal regulation. Issues around formal regulation and licensing of vendors are reviewed first. Self-regulation and self-organization among informal sector workers and street vendors is then discussed. The section then discusses the challenges that regulators have faced and end by exploring some of the policy interventions that has been undertaken in different parts of the world, aimed at 'balancing' the relations between vendors and regulators. Section three, the analytical part of this review, analyzes the various forms of relationships between urban regulators and street vendors in different parts of the world.

## 2.2 The Urban Informal Sector, Street Vending, and Street Food Vending

Over the years, the informal sector has grown tremendously by continuously adapting to changing socio-economic conditions and changing socio-economic demands (Hussmanns, 2001; Chen, 2004). In view of the employment and stable income opportunities that this sector offers to significant proportions of rural and urban dwellers in developing countries (International Labour Office, 2002; Tokman, 2007), there is an increasing recognition that the informal sector can play a key role in inducing economic growth and ultimately reducing poverty (Chen, 2004; Tokman, 2007). The informal sector is also a lucrative source of employment for a significant number of women in Africa and much of the developing world (International Labour Office, 2002). Most women in West African cities for instance work within the informal sector (Herrera, Kue'pie', Nordman, Oudin and Roubaud, 2012). In a survey of 11 cities in 10 developing countries, Herrera et al. (2012) found that over 90% of the women who were working were working within the informal sector. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, the ILO estimates that 84% of women non-agricultural workers are informally employed (International Labour Office, 2002). Clearly, this demonstrates and emphasizes the importance of the informal sector to the economies of developing countries, especially in Africa.

Within the informal sector, there are different groups and categories of workers (Tokman, 2007), ranging from home based workers, through industrial hands, to street vendors. The International Labour Office (2002) estimates that home based workers and street vendors form the largest category of informal workers. Although home based workers are more than street vendors (Skinner, 2008a), street vendors are more visible than home based workers and as such attract much more attention from policy makers, authorities and the general public (International Labour Office, 2002; Chen, 2004).

### 2.2.1 Street Vending

Second only to home based employment in the informal sector (Skinner, 2008a), street vending has existed for several years as a source of employment (WIEGO, 2012). Generally, a street vendor is defined as a person offering goods and services at a public space, including sidewalks and alleys, for a fee (WIEGO, 2012). Street vending may in turn be defined as "*the retail or wholesale trading of goods and services in streets and other related public axes such as alleyways, avenues and boulevards*" (Recio and Gomez, 2013: 175). Operating from the streets and other public spaces, street vendors may work from permanent locations, or may be mobile, carrying their wares to customers at places of high customer concentrations (Bhowmik, 2005). Street vendors who operate from permanent locations may operate from a variety of structures, including fixed kiosks, folding tables and chairs, and pushed carts that could be moved and stored at the end of each working day (WIEGO, 2012). Mobile vendors on the other hand may walk or use bicycles throughout the day (WIEGO, 2012). Like other economic activities in the informal sector, street vending is an attractive source of employment, especially for women, given the flexible working conditions presented by this form of employment (Cohen et al. 2000). This flexibility allows women to engage in trade and to perform other essential domestic

activities at the same time (Cohen et al. 2000; Mitullah, 2003). The flexibility offered by street vending is evidenced in the fact that the number of vendors may change considerably during the course of a day, from morning through evening (Skinner, 2008a). While some vendors may operate in the morning, others may operate in the afternoon and yet others may operate only in the evening (International Labour Office, 2002; Skinner, 2008).

Street vendors in Africa work an average of 8-12 hours each day (Mitullah, 2003), trading or vending in a variety of items including electrical appliances, toilet rolls, clothing, and food items (fruits, vegetables, snacks, fish, and various other fast foods) (Chen, 2004). These goods and services may be offered on wholesale or retail basis (WIEGO, 2012). Although there exist regional differences, women are generally more prominent in the sale or vending of SFs while men generally are involved in the vending of non-food items (Skinner, 2008a).

The prominence of women in the vending of foods and food items in Africa may be as a result of traditional roles and expectations of African women (Mitullah, 2003). Cohen (1986) explains that traditionally, women in Africa have had the economic role of producing and processing food crops for consumption. This traditional role and expectation may reflect the higher female participation in marketing and trade related activities, including the sale and vending of SFs (Cohen, 1986).

### 2.2.2 Street Foods, Street Food Vending and Street Food Vendors

Although different definitions exist for street foods, one important characteristic, common to all definitions is the location (street) of such businesses (Draper, 1996; Fellows and Hilmi, 2012). The term 'street' may appear to exclude those food vendors operating from 'officially sanctioned off street markets, bus terminals, and other public spaces. However, street foods are defined to include foods that are sold in markets, bus terminals, and other public places as well (FAO, 2009; WIEGO, 2012). This is because the activities and modes of operation of food

vendors operating in these public spaces remain the same as their street counterparts, even after moving off the streets (WIEGO, 2012). Consequently, street foods are defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as "*foods and beverages prepared and/or sold by vendors in streets and 'other public places' for immediate consumption or consumption at a later time without further processing or preparation*" (Food Safety Unit 1996, p.2). This definition introduces another term 'beverages' as an essential aspect of street foods. Thus, the definition of street foods include drinks, and meals (Draper, 1996). Drinks and meals are not the only items that come under the definition of street foods however. Snacks have also been included in the definition of street foods (Fellows and Hilmi, 2012). Snacks are defined as foods consumed between main meals and thus, of a relatively lighter and less substantial and nutritional value (Draper, 1996; Fellows and Hilmi, 2012). Snacks may be prepared from fruits, vegetables, and cereals and may be eaten in a raw state or be processed (Fellows and Hilmi, 2012). These snacks may include modern and more processed foods that are vended on the streets like biscuits, ice creams, and yoghurts (Ekanem, 1998). In addition to snacks, drinks and meals, fruits and vegetables that are sold for immediate consumption are also considered under the street food umbrella (Food Safety Unit, 1996). Street foods thus cover a wide variety of foods, food items, and beverages. This variety may depend on, and be influenced significantly by the culture, religion, and the climate of localities or countries within which they are sold (Fellows and Hilmi 2012). In recognition of this variety in the type, preparation and consumption of street foods, Mensah et al. (2002) defined street foods as "*a wide variety of ready to eat foods and beverages sold, and sometimes prepared, in public places*" (Mensah et al. 2002: 546). The authors further elaborate that street foods may be consumed at the point of purchase or they may be taken away and consumed elsewhere (Mensah et al. 2002). More often than not, street foods are prepared and/or made ready for consumption on purchase. Consequently, customers of street foods can decide to consume the foods on purchase or take

it elsewhere for consumption without having to process it much further (Ekanem, 1998). Street foods may be differentiated from formal food establishments by the fact that street foods are usually sold by hawkers and mobile vendors or from stalls and shops with less than four permanent walls (Fellows and Hilmi, 2012). In addition, the informal street food sector may be distinguished from formal food establishments by the relative lack of specialisation, the use of very low capital in starting and operating the business, the lack of or minimal amount of financial accounting and financial records, and sometimes the evasion of some or all taxes (FAO, 2007).

**Who are the Street Food Vendors?**

Street food businesses are usually operated by individuals or families (Draper, 1996; FAO, 2007). Women form the majority of street food vendors (FAO, 2007), and the sale of street foods has been described as one of the gendered occupations in countries in South East Asia (Milgram, 2011). This is similar to other developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa and most of the developing world where women play a significant role in street food enterprises, from the preparation of foods to the point of sale (Draper, 1996). The predominance of women in the sale of street foods is however not universal since men are usually the majority of street food vendors in countries (North African Muslim countries for instance) where cultural norms restrict the economic activities of women (Skinner, 2008a; Nicolo' and Bendech, 2012). Here, even though women may play a significant role in the preparation of street foods, the actual sale of the foods are left to the men. Even in countries where women predominate as food sellers, their predominance is only limited to a particular type of food. For instance, fast food sellers (especially fried rice sellers) and 'kebab' sellers in Accra, 'garba' sellers in Abidjan, or the meat sellers in Bamako are predominantly men (Overa', 2007; Nicolo' and Bendech, 2012). Sometimes, gender is used as an exclusion mechanism to deny others equal opportunities in the informal sector. This may be common among more established

market women who may look upon male involvement as an unfair competition and thus make it almost impossible for men to secure stalls for operation at well-established market areas (Overå, 2007). On the whole however, culturally embedded barriers to gender participation appears to be less prominent compared to perceptions of fear and danger as barriers to female involvement in certain types of activities in the SFS (Overå, 2007).

Street vendors may occupy different status within the sector. While some vendors are selfemployed owners with or without employees, others are mainly contributing family members. Yet still, others sell on commission basis for other self-employed vendors or for more formal establishments (WIEGO, 2012). Generally however, street food vendors have been revealed to be from poor households, have low levels of education, and are mostly residents and natives of the cities where they vend food (Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah, 2008; Mitullah, 2003; Overå, 2007; Solomon-Ayeh et al. 2011). These vendors may however be differentiated and characterised based on their mode of sale (Draper, 1996). While some of these vendors operate from a permanent point of business during the course of a day (stationary), others are mobile and move from one place to the other in the course of a day (Draper, 1996). Generally however, stationary food vendors appear to be the majority of all street food vendors (Draper 1996). Mobile and stationary food vendors are not the only means of distinguishing food vendors. There are some food vendors who vend food on a seasonal basis when the items they specialise in are available, while others vend on a part time basis to supplement another source of income (WIEGO, 2012). Nonetheless, it can be argued that whether part time or seasonal, these street food vendors will either operate from permanent stands or place of business, or be mobile and thus, can still be grouped under the category of mobile or stationary food vendors.

Stationary food vendors may operate from small stalls and kiosks, while mobile vendors operate from baskets, trays, pushcarts, balance poles, among others (FAO, 2007). Other food vendors display their food and food products on plastic sheets and/or cloth, spread out on pavements and sidewalks (FAO, 2007). Mobile vendors on the other hand move from place to place depending on where clients and potential customers are known or perceived to be during different times of the day (WIEGO 2012). Some of these mobile vendors follow fixed routes for business on a daily basis (Draper, 1996). Others vend on what Recio (2010) terms as 'consignment basis' since they do not own the initial capital needed to begin or finance the business as well as the necessary equipment (Recio, 2010 cited in Recio and Gomez, 2013). Thus, they take items from other vendors, vend and return the amount involved to the original vendor and keep a portion of the interest.

**Why do they Vend Food?**

Knowledge of the conditions and circumstances that lead people into street vending is important for policy makers and city regulators in understanding why vendors react the way they do to eviction, relocation, and other urban regulatory policies and subsequently to develop policies that satisfy the needs of vendors and of cities and city authorities. Consequently, this section explores the available literature on the circumstances that lead people to vend food, serving as a basis for future analysis of existing legal policies and rules for street food vendors. Various researchers have provided different reasons explaining why people end up in the informal sector as traders and vendors. In line with this, informal sector vendors and traders may be grouped into two broad categories.

The first category includes those individuals whose participation in the informal sector is in response to or as a result of structural socio-economic or political factors. These economic and political situations serve as push factors, driving people into the informal street food sector.

Some people in this category previously held jobs in the formal sector but ended in the informal sector in response to major socio-economic changes taking place at the time (WIEGO, 2012). Thus, during economic difficulties and hardships, when some formal workers are laid off by their organizations for instance, the informal sector serve as a welcome source of employment (WIEGO, 2012). In Bangkok and Thailand for instance, the financial and economic recession of 1997 compelled people into the SF trade as a source of income and employment (Chung et al. 2010). The central and municipal governments of Thailand and Bangkok respectively, went to the extent of encouraging citizens to take up street food vending as an alternate source of income during this financial crisis (Chung et al. 2010). Similarly, Ekanem (1998), reports that poor economic structures in Africa have compelled Africans to engage in the vending of street foods as a source of income. In some African countries for instance, the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 1980s and 1990s; and other trade liberalization programmes initiated by various governments, has reduced the ability of the formal economy to employ people, and in the process led to the laying off of several formal sector workers who were compelled to find employment in the informal sector (Skinner, 2008a). In addition to economic factors, political instability and upheavals may also lead people into informal street food employment. In times of war and conflict when people become refugees in other people's countries for instance, selling food on the streets become a welcome means of earning an income (FAO, 2007). In some African countries like Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, conflicts, wars, and other political upheavals have displaced a lot of people who become refugees in other countries and settle on jobs in the informal sector where there are limited barriers (Skinner,

2008a). Nicolo and Bendech (2012) for instance report of such migrant food vendors from Niger, vending 'garba' on the streets of Abidjan. Mitullah (2003:6) concludes that "*most vendors vend as a result of a lack of other sources of income*". Accompanying economic and

political constraints, is tradition and culture, with its existing role expectations and responsibilities which constrain the ability of people, particularly women to actively seek employment and be successful in the formal sector (Benefo and Pillai 2003).

The absence of an appropriate alternative thus compel some people into vending street foods. What is common for vendors in this category is how the prevailing social, economic, political and cultural factors compel them to work or seek employment within the informal street food sector. In a way, it can be argued that this represents a form of structural violence, where the prevailing economic and political conditions create disadvantages and constraints for individuals and groups within a society (Winter and Leighton, 2001). The formal sector is structured in a way that favours and attracts persons with high levels of education and skill, and who can afford to work out of the home for a considerable part of the day (Osei-Boateng and Ampratwum, 2011). Nicolo and Bendech in 2012 reported for instance, that only 51% of the population in Accra could rely on the formal sector for employment, leaving the other 49% to seek employment in the informal sector. By its structure and organization therefore, the formal sector exclude and discriminate against a significant number of women who in addition to a low level of education have traditional role expectations and responsibilities that keep them from seeking formal employment opportunities (Cohen, 1986; Benefo and Pillai, 2003; Mitullah, 2003; FAO, 2007; Milgram, 2011). The cultural system, with its expectations and role ascriptions (Benefo and Pillai, 2003), the educational system, with its failure to provide equal access to all members of the society (Osei-Boateng and Ampratwum, 2011) and the economic structure, with its failure to provide opportunities for employment in the formal sector (Skinner, 2008a), compel some people into informal street food vending. What this means is that, for this category of vendors, the prevailing economic and cultural conditions act as a force, influencing their participation in the informal street food sector. The prevailing

economic system then, promotes unequal access to economic resources between formal and informal sector workers like street food vendors. True, some informal sector workers earn incomes that are not significantly different from that of other workers in the formal sector (Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah 2008). Nonetheless, the emphasis here is on choices. The structural violence occurs when individuals who, otherwise may have preferred to work in the formal sector are unable to fulfil or achieve their goals or desires and are thus, compelled to make do with what exists in the informal sector (Ho, 2007). The disparity and misfit between what individual SFVs desire of and for themselves and, what they actually achieve as a consequence of prevailing structures and conditions, especially when this disparity is avoidable is what constitutes the violence of the existing structure against individuals (Ho, 2007). By its nature, structural violence presents itself as an acceptable, normal, and everyday aspect of social structures and institutions. Consequently, they do not draw as much attention as direct physical violence (Winter and Leighton, 2001). Consequently, those who experience and are victims of structural violence are often unaware of how the prevailing conditions contribute to their situation (Winter and Leighton, 2001). It is essential however, that society pays attention to structural violence as it manifests in the informal sector, since it can have negative implications for society (Winter and Leighton, 2001).

The foregoing argument creates the impression that informal sector workers are passive and only react to prevailing socio-economic conditions. While this may be true for some informal sector employees, others decide voluntarily to enter the informal sector out of their own volition because the nature of informal sector employment suits their needs. For this category of SFVs, conditions existing in the informal SFS act as pull factors attracting them to the sector. In West Africa, an increasing number of educated and trained individuals are entering the street vending sector in order to take advantage of some of the benefits that may be presented (Nicolo and

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Bendech, 2012). Under this voluntary category may be found the large number of women for whom the flexibility presented by the informal sector is a major form of attraction since they are able to engage in economic activities and take care of their households and their traditional role expectations at the same time (FAO, 2007; WIEGO, 2012). Others choose to voluntarily operate in the informal sector in order to avoid the costs of formal registration, including time and money and thus, to enjoy the relatively low amount of initial investment and skill required to operate a business in the informal sector (FAO, 2009). Other street vendors are purely opportunistic and seasonal, and choose to operate as vendors when there appear to be a certain change in demand for a commodity (WIEGO, 2012). These type of vendors may be seasonal and may vend in order to satisfy an emerging need by the general public (WIEGO, 2012). They are rational thinkers who act in the informal sector on rational principles. For this category then, it could be argued that deciding to enter or not enter into an informal sector occupation is one of rational decision making, rational choices made on the basis of rational estimations of the potential costs and benefits of each choice (Kornblum, 2003). It is important then that informal sector workers are perceived, not always as victims of structural violence, but sometimes as rational and active human beings who make rational, active, and continuous evaluations and decisions of their situation and act accordingly. People move in and out of the informal sector depending on the fluctuations in their personal occupations or businesses. Thus, the informal sector can serve as a sector for transition to and from the formal sector (Recio and Gomez, 2013). Then there are others who operate in both the formal sector and informal sector simultaneously.

## 2.3 Regulation of Street Foods

Street foods (SF) form an essential part of the food chain of many developing countries (FAO and WHO, 2003). Their regulation, as such, fall within the food control systems of such

countries. In order to ensure the health of consumers and for consumers to obtain adequate quality and quantity from their foods, it is essential for countries and states to develop policies that touch on food hygiene and safety (FAO and WHO, 2005). Most countries however do not have regulations specific to the Street Food Sector (SFS) (International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN), 2010). Individual countries in West Africa for instance regulate SFs by relying on general food safety laws and procedures, which may pertain to the handling and labelling of food and animal products (Nicolo' and Bendech, 2012). However, there remains no clear and specific rules and regulations targeting the SFS (Nicolo' and Bendech, 2012). What exist in most countries are national food safety laws and regulations under which SFs are generally regulated (Draper, 1996). These laws may be part of a larger group of rules and regulations dealing with food, health or environmental sanitation (Draper 1996). These national regulations may draw on food safety guides and policies developed by the WHO and/or the FAO. The FAO work hand in hand with the WHO in ensuring the safety of foods, and SFs for consumption on the international stage (Bessy, 2009). These two international organizations are concerned with strengthening the food control systems of individual countries based on scientific evidence (FAO and WHO, 2003).

In 1963, a joint FAO/WHO body was instituted. This body, known as the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) is made up of members from 176 countries and is responsible for ensuring the actual implementation of food standards (Bessy, 2009). This body ensures that producers, traders, and consumers of food are protected. Specifically, the CAC ensures that consumers are protected from unhealthy and harmful food. The body also ensures that producers and traders are protected from unfair trading practices and unfavourable conditions (Bessy, 2009). However, as a result of the broad variety of foods, ingredients used in food preparation, and the methods of food preparation in different contexts, it has been difficult for the CAC to develop general laws, guides and codes, that could be used or adopted by different national

governments in regulating the street food sector (Draper, 1996). In addition, although sub-regional groups have attempted to develop codes to regulate the street food sector, these codes have suffered the same limitations of not embodying the wide diversities and varieties of foods, ingredients and preparation methods available in different contexts (Bessy 2009).

Nonetheless, the CAC has developed standards and guides for ensuring food safety in general. These standards and guides, developed from scientific evidence and consultations with several international partners, cover cereals, fruits, milk and dairy products, fish and fishery products (Bessy, 2009). They also include guidelines for food import and export certification systems, risk analysis, and the prevention and reduction of food contamination (Bessy 2009). Although the standards from this commission are not mandatory and binding on national governments and municipal authorities, they are nonetheless highly recommended in ensuring high and quality standards for food (Bessy 2009). In order for national food control systems to promote food safety and enhance the wellbeing of producers, traders, and consumers, the CAC recommends that certain essential components must be present in national food control systems (Bessy, 2009). To be effective national food control systems must possess components dealing with four important aspects of food regulation. Firstly, the CAC recommends that food control systems must have an aspect (be it institution or group) that deals with the legal aspects of food control including food laws, regulation, and standards. Secondly, there must be aspects of the control component dealing with the management of food control including inspection and laboratory services. Thirdly, there must be an aspect of the food control component dealing with or performing monitoring functions including surveillance of food borne diseases and the ability of the food control system to respond effectively to emergencies and outbreaks. Lastly, there must be an aspect of the food safety component performing educative functions, including training, public information and education, as well as communication (Bessy, 2009). Even

though these standards are general and not specific to the street food sector, the four key components outlined above can be used as important guidelines in developing laws and regulations for the street food sector. Nonetheless, while these general food safety laws can go a long way in ensuring food safety, they however do not address the specific regulatory needs of the street food sector.

### 2.3.1 Licensing and Registration

Among most developing countries, licensing of SFVs is one of the most common aspects of regulation within the SFS (Food Safety Unit, 1996). However, even though most countries have some form of licensing for street food vendors, very few SFVs are licensed and registered (Food Safety Unit, 1996). Cohen et al. (2000) revealed that in Central Bombay, only 40,000 of an estimated 200,000 vendors have been licensed. Similarly, in New York

City, only 850 of the estimated 16,000 street vendors work with permits, while in Kuala

Lumpur, less than 10,000 of 25,000 vendors have legal licenses to trade with. In a survey of SFVs in four West African cities, Nicolo and Bendech (2012) also found that a significant number of the 400 street vendors interviewed had no permission to operate. These findings may be due to a variety of factors. For instance the licensing of vendors have very limited advantage for vendors themselves but have a lot of benefits for regulators (Food Safety Unit 1996). This is because licensing and registration procedures are often cumbersome, time consuming, and complex for food vendors (Food Safety Unit, 1996; Nicolo' and Bendech 2012). For food regulators and authorities however, licensing of vendors enable them to keep track of who is engaged in what form of business in the street food sector (Food Safety Unit, 1996). In addition, licensing enables authorities to raise revenue through taxes, and also to provide training in food safety. Food vendors on the other hand, are less motivated to get licenses for their businesses (Food Safety Unit, 1996). Cohen, Bhatt, and Horn (2000) have

argued that although registration and licensing may protect street food vendors from harassment and the confiscation of their goods, the time and cost involved in getting the license and registration is a major disincentive. Reasoning thus, SFVs are demonstrated to be operating on the rationality principle of social interaction which argues that human beings are rational actors who make estimates and calculations of the costs and benefits that particular interactions and social situations have for them and, acts accordingly (Kornblum, 2003). According to this principle then, interaction will occur and be sustained as long as the benefits are perceived to outweigh the costs. Similarly, if SFVs perceive that the costs and resources that will be incurred in pursuing licensure far outweigh the benefits to be gained from being licensed, they are less likely to seek to gain licenses.

Street food vendors may also be less motivated to seek licenses because customers and consumers of street foods rarely pay attention to whether a vendor is licensed or not (Food Safety Unit, 1996). Consumers are more concerned with the taste and quality of the food being served as well as the observed and perceived notions of hygiene and safety of the SFV (Food Safety Unit, 1996; Rheinländer et al. 2008). In a case study of the street food situation in the Kumasi metropolis for instance, Amoah et al. (2004) revealed that for consumers, the choice of street foods was determined by the price, taste, and the amount or size of food served. Similarly, Rheinlander et al. (2008) in their study of SFVs in Kumasi concluded that perceptions and notions of safety are strong determinants for consumers in choosing food vendors and street foods. Consumers then interact with SFVs on the basis of a pleasure principle of social interaction (Kornblum, 2003), emphasising more on the things they value and find pleasurable and choosing their vendors on this basis. Based on the foregoing, it may be concluded that for SFVs, since registration offers little benefits to their business and their

consumers base their choices and attitudes on factors other than registration or license, they are less motivated to license or register their businesses.

SFVs may also be less motivated to seek licensing because of perceived inconsistencies and unfairness. Regulations regarding licensing and taxation for SFVs are usually inconsistent and administered differently for different operators (Cohen, Bhatt, and Horn, 2000). In some cities, while the permanent vendors are taxed daily for their businesses, mobile vendors and hawkers are not (Cohen, Bhatt, and Horn, 2000). Similarly, vendors who work or sell their foods close to their home communities or even from their homes are usually unaffected by regulations especially where these communities are strictly residential communities (Cohen, Bhatt, and Horn, 2000). In other circumstances, some vendors have food licenses but no health certificates, and in other instances have health certificates but no food licenses (Cohen, Bhatt, and Horn, 2000). The rules, policies, laws and regulations governing the seizure of goods, the issuance of fines, and other punishments for illegal trading are also undefined, unclear, or simply not consistently implemented (Cohen, Bhatt, and Horn, 2000). Food vendors are less likely to actively seek licensing if they perceive that the laws and regulations are not fairly applied and implemented. What people consider fair in their interaction with others usually determines whether they will continue with the interaction or not (Kornblum, 2003). This goes beyond a simple calculation of profit and loss. Sometimes, even though a person may actually benefit from a situation, that person's perception of the unfairness of the situation may mean that despite the benefit, the person may not sustain the interaction (Kornblum, 2003). Thus, the fact that food vendors benefit from licensing and registration does not guarantee that food vendors will actively engage with authorities and seek to license and register their businesses. It is crucial then for food regulators and authorities to acknowledge that in social interaction among actors who are actively interpreting and negotiating their situations, the idea and

concept of fairness may be more important and carry more weight to social actors than any profit or benefit that the situation may present, or how rational the situation may be (Kornblum, 2003).

### 2.3.2 Self-Regulation

Vendor associations play a crucial role in regulating the activities of SFVs. Through selfmonitoring, the implementation of sanctions, and self-evaluation, vendor associations play a crucial regulatory role in the SFS. Associations can go as far as suspend members who violate city rules and regulations from operating for a set number of days (Solomon-Ayeh et al. 2011). On other occasions, leaders of associations can confiscate goods of members who disobey city regulations in an attempt to prevent confrontation with city authorities (Solomon-Ayeh et al. 2011). Where this confrontation is inevitable however, food vendor associations serve as mediators between members and city authorities (Solomon-Ayeh et al. 2011). Self-regulation goes beyond enforcing city rules and regulations. Among street hawkers in Mumbai for instance, Anjaria (2006) report of the existence of informal norms and agreements used to control the occupation and use of space. Through unwritten agreements and acknowledgements, street hawkers in Mumbai, sometimes in collaboration with shop owners and formal regulators for instance, confirm and help to protect the working space of each other (Anjaria, 2006). In addition, street traders have their own definitions and interpretations of what an appropriate use of space is and such definitions and interpretations have real effects on their activities in everyday practice. Such interpretations and definitions are used to evaluate their own and the actions of regulators in day to day practice (Anjaria, 2006). In Ghana for instance, Overå (2007) reports that among street hawkers on a particular street in Accra, only those hawkers who have traded for the longest time on that street are allowed to hawk their items before three o'clock in the afternoon. New hawkers to the street are only allowed to hawk

afterwards. By so doing, Overå (2007: 555) maintains that vendors are "*defining their rights in relation to each other*". Similarly, hawkers have determined their own rules for waste management, where they take turns in clearing rubbish that accumulates at the end of the day (Overå, 2007). This clearly indicates that traders and hawkers in the informal sector are not passive recipients of rules and regulations from regulatory authorities. On the contrary they, for instance, actively define what to them is unacceptable as waste and puts mechanisms in place to regulate and manage waste. Similarly, self-defined law and order and issues of seniority are very much at work among various workers on the informal scene.

It is interesting to also note that, while food vendors are actively interpreting and renegotiating their situation, food regulators, as active human beings are at the same time actively interpreting and adapting the laws and regulations they work with to different situations. At the same time, the application and implementation of laws are intervened and modified by a variety of personal, social, and economic factors in every day interaction (Anjaria, 2006). In discussing street hawkers in Mumbai, Anjaria (2006) states quite emphatically that "*one should not assume a direct relationship between the letter of the law and how the law works in practice*" (Anjaria, 2006: 2145). Anjaria (2006) reveals then that there exist a complex relationship between the written law and how this law is actually applied in practice on the streets.

### 2.3.3 Challenges to the Regulation of the Street Food Sector

National regulators face significant challenges in regulating street foods and the street food sector (Fellows and Hilmi 2012). These challenges include: a) rules and regulations that are out of date and thus, not sensitive to current regulatory needs of the SFS b) lack of clearly defined responsibilities and duties of agencies and government departments within the SFS, a situation which creates conflicts and overlap of duties and responsibilities among these

agencies c) inadequate supply and availability of resources (human, infrastructural, and scientific) d) inadequate knowledge regarding food quality and safety systems and e) inadequate collaboration and active participation in international food agreements and policies (Bessy, 2009). In Africa specifically, the laws and policies used in regulating the food sector are outdated, unspecific, and unclear (Fellows and Hilmi 2012). Even where these regulations exist, enforcement is a major challenge for food regulators. In West Africa for instance, low level of enforcement has been reported as one of the major challenges to the regulation of the SFS (Nicolo' and Bendech, 2012). This challenge of enforcement is compounded where mobile SFVs are concerned since food regulators are unable to effectively monitor their activities (INFOSAN, 2010). In some developing countries, human resource constraints, in addition to enforcement challenges, have led to the use of environmental health officers as food inspectors (FAO and WHO, 2003). This is not appropriate since such officers may lack the necessary skill and knowledge to effectively inspect street foods (FAO and WHO, 2003). However, where such inspectors are provided with adequate training regarding the inspection of food, or where they are closely supervised, then they may function effectively in such a role (FAO and WHO, 2003). In addition to unclear rules and challenges in enforcement of these rules, there exists very poor collaboration among government departments, regulatory agencies, academic and research institutions, farmers, manufacturers, food vendors, and consumers, all of whom are important stakeholders in the street food sector (FAO and WHO 2003; 2005).

### 2.3.4 Resolving Challenges to the Regulation of the Street Food Sector

According to Horn (2000:1 cited in Skinner, 2008c:239) "*the first principle of appropriate regulation of street trading is the participation of street traders*". Accordingly, national governments have been encouraged to recognize that ensuring food safety requires the collaborative effort of a variety of parties, groups and stakeholders, including SFVs and

consumers (Bessy, 2009). Sometimes, the structure and components of a food control system is less important than the nature of interaction and collaboration among stakeholders within such a system (Bessy, 2009). To be effective therefore, food safety policies, including policies targeting the SFS, must ensure transparency, build consumer confidence and ensure effective participation of all stakeholders (Bessy, 2009). It is essential therefore that SFVs, consumers of street foods, and other stakeholders are actively involved in the development of these rules and policies (Food Safety Unit, 1996). This will ensure that the rules and policies are relevant and sensitive to the needs of all stakeholders within the SFS (Food Safety Unit, 1996).

With regards to licensing and registration, national food regulators may, through various means encourage food vendors to register and secure licenses for their operations. The Food Safety Unit (FSU) of the World Health Organisation recommends that licensing requirements be centralised and the requirement for annual renewal of licenses be removed (Food Safety Unit, 1996). In addition, the FSU recommends that licenses should be issued based on a vendor's knowledge of food safety and their commitment to produce safe food (Food Safety

Unit, 1996). Contrary to the FSU's recommendation however, Bessy in (2009) suggested that national governments decentralise the control and regulation of food, institute educational programmes to raise awareness of the public regarding hygiene and food safety, encourage and fund research into more advanced, appropriate and safe handling and storage practices for food and develop environmentally friendly policies that emphasises food friendly pest management systems and organic pest control mechanisms among others (Bessy, 2009). While these two recommendations appear contrary to each other, it may be safe to assume that both authors based their recommendations on the prevailing conditions existing during the time of publication. Thus, by 2009 when Bessy was publishing, the challenges of registration of the SFS may have changed considerably from 13 years ago when the FSU were publishing. Away

from the centralisation and decentralisation debate, Fellows and Hilmi (2012) suggest that regulators should aim to reduce the obstacles to licensing and registration of street food enterprises by promoting policies that allow for easy registration and licensing, and eliminates labour exploitation and poor labour practices such as child labour among others (Fellows and Hilmi, 2012). Alternatively Nicolo' and Bendech (2012) has suggested that in order to resolve challenges to regulation, governments must develop and enforce laws and regulations that target specifically the street food sector and street food vendors, laws that focus on monitoring food vendor practices, the working condition of food vendors, and the handling of food by food vendors (Nicolo' and Bendech, 2012). These however, must be done in collaboration with other stakeholders especially consumer associations and street food vendors themselves. These stakeholders must be involved and consulted in developing policies and regulatory frameworks regarding the street food sector (Nicolo' and Bendech, 2012). In addition, policies and needs regarding the street food sector may also be included in National and Regional planning models and policies (Nicolo' and Bendech, 2012).

Open communication, inclusive participation and collaborative working between street vendors and regulators has been indicated as one of the best ways to improve the regulation of street vending (Kumar, 2012). An ideal example of this is the Warwick Junction urban renewal project in Durban, South Africa (Skinner 2008c). In this project, the project staff actively engaged street traders in discussions and consultations and subsequently developed infrastructural facilities that satisfied the needs of both the different groups of street traders and, the city as a whole (Skinner 2008c). Similarly, in Bhubaneshwar, India, Kumar (2012) describes how street vendors and city authorities worked together collaboratively and as partners to develop a regulatory policy model that satisfied the needs of all partners, a model

that has become a good example for other cities in India. These approaches has been shown to reduce considerably the tensions that often exist between regulators and vendors.

**2.4 The Negotiated Order of the Street: Street Vendors and City Authorities**

By their presence and activities, street vendors in different parts of the world have been in confrontation with city authorities to the extent that Austin (1994: 2121) argued that "*wherever and whenever street vendors appear, controversies over street vending almost always pit the same groups against each other.*" These two groups (street vendors and city authorities) have interests that often contradict or compete (Austin, 1994). There is a constant struggle, for instance, between the city authorities and street vendors over the use of public spaces. While city authorities are concerned with maintaining a 'modern city' free from vendors, vendors are concerned with gaining access to the most profitable spaces for business (Schindler, 2013). For the casual observer, this tension may not make much sense since there is no shortage of space in the urban area (Solomon-Ayeh et al. 2011). However, upon closer scrutiny, it becomes evident that vendors do not simply locate haphazardly at any place at all. On the contrary, vendors seek and converge at places that offer greater locational advantages than others, in terms of customers (Solomon-Ayeh et al. 2011). Consequently, the desire for a particular space for business is also determined, to a large extent by access to pedestrian traffic in these public spaces (Skinner, 2008). In addition to the access to a large consumer base that such spaces provide for vendors, vending close to the street enables vendors to attract unplanned and impulse buyers. Some vendors have argued that the success of their ventures is based on the unplanned decision making of pedestrians (Kayuni and Tambulasi, 2009). In this regard, Solomon-Ayeh et al. (2011: 29) has maintained that "*moving vendors even by a few metres can cause them to lose their competitive edge*". Street vendors will therefore resist attempts by city authorities to move or relocate them to built and enclosed markets that may take away the ability of street vendors to attract impulse buyers. These competing interests between vendors and city authorities have led to several

confrontations between street vendors, city regulators and other members of the general public in different cities of the developing world over space for business, conditions of work, sanitation and licensing (Popke and Ballard, 2004; Anjaria, 2006; Skinner, 2008c; Milgram, 2011; Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah, 2008). Consequently, Mitullah (2003) has argued that the relationship between street vendors and city authorities and regulators is generally poor and is characterised by harassment. Thus, where these competing interests exist, they often result in the ejection or eviction of traders from their place of business, destruction and/or confiscation of their goods, and harassment (Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah, 2008). Sometimes, the confrontation between regulators and street vendors result in the death of both vendors and regulators, as has been reported by Zhouxiang (2013) in Beijing, and Abdelrahman (2013) in

Cairo. In view of these conflicts and the importance of street vending for urban livelihoods

(as a source of employment and income, affordable goods and nutritious food), Asiedu and

Agyei-Mensah (2008), emphasised the need for researchers to explore and examine the

dynamic relationship between city regulators and street vendors in order to enhance effective

regulatory policies. This section reviews the existing literature on the dynamic relationship

between street vendors, city regulators and members of the general public. Specifically, three

key questions guide and serve as organising frameworks for this review.

1. How do city regulators and other stakeholders perceive street vendors and what are the implications of different perceptions for vendors?

2. How is space, a crucial resource for vendors, negotiated for among vendors, city authorities, and other stakeholders?

3. In what ways does power manifest itself and how is it used and negotiated for among vendors, city authorities, and other stakeholders?

Three main concepts: Negotiation, Space and Place and Power serve as the main theoretical concepts for this review.

### 2.4.1 Heroes or Villains: The Different Perceptions about Street Vendors

Street vendors have been perceived in different ways by different stakeholders in different parts of the developing world. Predominantly however, these perceptions have been negative focusing mostly on vendors' occupation of public space and the effects such occupation has on urban residents and urban life (Donovan, 2008).

### 2.4.1.1 Vendors as Villains and Criminals

Rajagopal (2001) groups the arguments and criticisms against street vendors into two main categories: those arguments that focus on aesthetics and those that are political. The aesthetic arguments deal with the appearance of cities and urban areas and how these are affected negatively by the activities and presence of street vendors while the political arguments focus mainly on how the activities of vendors causes crime, and the illegitimacy of the activity of vending itself.

Firstly, with regards to the aesthetic arguments, city authorities and regulators have often perceived and portrayed street vending and street trading in general as negatively affecting the attractiveness and beauty of their cities (Solomon-Ayeh et al. 2011). Street vendors are perceived as embodying everything that is inappropriate for a 'modern' and 'global city', and thus, reduce the image and international appeal of cities, as well as the value and commercial appeal of city blocks or areas within cities (Austin, 1994; Donovan, 2008). As such, street vendors are often portrayed as offensive and illegitimate invaders and aggressors, who inhibit the ability of cities to modernise and achieve a global status, a sign of chaos and disorder and a failure of metropolitan authorities to instil order within the cities (Austin, 1994; Rajagopal, 2001 ). Even though city authorities sometimes bear the blame, vendors are usually blamed as

the sole cause of congestion and chaos on city streets and roads and, the very idea of street vending and trading appears to go contrary to and oppose widespread held notions of a 'modern and global city' (Anjaria, 2006; Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah, 2008; Donovan, 2008). They (vendors) "*are a symbol of metropolitan space gone out of control*" (Rajagopal, 2001: 94). In other words, the conception of city authorities regarding a modern city does not include a city with its streets filled with street vendors. The predominant publications and news items that appear in the media portrays a negative image of street vendors and attempts to establish and or re-emphasise the illegitimacy of the activities of street vendors. In Ghana for instance, a search of the print media on articles about street vendors reveal a lot about how vendors are perceived and communicated about to the general public. Journalists use terms like "*swarm, take over, invade, flooded*" to describe the occupation of vendors of public spaces, suggesting the undesirability of their occupation of public spaces, those "daredevil hawkers" as one journalist simply puts it in the Ghanaian Times newspaper (Asare, 2006; Baffloe, 2006; Anyimah-Ackah, 2007; Benghan, 2011). The prevalent dissociation between the activities of street vendors and beautiful, modern and global cities is also captured by one Ghanaian journalist who explains quite strongly that "*attempts by city authorities to beautify the city are being thwarted by some petty traders and hawkers…*" (Bentil, 2008: 25). The above reveals that the media plays a crucial role in shaping the perception of the public regarding street vendors (Arvind, 2001). Not only do the government and the city authorities use the media to further their interests however, street vendors have also used the media to tell their own part of the story. In Mumbai, India for instance, street traders have been reported to write letters of response in newspapers, responding to what they perceive as unfair representations and coverage they had received in earlier news editions (Arvind, 2001).

The aesthetic arguments against the occupation of street vendors of city streets have often been the main basis for evicting street vendors. Nonetheless, there have been occasions when other political arguments become and are used as the main basis for eviction. With regards to the political arguments, street vendors have been perceived as creating a safe avenue, through their congestion of streets, for crime to flourish. They are untrustworthy people who, in collaboration with thieves and drug dealers deceive unsuspecting members of the public and pedestrians (Austin, 1994). Thus, for some shop owners, street traders bring only disorder, filth and the risk of crime and theft (Donovan, 2008). By their congestion of city streets, they are perceived as making it possible for thieves to hide and move amongst them unnoticed, a situation that adversely affects the activities of more established and formal shop owners (Donovan, 2008). Furthermore, street vendors are also perceived as creating unfair competition for more established shop owners and thus, reducing their profits by offering pirated and counterfeit goods and commodities for sale at very low prices (Austin, 1994; Mitullah, 2003). Owners of shops are more vocal in this regard and perceive street traders as providing unhealthy competition and draining the income of more established, registered and tax paying shop owners (Austin, 1994; Arvind, 2001; Donovan, 2008). These negative perceptions have important implications for the wellbeing of vendors. Such effects usually manifest in the form of evictions and relocation campaigns undertaken by the state.

Nonetheless, even though the perception of street vendors as a nuisance to the urban landscape and as a source of crime is widespread and grounded, increasingly there has been the recognition that governments should attempt to regulate and manage street vending rather than seek to eliminate street vending through hostile and aggressive policies (Zhouxiang, 2013). This emerges from positive perceptions and acknowledgements of the contribution of street vendors.

**2.4.1.2 Vendors as Heroes**

In some cities and urban areas, street vendors are perceived positively by city authorities and other urban dwellers. Thus, in addition to its importance as a source of employment and income for urban residents, street vending is perceived as providing other essential services to city dwellers and urban inhabitants (Arvind, 2001). The argument has been made for instance that by their mere presence, street vendors serve and act as deterrent of various forms of crimes on city streets (Austin, 1994; Anjaria, 2006). In Mumbai for instance, street vendors have, on occasion, protected women against sexual harassment (Anjaria, 2006). Consequently, vendors and street traders are perceived as providing important security for more established shop owners and the general public as a whole, maintaining a watchful eye over events, and showing up to assist in case of accidents and emergencies on the streets (Austin, 1994; Anjaria, 2006). Where shop owners hold such perceptions of street vendors, there evolve a special kind of relationship built on trust between the vendors and the shop owners to the extent that shop owners defend street vendors and hawkers from eviction (Anjaria, 2006). This perception of street vendors as capable of preventing crime has been evident in Durban, South Africa where street vendors have worked hand in hand with the police in preventing crime on the streets (Skinner, 2008c). Here, street vendors have been trained by the police to monitor their streets and to inform the police when they feel something is not right (Skinner, 2008c). Through such collaborative efforts, Skinner (2008c) reports that there has been a significant reduction in the incidence of crime in the inner city areas of Durban.

Evidently, wherever city authorities and other members of the public perceive street vendors positively, the larger urban community benefit through the collaborative efforts and the positive effects that result. However, these positive effects seem to receive very little attention from city and urban authorities and from researchers in general. On the contrary, the argument

has overwhelmingly been on the negative effects street vendors have on cities and the illegality of the street vending activity. These perceptions have a significant effect on the nature of interaction and negotiation between these two groups (Milgram, 2011). If the public for instance perceive street vendors as embodying chaos and disorder in the cities, then city authorities are likely to use such perceptions as justification for evictions and other hostile activities towards vendors (Anjaria, 2006).

## 2.4.2 Eviction, Relocation, and a Demonstration of the States' Power

Mostly, street vendors are perceived as the cause of massive public injustice, they are portrayed as villains and thugs who deliberately defy and break legal rules and regulations for their own selfish interests as against the interests of the larger public and the state. Consequently, the use of urban spaces and city streets brings governments and vendors together in an unequal power relations and points to the high stakes involved in the use of city streets (Stillerman, 2006). In line with the perceptions of a modern and global city, eviction and relocation campaigns are undertaking by governments and urban authorities in order to 'clean' up the city and make it more 'attractive' (Anjaria, 2006; Donovan, 2008; Milgram, 2011). Where vendors are perceived as a nuisance, a symbol of chaos and disorder, eviction is often brutal, involving the use of bulldozers, and justified as necessary to restore

'order' and 'sanity' back to city life (Arvind, 2001). Examples of such evictions and relocations have been undertaken in India, Vietnam, Mexico city in Mexico, the Philippines,

South Africa, and in other developing countries especially in Africa (Drummond, 2000; Anjaria, 2006; Donovan, 2008). Sometimes, evictions, in addition to being linked with negative perceptions of vendors in general, are also linked with major events, ceremonial or political. In South Africa for instance, Skinner, (2008c) reveals that after the country won the bidding to host the 2010 world cup in 2004, different cities attempted to outbid each other for the right to

host the matches by clearing the streets of street traders, with an underlying assumption that streets without street traders improve the image and standing of a city as a modern city. In addition to the above, evictions are also used politically to win re-election and political favours (Donovan, 2008). This may be particularly effective and prevalent where a significant majority of the public holds a negative perception of street vending (Donovan, 2008). Under such circumstances, elected officials use the eviction and relocation of street vendors to enhance their image and their ability to bring back order into the city and the city centre (Donovan, 2008). This has been evident in Bogota in Colombia, where elected officials can, sometimes be taken to court for failing to reclaim public space from street vendors and traders (Donovan, 2008). The general public are thus, not passive participants. Citizen groups and associations are very vocal and actively involved in the contest for public space through their votes and through numerous legal actions brought against city authorities for failing to do their job of evicting street vendors (Donovan, 2008).

In a way, these evictions and relocations can be conceived of as a sign of power, a demonstration of the power of city authorities and urban governments over residents and inhabitants. Mitullah (2006) argues that the eviction of street vendors from busy city centres and streets have power implications since the vacation of the streets makes these profitable streets and city centres available to large scale and powerful formal businesses. Thus, the eviction of vendors by force, the destruction of perceived illegal vending stands, and the confiscation and sometimes destruction of goods demonstrates the extent, nature and effects of the power held by city regulators (Rajagopal, 2001). The foregoing creates:

(a)     An image of city regulators using aggression and their power as a way of winning back public spaces.

(b)     An image of street vendors who are 'powerless' in the face of government or state aggression and demonstration of power.

Nonetheless, the reaction of city authorities towards street trading, even when negative perception exists, is not always physical and aggressive and street vendors are not 'powerless' since they have various options in and alternatives in responding to eviction. Vendors are capable of negotiating the daily challenges that come with their work, negotiating for space, economic opportunity, and for general wellbeing.

## 2.4.3 Negotiating for Space: Street Vendor Strategies and a Demonstration of the Power of Vendors

Street vending depends largely on a constant and important interaction, on a day to day basis, among vendors, buyers, and regulators, with each trying to negotiate for the best deal (Recio and Gomez, 2013). Through such negotiations, economic opportunities are gained, regulatory constraints managed and/or avoided, and new associations established (Recio and Gomez, 2013). In a bid to secure access to public spaces that allows access to pedestrian traffic and escape routes, street vendors are engaged, constantly in negotiating with other vendors, city authorities, pedestrians and other members of the general public. Like other forms of negotiations, negotiation for space for street vending is an on-going process and its dimensions may change with changing conditions (Skinner, 2008c; Schindler, 2013). It is a complex process and may occur in different forms under different circumstances, involving a complex interplay of actions among formal laws and regulators, informal norms and customs, formal businesses, street traders, and the general public (Skinner, 2008c). Similar to the demonstration of the states' power over vendors, these negotiations take place at both the micro and macro levels of social interaction.

## Negotiating at the Macro level

As active social participants actively reinterpreting and renegotiating their realities, street vendors have a variety of strategies available to them in the face of eviction and relocation.

For some street traders and vendors, the use of public space is perceived as a right, closely linked with the right to survive and to earn a livelihood, a right that must be fought for and protected (Rajagopal, 2001). In negotiating for a space for business therefore, some street vendors have gone as far as fight for this right in the law courts, taking on city authorities and subsequently gaining the right to vend within specific city spaces (Rajagopal, 2001). In Bogota city in Colombia for instance, street vendors have often responded to threats of eviction with a legal action arguing that eviction will go contrary to their right to work (Donovan, 2008). This right may however be perceived by pedestrians and some members of the general public as conflicting with the right of pedestrians to ease of movement within cities (Rajagopal, 2001). The rights of pedestrians then appears in direct contradiction to the right of vendors to survive and earn a living. These contradictions are negotiated in everyday interaction among street traders and vendors, pedestrians, and city authorities (Rajagopal, 2001). Sometimes, a conflict of rights such as the above is resolved through compromise, where vendors are, like in the case of Bogota in Colombia, sometimes compensated to relocate to other government market areas (Donovan, 2008). Alternatively, vendor unions have used their votes as a bargaining power and have also used the courts to bring legal action against city authorities in Bogota in Colombia and in Delhi, India (Donovan, 2008; Schindler, 2013). This is especially significant where the vendor population is large, as it is in Mexico city (Donovan, 2008). In addition, through public rallies, vendors sometimes march on the city council and hand over demands and grievances, an approach which has been used by vendors in Durban, South Africa in preventing eviction (Skinner, 2008c) as well as in Caloocan in Manila, Philippines (Recio and Gomez, 2013). As already indicated, especially when the vendor population involved in the

rally or match is high, these negotiating strategies can be effective, at least for a time. Sometimes, negotiations, as revealed by Milgram, (2011);

Solomon-Ayeh et al. (2011) and Recio and Gomez, (2013) among street traders in Philippines and in Ghana may be in a form of letter writing campaigns by members of street vendor associations to the authorities in charge, arguing why they should be allowed to operate under certain occasions (Arvind, 2001; Anjaria, 2006). Recio and Gomez (2013) report how street vendors in Caloocan, Metro Manila in the Philippines engage city regulators and authorities in discussions with an aim of bringing their grievances before such authority figures. Street vendor associations thus, play a crucial role in the negotiation process, sometimes operating as the main point of contact or communication between street vendors and city authorities and regulators (Milgram, 2011). The involvement of vendor associations in negotiating for space is however not always in opposition to national government bodies. Sometimes, vendor organisations work and contribute to national programmes in an attempt to foster a good relationship with national governments and to improve their image in general. In Chile for instance, vendor organisations have, on occasion, collaborated with government health organisations to eliminate public health risks through health promotion and campaigning programmes (Stillerman, 2006). Vendors in Chile have also organised during festive periods and given out free products as a way of enhancing their recognition and political appeal (Stillerman, 2006). While enhancing their image in general, through these strategies, vendors indicate the potential contribution they can make to national wellbeing and underlie their importance to the national urban landscape in general. In a way the adoption of these strategies is a manifestation of the power of street vendors, albeit expressed in a different form than that of the authorities.

**Negotiating at the Micro level**

Negotiating for space needs not always be at the structural level, between groups of vendors and city authorities or through the law courts. Quite often, negotiations occur at a more micro

level on a day to day or, even on an hourly basis. Thus, at a more micro level, individual street vendors have used a variety of approaches to negotiate for and have access to vend within city spaces and to avoid eviction. One important approach that has been used by street vendors in negotiating for space has been to make contacts and acquaintances with city authorities and regulators, as well as other authority figures and regulators in their cities (Milgram, 2011). This has been achieved by either voting for members, friends, or known supporters into leadership positions in the town or city, or paying tokens to city officials and regulators. Voting for people into city councils and other positions has been revealed as a common strategy by street traders in the northern city of Baguio in the Philippines (Milgram,

2011). In Malawi for instance, by voting for 'councillors' of local assemblies, street vendors were assured of a protective voice within local authorities since these councillors acknowledged the support of the vendors in bringing them into office (Kayuni and Tambulasi, 2009). Not only do these placed sources lobby city authorities on behalf of street traders in securing access to public spaces for business, they also serve as crucial sources of information about the actions and inactions of city authorities regarding impending evictions and raids through the city centre (Milgram, 2011). Since knowing when to run or leave a place of business is a crucial part of the negotiation for and use of space among street traders and vendors, well-placed sources in positions of authority within urban areas help street traders to effectively negotiate for and use space to enhance their livelihoods (Milgram, 2011).

Sometimes, space for business is negotiated for sustained use through the payment of daily tokens, in money or in kind, to city authorities and their field officials (Anjaria, 2006; Milgram, 2011). Through the payment tokens, relationships are negotiated and established, and infringement of rules and regulations, including the use of public spaces, are subsequently punished or overlooked depending also on the quality of the relationship (Milgram, 2011). In

places like Mumbai in India, street vendors sometimes have had to pay these tokens more than once a day in order to operate in busy public spaces (Rajagopal, 2001). Payment of such tokens has been observed as one of the most consistent aspects of the relationship between city authorities and street vendors in Mumbai for the use of public space (Anjaria, 2006). It must be emphasised though that tokens are not always demanded by regulators and city authorities. On the contrary, as vendors in Baguio city in northern Philippines have demonstrated, it is quite common for these tokens to be offered voluntarily in the form of food products like fruits and cakes for city officials and inspectors in order to enhance a vendor's stake or claim to a particular space of business (Milgram, 2011). These tokens and fees are thus seen as a crucial aspect of the negotiation process and the everyday life and survival for street vendors. The challenge for street vendors in paying tokens and fees to city authorities is that they end up paying to a variety of collecting organisations and regulators with the amount collected closely linked to the type of commodity vended (stationary or mobile) (Solomon-Ayeh et al. 2011). The payment of tokens by street vendors to city authorities also brings another important issue to the fore. Anjaria (2006: 2141) has termed this the "*official recognition of an unofficial and unauthorised practice*". Thus, as and when street vendors pay fees and fines in addition to tokens, especially when they occupy a space officially designated as illegal for their activities, does the payment of tokens and fines make them legal occupants of those spaces. Does the payment of fees and fines confer on street vendors any rights of claim over the space within which they undertake their activities?

These are important questions that need to be scrutinised further through field research. Another important strategy that food vendors have used in negotiating for and maintaining a space for business is to anticipate the actions and inactions of regulators. Street vendors in Baguio in northern Philippine for instance may sell from six to nine o'clock in the morning, twelve to one o'clock in the afternoon, and five to eight o'clock in the evening, reflecting the

times before the start of day, during lunch break, and close of day when regulators are likely

not to be working actively (Milgram, 2011). The knowledge of vendors regarding the working

culture of the context within which they work thus, serves as a great tool for them in negotiating

formal regulatory requirements. Other strategies that have been used for accessing public space

have been to collaborate with other stakeholders and the general public. Consulting owners of

neighbourhood facilities, negotiating through acquaintances, and sharing the space of others

who have already secured permission to vend have also been other means of negotiating for

space for some Ghanaian street vendors (Asiedu and AgyeiMensah, 2008).

Under hostile regulatory circumstances though, street vendors have been found to carry few

goods with them to sell at any point in time, a strategy that enhances an easy get away in case

city authorities approach and minimal losses in case of confiscation of goods (AnyimahAckah,

2007; Solomon-Ayeh et al. 2011). Carrying light weight items and being non stationary is also

a common strategy among street traders in Accra, Ghana (Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah, 2008).

Because there are usually high pedestrian traffic at the city centre, vendors try to blend in by

carrying a few wares in their hands, just as if they were pedestrians, but then announce to

potential customers in a bid to sell their items (AnyimahAckah, 2007). Sometimes, only a few

items are displayed on plastic sheets to allow for easy movement in case authorities are coming

(Milgram, 2011). Among street traders in Ghana, a popular strategy for dealing with

harassment is to move from location to location, where they will not draw too much attention

to themselves (Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah, 2008). Networking and communication among

colleague vendors is another important negotiating strategy that street vendors have used. Here,

vendors send messages to each other alerting each other of the presence or otherwise of city

authorities. Recio and Gomez (2013) report of Quick Response Teams (QRTs) in Caloocan,

Metro Manila, where these QRTs act as a form of early warning system, using text messages

to warn colleague vendors of imminent or ongoing eviction operations (Recio and Gomez, 2013).

**Summary**

This section of the review has revealed that even though street vendors are perceived positively in certain parts of the world, and have, together with city authorities worked collaboratively to prevent crime, predominantly, street vendors are perceived negatively as nuisance, source of crime and an indication of poor city management. These negative perceptions have often translated into hostile actions against vendors by city governments in the form of eviction and relocation campaigns. While these evictions reflect the power of the state over vendors, this review has shown that vendors are themselves powerful, since they have strategies for negotiating these evictions. Through these strategies, street vendors are able to make use of city spaces and to gain economic opportunities, despite the pre-dominant negative perception about their activity. Either through the payment of tokens or relying on sources within regulatory bodies, these negotiating strategies have worked for street vendors in different parts of the world. These strategies, as discussed by Recio and Gomez (2013) reflect the political power of street vendors, it is a demonstration of their own power, no matter how small and unstable this power may be. Street vendors are demonstrated as an organised political group, and not a disorganised group of people (Recio and Gomez, 2013). In the negotiated setting of the street therefore, power does not only reside in the state or in individual state agencies. Even though these state agencies may have the political support and the ability to use security agencies to carry out their activities, street vendors are adept at using strategies that allow them to survive, evade, and or negotiate with the power of the state. True, the state or regulators may come up with their own regulations but vendors are not passive recipients of these regulations

and instructions, and will have a say, no matter how subtle in how these regulations work. Schindler (2013: 2) sums this up by arguing that:

> "*Power is dispersed across a range of sites, and rests in varying degrees with a host of state and non-state actors, none of whom are able to unilaterally impose their preferred vision of formality. Instead these interest groups negotiate and struggle to define (in) formality and gain control over, or access to, urban space*"

In this sense, it is essential that any attempts at improving the use of space must necessarily include all actors and stakeholders, all of whom are powerful actors and can influence the outcome of state wide policies and practices.

## Conceptual Framework

Based on the reviewed literature and theoretical concepts, the following conceptual framework, figure 2.1, was used. Figure 2.1 illustrates that, through their interaction, SFVs and food regulators reshape their reality by negotiating changes. They create, either through conscious efforts or unconscious motivations, a negotiated order, a system that is

significantly different in its manifestation in reality. This is to say that regulators interact with food vendors on the basis of laws and policies relevant to their responsible organisations, which conveys on them certain duties, responsibilities, power and code of conduct. The regulators in turn implement the laws based on their own beliefs and interpretations, as well as the nature of their relationship with vendors. Food vendors also interpret laws and interact with regulators based on their own experiences, beliefs, norms and practices. Food regulators are therefore not passive implementers of laws and food vendors are not passive recipients of laws either. The distinction between conceptions of public and private space, legal and illegal practice, acceptable and unacceptable practice, right and wrong, and gender appropriate occupation becomes blurred and subject to negotiation, depending largely on the negotiating parties, the power dynamics inherent, and the way in which the negotiation is carried out.

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**Policies and Laws**

**International Organisations**

National and Municipal

Standards and Guides

**Regulatory Bodies**

**Research and Academic Institutions**

Responsibilities, Interests, Collaboration and Interaction, and Power dynamics

Training programs, Research, Collaboration

**Implementing Officials**

Interpretation; translation and Implementation; Experiences; Fears; Opportunities, Challenges, Relationships, and Self-motivation.

**The Field of Negotiation**

Production, use and management of space; Economic opportunities; Power; Concepts of private and public, legal and illegal; Challenges and Constraints

Pedestrians; Consumers; Media; Shop owners

Product sponsorship and promotion.

**Public**

**Corporate Bodies**

Self-regulation; Self-organisation; Self-monitoring; Relationships; Experiences; Practices, and Perceptions

**Street Food Vendors**

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework of Study

These concepts are continuously negotiated through definition, redefinition, and according to unwritten codes of practice. Directly or indirectly, other actors also play a role within this negotiated setting. Through their work, research bodies such as the Crops Research Institute (CRI), the Food Research Institute (FRI), and the Agricultural Research Institute (ARI) are involved in important research activities that inform policies and regulations. Similarly, researchers from academic institutions such as Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) conduct research into the street food sector. Corporate organizations such as Nestle Ghana Limited also play a key role in the sector through their sponsorship of food vendor associations. Educational and health institutions and other organisations where food vendors congregate to find consumers are also important actors in this regard. International organisations like the FAO produce documents and guidelines to aid regulators in regulating the food sector. Other organisations like DFID and DANIDA conduct research into the street food sector to enhance understanding and thus, promote the sector as a viable source of food and employment for urban Ghanaians. Some Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) also focus on organising training packages aimed at empowering street food vendors.

# CHAPTER THREE

## RESEARCH METHODS

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter explains thoroughly the processes followed and the methods used in conducting this research. A brief overview of the study area is first presented, including the occupational

and cultural environment and the state of street food vending. This is followed by an overview of the research design used, the sampling procedure, and the particular instruments used in collecting primary data. Subsequently, the approaches used in organizing and analyzing the data collected are presented. Finally, the challenges faced in collecting primary and secondary data, and how reliability and validity was ensured are explained.

## 3.2 Area of Study

This research was conducted in the Kumasi metropolis. Kumasi lies 270km north of Accra, the capital city of Ghana, and 397km south of Tamale. The city covers an area of about 254 square kilometres. According to the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), the 2010 population and housing census revealed that the Kumasi metropolis had a population of 2, 035,064 (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012), with the Akan ethnic group, including the Ashanti's making up approximately 78% of the population of the city (Amoako, 2011). As the most populous district in the Ashanti region, there is a high population density in the Kumasi metropolis with a population density of about 5,782 persons per square kilometre, second only to that of the Accra metropolis (Adarkwa, 2011). The Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) is the highest governing political authority in the Metropolis, responsible for, among other things, waste management and waste collection, revenue mobilisation, provision of basic socioeconomic infrastructure, and the maintenance of peace and security (Adarkwa, 2011). The KMA, previously divided into 10 Sub-Metropolitan Assemblies (Sub-Metros), has recently been re-classified into 9 Sub-Metros namely: Oforikrom, Asokwa, Manhyia, Tafo, Suame, Bantama, Kwadaso, Subin and Nhyiaeso, with each of these Sub-Metros serving as subadministrative bodies within the metropolis, responsible to the KMA. The tenth administrative area, Asawasi has recently been added to the newly created Asokore Mampong Municipal Area. Even though this Sub-Metro is not part of the Kumasi metropolis it still falls under the larger city of Kumasi with some of the

communities under this SubMetro (Aboabo and Alabar) having high concentrations of food vendors used for this study. That is the reason why Asawasi appears in Figure 3.1, which shows the Kumasi metropolis and its Sub-Metros.



Figure 3.1: Map of Kumasi showing all Sub-Metros

**3.2.1 The Informal Sector in Kumasi: its Uniqueness and Importance**

Because of the city's inability to attract many direct foreign investments, the growth of the city of Kumasi has mainly been driven by the private and informal sectors (Adarkwa, 2011). It is estimated that about 75% of the labour force in the Kumasi metropolis work within the informal sector. In addition to its importance as a major source of employment, the informal sector in Kumasi is also an important source of revenue for both local and national governments

(Adarkwa, 2011). Approximately 60% of the people employed within the informal sector in the Kumasi metropolis are engaged in petty trading, including hawking and street food vending (Adarkwa, 2011). In addition, Kumasi is considered as the commercial capital of Ghana, with the largest open air market in the West African sub-region (the Kumasi Central Market), one of the largest open air mechanic spare parts workshops in West Africa (the Kumasi Magazine) with a working population of approximately 200,000, and a wood processing village (Sokoban Wood Village) with an estimated 5000 wood workers (Adarkwa, 2011; KPMG, 2008). As a result of its transport network and commercial activities, a lot of travellers, goods, and services pass through Kumasi to other parts of Ghana, and the West African sub-region on a daily basis (Adarkwa, 2011). For these commercial businesses and workers, travellers and shoppers, SF serve as a source of easily available food as they pass through the city to other parts of Ghana and the West African sub-region (Feglo and Sakyi, 2012). As a result of the important role that SFs play for urban residents and for travellers through the city, the regulation of SFs has implications for both residents of Kumasi, as well as for traders and travellers from other parts of Ghana and the West African sub-region. In other words, Kumasi is strategically placed to benefit from research that aims at improving the regulation of SFs. This underscores the importance of Kumasi and makes it an ideal area for research study into the regulation of SFs.

### 3.2.2 Street Food Vendors and Food Vending in Kumasi

Like other workers in the informal sector in Kumasi, street food vendors generally have low levels of education, predominantly females, and below the age of 40 (Amoah, Marfo, Wallace and Osei, 2004; Solomon-Ayeh et al., 2011). The matrilineal form of kinship practised by the predominant Ashanti in the metropolis of Kumasi can be argued to be one of a number of factors encouraging the higher participation of women in the vending of street foods (Solomon-

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Ayeh et al., 2011). This system of kinship encourages greater initiative on the part of females, emphasising economic empowerment and independence among the females of the region (King, 1999 cited in Solomon-Ayeh et al., 2011). Despite the female dominance, Overå (2007) reveals how an increasing number of men are entering the informal street trading sector in Ghana, including the street food sector. Men are reportedly involved in activities that were previously defined and held as feminine including carrying food on their heads and selling on the streets (Overå, 2007). Where in the past food trade in Ghana in general was thought of and perceived as a feminine activity, now such definitions are becoming increasingly blurred, as more and more men enter into and engage in the vending of street foods, as a result of a lack of other opportunities in the economy (Overå, 2007). Certain types of foods are predominantly vended by men. Most notably are fast foods, commonly referred to as 'check check' joints (Overå, 2007). Overå (2007) reasons that this may be so because these fast food joints operate late into the night, when it will be considered dangerous for women to move around on the streets on their way back home. This perception of danger to women appears to be a stronger barrier to female involvement in certain economic activities in Ghana than socio-cultural barriers at present (Overå, 2007).

For six or seven days in a week, food vendors in Kumasi vend food from stationary stalls, although a small percentage of them are mobile food vendors who more or less hawk their food (Amoah et al. 2004). Some of the common street vended foods in Kumasi include meat pie, bread, fufu, ice-kenkey, fried rice, yoghurt, banku, Kenkey, porridge and wakye among others (Feglo and Sakyi, 2012). As with street vendors in other parts of the world, some street food vendors in Kumasi are stationary while others are mobile. Although some food vendors in Kumasi prepare their food at the same place used for vending, the place for food vending

(vending sites) sometimes differs from the place of food preparation (kitchen) of street foods. Stationary vendors can further be grouped into three broad categories. In the first place there are those food vendors who operate from the tops of tables without an umbrella or tent to provide a shade for consumers, and little or no spaces available for consumers as eating spaces. Sometimes two small stools with matching tables are tucked under the main vendor's table to serve as a table of eating for consumers where necessary. An example of this is depicted in plate 3.1:



Plate 3.1: A Table Top Vendor without an Umbrella or Sieve

Then there are those vendors who even though operate from table tops have protective netting and mesh built over the table to serve as a screen, usually with glass sieves within which foods are placed and an elongated table with two matching benches and a large umbrella serving as the eating place of consumers. An example of this is depicted in plate 3.2:

Plate 3.2: A Table Top Vendor with an Umbrella and a Sieve

A third category of stationary vendors are those vendors who share a single but comparatively large space. These are two or three vendors, operating from under a tent or within a metal but circular booth, large enough to contain three different vendors. There is often an eating place for all consumers set up behind the vending tent or booth. Here, the vendors sell different kinds of food from each other and so largely have different groups of consumers. An example of this can be found in Kejetia and is depicted pictorially in plate 3.3:

Plate 3.3: Vendors Sharing Vending and Eating Space in Kejetia

In addition to these stationary vendors, there are mobile vendors. Some mobile vendors (street food hawkers) vend single food items and move from place to place alone, as depicted in plate 3.4. Although most mobile street food vendors sell products that are simple to carry as shown in plate 3.4, there are a few cases of mobile street food vendors who sell foods that traditionally would require at least a stand. Some of these street food hawkers sell Tuozaafi, Fufu, or Banku. Such food sellers operate in groups of at least two. Sometimes, one hawker may carry the main dish, which is for instance the Tuozaafi while the other carries the soup that goes with the Tuozaafi. This is shown in plate 3.5. Sometimes, there is a third person who carries a coal pot (source of fire) on a round wooden tray. This is usually used to heat the food in order to keep it warm throughout the duration of the sale of food. Generally, these are broadly the type of vendors in Kumasi in terms of mode of operation.

Plate 3.4: A Male Mobile Vendor of Packaged Rice



Plate 3.5: Mobile Vendors of Traditional Foods Working in Pairs

## 3.3 Philosophical Assumptions of Study

This research is largely informed and driven by the interpretivist approach to social research, which is based on an idealist ontology and mostly an inductive epistemology (Ormston, Spencer, Barnard and Snape, 2014). In other words, I subscribe to the approach of social

research that argues that social reality is dependent upon individual interpretations and that the social world can be known and studied through an in-depth understanding of the meanings, interpretations, and perceptions that people have of their social world (Ormston et al., 2014). In line with these assumptions, this research relies on concepts and analogies to explore and make sense of relationships, interconnectedness and networks between and among stake-holders. The research also relies on interpretive explanations (Neuman, 2007), focusing on the meaning and operation of a social phenomenon within a specific sociocultural context. These assumptions informed the choice of research design, and the collection and interpretation of data for this study.

## 3.4 Research Design

A qualitative case study research design was employed in this research. A case study investigates into detail various features or dimensions of a system/multiple systems over a period of time, using multiple techniques to collect in-depth data from the context (Neuman, 2007). This design was appropriate since it allowed the researcher to rely on a variety of methods (interviews, observations, conversations, documentary review) to fully explore the regulatory set up of the SFS as well as the perceptions, practices and socio-cultural opportunities and constraints of street food vendors (Baxter and Jack, 2008). In addition, the case study design allowed the SFS to be explored from a variety of perspectives (male and female vendors, food regulators, consumers, and the public, governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders) enhancing a holistic understanding of the phenomenon (Baxter and Jack, 2008). Adopting a qualitative approach to this case study was appropriate for various reasons. Firstly, a qualitative case study approach was appropriate for studying and analyzing the SFS because qualitative research methods enable researchers to study and describe a situation as it is, examine the relationship of all the parts to each other, use the researcher as a

tool to gain an in-depth understanding of how people think and reason and, pay attention also to the process (Rifkin and Pridmore, 2001). Qualitative methods thus allowed for a detailed description of the SFS, and provided the researcher with a rich and indepth perspective on the interaction among stakeholders in the SFS. In general, qualitative methods, when used for studying complex issues involving several actors, such as the SFS in Kumasi, prevents the risk of paying exclusive attention to only a limited aspect of the entire phenomenon to the neglect of others that may have emerged through data collection. This is because qualitative research studies are often emergent, allowing for new and emerging issues from the field to be further explored to enhance the data (Varvasovszky and Brugha, 2000). Using qualitative methods for this study thus, allowed for hidden and emerging themes to be explored in detail to inform a deeper and richer understanding of the SFS in

Kumasi.

Secondly, by using qualitative research methods, the researcher was able to work with street food regulators in the field and experienced their daily activities as regulators of street foods (Rifkin and Pridmore, 2001). This is because qualitative methods are people-oriented, assist in generating information that is rich in detail, and help in understanding how people think and perceive events (Rifkin and Pridmore, 2001). Aagaard-Hansen and Yoder (2007) explain that qualitative methods allow researchers to arrive at a full understanding of social phenomenon within a particular context, understand the use, meanings and interpretations of beliefs and ideas and, provide detailed descriptions of what people do and how they do it.

Using qualitative methods therefore, this research was able to provide contextually rich and thick knowledge on the experiences, perceptions and practices of SFVs.

Thirdly, qualitative methods were also useful and appropriate for studying the various ways through which negotiations occur between and among various actors at various levels within the SFS (Nathan and Mitroff, 1991). This is because the qualitative methods of participant observation, in-depth interviews, and stakeholder analysis are among the qualitative methods that have been used for studying negotiated orders within various organisational and institutional environments (Nathan and Mitroff, 1991).

## 3.5 Access to the Field

In order to gain access to institutions and other formal stakeholders, formal letters of introduction were sent to these organizations introducing the researcher and detailing the key objectives and focus of the research and the nature of information needed from each particular organization. The researcher also relied on referrals from already identified or known stakeholders to gain access to others. This was especially useful with identifying nongovernmental organizations and groups of stakeholders, including vendor associations, as their ability to trust the researcher went a long way in determining their willingness to be interviewed. Such stake-holders included Nestle Ghana Limited, the Food and Drugs Authority (FDA) and collaborating laboratories working with the KMA. Groups and associations of street food vendors, for instance the Maggi Fast Food Vendors Association of Ghana (MAFFAG), the Nestle Tea Sellers Association of Ghana (NESTAG) and the Traditional Caterers Association of Ghana (TCAG), were also contacted with a formal request and these organizations in turn introduced the researcher to some of their members who were food vendors. In addition, opportunities for the researcher to participate in meetings and discussions of these associations, as well as for members of the associations to participate in the research as respondents were sought.

### 3.5.1 Study Site Selection Strategy

The Kumasi metropolis covers a large geographical area. Consequently, it was important for the researcher to first map out the areas of street food vendor concentrations within the larger metropolis. This was aimed at enhancing the research in two main ways. Firstly, by providing details of areas of street food vendor concentrations, readers are enhanced with a better understanding of the street food sector in Kumasi, and future researchers and policy makers are in turn provided with a resource material that could prove beneficial to future research and policy in the street food sector. Secondly, by first outlining the areas of food vendor concentrations within the metropolis, this research was enhanced as it assisted in data collection, especially with regards to interviews and observations of food vendors.

In order to identify the core areas of street food vendor concentrations in the Kumasi metropolis, food regulators, food vendors, taxi drivers and members of the general public were consulted in an initial brief and unstructured interview. Food regulators were consulted because of their involvement in the food sector and their extensive knowledge of where the food vendors were. Food vendors were themselves consulted because they were perceived as experts in their own field with experience and knowledge that was felt as necessary for the identification of these food vendor concentrations. On their part, taxi drivers, in addition to patronising the services of SFVs, roam about the city on a day to day basis and were thus perceived as knowledgeable of the city and where to find what in the city. Other members of the general public were included in this aspect of the study. Thus, using unstructured conversational interviews, one food regulator, 10 street food vendors, three taxi drivers, and two members of the general public were asked to indicate, in their own opinion, five of the main areas of food vendor concentrations within the Kumasi metropolis. By this method,

respondents provided 14 different communities or areas within the metropolis where respondents perceived food vendors to be concentrated. These areas were Tech-Junction, Ayeduase, Aboabo, Bantama, Alabaa, Oforikrom, Asafo, Ashanti New Town (Ash-Town), Krofofrom, Tafo, Suame-Magazine, Afful Nkwanta, Kejetia, Asokwa and Amakom. These 14 communities were ranked, using a pairwise ranking method (Rifkin and Pridmore, 2001). 10 of the communities were subsequently selected. The 10 communities that were selected as areas of food vendor concentrations through this method were Kejetia-Adum, Tafo, Asafo, Bantama, Suame, Tech-Junction, Ayeduase, Alabaa, Krofofrom, Aboabo and Ash-Town. Kejetia, Adum, Asafo, and Bantama together form a strong commercial core of the metropolis where most of the commercial activities take place (Amoako, 2011). This area of commercial activity attracts a high concentration of people to these places daily and may help to explain the high number of food vendors. Suame Magazine is a densely populated area of mechanics and sellers of auto-mobile spare parts and small scale engineering industries that attracts a daily working population of about 200,000 people (Adarkwa, 2011). As a result of this high concentration of predominantly male mechanic workers, a significant number of food vendors are concentrated here. This is similar to Tafo since a significant number of the male mechanics working in the Suame magazine also live in Tafo. This situation is similar to that found in the other areas of street food concentrations within the Kumasi metropolis. In addition to these 10 areas, public and private schools in the metropolis, together with satellite markets in the metropolis (New Tafo, Old Tafo, Bantama, and Kwadaso) have a considerable number of food vendor concentrations in Kumasi. These areas served as areas of data collection. See Appendix five for brief descriptions of these areas of concentration. Figure 3.2 shows a map of Kumasi and the areas of street food vendor concentrations.

Figure 3.2 Map of Kumasi Showing Areas of Food Vendor Concentrations

## 3.6 Sampling Procedure

This section describes the various strategies and approaches by which respondents were selected for this research. The target population for the research, the study population and the unit of analysis for this research are first presented. Subsequently, the sampling techniques employed for this research are explained. Finally, the sample size used and the selection of respondents for this study are discussed.

**3.6.1 Target Population**

The target population for any study refers to the total set of units, including individuals, groups and organizations from which the study population will be selected (Cox 2008). The target population for this study included all stakeholders involved in the regulation of street foods in the Kumasi metropolis. These stakeholders include street food vendors, street food regulators, local government authorities, consumers, corporate and international stakeholders, research institutions like Crops Research Institute and KNUST and members of the public.

**3.6.2 Study Population**

The study population on the other hand, refers to the specific group and individuals that were studied as part of this research. The study population for this research included vendors of street foods excluding snacks and beverages, Environmental Health and Sanitation Officers operating within the nine sub-metros of the Kumasi metropolis, medical laboratories involved in certifying street food vendors, the Food and Drugs Authority (FDA), the Ghana Tourism Authority (GTA), the Ghana Standards Authority (GSA), the Metropolitan Health Directorate of Kumasi (MHD) and corporate stakeholders including Nestle Ghana Limited and Opportunities Industrialisation Centres Ghana (OICG).

**3.6.3 Unit of Analysis**

The unit of analysis for any study refers to the specific entity, be it individuals, groups, organizations or events that is being analyzed (Guest, Namey, and Mitchell, 2013). The unit of analysis for this research are the individual street food vendors and regulators, as well as the groups and organizations of vendors and regulators and other governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders involved in regulations.

### 3.6.4 Sampling Techniques

In line with the research design adopted for this study, non-probability sampling techniques were used to select respondents. Specifically, purposive and snowball sampling techniques were employed.

Purposive sampling was employed since it allowed for the selection of specific, but diverse categories of food vendors. The food vendors were purposively selected in order to ensure diversity in terms of:

A. Types of food vended (fufu, fried rice, gari and beans, fried yam and sauce, banku, Tuozaafi/breakfast foods including tea and bread, porridge).

B. Mode of operation (both mobile and stationary vendors; as well as day time and night time vendors).

C. Gender (both male and female headed vendors).

Thus, purposively selecting this diverse group of vendors enriched and helped this research in providing knowledge on the different experiences, practices and perceptions of different food vendors and, in exploring the various processes by which they negotiate the day to day challenges and opportunities they experience in their work.

Purposive sampling was also used to select one Sub-Metropolitan EHU Office for participant observation. Information from key informants was crucial in selecting this Sub-Metro. Similarly, purposive sampling techniques were used to target street food regulators and other stakeholder organizations throughout the metropolis. Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) at eight of the nine sub-metros in Kumasi were purposively interviewed as part of this study. This group of officers were purposively selected to explore the policies and procedures governing the regulation of street foods as well as the nature of collaboration and

communication between the Environmental Health and Sanitation Unit (EHU) and other stakeholder organizations such as the Food and Drugs Authority (FDA) in regulating SFs in Kumasi.

Snowball sampling techniques were also used in this research. Snowball sampling techniques were used extensively as it helped in sampling particular groups of SFVs. For instance, snowball sampling techniques were used to select the men who vend traditional foods and operate chop bars. These vendors are a small, difficult to reach, but important part of the street food scene in Kumasi. Consequently, the Traditional Caterers Association of Ghana (TCAG) for instance, served as key informants in identifying three of these food vendors. From these initial three, snowball-sampling techniques were used to identify other male traditional food vendors. Going through the vendor associations ensured that researchers gained the trust of the initially identified male vendors, whose recommendation in turn facilitated access to and the willingness of other male vendors to participate in the study. In addition, snowball sampling techniques were used to identify some stake-holder organizations in the SFS. For instance through snowball sampling techniques, an organization such as Opportunities Industrialization Centres, Ghana (OICG) was identified and included in this research. Thus, through snowballing, organizations and specific groups of food vendors were identified, groups and individuals who otherwise may have been excluded from this research.

### 3.6.5 Sample Size and Selection of Respondents

From the various sampling techniques employed, this research included a total of 78 respondents from three different groups. In line with qualitative research sampling techniques (Bowen, 2008; Mason, 2010; Morse, 2000; Crouch & Mckenzie 2006) the number of respondents included in this research was also determined by the concept of saturation. The emphasis of sampling

was also on accessing a diversity of perceptions and experiences from different stakeholders, as groups and as individuals. This helped to enrich, deepen and challenge the emerging understanding of the SFS in Kumasi. In line with this theme of diversity and variation in experiences, the research selected Environmental Health Officers

(EHOs) from different sub-metros and at different occupational levels. In all, 17

Environmental Health and Sanitation Officers (EHOs) were selected from the nine SubMetros in the Kumasi metropolis. This was made up of eight Sub-Metro heads, seven Town

Council officers, and two Metropolitan Health Directors. Table 3.1 illustrates the different EHOs selected at different levels. Furthermore, 39 Street Food Vendors (SFVs) were selected as respondents for this study. Table 3.2 illustrates the different groups of SFVs selected as part of this study in terms of gender and mode of operation. Finally, 22 corporate and government stake-holders, identified through key informants such as the EHU and the TCAG and through snowballing, were also selected. Table 3.3 shows stakeholders selected as part of this study.

Table 3.1: Environmental Health Officers Selected for the Study

|  | Male | Female | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Metropolitan Heads** | 2 |  | 2 |
| **Sub-Metropolitan Heads** | 7 | 1 | 8 |
| **Town Council Officers** | 3 | 4 | 7 |
| **TOTAL SELECTED** |  |  | 17 |

Table 3.2: Food Vendors Selected for the Study

|  | Male | Female | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Permanent** | 13 | 23 | | | 36 |
| **Mobile** | 1 | 2 | | | 3 |
| **TOTAL SELECTED** | | | | | 39 |

Table 3.3 Corporate and Government Stakeholders Selected for the Study

| Stakeholder | Interviews | Stakeholder | Interviews | Stakeholder | Interviews |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nestle Ghana | 1 | Ghana Tourism Authority | 1 | Traditional Caterers Association of Ghana | 1 |
| Opportunities Industrialisation Centres Ghana | 1 | Metropolitan Health Department | 1 | Maggi Fast Food Sellers Association of Ghana | 1 |
| Megah Laboratory | 1 | Food and Drugs Authority | 1 | Consumers and Members of the Public | 7 |
| Edward Prempeh Laboratory | 1 | Crops Research Institute | 1 | Ghana Standards Authority | 1 |
| School Officers | 3 | Ghana Health Service | 1 | | |
| **TOTAL SELECTED** | **22** | | | | |

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## 3.7 Methods for Collection of Data

Data collection took place over a period of 23 months, from October 2012 to September 2014. Both primary and secondary sources of data were relied on in this study.

### 3.7.1 Primary Data Collection Tools

For the primary data, the qualitative tools of semi-structured interview and observation were used. Semi-structured interviews were appropriate since they provided flexibility (Marvasti, 2004; Aagaard-Hansen and Yoder, 2007) and thus, allowed the researcher to probe and follow new and emerging leads from respondents and allowed respondents to elaborate more on their responses. Furthermore, as revealed by Marvasti, (2004) the semi-structured interviews allowed for the revelation of multiple, divergent and sometimes, contradictory information that went on to further enrich this research and deepen the understanding of the street food sector. The observations in turn provided rich descriptions that complemented, added context to and questioned the data from the semi-structured interviews. Together, data from the semi-structured interviews and observations provided holistic information and allowed for a rich and in-depth understanding of the street food sector in Kumasi.

### 3.7.1.1 Observation of Food Vendors

Non-participant observations of food vendors were conducted. The observations were carried out at different times of the day and on different days of the week in order to gain a comprehensive insight into the work and activities of food vendors. With regards to mobile SFVs, the researcher observed how they organised themselves and operated in the course of a working day. The researcher spent time in the field and moved around with three mobile vendors to experience the work they did. For stationary food vendors, observations focused on their daily routines, how they managed the space they operated in, how they interacted with

food regulators and city authorities, their daily challenges and difficulties and how these challenges were negotiated. In the field, short notes were recorded during the day. These served as reminders at the end of the day when a more complete account of each day's observation was written (Mulhall, 2003). Important themes and messages emerging from these observations were further explored through qualitative interviews (Patton, 1990).

The researcher also observed the activities and programmes of food vendor associations, the Maggi Fast Food Sellers Association of Ghana (MAFFAG) and the Traditional Caterers Association of Ghana (TCAG). Thus, the researcher attended and observed training programmes organised by these organizations for SFVs, in collaboration with the EHU and the FDA. These observations allowed the researcher to further understand and experience first-hand, the education of SFVs, the role of stakeholder organizations in this process, and the participation and involvement of SFVs themselves. Information from these observations therefore complemented and enriched the interview data. Areas of food vendor concentrations identified through this research were also observed. Observations focused on how the food vendors in these areas were set up and organised, what may have accounted for these concentrations and how these areas of food vendor concentrations changed during different times of the day and also over weekends.

### 3.7.1.2 Observation of Food Regulators

As the main street food regulatory body, the researcher participated and observed the field activities of one of the Town Council Offices of the EHU over a period of three months, joining field activities on different times of the day and on different days of the week. Information from key informants was crucial in selecting this sub-metro. The researcher had planned to undertake the observation within a different Sub-Metropolitan EHU office. This choice was

made based solely on convenience of the Sub-Metropolitan EHU office to the researcher. However, after a discussion with one of the Health Officers, the Officer suggested a different Sub-Metropolitan EHU office as the focus of the observation. This officer argued that it will be better for the researcher to do the attachment at the said Sub-Metro because there were a lot of chop bars and food vendors there. Upon further interrogation, it was revealed that this Sub-Metro had high concentrations of street food vendors, and that two of the areas of concentration identified earlier fell within this Sub-Metro. This informed the choice of this particular Sub-Metro for the participant observation.

The main goal for this participant observation was to understand how rules and regulations were translated and implemented in practice, to understand day to day challenges of regulators, the nature of their relationship with the vendors they regulated and how this relationship affected regulation, their own challenges, motivations, and stories. Furthermore, the researcher spent time with these regulators in their offices, participating and observing the day to day non-field activities of food regulators in Kumasi. The researcher also participated and observed the health certification process of food vendors by registering and going through the health checks and the health certification process. Thus the researcher, from January 2013 to January 2014 was registered and certified to sell food or be close to the sale of food in the metropolis. The registration and certification of the researcher provided an opportunity to observe first-hand the processes that vendors went through in order to secure a certificate that allowed them to vend.

### 3.7.1.3 Interviews of Food Vendors

Semi-structured interviews with a total of 39 food vendors took place as part of this research (Table 3.2). Interview guides were developed to capture the diversity of respondents included in this study

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(Appendices two, three, and four). Preliminary contacts were made with a number of food vendors during the first month of data collection regarding the research, their willingness or not to participate, and an appropriate time for the interviews was sometimes agreed. While some vendors preferred to be interviewed in the mornings, others preferred to be interviewed in the afternoons. Predominantly however, the vendors preferred to be interviewed at their work places while work was on-going. Consequently, there were frequent interruptions (when attending to customers). While this was challenging, it nonetheless allowed the researcher, a brief time to look at the responses received and then to think through on the next line of questions and then strategize. It also provided the opportunity for researchers to observe the interaction between food vendors and different groups or types of consumers and how different types of vendors interacted with consumers.

Plate 3.6 shows the researcher interviewing male kenkey sellers at Asafo.



Plate 3.6 researcher interviewing a Kenkey vendor at the work place at night

**3.7.1.4 Interviews of Food Regulators**

The researcher made initial contact and interviewed the Environmental Health Director of the KMA in Kumasi. From this officer, eight of the nine Sub-Metropolitan environmental health officers were interviewed, seven were males and one was a female. These officers further referred the researcher to Town Council health officers for further interviews and information. In total, seven Town Council Officers (four males and three females) were interviewed. While the research was on-going, a new Environmental Health Director was instituted in the metropolis. This officer was also interviewed. Thus, a total of 17 interviews were conducted with food regulators at three levels (Table 3.1): the Health Director in charge of regulating street foods at the Metropolitan level, the Sub-Metropolitan level where the officers were in charge of regulating street foods in their respective Sub-Metros and at the Town Council level where the officers were, on a day to day basis, in direct contact and communicated with street food vendors.

The researcher and a research assistant made initial contact with these regulators to arrange an interview date. All the interviews were pre-planned and took place in the offices or place of work of these officers in the morning. Sometimes however, because of the busy schedule of these officers, planned interviews had to be re-scheduled. Besides, majority of these officers did not allow researchers to use the field recorder. Thus, the researcher and his assistant had to record the interview manually which was really difficult. The research assistant mainly recorded the responses and also prompted the researcher of any follow up questions at the end of interviews. Also, the researcher wrote down as much as he conveniently could. By this approach, both notes were compared and gaps in what the research assistant recorded were filled. This does not imply that some information were not lost. Even when both recorded, it was not possible to record all information. Nonetheless, the ability of researcher to re-visit

these officers over a 23 month period meant that some of the information lost was retrieved and clarifications sought. Some of the officers were also willing to do follow-up interviews on phone in order to fill or clarify issues. During the course of the observation with the Sub-Metro, the researcher also had the opportunity to engage in several conversations with the Environmental Health Officers there for further understanding of observed events.

### 3.7.1.5 Interview of Other Stakeholders

Semi-structured interviews with 22 stake-holders in the SFS were conducted. These interviews were aimed at providing understanding of the interests, responsibilities, modes of operation, interaction, relationship and collaboration, and the power dynamics among formal regulatory bodies and other key corporate stake-holders within the SFS. The interviews were conducted with staff at different levels who had knowledge about their organization's work and involvement with SFVs.

### 3.7.2 Secondary Data

For secondary data, this study reviewed policy and legal documents guiding street food regulations in the Kumasi metropolis and used the information from these documents to support or challenge information from the primary sources of data. The researcher collected and analyzed documents covering rules, regulations, laws and policies that informed and guided the work of the street food regulators. Information from other secondary sources, including published and unpublished articles, and newspaper publications on the relationship between street vendors and city regulators were also major sources of secondary data. The information emerging from these documents were used to complement as well as cross-check information revealed through the other primary data collection methods.

### 3.7.3 Recording of Field Data

During the field work, data from observations were recorded in a field notebook. The researcher recorded both descriptive and reflective notes in the notebook separately. Some of the pages had descriptive notes of direct field observations. On the other pages were the researcher's own reflections of the observed events from the field. At the end of each field work day, the researcher summarized the day's events. These reflective notes formed an essential aspect of the data analyses. Where possible, some pictures were taken to help elaborate more on observed phenomenon. Audio tape recording was the main instrument for recording information from the interviews. The setting for the semi-structured interviews, if possible, were arranged in a way that as much as possible reduced background noise in an attempt to improve the quality of the audio recordings. Handwritten notes of interview sessions, non-verbal behaviour of informants, and how informants responded to different questions during different phases of the interview process were also recorded in a notebook.

### 3.8 Problems of Field Work

This research faced several challenges with regards to field work. One major challenge was getting food vendors to observe their activities. While these vendors were generally willing to be interviewed, they were reluctant when it came to observation. This is captured by this particular vendor's comment: *"I will not allow you to come and work with us and observe, you will impregnate my girls. I am working with two girls now but they all got pregnant and were disappointed by their men so I don't want you guys around my girls".* (Female food vendor, Krofofrom). Nonetheless, she was willing to be interviewed regarding the work she did and even informed us that the best time to get rice sellers to interview was in the afternoon at one o'clock in the afternoon. As already indicated, other challenges included the researcher's inability to audio record some of the interviews.

### 3.9 Management of Data

This section briefly describes how interview data were transcribed, how data from the field were stored and the processes used in analyzing the research data.

### 3.9.1 Transcription of Data

All identifiers on the audio tapes were code named. The interviews were transcribed ad verbatim. Reflections of the setting, as well as researchers' attention of the non-verbal communication of respondents, and field observatory notes, were key data components of the transcription and analysis, as emphasised by Rabiee (2004). Transcribing the audio tapes were also challenging because some of the respondents naturally were fast speakers, people who speak very fast and inaudibly and thus, made it difficult to hear what was been said. However, transcribing each interview on the same day of the interview helped in recalling some of the comments that appeared inaudible on the tape.

### 3.9.2 Storage and Safety of Data

Audio files from the field interviews were stored on different devices (external hard disk, pen drives, home-based desktop, and a laptop computer) in order to prevent loss of information. Furthermore, an on-line data base (Drop Box) was used to store information and write-ups in order to prevent data loss. To ensure the safety of field data and the confidentiality and anonymity of informants, the researcher kept all audio files on a home-based, unconnected, password protected desktop computer with an up-to-date antivirus. Identifying information on audio files was turned into codes with the meaning of codes kept in a separate location.

### 3.9.3 Data Organization and Analysis

This study, with its qualitative focus produced a vast amount of data, including field notes, interview transcripts and jotted points as well as the researcher's own reflections on methods and events during

the research study. In view of this, information gathered from the field was organized and analyzed while data collection was still on-going. This allowed for new and emerging themes from collected data to inform future data collection (Pope et al., 2000). Data collection and analysis thus occurred simultaneously. In line with qualitative research approaches, the process was not fixed and linear but rather iterative with several overlapping stages and processes. This study also used theoretical ideas and concepts to scrutinise and analyse the data.

After data collection had ended, the transcripts were all reorganised under the specific objectives that guided the study. These served as broad organising categories for the data analysis. Subsequently, under each of these broad categories, the responses of different respondents, and the observations of the researcher were further separated. For instance under the category 'challenges to the implementation of and adherence to regulations', the responses of both regulators and vendors were separated. After this was done, a more thorough reading of the responses from the different groups of respondents and from the observations was conducted. Major ideas or responses were then tagged with either single words or phrases to represent the presenting idea. For instance, words like 'finances', 'mobility', and 'security' were used to tag and represent some of the challenges highlighted by regulators. These served as initial codes for the analysis. After this was completed, similar codes were considered and put together to form a theme. For instance, the codes of finances, mobility and personnel were all put together to form the theme 'lack of resources'. Thus, the theme 'lack of resources' encompasses the various challenges that the regulators expressed. This theme though is only an example of some of the challenges that regulators faced. A similar approach was used for the responses of vendors. In taking the analysis forward, each of the identified themes were described and their characteristics were recorded. For instance, how many of the regulators mentioned financial constraints and how did they discuss it? How did different regulators (Sub-

Metro and Town Council) approach the issue and whether there were any identified differences in responses? Where applicable, the opinions of those who did not express a particular opinion but expressed an opposing or divergent view were used to further challenge general assumptions in arriving at a deeper and more contextualised understanding of the phenomenon. Data analysis was also driven by theory, where the researcher moved from an exploration of the raw data to an exploration of the theory and concepts that could help explain aspects of the data and then back to a further exploration of the data. Interesting themes emerging from the data led the researcher to explore concepts that could explain these issues and these concepts were subsequently employed to further explore the data. Sometimes, a table matrix was used to further the analysis. For instance in terms of what challenges exist for the regulation of foods, a table matrix was developed that summarised the perceptions of different respondents and the observations of the researcher. An example of a matrix is provided below in table 3.4. Using a table matrix helped to understand how these stakeholders differed or agreed on a particular issue (Darke, Shanks and Broadbent 1998).

**3.10 Ensuring Validity and Reliability of the Research**

This research faced the challenge of validity and reliability that is common to qualitative research methods (Mays and Pope, 2000; Malterud, 2001). In order to overcome these limitations, a number of techniques were employed. Firstly, triangulation of methods (observation, interviews and document reviews) and sources (regulators, vendors, corporate stake-holders) were employed to enhance the validity and reliability of this research. This ensured that different perspectives and viewpoints were considered and included in developing a comprehensive understanding of the regulatory framework of the SFS in the Kumasi metropolis (Mays and Pope, 2000).

The validity of this research has also been enhanced through the consideration of divergent and alternative explanations. Thus, the perspectives and opinions of those expressing different opinions were included in the data analysis to enrich the analysis (Mays and Pope, 2000). Validity was also enhanced through respondent validation (Mays and Pope, 2000), where regulators and vendors were exposed to aspects of the researcher's interpretations for further clarification and discussion. In addition, through critical reflection, the researcher has documented the challenges and constraints faced during the research. The potential implications of these constraints as well as the effects these constraints might have had on data collection have been recorded and acknowledged as part of this research report. Similarly, the detailed exposition and breakdown of how data was collected and analyzed as well as the theoretical and conceptual perspectives that influenced and informed the analysis of data also contributed to improving the validity of this research (Mays and Pope, 2000; Malterud, 2001). Finally, by providing a detailed qualitative description of the study context, other researchers and readers would be enhanced and able as a result, to determine the extent to which findings from this study may be extended, transferred or applied to their settings (Malterud, 2001).

**3.11 Ethical Consideration**

The ethical issue of informed consent was overcome by sending a formal request to institutional heads (the Metropolitan Health Director of KMA) as well as heads of street vendor associations and other stakeholder organizations outlining the nature of the research,

the intention, the methods to be used and the duration of the research.

Table 3.4: Table Matrix showing Challenges to Regulation from Various Perspectives

| | CHALLENGES | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | **EDUCATION** | **CERTIFICATION** | **INSPECTION** | **STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT** |
| **INTERVIEWS**<br>➢ **Regulators** | Few resources, lack of on the job training (*However lack of resources makes it difficult for us to run constant education on health screening and hygienic lifestyles…EHU ALPHA)* | Unwillingness to pay for screening by night and mobile vendors, and sometimes as a result of religious and cultural myths against drawing of blood.<br><br>Lack of commitment and support from KMA | Lack of adequate security on inspections.<br><br>Political interference in inspection and enforcement.<br><br>Lack of transportation and lack of financial motivation for inspecting mobile, weekend and night time vendors | Disinterest of stakeholders in street foods: "*In reality when it comes to the informal food sector, we have ignored them; in our minds they don't exist*" (GTA Official).<br><br>Lack of appreciation and respect for the work of the EHU: *"some institutions underrate our work and expertise so they do not inform us about matters we are supposed to handle"* (Male sub-metro EHO).<br><br>Poor communication among stakeholders |
| ➢ **Vendors** | Organised education affects time of operation. Having to leave businesses unattended to attend an educational program is a major disincentive. Education politically motivated. | Pay for screening each year and you never get the certificates, and the screening is expensive.<br><br>Challenges regarding the screening of helpers | Sometimes inspectors are unnecessarily confrontational and aggressive, where they can simply educate. | |
| **OBSERVATIONS** | At the EHU, it is unplanned, generic, and usually confrontational. Those conducted by the TCA involves the payment of money by vendors to attest to their attendance of training, a fact which serves as a major disincentive. | Some of the certified laboratories do not have medical doctors attached to their facilities to interpret the results. Sometimes, these are done by lab workers who have been trained on the job. Process not closely controlled and open to duplication. | Lack of transportation means a relatively small area is covered in terms of inspections daily.<br><br>Inspections also focus predominantly on vendors by road sides and sidewalks and leaving those inside communities and markets. | The exclusion of street vendors as important stakeholders. Most government organisations are quick to refer one to the KMA as soon as street foods are mentioned, insisting that they do not or cannot play any significant role |

The consent of individuals within these organizations was sought before the study. All participants in the study including food vendors also gave their consent to participate. At the beginning of each interview, the researcher made respondents aware of their right to withdraw from the interview or refuse to answer a particular question, without fear or favour or without harm to their person, reputation and esteem or business and occupation. In general, participants were made aware of the purpose of the research, the time it may take and what was expected of participants. Such information laid a good foundation for the development of a trusting relationship on which the research process was based (Sixsmith et al. 2003). In the write-up, the names and identities of persons and events as well as their actions and comments were altered in a way that preserved the anonymity and confidentiality of respondents.

**DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF RESULTS**

## 4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents data analysis on the SFS in Kumasi, focusing on the regulation of street foods, stakeholder involvement and interactions in street food regulations, the challenges and coping strategies of regulators in regulation, and the informal beliefs, perceptions and relations that mediate street food regulations. The chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section presents data on the existing policies and institutional framework for street food regulations, focusing on laws and policies and the key stakeholders, both government and non-governmental institutions involved in regulations. A stakeholder matrix is presented that summarizes the interest and nature of involvement of various stakeholders. The second section explains the key aspects of regulations, how they are carried out in practice, the stakeholders involved and how they interact or collaborate in carrying out different regulatory activities. Section three analyzes the challenges that regulators have faced in their work, their coping strategies and how these coping strategies had affected the quality of their relationship with SFVs. Section four investigates how personal beliefs, perceptions and interpretations and the social networks of both regulators and vendors mediates the implementation of street food laws. Finally, section five investigates the implication of gender for street food regulations.

## 4.2 Institutional and Legal Framework for Street Food Regulations

This section reveals and discusses the main governmental institutions whose mandate touch on and include the regulation of street foods. This section is divided into two parts. The first part briefly discusses the set-up of these governmental institutions and their relationship with street food vendors, indicating which of these institutions take the leading role in regulating street

foods. The second part reveals and discusses the laws and policies used to regulate street foods in Kumasi.

### 4.2.1 Main Government Institutions

The interviews and a review of policy documents revealed that four main governmental institutions have legal mandates that touch on street food regulations. Their duties include, but not specific to, street foods or street food enterprises. These institutions are the Food and Drugs Authority (FDA), the Ghana Tourism Authority (GTA), the Environmental Health and Sanitation Unit of the KMA (EHU), and the Kumasi Metropolitan Health Directorate (MHD).

The Food and Drugs Law 1992 (PNDCL 305 B) which established the FDA and was amended by the Public Health Act 2012 (ACT 851), mandates the FDA to regulate foods in Ghana. The Food Safety Division of the FDA undertakes the regulatory activities concerning foods in Ghana by providing and enforcing standards for the sale of food. It establishes prohibitions against the sale of unwholesome food and required standards for foods offered on sale. However, the Food Division of the FDA focuses on manufactured and processed foods, and on food manufacturers rather than on street food vendors. Information from this

Female Official of the FDA confirms that: "*for the street foods, KMA is in charge. We did not delegate that responsibility to them, it is the local government that did and so we do not give them instructions.*" The FDA's involvement then, is more supportive as a result, especially in terms of educating food vendors where occasionally, the EHU invites the FDA to assist in educating street food vendors (Personal communication with female official of FDA). Similar to the FDA, the GTA, established by the Tourism Act 2011, Act 817, is the main implementing body of the Ministry of Tourism. As such, some of the main functions of the

GTA include the inspection, licensing and registration of food establishments and chop bars: "*anything food is regulated and licensed by the GTA. The law mandates the GTA to license the caterers, the chop bars and the like*" (GTA Official). The GTA states, as part of its quality assurance that its duty is to "*set and regulate industry standards through registration, inspection, classification and licensing of accommodation and catering enterprises including...restaurants and fast food establishments, and traditional catering (chop bar) establishments*" (GTA, 2011: 1). Nonetheless, in their inspection, registration and licensing activities, the GTA focuses mostly on the formal sector food establishments including hotels and restaurants because of: "*resource constraints, both human and material*" and the fact that informal sector street food vendors are perceived as being "*too small to regulate*" (GTA Official). In view of this, the GTA plays a very minimal role in regulating street foods, focusing mainly on licensing chop bar operators, excluding the mobile food vendors and those food vendors who operate on table tops with minimal or no eating places for consumers throughout the metropolis.

Thus, the FDA is a National Authority mandated to determine and enforce food standards in the country while the GTA, also a National Authority is mandated to register, license, and inspect catering and fast food establishments in the country. At the local government level however, the Local Government Act 1993 (Act 462) mandates local government authorities (Metropolitan, Municipal and District) to supervise and regulate foods within their areas of authority. Section 15 of the Local Government Act 1993 (Act 462) of Ghana allows the local government authorities to delegate some of its functions. Subsequently, the KMA, as the local governing body of the Kumasi metropolis, has mandated the EHU to officially regulate the sale of street foods in the Kumasi metropolis (Personal communication with the EHU Director at KMA). Furthermore, the Local Government (Departments of District Assemblies

Commencement) Instrument 2009 (L.I. 1961), indicates that health departments under the local authorities may assist in the supervision, regulation, and inspection of the manufacture and sale of foods in their areas of jurisdiction. Thus, within the Kumasi metropolis, the EHU is legally the main body that implements and enforces, on a day to day basis, street food regulations. The EHU is sub-divided into Sub-Metropolitan Assemblies (Sub-Metros), with each of the nine Sub-Metros in the metropolis having an EHU attached. The EHU has offices and EHOs working in each of the nine Sub-Metros in the Kumasi metropolis. Each SubMetro has a head (EHO), referred to as a Technical Officer (T.O), who oversees the regulation of SFs. Each Sub-Metro EHU office is further divided into Town Council offices, responsible for regulating SFVs in a number of communities. The Town Council officers are Assistant Technical Officers (A.T.Os) and their areas of jurisdiction are the communities within their particular Town Councils. For instance, the Asokwa Sub-Metro has three Town Councils: Asokwa, Ahinsan, and Atonsu Agogo Town Councils. The Ahinsan Town Council in turn covers four communities (Ahinsan, Ahinsan Estate, Kaase, Angola) and EHOs in the Ahinsan Town Council regulate the SFVs within these communities. The T.Os and A.T.Os are front-line regulators who are in frequent contact with SFVs. According to records from the KMA, in total, there were 135 EHOs (both T.Os and A.T.Os) in the metropolis in 2013, 70 of whom were men and 65 women. It is these regulators (135) who are tasked to regulate the approximately 20,000 SFVs operating within the Kumasi metropolis in addition to other non-street food regulatory responsibilities (Personal communication with Metropolitan Environmental Health Director, 5th September 2014). Figure 4.1 depicts the organizational structure of the EHU.

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Within the EHU, there is no group of people whose sole responsibility is to regulate street foods. All EHOs are thus, involved in all the other responsibilities of sanitation officers, in addition to the regulation of street foods.



Fig. 4.1: Organizational Structure of the EHU

Previously, there was a division which performed only street food regulatory activity. This Male A.T.O explains:

> *We used to have a division which solely regulated and dealt with street food vending. They were very knowledgeable and knew every nook and cranny where they vended food. They had their own teams and worked on rotational basis. Later we had a special team who only dealt with screening.*

Thus, having such a special unit was crucial and offered officers extra knowledge and expertise on street food vending. However, no such unit has existed under the EHU since the EHU was moved from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Local Government.

Finally, the Kumasi Metropolitan Health Directorate (MHD), operating under the Ghana

Health Service and thus separate from the EHU, is another institution at the Local

Government Level that performs duties relating to the regulation of street foods. As the

Health Directorate of the Metropolis, health issues including the medical screening of food

vendors are handled by this organization. In this regard, they perform some similar functions

to those performed by the EHU, with the exception of inspection and enforcement. That is, the

MHD is involved in the certification of street food vendors in Kumasi.

The four institutions discussed above are independent of each other and operate under different

governmental ministries. The FDA operates under the Ministry of Health, the GTA operates

under the Ministry of Tourism, the EHU operates under the Ministry of Local Government,

and the MHD operates under the Ghana Health Service. The relationship of these institutions

to street food vendors can be illustrated diagrammatically below:

Figure 4.2 : Key Government institutions involved in street food regulations in Kumasi

From figure 4.2, it is revealed that even though the EHU has the main mandate to regulate

foods (engaging in four broad activities of certification, inspection, education and research),

the GTA and the MHD performs some street food regulatory functions like health

certification and inspections. On the other hand, the role of the FDA is largely supportive, in

terms of providing education for street food vendors in collaboration with the EHU.

## 4.2.2 Laws for Street Food Regulations in Kumasi

As indicated in section 4.2.1, the EHU is the main governmental organization charged with the

regulation of street foods in the Kumasi metropolis. As the foremost organization mandated to

regulate street foods in the Kumasi metropolis, the EHU rely on a variety of laws and policies

in their work. These are the Public Health Act (1960) which has been replaced by the Public

Health Act 2012, Act 851, the Criminal Offences Act 29 of 1960, the

KMA bye laws of 1995, and the Town's Act 1892 (AP.86) (Personal Communication with

Metropolitan Director of EHU).

The Ghana Public Health Act of 1960 (amended in 2012 as the Public Health Act 2012, Act

851) contains within it the Food and Drugs Law and also spells out duties or areas of

responsibility for Public Health Officers or EHOs in general. These areas of responsibility

include *refuse disposal, vector control, hygiene education, waste water disposal and drainage,*

*housing and building, hospital/health center sanitation, food hygiene, water supply, sanitary*

*inspection, disposal of the dead, law enforcement, excreta disposal, school health, public*

*cleaning, and port health* (Parts 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 of the Public Health Act 2012). These are all

activity areas that EHOs are expected to fulfill within their areas of operation.

In relation to food hygiene, the Public Health Act indicates eight specific duties of EHOs:

> *1) Planning (identification of needs and data collection for programme*
> *development); 2) Sanitary inspection of slaughter houses/slabs; 3) Meat*
> *inspection (in slaughter houses and outside slaughter houses); 4)*
> *Inspection of food premises; 5) Medical examination of food handlers*
> *and issuance of health certificates; 6) Protection of food source; 7)*
> *Hygiene education on proper food storage, Preservation and handling*
> *etc.; 8) Law enforcement.*

These duties can be grouped into four main regulatory activities namely: Education, Medical

Screening and Health Certification, Inspection and Enforcement and Research. In addition to

spelling out the responsibility of EHOs, Part 5, Sections 51-53 and Part 7, Sections 100-105 of

the Public Health Act, indicates various prohibitions against the sale of unwholesome,

poisonous or adulterated food. It specifically defines what actions may be considered as an offence in this regard. For instance Part 7, Section 100 (sub-sections 3, 5, and 6) of the Public Health Act states:

> *3) A person commits an offence if that person sells or offers for sale a food that: has in or on it a poisonous or harmful substance, is unwholesome or unfit for human or animal consumption, consists in whole or in part of a filthy, putrid, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance, is adulterated, is injurious to health or is not of the nature, substance, quality or prescribed standards.*
>
> *5) A person shall not sell, prepare, package, convey, store or display for sale food under insanitary conditions.*
>
> *6) Food shall be stored and conveyed in a manner that preserves its safety, composition, quality and purity and minimizes the dissipation of its nutritive properties from climatic and any other deteriorating conditions.*

Thus, this law points out to regulators what they should enforce as well as what may be considered appropriate or inappropriate action by food vendors, manufacturers, and other distributors. This law goes further to define what certain terms mean under certain circumstances. For instance part 7, Section 100 Subsection 4 states:

> *food is adulterated if: (a) a constituent of the food has in whole or in part been omitted or abstracted, (b) a damage to or the poor quality of the food has been concealed in any manner, (c) a substance of the food has been substituted wholly or in part, (d) a substance has been added to, or mixed or packed with, the food to increase its bulk or weight or reduce its quality or strength or to make it appear better or of greater value than it is; (e) it contains an additive not expressly permitted by the national standards, the Codex or the Regulations or is in excess of the quantity permitted (f) a constituent of the food exceeds the amount stated on the label or permitted in the Regulations (g) its nature, substance and quality has been affected to its detriment.*

This clear definition of terms and statement of regulations is good in preventing ambiguity in interpretation of street food laws. The law also explains the sanctions or fines to be applied to specific offences, which goes further to reduce conflicts and ambiguity in interpretation. In relation to the sale of food under insanitary conditions for instance, this law states in Part 5, Section 52, Sub-Section 2 that:

> *A person who contravenes subsection (1) commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than one thousand penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not more than four years or to both.*

The Public Health Act therefore is an important legal document for food regulations in general, containing relevant information on the responsibility of inspectors, prohibitions regarding food and the sale of food in general, key definitions, and specific definitions of sanctions for specific offences. It can be observed however that the statements of this law are not specifically tailored towards street foods only but are broad laws that covers the food system, including manufacturing, and sale (in both formal and informal situations). The laws and policies appear to be generally about food systems and not on street foods per se. In other words, what is included in the four legal documents is often general laws that can be applied to restaurants and other more formal food establishments and food manufacturing firms.

The Criminal Offences Act 1960, Act 29 and the Town's Act (1998) are two other legal documents providing a legal base and framework for food regulations in the metropolis of Kumasi. The Criminal Offences Act, 1960, Act 29 gives Health Inspectors the mandate to prosecute some of the offences around the sale of unwholesome food as well as what can be considered as an unwholesome food in the first place. The Criminal Offences Act is concerned more with what can be considered as an offence or crime, the role of various officers including EHOs in sanctioning offenders and criminals, and what can be considered as an appropriate punishment for a particular offence. In other words, it specifies what EHOs can lawfully do in case of an offence by street food vendors.

Even though the Town's Act does not specifically mention food vending, this Act covers some general aspects that are of relevance to food regulation, including specifying inspection of

premises and nuisances and the issuance of abatement notices that food regulators draw from in enforcing laws and regulations.

In sum, the Public Health Act, the Criminal Offences Act, and the Town's Act spell out the duties and responsibilities of Public Health Inspectors or Environmental Health Officers and help to guide their work. These legal documents however are general legal documents that apply to food regulations in Ghana as a whole and not specific to the context of Kumasi. Furthermore, since the EHU operates under the Local Government (KMA), it is necessary for the EHU to perform within the legal requirements of the Local Government of Kumasi which is the KMA. Consequently, the EHU officers in Kumasi also rely on aspects of the KMA Bye-Laws of 1995. The KMA bye-laws of 1995 provide the legal and policy framework and guidelines for regulating foods. Specifically, the KMA (Restaurant, and Eating Houses or Chop Bars) Bye-laws, 1995 spells out clearly the requirements that public eating places and chop bars as well as the food vending personnel must meet. For instance Section 2 SubSections (a) and (b) of the KMA Restaurant and Eating Houses or Chop Bars Bye-laws

states:

> *In all premises used as a restaurant or eating house, there shall be provided: a separate room which shall be used solely as a public eating room; a separate kitchen which shall be used solely for cooking and for the preparation of food and liquid refreshment for use in the restaurant or eating house.*

This law goes further to indicate the need for eating rooms to have floors made up of "*impervious material*", walls to be "*capable of being washed*", and for eating rooms to have "*adequate lighting and ventilation*". Furthermore, this section of the law provides instructions regarding the personnel who handle food. It indicates that people who suffer from contagious diseases must not "*take part in the preparation or serving of food in connection with the*

*restaurant or eating house*". The law clearly defines that: *any place where food is prepared or cooked or liquid refreshment is provided for sale to the public for consumption on the premises shall be deemed to be a restaurant or eating house for the purpose of these byelaws.* This definition makes these laws applicable to food vendors in the Kumasi metropolis. In addition to the above, the KMA Sanitation Bye-laws also specify in Section 5 that: "*no food seller shall serve food in anything unless due care has been taken to make sure the food wrappers are hygiene*".

The KMA (Sanitation) Bye-laws, 1995 and the KMA (Public Markets) Bye-laws, 1995 also cover standards for food hygiene within the Kumasi metropolis. Together, these bye-laws provide the EHO with instructions on what to look out for in street food regulations within the Kumasi metropolis. Despite the existence of these four main legal documents, it is evident that none of them specifically targets street foods and that mostly the laws are about food systems and may be adapted for food manufacturing as well as restaurants and other actors in the formal food industry in general.

**4.3 Regulation of Street Foods: Stakeholder Practices and Interrelations**

This section of the analyses discusses the presence of non-governmental stakeholders and how, together with governmental stakeholders, they contribute to each of the regulatory responsibilities (education, medical screening and certification, inspection and enforcement, and research). This section is further divided into five (5) sub-sections. The first sub-section will identify the key stakeholders, their interests and nature of involvement in the street food sector by using a stakeholder profile matrix. The subsequent sub-sections will focus on each of the regulatory responsibilities, discussing how each of these regulatory responsibilities are undertaken and the role and collaborations of various stakeholders in relation to these regulatory responsibilities.

**4.3.1 Key Stakeholders, Interests, and Nature of Involvement: A Profile Matrix** Despite the involvement of the FDA, the GTA, the EHU and the MHD, the challenge of not having a specific organization with the sole mandate of regulating street foods still persists. Thus, it has been emphasized in section 4.2.1 how the EHU performs several other responsibilities in addition to the regulation of street foods. What exists thus, are a number of groups and organizations who in interaction with each other, play various roles and contribute to the regulation of SFs within the Kumasi metropolis. These groups and organizations are all stakeholders since they have an interest in or are affected by regulation of SFs or can have an active or passive influence on SF regulations (Brugha and Varvasovszky, 2000). This research identified 14 key stakeholders each of whom contributes, one way or the other to at least one of the regulatory components identified above.

Table 4.1 provides a summary profile of all stakeholders, their interests and nature of involvement in SF regulations, as well as their positioning regarding SF regulations. In sum, the various stakeholders indicated can be categorised into six main stake-holder groups:

1. **Governmental Stakeholders:** These are those government institutions whose mandates involve some aspect of street food regulations. These stakeholders include the EHU, FDA, MHD, GTA, GSA and the Police (Supportive).

2. **Food Vendor Based Stakeholders:** These are registered and recognized food vendor organisations with active membership and who potentially can influence policy and practice in the SFS. These stakeholders include

    Traditional Caterers Association of Ghana (TCAG), Nestle Tea Sellers Association of Ghana (NESTAG) and Maggi Fast Food Sellers Association of Ghana (MAFFAG).

3.  **Corporate Stakeholders:** These are those corporate bodies that offer some services to or contribute to SF regulations in their work. These stakeholders include Nestle Ghana Limited and other private laboratories contracted by the EHU to medically screen vendors.

4.  **International Donor Organizations:** These are international organizations which through education and research contribute to street food regulations. These organizations include DANIDA and OICG.

5.  **Research Institutions:** Educational institutions such as KNUST provides research evidence to inform regulators and help by allowing students to go on attachment and assist in food regulations.

6.  **General Public and Consumers:** Consumers and the public in general contribute as stakeholders by reporting instances to regulators and helping to monitor food vendor activities.

Table 4.1: Stakeholder Profile Matrix

| STAKEHOLDER | IMPORTANCE TO REGULATION | LEVEL OF INTEREST IN REGULATION | NATURE OF INVOLVEMENT IN REGULATION | POSITION |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Environmental Health and Sanitation Unit (EHU)** | Main regulatory body mandated by the local Government (KMA) to regulate street foods. | HIGH | Central to all regulatory activities. Officers in day to day contact with street food vendors in a regulatory capacity. | Central and Proactive |
| **Food and Drugs Authority (FDA)** | The FDA is the National Authority mandated by Law to regulate foods and drugs in Ghana as a whole. | MEDIUM | Possesses and provides resources, both human and material for the education of street vendors. | Passive but Supportive |

| STAKEHOLDER | IMPORTANCE TO REGULATION | LEVEL OF INTEREST IN REGULATION | NATURE OF INVOLVEMENT IN REGULATION | POSITION |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Metropolitan Health Directorate of Kumasi (MHD)** | The Directorate is directly in charge of all health issues within the Kumasi Metropolis | HIGH | Involved in the medical screening and health certification of food vendors | Active |
| **Ghana Tourism Authority (GTA)** | The GTA engages in inspection, licensing, and registration of catering enterprises in the Kumasi Metropolis | HIGH | As part of its functions inspects, registers, and license fast food and chop bar establishments, all prominent aspects of street foods | Central |

| STAKEHOLDER | IMPORTANCE TO REGULATION | LEVEL OF INTEREST IN REGULATION | NATURE OF INVOLVEMENT IN REGULATION | POSITION |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Food Vendor Associations** | The vendor associations are a prominent mouthpiece for food vendors with leadership in Kumasi who collaborate with regulators. | HIGH | Collaborates with the EHU in planning and undertaking educational campaigns for food vendors. | Collaborative |
| **Schools** | Because schools attract a lot of street food vendors, school authorities play an important role in regulating foods in the Kumasi metropolis by collaborating with regulators | Medium | Collaborates with EHU officers in maintaining food safety standards in and around schools | Supportive |

| Nestle Ghana Limited | As a sponsor of vendor associations, Nestle Ghana are well placed between food vendors and food regulators | Medium-High | Provides street food vendors with protective aprons and head caps (all regulatory requirements); invites experts and collaborates with EHU officers in educating vendors. | Collaborative |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Ghana Standards Authority (GSA)** | Mandated to undertake testing, inspection and certification to ensure that products and production processes meet standard requirements. | Low | The testing division of the GSA has labs that analyses food products and foods for chemical; microbiological; and metallic contaminants as well as pesticide residues in fruits during outbreaks. | Reactive |
| **Medical Laboratories** | These laboratories are in charge of one of the most crucial aspects of regulation (certification) | High | Works with the EHU in screening and issuing health certificates. | Collaborative and Supportive |

| STAKEHOLDER | IMPORTANCE TO REGULATION | LEVEL OF INTEREST IN REGULATION | NATURE OF INVOLVEMENT IN REGULATION | POSITION |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Consumers and the Public** | Since consumers are at the receiving end of street food products, the way in which these foods are regulated is important to them | High | Consumers serve as informants for food regulators, keeping an eye out, especially in the evenings when regulators do not work | Collaborative |
| **Security Services** | Their presence is important to enhance enforcement of street food laws | Medium-High | Accompanies regulators in arresting street vendors who repeatedly fail to obey or follow street food regulations | Supportive |

| STAKEHOLDER | IMPORTANCE TO REGULATION | LEVEL OF INTEREST IN REGULATION | NATURE OF INVOLVEMENT IN REGULATION | POSITION |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)** | As a leading public research institution, KNUST is well positioned to provide research evidence; personnel; and material to improve food regulations | Medium | Provides research evidence to regulators and makes recommendations, sends students on attachment to assist EHU; and organises training workshops for vendors | Supportive |

| STAKEHOLDER | IMPORTANCE TO REGULATION | LEVEL OF INTEREST IN REGULATION | NATURE OF INVOLVEMENT IN REGULATION | POSITION |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Opportunities Industrialisation Centres Ghana (OICG)** | A Non-Governmental Organisation that works and interacts with food vendors and can be an outlet for regulatory information for street vendors | Low | They provide education for street food vendors regarding hygienic and safe cooking methods in collaboration with health officers | Collaborative |

| INTERNATIONAL DONOR ORGANISATIONS | International Donor Organisations like DANIDA maintains an interest and presence in the street food sector in Kumasi through its sponsored research projects | Medium | DANIDA, in collaboration with local research institutions like KNUST undertakes research into street foods in Kumasi to inform policy and practice. Currently, DANIDA is sponsoring an on-going street food research study in Kumasi aimed at enhancing street food businesses and street food safety in Kumasi. | Supportive |
|---|---|---|---|---|

Through various relationships and interactions, both formal and informal, the stakeholders identified above contribute to and are affected by SF regulations in various dimensions. There exists an overall network of relations among these stakeholders with the EHU often serving as the central node around which other stakeholders operate. The links between and among stake-holders is often marked by information and resource flow, moving in all directions. Within this broad network of relations however, this research found that there are sub-networks or clusters of networks of relations around the identified regulatory activities. In other words, not all identified stakeholders contribute to all aspects of regulations. These sub-networks show closer and stronger relations among the stakeholders involved. In the following sub-sections, the role that the various stakeholders play in food regulations, in relation to the regulatory responsibilities identified will be explained and analyzed. Through such analysis, the relationships, interactions and power dynamics among the various stakeholders will be elaborated.

### 4.3.2 Education

From the interviews and review of legal and policy documents, education (usually of and for food vendors), is one of the key aspects of food regulation in the Kumasi metropolis. As such, most of the key stakeholders identified contribute to enhancing education. As the principal regulatory authority however, most educational programmes that target SFVs involve the EHU. While the GTA also could have played a key role either as educators or collaborators in education, their participation remains minimal: "*honestly, when it comes to education and training, we have not been honest with the street food vendors. We don't do the training often and when we do we only include a few street vendors*" (GTA Official). Since, the EHU "*lack the resources to carry out education*", the FDA serves as a major source of resource and key informants for these educational campaigns organised by the EHU (Personal communication with the immediate past Metropolitan Health Officer, 4th January 2013).

Thus, in terms of education, the relationship between the EHU and the FDA may move from collaborative to supportive under different circumstances:

> "*The FDA has the resources and we collaborate with them, we rely on them for resources for training and education. Also, assuming I go out and meet a problem and can't solve it on my own, I have to draw their attention (FDA). When they are organizing a training programme also, they call on us because they don't have the men on the ground, they contact us. They have got the materials to educate the food vendors, we have got the men*" (Kwartemaa, Female T.O)

There is thus a complementary relationship between the FDA (with the resources) and the EHU (with the men on the ground) when it comes to education. The FDA provides the material resources and the expertise and the EHU provides the men on the ground to carry out the training. Below is a sample of a picture-based educational flyer developed by the FDA but given to and distributed by the EHU to street food vendors in the Kumasi metropolis to educate them on food hygiene:



Plate 4.1a: Front page of a sample FDA hand-out for food safety education

Plate 4.1b: Back page of a sample FDA hand-out for food safety education

As indicated earlier, the FDA as a National Authority has access to resources and produce materials (as depicted in plates 4.1a and 4.1b) and the EHU rely on some of these materials to enhance their education of food vendors. Evidently, the flyers are picture-based with big green 'correct' symbols to indicate appropriate and hygienic practices, and big red 'wrong' symbols to indicate inappropriate and unacceptable practices. This way, the educational materials are made beneficial to literate, non-literate and semi-literate SFVs. Between these two governmental stake-holders (FDA and EHU), there appear to be a negotiated agreement that when it comes to educating SFVs, the EHU has more responsibility and jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that they are more present and visible in the field and have the capacity to contact vendors more easily than other stakeholder organizations: *But when it comes to the food vendors, the final decision is with us. We are on the ground; we go to the people,*

*so we know. We are not working under them (FDA). They call us when they need our assistance"*

(Asiama, Male T.O). Another health officer explains it this way:

> *"I think theirs (FDA) is the enforcement of the law; they are understaffed, so we do our work. It does not conflict with theirs, we are on the ground. We are on the ground and they are in the office. There is no conflict between us in the performance of our duties. Only when they call on us when they get a complaint."*

It is therefore appropriate to conclude that the FDA, in terms of education of SFVs, works either in a collaborative or supportive role, and that the EHU performs the foremost functions and carries the responsibilities of educating street food vendors.


**4.3.2.1 Participation of Non-Governmental Stakeholders in Education**

In addition to the EHU and the FDA, other organizations such as Nestle Ghana limited, OICG, and the TCAG, are also important stakeholders in terms of the education of street food vendors. These stakeholders, in collaboration with the FDA and the EHU provide resources and carries out training programmes for SFVs. *"We collaborate with Ghana Traditional Caterers Association. The association organizes training programmes for its members in all the Sub Metros; we mobilize the people for them"* (Takyi, Male T.O). Under this circumstance, the relationship of the TCAG with the EHU is more collaborative, where they work 'hand in hand' with the EHU. As this official elaborates:

> *"We have the traditional caterers association, we work hand in hand with them, and then sometimes too…Maggi (Nestle Ghana Limited) we collaborate with them…They assist us to help educate the food vendors…They teach them how to prepare better food and nutritious food for the people" (Ofori, Male T.O)*

Similarly, OICG, in developing a training manual for an educational programme for SFVs indicated that they: *"contacted the TCAG and the EHU and worked collaboratively with them"* (OICG Official). Nestle Ghana Limited on their part organizes training programmes for SFVs within the metropolis periodically: *"quarterly we do have some of these workshops for them where we invite*

*qualified chefs to come and educate them, talk to them as to how to handle their foods in terms of the preparation" (Nestle professional)*. Since they are a collaborating organization, their educational programmes, like that of the TCAG, are carried out with the advice and collaboration of the FDA and the EHU: *"anytime we need them, we write to them, we call on them to give us the assistance we need from them"* (Nestle professional). Unlike other stake-holders however, Nestle Ghana's interest in the education of SFVs has also to do with promoting their products as a corporate entity. Their interest lies in the fact that they want to improve their company's image and by improving the safety of the foods of the SFVs who use their products, they ultimately promote their products:

> *"By so doing, we also want to ensure that consumers can identify our brand so that at any time you want to take something, you know that when I go to this stand I will get the quality service I need! Branding also ensures visibility of nestle products"* (Male Nestle professional).

These organizations, through their interaction with the EHU and the FDA, contribute to the education of SFVs within the Kumasi metropolis. Since the EHU has got other responsibilities as indicated above and that their educational programmes are usually yearly, and the FDA does not have the staff strength for such education, the input of these organizations in educating SFVs is crucial for the Kumasi metropolis. They assist the EHU in fulfilling an essential component of street food regulation within the Kumasi metropolis.

Research institutions such as KNUST, with international partners like the DFID and DANIDA all play roles, though minimal, in enhancing education of SFVs and in enriching educational programmes. For instance during the University's long vacation period, the Environmental Science Department sends students out on attachment to the EHU for three months each year and these students assist the EHU in providing much needed environmental sanitation education for SFVs. "*The recent Student Industrial Attachment (29 students) is helping us a lot to educate the public"* (Takyi, Male T.O). In these ways, various departments and organizations play varying roles in enhancing and

promoting education, as an essential component of food regulations within the metropolis. From the preceding, it is evident that the EHU plays a leading role in education. However, there are other organizations who either directly or indirectly, as collaborators or supporters, are actively involved in education. Figure 4.3 provides an illustration of the relationship among stake-holders in carrying out education for street food vendors in Kumasi:



Figure 4.3: Stake-holder Interactions in Education

From figure 4.3, it is evident that the EHU, FDA, Nestle, and TCAG are core stakeholders in terms of education. The relationship between the FDA and the three remaining stakeholders are more directional, with the FDA often serving as a source for resources, both intellectual and material.

Among the remaining three (EHU, Nestle, TCAG) however, the relationship among them is not single directional but rather multi-directional and is marked by resource and information flow in all directions. These three organizations form a strong collaborative core for SFV education within the Kumasi metropolis. The contribution of the other stakeholders (OICG, KNUST, and GTA) is minimal and intermittent and the level of collaboration with the other stakeholders is not strong.

### 4.3.2.2 Form of Educational and Training Programmes

According to the food regulators, each Sub-Metro EHU has its own educational itinerary, usually undertaken yearly: *"once in a year we organize health programme for the food vendors, we educate them on the need to prepare under strict hygienic conditions"* (Ofori, Male T.O). Generally, this research identified two main forms of education carried out for SFVs within the Kumasi metropolis. The first form of education, labelled here as the 'macro educational approach', involved stakeholders and regulators bringing SFVs together at a particular venue or location to be educated. This is typical of the educational programmes organized periodically by either or both Nestle Ghana Limited and the TCAG, and sometimes OICG in collaboration with the EHU and with the support of other partners like the FDA. Since SFVs usually have to leave their businesses behind and attend these programmes, some of these programmes (especially those organized by the TCAG) are often organized within each Sub-Metro and in different communities within the Sub-Metro to make it convenient for SFVs to attend. In addition, it was observed that the educational package was usually divided into several separate and independent sessions where SFVs could attend and leave at different times of the day and still benefit from the entire package. This notwithstanding, patronage of these educational programmes was usually low since SFVs indicated that they were usually reluctant to leave their businesses either closed or in the hands of an employee. The researcher had the opportunity to observe three macro educational programmes organized by the TCAG throughout the metropolis. As already indicated, these educational programmes drew on the resources and expertise of officers from the

FDA and the EHU, and officers from each of these organizations took turns to speak to SFVs regarding safe cooking practices and methods as well as food safety and hygiene. Even though the macro educational approach provided SFVs with useful and important information, they tended to assume a top down approach, where the SFVs were always recipients of instructions and knowledge coming from regulators and officials from other stakeholders. This means that individual SFVs often did not have the opportunity to contribute to the nature, form and content of educational programmes.

The second form of education, labelled as the 'micro educational approach', involved regulators going to the field on chosen or particular days in teams to educate SFVs. It was observed that this form of education involved very few stakeholders and was conducted mainly by ATOs or Town Council EHOs working within their respective communities. As part of this form of education, SFVs were educated on their business premises while they were still at work. Usually, the interaction between the EHOs and the SFVs in this form of education was brief, averaging 10 minutes per vendor and conducted briskly. Sometimes and where available, flyers, as shown in plates 4.1a and 4.1b, were distributed as part of this form of education in order to enrich the education. Since this form of education targeted SFVs at their business premises, it was usually able to access a larger number of SFVs, depending on the number of days the programme was undertaken. Furthermore, unlike the other forms of education, it was observed that SFVs interacted more with regulators this way, asked more questions and expressed their grievances more freely to the regulators. Nonetheless, the depth of information was usually less than those provided in the macro form of education since regulators spent typically less time with each SFV.

### 4.3.2.3 Content of Educational and Training Programmes

Throughout the course of this research, the content of educational programmes covered mainly health education, and focused on issues of food hygiene, the importance of maintaining personal and

environmental hygiene, and safe cooking methods. Moreover, the educational programmes emphasised the importance of the health certificate, leaving out other important topics that could have been taught to improve the understanding of SFVs regarding the regulatory set up. For instance observations revealed that the educational programmes did not teach SFVs about which government organizations were responsible for what, in terms of regulation and why SFVs were made to pay certain amounts of money to different collecting organizations. Such information was essential since it could enhance SFVs' understanding of certain requirements and thereby motivate the SFVs to comply with street food regulations. Furthermore, field observations and interviews revealed that educational programmes failed to inform SFVs of the extent of the authority of street food regulators (under what circumstances could some law be enforced). While food regulators within the Kumasi metropolis appeared to be aware of what was expected of them in terms of regulating SFVs, SFVs had poor knowledge of who exactly the regulators were, what was expected of regulators, and the extent of the authority of food regulators that was backed by law. For instance the KMA (Public Market) bye-laws, 1995 clearly indicate that even though vendors are supposed to "*sweep and deposit*" all dirt and rubbish at the end of each day in "*covered receptacles*", such receptacles, according to this bye-law are supposed to be provided by the KMA for such a purpose.

This implies that KMA as a stakeholder may have to play their role before food vendors' negligence to clear rubbish and refuse can be defined as a 'nuisance' by regulators. Such responsibility on the part of the government was not included as part of SFV education. The education also did not teach vendors on what legally were appropriate punishments, for specific offenses. Perhaps this lack of diversity in the educational content may stem from the fact that the Public Health Law and the KMA bye-laws that specify the educational functions of health officers exclusively emphasise safety and hygiene. Furthermore, the educational background of EHU officers, most of whom were educated at various schools of hygiene in the country may influence their outlook on what vendors must be educated on. The researcher's conversation with several vendors attending some of these educational

programmes revealed that they were simply going through the process for the certificate since, according to the SFVs, education was always '*the same message*' as that of the previous year and '*nothing new*' (female food vendor). In addition, the almost exclusive emphasis on health education meant that SFVs were not educated on self-monitoring and self-organization through the strengthening of vendor associations, qualities that could have important consequences on the success of SF regulations in the city. According to this Male Executive of TCAG, there was this pre-dominant attitude among SFVs that "the *association is just a group, and I join out of my own will…*" He further explained that as a result of this attitude on the part of SFVs*: "if it does not include the police and an authority (EHO, FDA), getting them to follow instructions becomes difficult, that is, the limitation of using the association as an outlet for regulations*" (Male TCAG executive). This implies that unless SFVs are educated to appreciate the essence of vendor associations, the contribution of such associations to regulations may not be fully realised. As was revealed in the literature review, through self-monitoring, the implementation of sanctions and selfevaluation, vendor associations could play a crucial regulatory role in the SFS (Solomon-Ayeh et al. 2011). Educating and urging vendors to join associations is therefore one way of improving street food safety and hygiene. As a result, education on the importance of associations should be an important part of the content of food vendor education. In sum, education is one of the important components of street food regulations, with various organizations, both governmental and non-governmental contributing to it. The emphasis of education though, is on safety and hygiene of street vended foods. While this is appropriate, as a regulatory component, education may also incorporate teaching vendors about organizations involved in regulations, their duties and responsibilities, and the extent of their authority, as well as the importance of joining and establishing strong associations.

**4.3.3 Medical Screening and Health Certification**

Under ideal circumstances, in order to operate any catering enterprise, including as an SFV of any kind, a person would, after registering with the Registrar General, apply to the GTA. Figure 4.4 depicts the relationship that legally should exist among key governmental institutions, including the EHU before vendors are issued a license, which allows them to vend food.



Figure 4.4: Ideal flow of relations among stake-holders in medical screening

Figure 4.4 shows that after food vendors apply to the GTA, the GTA then would ask three institutions, the Fire Service (to inspect the premises and report on fire safety), the EHU (to conduct medical screening and report on sanitation) and the Police (to check and report on the criminal background of the applicant). Based on the report of these three institutions, the GTA would then conduct their own inspections before a prospective vendor is issued a license to operate (GTA Research Official).

In reality however, the research revealed that this procedure or requirement was only applied to formal restaurants and hotels and not SFVs. Even though the GTA acknowledged that the ideal situation would have been to collaborate with the EHU, the Police and the Fire Service, they argued that the SFVs would not pass such examinations. Thus, this research official at GTA explains:

> "*Ideally, we should make these vendors go to the Police, Fire Service and the EHU before we do our own inspections and then license them. But when we*

*make them go through this process, they won't pass. So what we do is we do our own inspections…then the KMA on their own go and take them through the health certification process*"

Apparently, because these SFVs were likely to fail rigorous and coordinated inspections from collaborating institutions, there evolved a negotiated understanding that each of these two institutions work on their own without much interaction. The fear for the GTA official was, if the law was applied strictly, almost all of the SFVs would go out of business and then, as this GTA official questions: "*where are the citizens and you and I going to buy food? Can we all afford to go to the restaurants and hotels?*" This official goes on to explain that it is as a result of this challenge that "the *KMA (EHU) goes round and asks only for the medical health certificate and they go on*" (GTA Official). The medical health certificate (henceforth referred to as the health certificate) alone has therefore become, for SFVs and the EHU, a license, something that "*allows a person to operate as a street food vendor*" within the Kumasi metropolis (Boateng, Male Sub-Metro EHU officer).

### 4.3.3.1 The Medical Health Certificate

Given the preceding information therefore, the processes involved in securing the health certificate and the stakeholders involved in this process, is one of the most important components of street food regulations within the Kumasi metropolis. Health certification refers to the process of taking SFVs through medical screening and issuing them with certificates that allow them to vend for a period of a year. As already indicated, this process is undertaken mainly by the EHU but sometimes by the Metropolitan Health Directorate (MHD). With regards to the EHU, this research found that the process of medically screening SFVs had been decentralized and was conducted at the SubMetro level where each Sub-Metro Environmental Head allocated each Town Council with medical laboratories: *the laboratories for the screening are determined by the Sub-Metro Head. He assigns each town council to a convenient laboratory or a laboratory close to you and the laboratories can change from year to year* (Manu, Male T.O). Specific laboratories were chosen by the sub-metro head

of the EHU because, as Osei, the Metropolitan Health Director of the EHU puts it: *"some food vendors could go to other laboratories for fake medical reports"*. This underlined the importance of contracting credible and reliable laboratories, especially when laboratories usually undertake medical screening without direct supervision from EHOs. Once a laboratory is chosen however, "*the KMA Environmental Sub-Committee goes to inspect the laboratory and make sure that the laboratory qualifies before they allow them to do the screening*" (Afia, Female A.T.O). Though the particular criteria for selecting medical laboratories to undertake screening appeared to vary from one Sub-Metro to the other, convenience of the laboratory to that particular town council was one important factor:

> *"The people used to go to Bantama while this laboratory was here. And so when they finish with the mass screening those who could not participate had to travel far away to Bantama which was inconvenient. So they decided to give it to me because I was close"* (Male Laboratory Official)

Moreover, the EHU *"uses laboratories with up to date equipment and those who will not manipulate the system"* (Kwadwo, Male A.T.O). Despite the above information from the interviews, the researcher's conversation with two female A.T.Os revealed that their Town Council was working with laboratories that were geographically located far away from their Town Council and the Sub-Metro in general and that a lot of "*behind the scene arrangements*" went on before contracts were awarded to laboratories. This notwithstanding, in an attempt to prevent SFVs from manipulating the medical screening process, the Metropolitan Environmental Health Director revealed that every few years, the laboratories certified to work with and undertake medical screening of SFVs were changed to prevent SFVs from getting too familiar with the laboratories and thus, avoid corruption. Nsiah, a Male T.O confirms that: "*the moment you continue with one laboratory, the people are used to that laboratory and they can go and see the laboratory man to give them a report...So that is why we occasionally change the laboratories"*. This may be true given the fact that one Female Technician of one of the certified laboratories indicated how, within a year of working with the laboratory, she

had established a very good and cordial relationship with the SFVs such that some of them came to her to discuss their "*personal problems and challenges*".

Again, from the researcher's observation of some of the mass screening exercises, the laboratory technician usually sat in an open space in the community with laboratory equipment for the SFVs in the immediate vicinity to come and have their samples taken. In this process, there was a lot of informal communication between the laboratory technician and the SFVs, which could increase the risk of SFVs trying to get round the requirement for certification. The danger here is that over time, SFVs and laboratory technicians may begin to perceive each other as friends rather than as persons engaged in a professional relationship, which in turn could lead to SFVs trying to bypass the requirement of going through the screening and receive the certificate nonetheless. Even though officials at the laboratories denied being compromised by their relationship with SFVs, the practice of changing these laboratories periodically appeared to be a good way of preventing the negative effects of SFV familiarity with laboratory technicians and its effects on the screening process. This notwithstanding, the informal communication between laboratory technicians and SFVs could be beneficial to street food regulations since the laboratories *"provide the vendors with information from the authorities and also tell the authorities the complaints of the vendors since we are partners"* (Female Laboratory Technician). This means that despite the potential dangers involved, the laboratories are important stakeholders not only in undertaking medical screening but also as an important part of information exchange between two other key stake-holders (SFVs and EHOs) in the health certification process.

### 4.3.3.2 The Certification Process: Stakeholder Involvement and Interaction

At an appointed time each year, usually towards the end of the year, each Town Council in collaboration with the medical laboratories would send information vans around, announcing within

their respective communities and reminding vendors of an impending certification process. Specific and predetermined points of screening, determined without consultation with SFVs or vendor associations, would then be announced and SFVs would be expected to go to these points of screening for their blood samples to be taken:

> *"A mass medical screening is conducted yearly. We announce it via car or public announcement and we indicate the particular date and venue for the screening. We have about three communities under our Town Council. We establish four different centres to cater for vendors from different areas"* (Kwadwo, Male A.T.O)

> *"From November to December each year we send our vans around to remind food vendors and to invite them to come around for the medical screening. This is done on Town Council basis. The announcement is done for about 2-3 days on a mobile van and then we decide on a screening point"* (Manu, Male T.O).

Even though the assigned laboratories and the Town Councils worked together on this, their relationship was one of an employer and an employee, as this statement by Kwartemaa, a Female T.O indicates: "*We have some laboratories that we work with and we send the laboratory people to the field to do the screening"*. This officers' use of the phrase 'send to the field' says a lot about the relationship between the laboratories and the EHU, implying that the EHU is the authority and the laboratories are subordinates who are sent, and not partners who go to the field, to conduct medical screening. Another Male Laboratory Officer further confirmed, arguing that "*they relate to us as their employees because they gave us the contract and they can terminate it anytime. We are not at an equal level, they are at a higher level*". Such a relationship between two key stakeholders in the medical screening process has implications for food safety as a whole, especially when the EHU possesses the power to terminate the contract of a particular laboratory and sign on a new one. Thus, this research found that the laboratories were unable to effectively question some of the actions and inactions of the EHU. The EHU simply assigns a job to the laboratories to "*check the blood, urine and spittum for typhoid, hepatitis B, and then tuberculosis*" and to report back to the EHU indicating

those who are fit and unfit, for the EHU to issue certificates accordingly. In such an employer-employee relationship, weaknesses in the process may go unexplored. This laboratory official, in explaining that SFVs who did not pass the initial screening did not come back for retesting after taking their medication, expressed his frustration at this "*major weak point of the EHU*" and the fact that the EHU were unable to follow up and ensure that SFVs who were deferred came back for re-testing. The challenge for this technician was that he could not insist and comment too much on it since his laboratory had only been employed to perform a job and that they could be terminated at any point. Thus, because of the unequal power relations between these two key stakeholders, there was not much opportunity for dialogue and deliberation, which, if present could have enhanced the entire medical screening and health certification process.

Schools, community leaders, assembly members and vendor associations were also found to be important stake-holders in the health certification process by virtue of the fact that they assisted in informing and organizing SFVs to go through the medical screening process. Field observations revealed that each school had a health and sanitation officer who ensured that food vendors operating in the schools had health certificates and were certified by the KMA to sell food. As this

Female School Head indicated:

> "*Once every year the Sub-Metro sends letters round to the schools indicating that the health screening is going to take place…we in turn make sure that those who sell food here are alerted and they go for the screening*".

However, various schools may add additional rules (for instance requiring vendors to wear a particular uniform and limiting the number of vendors of a particular food) to the basic vending requirement that the EHU requires of all SFVs. Thus, these additional rules did not go contrary to those prescribed by law and the EHU as suggested in the literature by Nicolo' and Bendech (2012). The EHU rather served as an overseeing authority over these schools and periodically visited the schools to educate

the School Sanitation Officer on how to handle SFVs. Interestingly, the EHOs did not interact directly with SFVs in schools but did so only through the school sanitation officers, making schools and school sanitation officers, important stakeholders in promoting the medical screening and health certification of SFVs.

The Metropolitan Health Directorate (MHD) of the Kumasi Metropolis also engages in the medical screening and certification of food vendors. The food vendors go through a similar process as that of the EHU. They apply, go to the laboratory, they bring back their results, the doctor checks the results, and then certificates are given based on the results. Unlike the EHU however, there is a medical clinic attached to the MHD with a laboratory and a resident doctor, who happens also to be the Director of the Kumasi MHD. The laboratory attached to the clinic thus conducts the analysis of the blood and urine of vendors and certifies the issuance of the certificates. This research found no collaboration between the MHD and the KMA in terms of medical screening with both stake-

holders indicating that they ultimately had the sole right to issue the certificate:

> *Ideally all food vendors are supposed to come here for the health certificates. This is the Metropolitan Health Directorate and so everything health should be done through here. The secret truth is, if the KMA send them to the laboratories, they get their share of the money* (Female Official at MHD).

The fact that SFVs paid for the screening and that any organization in charge of the screening would get financial benefits meant that this duplication of functions by both the EHU and the MHD had not been resolved by the time field work ended. In discussing this with Osei, the Metropolitan Director of the EHU, he acknowledged that "*sometimes the MHD also issues the certificate but, because of the financial issues, it has been difficult to resolve*". To explain, when SFVs pay GH¢ 30 for the certificate, GH¢ 20 goes to the laboratories while the remaining GH¢ 10 goes to the EHU (personal communication with Osei, 5th September 2014). For instance, as at July 2014, 9455 SFVs had undertaken the medical screening process with the EHU, translating into GH¢ 94,550 (approximately $22,000) in revenue for the KMA. This shows that this exercise is a major source of

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finance for the EHU. This means that two main governmental organizations were, independently of each other, involved in the medical screening and certification of SFVs in the metropolis. Thus, while some SFVs were vending with certificates issued by the EHU of the KMA, others were vending with certificates issued by the MHD under the GHS. Sometimes there were conflicts and challenges when field EHO officers met an SFV vending with a certificate issued by the MHD.

When that happens:

> "*They intimidate them and threaten them with court action. But the food vendors because they are illiterates and do not know, they become scared they do another certificate with the EHU with additional cost* (Female MHD Officer)"

This is a challenge in the medical certification of SFVs that need to be resolved. Nonetheless, irrespective of where a vendor accesses the certificate, once SFVs go through the medical screening process and they are cleared to vend, they are awarded a certificate of health that bears the name, address and photograph of the particular food vendor in order to facilitate recognition and prevent duplication. The certificates are valid for one year after which time SFVs must go through the medical screening once more. Plate 4.2 shows a sample of the certificate that resulted from this process.

Plate 4.2: Street Vendor Health Certificate

In certification as in Education, the EHU was found to be centrally located, around whom other participating organizations and groups performed. Figure 4.5 depicts briefly the process of attaining a health certificate and the relationship between various stakeholders in such process.

Figure 4.5: Actual flow of relations among stakeholders in medical screening

In sum, SFVs apply through the EHU or the MHD for health certificates. Where the EHU organizes this certification on a mass scale, community leaders and assembly men assist in informing SFVs of the certification exercise. Schools on their part make sure that SFVs operating in their schools are sent to the EHU for certification. Hence, the ties between the EHU and community leaders, and the EHU and schools are more reciprocal than uni-directional. Once the EHU receives all these applications, they are forwarded to certified laboratories that come in to take the blood, urine and sputum samples of vendors to check for diseases such as typhoid, and hepatitis B. After, the laboratories report on the results of the tests of each SFV to the EHU and based on this report the EHU issues out a health certificate to SFVs, allowing them to vend street foods. The ties between the EHU and the laboratories are more uni-directional and less reciprocal, with the EHU assigning tasks for the laboratories to report on. Very little dialogue was found between the EHU and the laboratories in this process.

**4.3.4 Inspection and Enforcement**

Inspection activities are carried out primarily by two foremost organizations, the GTA and the EHU. The GTA's inspection activities are limited mainly to informal chop bar operators, excluding table top vendors and mobile food vendors who make up the majority of street food vendors, while the EHU focuses on the informal chop bar operators as well as other SFVs. This is because the GTA considers mobile SFVs and other table top operators as "*too small to regulate*" (GTA Research Officer). Thus, with regards to inspections, the EHU focuses on mobile and permanent SFVs as well as chop bar operators while the GTA's inspection focuses mainly on chop bar operators. Nonetheless, despite their independent and different scopes of inspection, interviews with GTA and EHO officials revealed that there are two main forms of inspection activities.

The first is the space and place inspection or premises inspection and the second is personal inspection. As with education, planned inspection of food premises was carried out occasionally by each town council EHU, as part of their overall activities as Health Inspectors. In order to carry out inspections, EHOs were divided into groups of three or four by the leader and each group covered a different area of the town council. Observations and conversations with officers on the field revealed that this movement of officers in groups was for security reasons as officers were sometimes attacked by SFVs or in other circumstances accused of attacking others.

These inspections, even when organized were not organized solely with SFVs in mind. On the contrary, each group were expected to inspect everything that they came across within the community they were assigned, including the inspection of refuse dumping sites, drains, and SFVs. In addition to the organized and planned inspections, sometimes spontaneous inspections were carried out when EHOs, returning from other activities like refuse site inspections, met an SFV on the way.

## 4.3.4.1 Space and Place Inspections

The space and place inspections are divided into internal and external inspections: "*When we pay them a visit, we conduct what we call interior and exterior inspections*" (Asiama, Male T.O). Interior inspections of food vending premises focus mainly on the eating spaces of street food vending sites. There are certain basic facilities or requirements that an eating room must fulfill, including the provision of separate rooms for cooking, eating, and for the staff: "*we will inspect the eating room, where they prepare the food, you should provide a cloak room that is a place people come to change and resume their work. There should be a urinal, a toilet facility for the customers*" (Ofori, Male T.O). These requirements appear to apply mainly to chop bar operators whose consumers mostly eat their food at the place of purchase and who have employees they work with. For those SFVs who operate from table tops and do not (but for a few benches and a table on which some consumers may use) necessarily have an eating room, most of the inspection focuses on the immediate vending environment, known as the exterior inspection.

The exterior inspections were more generic and applied to all street food vendors. During field work with the EHU, the researcher observed that covering of the food, not keeping food close to the ground, not operating from poor structures and not operating close to open drains, refuse dumps and public toilets were the main focus of exterior inspection activities with SFVs who operated along the streets. Similarly, food vending spaces were expected to fulfil specific requirements, as explained by this EHO: "*before we allow a food vendor to operate in a particular space, we check if the place is safe, cemented, not sandy, and well ventilated*" (Manu, Male T.O). Another EHO further explains "*when we come to your stand, we look at the water you use in washing and rinsing*" (Ama, Female A.T.O). Street food vending sites were also expected to provide other

external facilities:

> *"With the exterior inspection, they must have a urinal and a sanitary dust bin (a dust bin with a cover)… There must be nets covering the eating room. We also check sources of water supply as part of our exterior inspections"* (Asiama, Male T.O)

Environmental Health officers also checked and ensured that the space for street vending was not close to a public toilet facility. These various aspects of food inspections, the interior and exterior, are captured by the laws regulating street foods within the Kumasi metropolis. For instance, the KMA (Restaurant and Eating Houses or Chop Bars) Bye-laws, 1995 outlines the standard that eating spaces and restaurants must keep and in effect what the EHO should look out for when they go out on inspection: "*the floor of every public eating room shall be of concrete or other impervious material and the wall shall be capable of being washed*". Similarly, the KMA (Public Markets) Bye-laws, 1995 specifies that food being offered for sale must be adequately protected from dust, flies, and other insects and must be placed on an elevated structure like a table. Nonetheless, despite the above revelations, most of the observations of the researcher revealed that EHOs did not ask about source of water, urinal facilities, and the availability of a sanitary dust-bin. The presentation of the street vended food (whether covered or not) and the location of the vending table or structure (whether close to a drain and refuse dump or not) were the main focus of food inspectors.

### 4.3.4.2 Personal Inspections

The EHOs also inspect the personal appearance of SFVs. Personal inspections took two main forms, namely personal appearance and hygiene, and the inspection of the health certificate. Here, street food regulators ensured that SFVs were in a hygienic physical condition in order not to contaminate the hygiene and safety of the foods being vended. SFVs were expected to: "*get protective clothing, hair tights and ensure that they don't have skin rashes* (Asiama, Male T.O). In a conversation with Ama, a Female A.T.O, she explained the reason behind these requirements:

> *"This is because they use chemicals to do the touching of the hair and so if it falls into the food, the food is contaminated. It is the same with the artificial nails and the nail polish. They will all contaminate the food on contact".*

Thus, the risk of contamination makes these requirements necessary for SFVs. Similar to education, there is a strong health and sanitation theme expressed in these regulatory requirements, with most of the measures put in place to improve health and safety of street vended foods. In line with the health and sanitation theme, inspection of health certificates, according to regulators, should feature prominently in the inspection component of street food regulations within the Kumasi metropolis. Nonetheless, even though the researcher spent three months as a participant observer within one of the town council EHU in the metropolis, in none of the encounters with SFVs did EHOs request to see their health certificates. Most of the inspection activities observed during this period revolved around external inspection of premises, with personal inspection receiving very little attention.

Closely linked with inspection is enforcement, where vendors who broke a particular law by their actions or inactions were compelled to rectify or obey the particular law. Usually, enforcement entails issuing an abatement notice: *"an abatement notice is served to problematic vendors indicating or telling vendors to eliminate the problem"* (Kwaku, Male A.T.O), and subsequently summoning the offender to court if the offender does not abate the offence as indicated. Thus EHOs explain that:

> *"...when we come and check and the vending site is not clean, even if the vendor has a certificate, we will penalize that vendor. We will also give the vendor a notice and add a date to it. On the specified date, the vendor will have to come to the office to be educated. But if the vendor continues to offend, we will push that vendor to the wall and send the vendor to court"* (Manu, Male T.O)

The abatement notice therefore provides SFVs the opportunity to correct their shortcoming and then to inform regulators that the particular problem has been corrected, after which regulators go back for re-inspection: *"after, they have to tell us to come for re-inspection to ensure that the problem does*

*not still persist"* (Kwaku, Male A.T.O). Usually the abatement notice provides street food vendors 24 hours to abate the nuisance or to present proof to EHOs at their office that the nuisance has been or is been abated. When this is done, prosecution through the courts is avoided. Summoning a street food vendor to court then is a last resort, after vendors fail to do what the abatement notices expected of them.

### 4.3.4.3 Stakeholder Involvement in Inspection and Enforcement

In their inspection and enforcement activities, both internal and external collaborations with stakeholders occur. Internal collaborations refer to instances where different Town Councils within the same Sub-Metro or in different Sub-Metros work together on an identified problem, especially in dealing with mobile food vendors for instance. These food vendors may cook from one submetro and sell it within another Sub-Metro. Thus, dealing with them becomes difficult for the EHO since these mobile food vendors may not come back to the same area for re-inspection. Nonetheless, one strategy devised by EHOs in Kumasi in dealing with this challenge was to collaborate with other colleagues. Food regulators gave some examples such as these:

> *"We network with other Sub-Metros. It happens a lot and I am happy that most of the Sub-Metro T.Os are my colleagues and classmates so communication is just easy. So in case of any mobile vendor misbehaving we just network and try to find solutions to this"* (Boateng, Male T.O).

> *"We coordinate with officers from other Town Council offices. Sometimes I even call the officers in charge of certain areas or the officers in the main Sub-Metro office to follow up on a problem for me"* (Kwaku, male A.T.O)

These collaborations among colleague officers, the research revealed, allowed the EHU to deal with mobile food vendors in terms of inspection and enforcing of the law. This research found that other stakeholders were involved in inspection and enforcement as external collaborators. External collaborators refer to organizations, groups and individuals outside the EHU who play important roles in inspections, and especially enforcement. The security services, defined to include the police and

the courts are especially relevant. The EHU depend on the police to arrest those food vendors who fail to respond to court summons: "*we only involve the security agencies when those persons prosecuted fail to attend court and then we seek the help of the police in arresting these people to court*" (Afia, Female A.T.O). Again, citizens and other members of the public were found to be important stakeholders and collaborators in the sense that they served as important sources of information for street food regulators in their inspection and enforcement activities. This is clearly explained by this regulator:

> "*we rely on the citizens to report to us when food vendors sell in unhygienic environment…it is the responsibility of the citizen to be each other's keeper*…it *is the citizens who report vendors who flout the laws to us*" (Manu, Male T.O)

The public then are important stakeholders in inspection and enforcement of street food laws. The research also revealed that formal organizations such as Nestle Ghana Limited play important roles in inspection. This is because they have branded some food vending stands and as a result, go round during the day and night to ensure that their branded food vending stands are operating within accepted standards. The comment by this official from Nestle Ghana Limited further explains this:

> "*We also do a lot of rounds, in the day and night, whenever. When we go to them and they are not doing the right thing, we talk to them and tell them to do the right thing. We take a week in every month for night visits. During the day, I have coordinators who visit these vendors*" (Nestle Professional) Inspection and enforcement therefore, involves several stakeholders, from consumers and the public, to GTA officials who in various ways, either collaboratively or independently contribute to inspection of street food stands and the enforcement of street food laws. Here again, the EHU appear as the central regulatory body or organization since they have more personnel and are always involved, one way or another in inspection activities within the metropolis. The EHU officers acknowledge that "*we are in the centre. If we go out and we see something, we alert the relevant agency and they take action*" (Afia, Female A.T.O). This further emphasises the centrality of the EHU, among other stakeholders in food regulations within the Kumasi metropolis. The relationship among the various stakeholders in inspections and enforcement may be depicted by figure 4.6.

Figure 4.6: Network of relations among stakeholders in inspection and enforcement

In sum, the EHU primarily conducts inspection of street food vendors within the metropolis. In their activity, they collaborate a lot with colleague officers in other Town Councils and they are supported by the security agencies such as the Police and the Courts, as well as the public. The GTA conducts inspection as well, but theirs has a limited scope (focusing only on informal chop bar operators) and they work with little or no collaboration with the EHU. Organizations such as Nestle Ghana Limited, even though does not explicitly collaborate with the EHU in inspections and enforcement, maintains an essential presence and undertakes essential inspection activities as well.

### 4.3.5 Research

Even though research is one of the key regulatory components expected of EHOs, this aspect of their work appeared to be less emphasised. In an interview with the EHU and, at the time of field observation, research as a component of regulation was not emphasized. The Metropolitan Director of the EHU, also admitted in a personal communication on 4th January 2013 that the 'research' aspect of their work had been overlooked and they were weak in that department. International organizations

like the FAO, DANIDA, DFID, and UNDP are all important stakeholders when it comes to research on street foods and they can play a crucial role in this regard. Between 1995 and 1996 for instance, the then Ghana Standards Board (now Ghana Standards Authority) with support and funding from the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), carried out a research into the SFS in Ghana aimed at determining the state of SFs and the challenges and constraints faced by the sector (Ntiforo, 2000). Similarly, between 1999 and 2006, the Department For International Development of the United Kingdom (DFID) working with other partners and organizations, both locally and internationally, carried out a series of studies into the SFS in Ghana, investigating among others the economic, social value, safety of selected SFs, and sources of contamination of SFs including lead contamination. Thus, through their sponsorship programmes, these international partners enhance research understanding of street foods and street food businesses and play such a key role in

Kumasi. Research institutions and universities also play a key role in research into street foods. Currently, there is an on-going DANIDA sponsored 'Street Foods Project', a collaboration between KNUST, the University of Copenhagen in Denmark, and the Food Research Institute (FRI) to investigate street foods and street food businesses within the Kumasi metropolis. Thus, this research found that research as a regulatory component is not directly undertaken by the EHU. Rather, international stakeholders and research institutions perform those functions and disseminate the results for regulators to learn from.

### 4.3.6 Overview and Summary

The overall relations among the stakeholders in regulation, based on the analysis can be depicted in figure 4.7.

Figure 4.7: Overall network of relations among groups of stakeholders in regulation

Figure 4.7 shows that three core groups of stakeholders (government, corporate, and vendor associations) interact with each other more frequently and exchange resources among each other. Together with street food vendors as one group, these four groups of stakeholders form the central network of relations among stakeholders. However, the relationship between the three stakeholders on the one hand and food vendors on the other hand is more uni-directional than multi-directional, with instruction and guidelines moving downwards from these institutions to SFVs and very little information (experiences and perceptions) moving upwards from SFVs to these institutions. While one may argue that vendor associations are essentially SFVs, I have separated them here since the membership of these associations was found to be very low and not representative of the SFVs in Kumasi. Thus, none of the SFVs interviewed as part of this research was a member of a food vendor

association at the time of the research. Moreover, there were occasions during the research when SFVs referred to these vendor associations as political entities used by the government to achieve its goal. Thus, though made up of SFVs, they are not representative and these organizations have assumed a new form that SFVs do not identify with.

With respect to regulatory activities, the key components of street food regulation in Kumasi have been revealed to include education, certification, inspection and enforcement, and research. However, even though these activities have been presented linearly, in reality, these activities are not performed in a linear manner but rather they are undertaken such that two or three components may overlap and may be conducted at the same time, as illustrated in figure 4.8. Education as a component may overlap with the other components of inspection and enforcement. During the medical screening exercise for instance, the researcher observed how a particular health out-post placed a recorded audio message informing and educating food vendors of the negative effects of not going through with the medical screening.

Figure 4.8: Overlap of regulatory activities and stakeholders in regulations

The recording went further to educate vendors on keeping their environments clean as well as avoiding diseases such as typhoid and cholera. Thus, this form of education, goes on at the same time that the certification process is on-going. Furthermore, while out inspecting food vendors with food regulators, the researcher observed how those vendors whose offences were perceived as 'minimal' were educated, sometimes sternly and sometimes in a friendly manner, and asked to refrain from what was being done. Alternatively, sometimes when street food regulators went out to educate SFVs, they ended up inspecting and enforcing the law. This shows that the relationship between these components is much more complex than the linear image presented earlier. Even though research appears to lie outside the regulatory framework, research findings from international organizations and non-governmental organizations educate food regulators, informing regulators on what to look out for when they go out on inspections. This complex relationship is illustrated by figure 4.8. As is evident from figure 4.8, the involvement of most stakeholders in street food regulations centres around the education of food vendors, followed by medical screening and certification, and research. Inspection and enforcement involves the least stakeholder involvement.

## 4.4 Challenges to the Implementation and Adherence to Regulations

The previous sections discussed the key street food regulatory components, how these are translated into regulatory activities and the involvement and interaction of various stakeholders in enhancing the regulation of street foods in the Kumasi metropolis. Two key stakeholders stand out in this process, the EHU for their central position in street food regulations and SFVs as recipients of street food laws. For these key stakeholders, several factors pose a challenge and prevent the effective implementation of and adherence to the street food regulations. For regulators, these challenges can be categorised into four main problem areas namely: lack of resources, transportation, security and

protection from harassment and abuse and poor collaboration among stakeholders. This section first explains these challenges. Subsequently, the various strategies regulators adopt to cope with the challenges are presented. This section further explores the effects of the coping strategies on the relationship between regulators and SFVs.

## 4.4.1 Human, Infrastructural, and Financial Resource Constraints

As already indicated in section 4.2.1, there were only 135 EHOs regulating approximately 20,000 SFVs as at September 2014, and performing additional non-street food responsibilities. Regulators were, as a result, constrained in their ability to dedicate enough time and personnel towards SF regulations. The following comment by Nsiah, a Male T.O accurately captures this constraint:

> *"As I said the staff numerical strength is low so it is not easy to regulate food vendors as expected because environmental health and sanitation are very broad so if you want to focus only on food vending then what about the others?"*

Human resource limitations aside, observations revealed that mostly, EHOs worked in poorly resourced buildings, with limited access to office equipment and stationery. The plate 4.3 is an example of an EHU Town Council office within the Oforikrom Sub-Metro:

Plate 4.3 Office of Regulators in one of the Study Areas.

EHO's share this office with other local government officers as well. In relation to these resource constraints Takyi, a Male T.O explains that: "*we are not well resourced. Even we do not have A4 sheets to write reports*". To add to this, inadequate funds to purchase these resources was one of the challenges that was unanimously expressed by regulators. This sentiment is accurately captured by the following statement: "*sometimes you prepare your plan of action, but the KMA will tell you that there is no money. So if there is always no money, how do you carry on the work?*" (Ofori, Male T.O). As a result of this lack of basic office resources, Nsiah emphasizes that: "*we have a problem with record keeping. Our records are on pieces of papers so if I am not around who will get to know what is where? And the paper can get missing but if it is in soft copy that is safer*". The concern for this regulator is that since regulators are rotated yearly, a poor recording system means that subsequent regulators are not kept sufficiently updated on happenings in their new offices. Observations confirmed that some EHU offices still used typewriters to type information and that these offices lacked up-to-date record keeping and filing systems to file and keep the records of street vendors. These challenges have significant effects on the efficiency of EHOs to discharge their duties. For instance in terms of the medical screening and health certification, sometimes the records and certificates of SFVs get lost because everything is kept in hardcopy, using basic record keeping systems such as filing. One SFV revealed how she does not receive her certificate after going through the screening:

> "*I have done it twice. You pay the money, they screen you but they never give you the certificate…so I am ready, waiting for some regulator to come and ask me of my health certificate and I will tell him or her my piece of mind*"
> (Female Yam and Stew Vendor).

For this vendor, consistent non-receipt of the certificate has led to anger against the medical screening process and regulators in general. In line with her assertion, observations revealed how some EHU offices were stacked with the unclaimed certificates of SFVs. On inquiry, regulators indicated that

the particular SFVs could not be traced to collect their certificates. Clearly, the poor record keeping affects regulators' ability to discharge their duties effectively, which in turn affect the confidence and trust of SFVs in regulatory activities. In sum, regulators face infrastructural and resource challenges that affect their ability to perform their numerous mandates in various ways.

Two other regulators discussed the lack of resources in terms of challenges with identification for EHOs. Challenges with identification were explained in the form of regulators not having uniforms and identity cards which would help the public to identify them and subsequently prevent impersonation: "*we need ID cards; we need to go out with ID cards* (Nsiah, Male T.O); *even uniforms, you see that we are all wearing our own clothes*?" (Kwaku, Male A.T.O). Observations confirmed that most of the EHOs reported to work in their own clothes. When asked, the Director of the EHU said that for over 10 years the EHU had not received uniforms from the KMA or any other authority (Personal communication with Metropolitan Health Director, 5th September 2014).

The implication of this lack of identification is demonstrated in the following example:

> *"There is impersonation in the work. You will see a group of people conducting food hygiene inspections and you will not know where they are coming from. Oh just about two months ago some of them were trying to conduct inspections and they went to a baker. The lady wept and came to me here...There was a time that a woman presented an abatement notice here claiming that action had been taken against her but we couldn't trace the officer responsible. There was no name on it and the signature did not fit that of any of my officers you see, so we have a problem with impersonation"* (Nsiah, Male T.O).

This problem with identification, combined with the poor knowledge of vendors regarding regulators, creates challenges for both vendors and EHOs and has implications for adherence to street food laws, since the ability of SFVs to accurately identify regulators may, affect their willingness to adhere to regulations.

In their narratives, regulators portrayed an underlying sense of frustration when they spoke of the resource context within which they worked, a sense of disengagement and a feeling of neglect as evident in this statement from Osei, the Metropolitan Director of the EHU: "*they don't see us and the job we do as a priority*", while Kwartemaa, a Female T.O emphasizes that: "*they don't recognise us else they will provide more resources*". Takyi, a Male T.O sums this up when he argues that: "*It is like we are not important, we are orphans and we are not being taken care of*". This feeling of unimportance and neglect has implications for the motivation of these regulators and their ability and willingness to effectively implement street food regulations. This frustration appears in their conversation and it transfers to their attitude to work where most EHOs demonstrate a lack of commitment for the work they do. From the researcher's field time spent with regulators, the researcher observed that EHOs usually reported to work very late and often had a very relaxed approach to work in general. Even though the EHU Office had an attendance book, nobody checked or monitored the entries, meaning that officers could sometimes report at 10.30 am and indicate that they reported at 8.30 am.

### 4.4.2 Transportation

Access to transportation was another challenge for EHOs. Even though EHOs cover a number of communities in their work, they have no access to transportation and neither are they remunerated for the monies they use in moving from one community to another. Ofori, a Male T.O laments: "*one of the major problems is that we find it difficult to move from area to area. There is no means of transport readily available*". Kwadwo, a Male A.T.O also emphasises: "*we have no vehicles for transport. Not even motor bikes*". Without a means of transportation, regulating the communities under a particular town council becomes a challenge since regulators have to walk on their rounds. As a result, some regulators use their own money or vehicles to visit outlying communities. The challenge however is

that the expenses they incur in this regard are not refunded. Some of the EHOs gave examples such as the following:

> *"You know we use our own money for transportation. These are not refunded. All the staff use their own money. We have to use our own money for transportation, no refund. I fill my car with petrol, my own money. It broke down some time ago, the way I suffered? Up till now I did not even get a penny"* (Kwaku, Male A.T.O).

> *"One other challenge we face is that when we go out, we use our own money for transportation. Sometimes you get caught in the rain. Sometime ago I had to follow up on a complaint and I spent GHc 150 of my own money for transportation"* (Ama, Female A.T.O).

This lack of refund demotivates EHOs, making EHOs reluctant to visit areas that are not within walking distance from their stations. The remark by Kwartemaa, a Female T.O below typifies this lack of motivation:

> *"There is also a lack of financial motivation and a refund of the money we spend on transportation. You will go out with your own money and they will not pay you back. We have a lot of responsibilities, we are not mobile, we have to use our own means for transportation, even though we are not motivated to do so".*

As a result of this lack of motivation, mostly communities that are easy to reach and areas of high concentrations of SFVs become the focus of most regulatory activities. The researcher recounts his experience with regulators in this way:

> *"In my field rounds with regulators, we had to walk for hours and usually in the sun because we usually began our rounds around 10 am when at least the possibility of getting access to morning and afternoon vendors was high. I observed that officers often got tired easily and so we were only able to cover a small geographical area for inspections and education daily".*

Clearly, poor access to transportation limits the scope and effectiveness of regulation. Interestingly, some mobile vendors were aware of this limitation and took due advantage. In one of the outlying communities of one of the Town Councils, a female mobile vendor indicated that she had not bothered to go through the medical screening since she knew that regulators did not operate in her area. This mobile vendor indicated that since she met regulators three years ago, she had not met them again.

But she agreed that if she were vending in 'town', it would be different. She explains: "*for this place they do not give us problems at all. If it were to be in town, that is where we will be asked to pay for the license, ticket etc. but here, we are not charged for license, ticket or anything like that*". To further elaborate on this, one other female SFV, operating within another outlying community indicated that since she started operating about five years ago, no food regulator had visited her place to inspect: "*...since I have been here, nobody like that has come...nobody has been here to question me or to inspect anything*". These revelations from SFVs in outlying communities confirm the point that challenges with transportation limit the scope of regulatory activities. The lack of transportation affected the ability of EHOs to regulate mobile SFVs. In line with this, Nsiah a Male T.O reasoned that: "*this means of transport can help us move around so that if anybody is proving recalcitrant, we can seize his/her foods to serve as a deterrent for others. But if you are walking, how can you seize the food*?" Thus, the revelations from EHOs and SFVs and the field observations revealed that the transportation challenges that EHOs face affected their ability to effectively regulate SFVs who operate in the Kumasi metropolis. EHOs were reluctant to visit far and outlying communities and were unmotivated to use their own financial resources because of a lack of refund for these resources.

### 4.4.3 Security and Protection

Security as a challenge was expressed by five regulators in their responses. These regulators did not discuss security in terms of their using or carrying weapons themselves but rather, as necessary for them to collaborate with security agencies and officials like the Police. Access to security, regulators argued, would enhance their ability to perform certain key aspects of their work and then protect them from personal harm. Regulators explained how sometimes vendors could attack regulators, thus the need for the presence of security personnel: "*sometimes the people can be dangerous. They can even attack you*" (Kwadwo, Male A.T.O). In line with this, Ama a female regulator shared the following experiences: "*one lady tore my dress into pieces at Ash-Town, the first month I started working in*

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*2002"*. She also revealed: "*there was this girl selling water melon who had not covered the food. When I told her, she got angry and poured the food on me*". Another male regulator also shared experiences of instances where he was cursed by vendors for doing his job. He revealed that: "*sometimes, we are even cursed by the people. Some woman used Antoa to curse us*" (Kwaku, Male A.T.O). This theme came up mainly in discussing how SFVs who vend in the night are regulated. Asiama, a Male T.O maintained: "*our challenge is with those who operate in the night. We can work in the night but the risks involved. Forcing someone to obey the laws with no protection is a problem*". Similarly, Afia, a Female A.T.O indicated that: "*you can't do the work in the night without the police*". By these, regulators argued that without some form of protection and security, they were unable to perform to the full expectation of their responsibilities, especially with regards to night time and other mobile SFVs. They argued that if there were access to security, night inspections and enforcement would be possible: "*if the police can provide us with security during the nights, we can regulate foods in the night as well*" (Asiama, Male T.O). To emphasise the effects that lack of security and protection have on night regulations, Takyi a Male T.O explained:

> "*If in case it is necessary and we come and you don't have the certificate, we will arrest you. But if we come alone in the night and they even do not have the certificate, how can we arrest them, and where are we going to find them in the day to prosecute them*?"

The effect of not having any form of security then goes beyond the threat of personal harm to the ability of regulators to fully implement their mandates as food regulators during the night. Regulators were unwilling to go out for inspection during the night. On the few occasions that they did go out for inspection during the night, they were unable to effectively sanction those SFVs who were not following regulations. This was because of a lack of support from law enforcement, and a fear of violence from the SFVs.

## 4.4.4 Poor Collaboration among Stakeholders

In section 4.3, it was demonstrated how various stakeholders related with each other and contributed to various aspects of street food regulations in the Kumasi metropolis.  In order for their work to be successful, the EHU had to interact and communicate with several organizations, both governmental and non-governmental. However, there were several challenges that affected the effective collaboration of these stakeholders and subsequently affected the implementation of street food regulations. One of the major challenges to stakeholder collaboration was a general disinterest on the part of major governmental stakeholders in street food regulations in Kumasi. One GTA official acknowledged that: "*in reality when it comes to the informal sector, we have ignored them, in our minds they don't exist*". Such is the attitude of some governmental stakeholders like the FDA, GTA, and the GSA, important stakeholders who could play a key role in improving street food regulations. The FDA has moved more into the Drugs aspect of their job limiting the food aspect to the inspection of canned foods in supermarkets and restaurants. The GTA focuses on formal restaurants and only an aspect of street food vendors, while the GSA comes in only in times of disease outbreak or when there is a need for testing of food or recommendation of certain standards. According to the GTA, their limited involvement in street food regulations is as a result of the difficulty in regulating these 'small' street food vendors. Nonetheless, the EHU officers hold

the view that the disinterest stems mainly from the fact that the SFVs cannot give these organizations enough money, as Afia a Female A.T.O explains: "*the GTA and the GSA are supposed to work hand in hand with us, but it does not happen like that. They chase after the big big money. How much can a food vendor give them?*" The big money mentioned here refers to the fines that restaurants and food processing companies are charged if they default, which is substantially more than they can get from SFVs. Thus, these attitudes of these important governmental stakeholders have hampered effective collaboration in street food regulations and left most regulatory activities solely in the hands of the EHU.

The EHOs further argued that their work was not appreciated by these governmental stakeholders, a situation which also hindered effective collaborative efforts in regulations: *"some institutions underrate our work and expertise so they do not inform us about matters we are supposed to handle"* (Kwadwo, Male A.T.O). The EHOs revealed that sometimes when they take the initiative and call on these institutions for assistance, they are reluctant in providing such assistance: *"our collaborators too are not performing as expected, they only come to you when they need you, but when they are fine, they won't mind you"* (Kwartemaa, Female T.O). This situation has made the EHU to rely extensively on non-governmental organizations such as Nestle Ghana Limited and food vendor associations such as the TCAG as the main collaborating institutions in street food regulations. Although the FDA for instance may play a role in education, their role is more supportive (providing resources and personnel to enhance education) than collaborative (working together as partners to achieve the educational goal). Another barrier to collaboration among stakeholders has to do with leadership. That is, which organization to take up leadership positions among the various stakeholders. Most of the governmental stakeholders work under different ministries while others are Authorities on their own (FDA; GTA; GSA). The problem therefore is: "*who should lead and bring these organizations together*?" (GTA Official).

The lack of participation of SFVs in some regulatory components, including education is also a significant barrier to stakeholder collaboration. SFVs themselves are important stakeholders, and as Horn (2000:1 cited in Skinner, 2008b:239) indicated: "*the first principle of appropriate regulation of street trading is the participation of street traders*". As important stakeholders therefore, the exclusion of SFVs in deciding the content of educational programmes, medical screening exercises and other regulatory activities is a major barrier to achieving effective collaboration among stakeholders. In addition to SFVs, other potential important stakeholders like community leaders,

consumers and health personnel are not involved in regulatory activities. While discussing some of the challenges of regulators in improving medical screening among food vendors, Kwadwo, a Male A.T.O explained:

> *"Another issue is we often make a mistake. Our major mistake is that we often exclude assembly members and other opinion leaders in the communities who are influential and can increase compliance on the part of vendors. We just set our dates and go and set up our equipment in the community without consulting them. But if we can bring them on board it will really help us a lot. Also, the radio stations can be important outlets for publicity and can help us to reach areas where announcement vans may not be able to go".*

Together, these barriers hinder effective communication and information sharing among stakeholders in regulating street foods in Kumasi.

### 4.4.5 Coping Strategies for Challenges and their Implication for the Quality of Relationship between Vendors and Regulators

The above depicts the context within which regulators operate. This notwithstanding, regulators employ several strategies in an attempt to overcome the challenges discussed above. These strategies have implications for their relationship with SFVs.

In coping with the resource constraints, sometimes EHOs used their own financial resources to provide equipment for their offices. Takyi shares a personal example: "*this lock, when it even spoiled and we went to the administrator, we didn't have the money and so the staff had to contribute to buy it*". Furthermore some EHOs revealed that they used their financial resources to make the customised brown uniforms previously associated with EHOs. As already indicated, EHOs sometimes used their finances and vehicles to visit outlying communities. Here, regulators are demonstrating their initiative in enhancing their working environment, a subtle sign of commitment for the work they do. Such commitment is important since employee commitment in general have been found to have positive influences on job performance, and enhances the growth and survival of organizations (Chalofsky and Krishna, 2009). Nonetheless, regulators' use of their personal resources was found to be a dangerous phenomenon, as it increased the potential for corruption. For instance, since regulators

were not given a refund on the monies they spend, they took these monies back from SFVs. To EHOs, these monies do not amount to extortion or harassment but rather "commission for field work" that officers are entitled to it. Observations from the field confirmed that each time EHOs undertook field inspections, SFVs who were served with abatement notices came to the offices of the EHU and negotiated informally with the senior officers in order to resolve the case. This usually happened at the end of inspection campaigns. After each closed door negotiation, an amount termed as "field work commission", was shared among all the EHOs who took part in the inspections. One of the A.T.Os said that sometimes officers simply summoned vendors to the office to extort money from them. In a way, these "commissions" appeared to motivate EHOs to participate especially in inspections, since those who did not participate in inspections were not giving a share of the commissions.

The implication of this strategy of coping (taking money from vendors) is that SFVs have come to perceive that the sole purpose of inspections is to extort money from vendors. Some of the SFVs indicated that EHOs were corrupt and once they set themselves to it, they will find some faults and charge SFVs: *"when the Town Council people come, even when your place is clean and not dirty, they summon you. When they summon you and decide not to take you to court, they decide the amount of money you will pay to them"* (Female chop bar operator). Another Female SFV lamented: "*if they want 'something' from you, they just come here and tell you that your place is not hygienic, etc. and so you find something and give it to them"*. These comments demonstrate an underlying sense of distrust that vendors have regarding the genuineness of inspection activities, a suggestion that inspection is simply another way of making money for regulators. Another female kenkey vendor shares her experience: "*recently it happened to me and they threatened to take me to court. So I went to their office and begged them, I ended up paying GH¢30 before I was allowed to continue operating again*". These comments of SFVs speak volumes of their experiences with and perceptions of regulators and the effect that regulators' way of managing their constraints have on vendor perception

and attitudes. The point being made from the preceding is: because of resource constraints, regulators often use their own resources to carry out regulatory activities and in turn take money from vendors as a commission for their field activities. Based on their experiences, some SFVs also adopt a negative attitude and perception of EHOs, an attitude which may help explain the security and protection concerns raised by regulators. From the foregoing, it is not surprising that some EHOs indicated that the relationship between regulators and SFVs have been marked by violence. During field work with regulators, the researcher witnessed aggressive and offensive exchanges between regulators and vendors, as SFVs tried to resist sanctions. The comment by this female EHO gives an insight into how SFVs have come to react to EHOs: "*well, for some of them immediately they see you in the uniform, they frown and they change their attitude*". Thus, vendors portray a general distrust of EHOs and perceive EHOs as only interested in money and not necessarily in the safety of SFs or the wellbeing of SFVs. This general distrust is crucial as it reduces the effectiveness of the communication between regulators and vendors. There is thus a linkage between the concerns of SFVs in terms of harassment and regulators in terms of the need for security from physical harm. In addition, since there are no existing resources for the field rounds, some regulators make up by extorting money from vendors. In other words, the other challenges faced by regulators in the form of lack of transportation and other such resources could well explain the attitude of taking money from vendors through harassment. The increased harassment from regulators in turn make some vendors develop a negative and hostile stance towards regulators and regulations which in a way feeds into the security and protection challenges and demands expressed by regulators.

For some regulators, one way of overcoming the security concerns that comes with working with SFVs is to work together in teams of at least four people rather than break up into smaller groups in order to effectively use the limited human resources available. For other regulators, dealing with

threats to security meant a change in the approach of regulators towards SFVs. Being nice and friendly was expressed as one way of reducing confrontation. Two female regulators explained:

> *"The vendors? You do not have to be aggressive with them, you have to be tactful and know that you are working with people…You have to know that you are working with different kinds of people with different attitudes and so communication is very important. If you don't take care with the way you talk, you will always fight with them and so you have to find a way to explain nicely to them what they have done wrong and in that way they are more likely to follow the regulations"* (Akosua, Female A.T.O).

> *"You have to present yourself well, community entry. You can't just go and start shouting on the people. You have to have courtesy. Greet, find out how they are faring, with that people will be ready to listen"* (Afia, Female A.T.O).

By this, the regulators are suggesting that whether a regulator will be assaulted or not will mostly depend on how that regulator presents him or herself to the SFVs. Regarding night time regulations, one regulator explained how security threats could be overcome using a similar approach:

> *"we undertook night time inspections some time ago and we relied mostly on good communication skills and a friendly way of talking to the vendors to make it a success… Sometimes we explained the importance of screening in the presence of consumers and when that happens, the consumers themselves begin to put pressure on the vendors to go and get the screening done or they won't purchase food from them again"* (Kwadwo, Male A.T.O).

It would therefore appear that approaching vendors nicely and targeting vendors indirectly through consumers may be an effective way for regulators to overcome the challenges with night time inspections and regulations. This strategy of working through consumers and being friendly is an example of how resistance could be turned into cooperation in urban governance. This notwithstanding, this strategy of being nice and friendly also leads to other challenges for EHOs: *"if you become too friendly with people in the community, they try to take advantage of that and try to get away with bad deeds. You see, the days on which I try to be most friendly, those are the days on which I encounter most problems"* (Ahinsan, Male A.T.O). This means that even though being nice and moderate in approach can potentially reduce the security threat expressed by some regulators, at the same time this has a potential for undermining the quality of the work that need to be done by

regulators. This creates a very complex picture: on the one hand, being strict and unfriendly evokes equally aggressive response from vendors while being friendly and nice has the potential of affecting a regulator's ability to effectively carry out his or her mandate.

As a result of the poor mobility of EHOs, mobile SFVs present a particular challenge for regulators in Kumasi. Nonetheless, one strategy devised by EHOs in dealing with this challenge is to collaborate with colleagues in other sub-metros. Food regulators gave some examples such as these: "*We network with other sub-metros. It happens a lot and I am happy that most sub-metros are my colleagues and classmates so communication is just easy. So in case of any mobile vendor misbehaving we just network and try to find solutions to this*" (Boateng, Male T.O). Another male regulator explained "*we coordinate with officers from other town council offices. Sometimes I even call the officers in charge of certain areas or the officers in the main sub-metro to follow up on a problem for me*" (Kwaku, Male A.T.O). By these strategies, EHOs draw on the social network available to them in order to overcome the problems and challenges they are presented with. This network extends the reach and ability of each EHU beyond the limitations imposed by poor access to transportation. Through their ability to network with each other, EHOs are empowered to overcome the challenge of poor mobility and the subsequent difficulty in regulating mobile SFVs. These internal networking and collaborations therefore, has good implications for street food regulations in the Kumasi metropolis and has been recommended to ensure effective regulations for street foods (Johnson and Yawson, 2000; Nicolo' and Bendech, 2012).

Another strategy adopted by some EHOs to overcome challenges, especially human resource constraints was to multi-task. This means that EHOs carried out a number of activities, including street food related and non-street food related activities on any field rounds. Observations revealed that, regarding inspections for instance, EHOs decide on which part of town to inspect, divide into

groups and inspect everything they come across, from SFs, to refuse disposal sites, to drainage systems within homes. Sometimes also, spontaneous inspections are carried out when EHOs, returning from other activities like refuse site inspections, meet an SFV on the way back. This, way, EHOs are able to cope with the numerous responsibilities they have within the limited human resource available to them. This notwithstanding, this approach to negotiating the constraints EHOs encounter have implications for their work and for their relations with SFVs. Firstly, since some research evidence has suggested that performing multiple responsibilities can negatively affect productivity (Appelbaum et al., 2008), the workload and numerous responsibilities of EHU officers may hinder their ability to commit fully to the regulation of street foods in the metropolis. One other downside of this multi-tasking approach is that EHOs often spent very little time with each vendor and moved on to the next, since their activities were conducted briskly. This in turn greatly limited quality and frequency of communication and the ability of EHOs to engage with and communicate with SFVs.

One other strategy adopted to overcome human resource constraints was for regulators to undertake mass education of street food vendors and inspection of street food vending stands between May and July each year when students from Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST), during their long vacations, were posted to do their attachments with the EHU. Thus, during this period, one Sub-Metro could get as many as 29 students to assist in its activities throughout the Sub-Metro. Although this is helpful, the challenge here is, this may make the activities of regulators predictable to food vendors and subsequently, reduce the effectiveness of inspection activities. In coping with the challenges that regulators encounter in getting vendors to license their helpers, there has evolved a negotiated understanding between vendors and regulators that those helpers who work 'very closely' to food preparation, including those who serve the food are the ones to be screened while other workers like those who wash bowls can be exempted:

*"So when we go we ask the proprietor to identify those who are directly involved in the cooking, the selling/serving and the storage of the food, so that we take them through the medical screening. However, with regards to those who wash and clean the floors, we don't pay so much attention to them. This is because, the cost involved in the screening is high, GH¢ 20 per person. So if a particular vendor has 10 workers, the cost will be very high"* (Sekyere, Male T.O).

*"With the chop bar owners, it is really difficult for them because we require that the helpers who come in contact with the food should be screened. But we consider them and allow only those very close to the food preparation, such as the ones preparing the soup and driving the Fufu to be screened"* (Kwadwo, Male A.T.O).

However, despite the suggestion from regulators above, the difficulty here is that there is often no rigid line between those who go close to food preparation and serving and those who do not, when it comes to a food vending kitchen. This is because field observations revealed that every single helper is a potential step in and can perform a variety of tasks during the course of a working day. Consequently the negotiated requirement to allow only those who go very close to food preparation to screen does not resolve the challenge or problem regarding the screening of helpers.

### 4.4.6 The Inter-linkages of Challenges

In this section, the challenges faced by regulators in implementing regulations and vendors in adhering to regulations have been revealed. What has been made evident is how the various challenges expressed by these two stakeholders are interrelated. Figure 4.9 illustrates the linkages among some of the challenges expressed by both regulators and street food vendors. It is demonstrated that lack of resources and poor collaboration affects the motivation and sense of worth of regulators which in turn affects the effectiveness and commitment of regulators in carrying out education, inspection, and screening responsibilities. Because education delivery is poor, vendors end up with a poor knowledge of who regulators are, what they are mandated to do, how regulators are expected to perform their activities, and why food vendors are made to follow particular regulations. Poor inspection practices, coupled with poor knowledge of regulations may lead vendors to avoid or evade

inspections. On the other hand, poor knowledge of regulations by vendors, in addition to the poor motivation and feeling of self-worth by regulators lead some regulators to exploit and harass some vendors which, over time, leads to a feeling of distrust and hostility among vendors towards regulators. Consequently, vendors begin to evade inspections, avoid screening and abstain from organised educational programmes. For their part, regulators begin to draw more and more on their formal power and to use equal amounts of hostility to communicate with vendors. The reluctance of vendors to comply with regulations put a strain on the already limited resources and further destroys the possibility of collaboration among key stakeholders in the regulation of street foods.

## 4.5 Informal Beliefs, Perceptions, and Street Food Regulations

Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 have revealed the formal rules and legal requirements, the institutions involved and the challenges faced in regulating street foods. Nonetheless, an understanding of these formal rules and regulations do not provide a complete picture of how street foods are regulated. This is because food regulators and vendors are social actors who are actively engaged in interaction, interpretation and re-interpretation of both the law and particular situations that they encounter. Thus, in order to fully grasp the regulation of street foods, it is necessary to also understand the implication of personal beliefs and relationships of regulators and vendors for food regulations.

The research revealed that despite the existence of formal rules and regulations discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3, the beliefs and perceptions of regulators and food vendors have implications for the way in which street food laws are implemented. This section presents data analysis on how beliefs, perceptions, interpretations and relationships of both regulators and vendors mediate the implementation of street food laws.

KNUST

Lack of Resources and Poor Collaboration and Commitment from Stakeholders

**REGULATORS**

Low Motivation

**REGULATORS**

Poor Delivery of Education

**REGULATORS**

Poor Inspection Practices

**REGULATORS**

Poor Screening Practices

**VENDORS**

Poor Knowledge of Regulations

**VENDORS**

Poor Knowledge of Screening

**VENDORS**

Evading Inspections

**VENDORS**

Lack of Trust in Screening

**REGULATORS**

Harassment and Impersonation

**VENDORS**

Lack of Trust and Hostility towards Regulators

**VENDORS**

Reluctance to Screen

Pressure on the already limited resources and increased hostility among two key stakeholders, reducing further opportunities for collaboration.

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Figure 4.9: Interconnectedness among challenges of vendors and regulators

**4.5.1 Regulators and Personal Interpretations**

As already indicated, food regulators are not passive implementers of street food laws. These regulators have emotions, feelings and perceptions that often mediate or modify their legal responsibilities. This research revealed that, usually, food regulators' understanding of the context as well as their ability to empathise with food vendors mediates the implementation of street food laws:

> *"There is a woman who do not have a certificate, when we warn her, each time she sees us she escapes. If the vendors do that, we confiscate the food but sometimes you have to consider them. This is because it may be that food vending is what she is using to support the family. Sometimes I won't arrest them on humanitarian grounds because it may be that food vending is what she is doing to support her children"* (Ama, Female A.T.O).

This street food regulator appears to be using her understanding of the context and situation of vendors (street food vendors in Ghana have low levels of education and generally low incomes) as a way of not enforcing the street food laws completely. By assuming that this street food vendor has children to take care of, this regulator has reinterpreted the law to mean that for such vendors it is 'okay' to overlook some of the offences, without completely enforcing the law. Other street food regulators shared similar sentiments:

> *"With the exterior inspection, they must have a urinal, and a sanitary dust bin with a cover. But of late, because of poverty some of them don't have the dust bins so we over look"* (Asiama, Male T.O) *"But sometimes because of the economic situation, we don't enforce every law, with low incomes and the rest sometimes we just overlook things"* (Manu, Male T.O)

Thus, in these instances, the empathetic understanding of regulators appears to have superseded the demands of the law in terms of street food regulations. This implies that regulators interpret the actions and inactions of food vendors using their own understanding and experience of the context, which in turn modifies the extent to which street food laws are interpreted in regulatory activities. This is interesting, given the fact that regulators showed an awareness of the dangers

involved when food vendors do not keep to required hygiene standards. Regulators are therefore revealed to be public officers who rely on their discretion and personal judgements to decide on certain aspects of their regulatory responsibilities.

This research also revealed that not only do the empathetic understanding and discretion of regulators influence how the laws are interpreted, but also depended on the response (actions or inactions) of SFVs. Most regulators agreed that how regulations were enforced depended to a large extent on how SFVs responded and reacted to regulators. It was observed that different food vendors may be guilty of the same offence but may receive entirely different treatment from regulators. Those who behave aggressively and try to challenge EHOs often received abatement notices and were summoned to court on a very short notice. On the contrary, some food vendors asked regulators to consider them, given the complexity of their condition. Being calm and submissive, accepting one's mistakes and asking regulators to look upon God and be humane, appeared to be major negotiating strategies for some food vendors in this regard. During field inspections with the EHOs, the researcher asked Precious, one of the female A.T.Os for a further explanation of how the reaction of SFVs informed regulatory decisions. She explained that whether or not a regulator would serve a notice usually depended on how serious the offence was and how the respondent related with the

regulator(s). She argued that:

> "*Sometimes, you will go to a particular place and the vendor will acknowledge his or her mistakes and ask you to forgive him or her and give him or her time to resolve it. In such cases, you can forgive that vendor and educate him or her. However, those who resist and try to argue with the officers are given abatement notice and a shorter time to resolve the problem, with the regulator knowing that they cannot resolve the problem in that time, just to get an opportunity to 'punish' them*" (Precious).

This puts a human face on regulators. Regulators are portrayed not only as powerful bullies of SFVs but as interpreting and empathetic actors who are constantly interpreting their situations.

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Over the years, most SFVs have come to know this and as such try to influence how regulators implement the law either by appealing to regulators to forgive them or by offering gifts and establishing friendships with regulators.

### 4.5.2 Vendors and their Negotiation Strategies

From the responses, it was revealed that SFVs attempt to influence the implementation and enforcement of street food laws by begging, being humble, and showing remorse as this female SFV explains: "*oh if they come I plead with them and try to reason with them and some of them understand*" (Female Beverage Seller at Suame). In relation to the requirement by law for SFVs to medically screen all of their helpers for instance, this male chop bar operator at Tafo points out:

> *"We just have to plead with them to understand that as for the helpers it is different. Because my wife and I have the certificate but for the helpers, we plead with the regulators to exclude them from the screening process, because some of these helpers are only temporal workers."*

Thus, begging regulators to overlook some aspects of regulations was revealed as an important strategy for SFVs. This female SFV in Kejetia describes her encounter with regulators as follows:

> *"If they want 'something' from you, they just come here and tell you that your place is not hygienic, etc. and so you find something and give it to them, or you can apologize. Once they arrested me like that but when they did, I apologized and they listened. If they arrest you and you try to argue with them, they will take you to court."*

Through experience therefore, SFVs have come to understand that arguing with regulators or trying to prove one's innocence always leads to undesired results. Field observations revealed that most often when vendors pleaded with regulators, they called on regulators to look upon God in order to forgive them. This notwithstanding, sometimes begging or pleading with regulators, even by invoking the name of God was not enough to influence regulators and change the way some aspects of regulation were carried out. Consequently, it was revealed that

some food vendors go to the extent of offering regulators food and other gifts including money, as a way of managing how regulators respond to them. This strategy by SFVs and its effectiveness as a negotiating tool is accurately captured by the following revelation from Kwadwo, a Male A.T.O:

> *"Well the food vendors have become so close to us and that is why we are rotated. This is because sometimes when you go there to enforce the law or to do some inspections, they try to talk to you nicely and serve you food and so you are unable to do your job."*

As indicated in the quotation above, in order to prevent vendors and regulators from building sustained relationships (whether positive or negative) over time, the EHU rotates its officers yearly. The EHU Director, in a personal conversation (5th September 2014) said that: "*staying in one place compromises them (EHOs), since they interact with vendors on a daily basis and they may close their eyes to wrong doing, so we rotate them yearly*". Officers are reposted to different Sub-Metros within the metropolis. Nonetheless, this rotation does not affect the effectiveness of the vendors' strategy since vendors could organise and offer gifts to welcome newly transferred regulators to their communities. Thus, the research revealed that the giving of gifts does not happen only when vendors commit an offence but sometimes these are offered in anticipation of future benefits. This regulator recollects his experience in the following way:

> *"I remember this woman gave one of my officers bread and an avocado and so one day we went to her place, where she bake bread and the place was horrible. But when we summoned her, she complained and asked why my officer was looking on without intervening. She said 'eeieii, don't you remember I am the one who gave you this and that on that day?"* (Kwaku, Male A.T.O).

The statement shows how vendors sometimes use these gifts as an assurance against a future occurrence. Thus, the baker expected some level of protection or exemption as a result of some good deed that had been done in the past to one of the regulators. This is a common practice among SFVs. In controlled vending areas like major lorry parks and markets for instance, food vendors can organise and in a way, institutionalize this gift giving as a way of reducing

harassment and negotiating with regulators. This is evident from this illustration of a female food vendor at Kejetia:

> *"Sometimes during Christmas, out of our own free will, we organize something for the authorities, may be GH¢ 5.00 from each food vendor for the authorities. This is because it is by their grace that we get the opportunity to vend from here every day. Through these I believe strongly that it prevents them from harassing us. Even among friends, if you are generous, there is always good relationship between you. Even if you offend that friend, the friend can forgive you if you give that friend a gift. That is why we give these presents to the regulators".*

This vendor appears to suggest strongly that by giving these gifts, acquaintances and reciprocal relationships are established between SFVs and regulators. When she indicates that generous friends are often forgiven for their offences, she expresses the central idea behind the giving of gifts by SFVs. Thus, aside begging, accepting one's mistakes and showing remorse, offering gifts to regulators is a powerful tool used by vendors to negotiate the legal requirements involved in their work.

Clearly, the vendors use the giving of gifts as a negotiating strategy, to establish alliances and friendships with regulators. This can be a very powerful tool since some regulators can go to the extent of alerting food vendors of an impending inspection campaign by regulators. The following quote by an SFV gives a vivid illustration of how this works: "*because of the good relationship I established with the regulator who helped me to secure this space, he can come from the office and tell me that the regulators are about to do their rounds and so I should put things in order. So I do it and when they get here, they don't find anything*" (Female food vendor at Kejetia). The implication is that how the law as described in section 4.2 is implemented and enforced in practice depends also on how food vendors react towards regulators and how regulators understand and interpret the context, actions and inactions of street food vendors. Together, these two key stakeholders shape and re-interpret the meaning of the law and through these approaches, the manner in which street food laws are implemented

is negotiated on a daily basis. This shows vendors as active and powerful agents and participants, who in their own way consciously influence how street foods are regulated in Kumasi. They are not a passive and powerless group but rather an active powerful group of actors whose actions and inactions affect street food regulations.

## 4.6 The Implications of Gender for Street Food Regulations.

In many societies the world over, there are culturally embedded differences between what is expected of males and females, that do not necessarily result from their biological differences (Schaefer, 2004). Males and females are socialized to perform within certain socially defined roles, and such role socialization leads both males and females to behave differently in different environments, including within occupational environments and even in the choice of occupations (Schaefer, 2004). This section explores how gender socialization and gendered expectations of males and females affect street food regulations in the Kumasi metropolis.

### 4.6.1 The Implications of Gendered Perceptions for Street Food Regulation

In spite of the influence of personal relationships, interpretations and feelings on the implementation of and adherence to street food laws, this research also found that gendered beliefs and perceptions also have some effect on how laws are implemented and how vendors respond to regulators on the other hand. The research revealed that street food vendors, majority of whom are women, are perceived to treat male regulators with more reverence and respect than female regulators:

> *"For us the males the vendors have some respect, fear and reverence for us. They are more patient with us. But you see, in our culture women have a problem receiving orders from fellow women and so that is why if you have observed we usually go out in mixed sex pairs.*
>
> *For instance sometimes when I go out with the female regulators, I talk to the vendor(s) first before even the females will talk to them"* (Kwadwo, Male A.T.O).

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This means that food vendors are more likely to listen to, follow and not challenge instructions coming from male regulators than from female regulators. As a result of this attitude and perception of SFVs, one female regulator explained that in order to excel and effectively perform her responsibilities, she mostly had to carry herself in a different manner than that of her male counterparts, in order to elicit respect from the SFVs. She explained that as a female regulator, the only way of gaining the respect of SFVs is to be 'wild' and aggressive with the vendors:

> *"Hmm, for a female regulator you have to be wild. They give a lot of respect to the men than women. This is because in our culture, we traditionally give the respect to men than to women and so as a woman regulator, I have to portray myself as a very strong person and when you do that too they say you are bad and unfriendly, but that is not so"* (Akosua, Female A.T.O).

What this regulator is suggesting is that a female regulator would have to do something extra to gain the same respect from SFVs as it is given to colleague male regulators. These culturally embedded gendered perceptions and the resulting behaviour change of female regulators may perhaps explain why some of the female SFVs held very negative perceptions about female regulators. They argued that: "*the female regulators are always looking to smell trouble, they are full of pride and do not respect human beings, they are really proud people but the men are more tolerant because they understand us a lot better than the females*"

(Female Beverage Vendor at Kejetia). Another female SFV puts it this way:

> *"Oh, the women (regulators) do not want to listen to their fellow women. The men (regulators) have more sympathy and empathy when it comes to enforcing food regulations than the females. The men will understand when you plead with them but the women will not"* (Female Rice Vendor at Kejetia).

Thus, the behaviour of female regulators as described by the vendors may be informed by the perception that female regulators are not respected and so they have to be 'wild' in order to gain such respect. Not all female SFVs held negative perceptions of regulators though. One of

the female SFVs disagreed and contended that it is the male regulators rather who are difficult to deal with. This female vendor at Kejetia shared her experience in the following way:

> *"The men do not have motherly instincts as the women so the men are wicked. I was once arrested by a man, then, I was a mother with a child. I apologised and apologised but the guy did not understand and so I was taken to court. But if it were a woman, she would have had motherly feeling for me and maybe taken a token from me and let me go. And so that is why I think the men are wicked"* (Female Banku Vendor at Kejetia).

Nonetheless, this vendor's assertion does not take from the overall argument that gendered perceptions play a role in street food regulations and in how SFVs and regulators perceive and interact with each other. These gendered perceptions emerge from the traditional and religious beliefs of the people of Kumasi. This is accurately explained by the following statement from a female SFV:

> *"The women (regulators) do that because in our culture, the men do not go to the kitchen and so they are not really blamed for what happens there. It is the same with the regulations and the regulators. When the female regulators come, they ask: a woman like you, why should you keep your place so dirty? They don't understand why you should keep your place dirty because you are a fellow woman who should know. But the men will take time and explain things to you. But when the regulators go to the male vendors and there are mistakes, they don't blame them too much because the assumption is that they are men and are not traditionally in the kitchen and so they are lenient with the men"* (Female Rice Vendor).

The statement is a powerful indication of the extent to which local beliefs, practices and perceptions concerning gender go to shape and influence the regulation of street foods. Taking the gendered perceptions into consideration, it is not surprising that among food regulators, gender plays an important role in how SFVs are perceived. There is a general perception among regulators that male SFVs adhere to and respond to regulations more promptly than their female counterparts: "*the men are far far better than the women. For the women sometimes you have to even take them to court. Even the health certificate, they don't want to do it"* (Ama, Female A.T.O). From the explanation offered by the female vendor above, it can be deduced that this

gendered perception of regulators exists because of the general culturally informed attitude of leniency and tolerance towards the mistakes of men in the kitchen than towards the mistakes of women. Some of the female SFVs also suggested that their traditional responsibilities in the home put them at a disadvantage since it makes it difficult for them to follow regulations and adhere to street food laws: "*it is because we have a lot of responsibilities than the men, that is why we are less likely to obey rules*" (Night Kenkey Vendor at Tech Junction). In addition to these traditional constraints, some regulators also argued that since female SFVs usually have less education than male SFVs, the female

SFVs take a longer time to understand the regulations, compared to their male counterparts:

> "*The men are more educated and understand the implications of the law easily and so the men are more proactive when it comes to adherence. But the females take a longer time to understand and I think that sometimes they are a bit reluctant to make us come close to them. They are afraid of us and so they don't allow us enough time to explain things to them*" (Kwadwo, Male A.T.O).

These gendered perceptions affect the quality of the relationship between regulators and SFVs. Thus, despite the existence of the law, the personal experiences and interpretations of regulators, the actions and reactions of food vendors and the perceptions and traditional beliefs of both vendors and regulators, all mediate how these street food laws are implemented and adhered to in practice.

# CHAPTER FIVE

## DISCUSSION OF MAJOR FINDINGS

### 5.1 Introduction

This research set out to investigate how street foods are regulated in the Kumasi metropolis and examine the practices and attitudes of stakeholders. The national and metropolitan laws and policies guiding street food regulations and the governmental and non-governmental institutions and stakeholders involved in street food regulations have been revealed in previous sections. Furthermore, the content of street food regulations and the network of relations and interactions among stakeholders in carrying out street food regulations have been explored. The challenges involved in regulations and the influence of informal beliefs, networks and gender on regulations have been investigated. This chapter discusses the key findings that emerged from these major research areas. Existing literature and theoretical concepts are used to draw out the implications of the research results that were revealed. The theoretical concepts of 'power', 'negotiation', 'gender' and 'social networks' are used to explore and offer a deeper understanding of the interrelations and interactions among stakeholders in regulating street foods.

### 5.2 Mandated Institutions and Legal Policies

This research found that four government institutions have legal mandates to regulate street food in Kumasi. This is typical and similar to the multiple agency system of food regulations where food control responsibilities are shared among various government departments (FAO and WHO, 2003). While having multiple agencies with legal mandates to regulate various aspects of foods may be beneficial, it may lead to duplication of functions and poor coordination (FAO and WHO, 2003). This is evident from the reported relationship between the MHD and the KMA regarding the issuance of the health certificates. In this sense, the

finding that the EHU takes the central and leading role in street food regulations in the Kumasi metropolis may be important and beneficial for regulations in the city since it helps to reduce all the challenges that come with multi-agency regulatory system. Nonetheless, even though having such a single agency like the EHU to handle the day to day regulation of street foods may be beneficial (increasing accountability, efficiency, and uniformity of implementation) (FAO and WHO, 2003), this research revealed that food regulation is only a fraction of the work done by EHU officers. Appelbaum et al. (2008) suggested that performing multiple responsibilities can negatively affect productivity. Similarly, the increased responsibilities of the EHOs (regulating street foods and performing other nonstreet food regulatory activities), coupled with the human resource challenges faced by regulators (135 EHOs) hinder their ability to commit fully to the regulation of street foods. This subsequently negate the benefits that may have emerged from having a single agency to regulate street foods.

The central role played by the EHU in the regulatory process also corroborates Alfers' (2011) assertion that local government institutions currently are those with the capacity and mandate to improve conditions in the informal street vending sector in Africa. Furthermore, the use of health inspectors or EHOs to regulate street foods in Kumasi is consistent with information from the literature that indicates that as a result of human resource constraints and challenges in enforcement, several countries have resorted to the use of Environmental Health Officers as food inspectors (FAO and WHO, 2003). However, the use of health inspectors as street food regulators is said to be appropriate only when the officers are given the needed training specifically for the regulation of street foods (FAO and WHO, 2003). As far as this research is concerned, no such street food specific training was provided for health inspectors to do their work. The lack of street food specific training for regulators reflects in their work, especially in education and inspection where the focus is overwhelmingly on environmental and personal

hygiene; and very little on food handling, storage and preservation practices which will have direct bearing on improving street food safety.

It was found that the EHU relies on four main laws to guide them in regulating street foods in Kumasi. These laws specify duties and responsibilities for EHOs, prohibitions, specific definitions, and food handling requirements for food vendors, specific requirements for eating houses and vending environments and guidelines regarding offences and the prosecution of offences. The various aspects specified by the law reflect the key aspects of an effective food control system recommended by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) (Bessy, 2009). This means that when all components of food regulations are implemented, it will make the regulation of street foods in the Kumasi metropolis effective and efficient. This notwithstanding, this research revealed that the laws mostly do not cover the unique dynamics of selling foods on the streets but are rather general food control laws applicable to food manufacturing firms, hotels and restaurants. This finding is typical of street food regulations in West African countries. This confirmed the works of (Draper, 1996; FAO, 2009; INFOSAN, 2010; Nicolo and Bendech, 2012) that most countries in West Africa do not have laws and policies that deal specifically with the sale of street foods in the informal sector. Most countries regulate street foods by relying on general food safety laws and procedures that may pertain to other items like canned foods and animal products.

This situation creates some amount of uncertainty and lack of clarity regarding street food regulations for EHOs and street food vendors, a situation which, according to Nicolo and Bendech (2012), is typical of West African settings. These laws are then subject to the discretion and interpretation of EHOs who may implement them differently under different circumstances to suit their interests at the expense of the rights and interests of street vendors.

In other words, the lack of specificity of these laws gives street food regulators increased discretion in implementing them. This research revealed how officers used a lot of discretion and their own judgments to decide which laws to enforce, 'where' and 'when'. The EHU may thus be perceived as similar to 'street-level bureaucrats', organizations whose workers are in direct contact with the public and who have discretion in providing benefits or sanctions to the public (Hupe and Hill, 2007). As a result of this increased discretion, the EHU officers, like other street level bureaucrats make decisions and establish regular patterns and new ways of resolving work related challenges (Hupe and Hill, 2007). These regular patterns of resolving work related challenges then become more of a mandate for these officers, rather than the existing laws provided for their work per se. Consequently, the increased discretion that EHOs enjoy can be detrimental to the well-being of SFVs in the form of harassment of vendors.

Another important finding from this research was that even though three of the regulatory laws are national and general laws that could be applied to other contexts apart from Kumasi, one law, (the KMA's Sanitation, Public Markets, and Eating Houses Bye-laws) focuses on regulation issues in Kumasi. While the KMA bye-laws, as part of the regulatory framework is important, a close look at them revealed that the bye-laws discussed general laws about food regulations that could be applied in other settings as well. This is a major limitation for street food regulations in Kumasi since having laws that are specific to a cultural context has been argued to be important for effective regulation of SFs (Fellows and Hilmi, 2012; Nicolo' and Bendech, 2012). The FAO and WHO (2003) have argued for instance, that it is essential for street food regulatory policies to consider the varying needs, constraints and abilities to comply of various street vendors, and to take into consideration local conditions and risk factors that are specific to particular food preparation procedures. Chen (2004) has also argued that for informal sector laws to be effective, they have to be context specific and based on an informed

understanding of that particular sector. This is because the culture and geographical context of a place determines the types of foods sold, the ingredients used, the mode of preparation and how the foods are sold. Consequently, for SF laws in Kumasi to be effective in regulating foods, they must be sensitive to and consider all these aspects, arming regulators with the ability to handle specific challenges that arises out of the specific local context of Kumasi.

## 5.3 Stakeholder Relations and Collaborations

The research identified eleven (11) stakeholders who contribute to the regulation of street foods in Kumasi. These stakeholders are classified into six main groups (Government,

Research, Vendor Based, Corporate Stakeholders, NGOs and International Donor Organizations and Consumer Based Organizations). On the whole, stakeholder involvement is stronger in education, medical screening and in research, than in inspection and enforcement. Interaction among stakeholders is marked mostly by the exchange and/or flow of resources among stakeholders, and on a few occasions, by partnership.

In the various spheres of interaction among stakeholders, SFVs remain largely recipient of instructions rather than as equal and active partners in regulation. This remains a major limitation which needs to be addressed. This is because, regulatory practices that are inclusive and involve key stakeholders (including vendors) working towards a negotiated but common goal has been argued and found to be effective (Chen, 2004; Kumar, 2012). Kumar (2012) describes how street vendors and city regulators worked together as 'partners' in developing a policy model that addressed the needs of both regulators and vendors in Bhubaneshwar, India and emphasizes the inclusive participation of vendors as essential in enhancing the success of the programme. In relation to this, the author indicates that without the mutual assistance and flexibility of both town authorities and vendors, the desired output

might not be achieved (Kumar, 2012). Kusakabe, (2006) further reiterates the importance of inclusive regulatory approaches. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the adoption of an inclusive participatory approach to regulation of street vendors has reportedly resulted in the reduction of crime, improved cleanliness of streets, and enhanced implementation plans in general (International Labour Office, 2013). Inclusive participation and partnership between vendors and regulators working together to achieve a single goal can help re-establish trust between SFVs and regulators in Kumasi, as has been demonstrated in Bhubaneshwar, India (Kumar, 2012).

Despite the difficult relationship between vendors and regulators, the involvement of the other stakeholders revealed in this research confirms Ntiforo (2000) who called for an increased collaboration among stakeholders in Ghana in order to improve street food vending and street food safety. This research revealed two main forms of stakeholder involvement in street food regulations. Internal involvement and collaboration is where regulators from different sub-metros and town-councils work together to resolve a common problem usually with mobile vendors. This has good implications for street food regulations in the Kumasi metropolis since such collaborations are essential and has been recommended to ensure effective regulations for street foods (Johnson and Yawson, 2000; Nicolo' and Bendech, 2012). On the other hand, external involvement and collaboration involves security agencies like the police assisting in enforcement, and corporate stakeholders like Nestle Ghana Limited, collaborating in street food vendor education. Furthermore, it was revealed that the

EHU relies very much on the public for information on vendors who engage in unhygienic practices. This is significant since the effective collaboration of the public means that the EHU can maintain watch over the SFS during all times of the day and can regulate foods accordingly.

**5.4 Manifestation and Use of Power in the Interactions among Stake-holders**

In the data analysis, it was revealed that different forms of power was evident in the relationship among stake-holders within the street food sector. These power relations were evident in the education, inspection and certification of SFVs.

**5.4.1 Street Vendors, Regulators, and Power Relations in Education**

Despite the involvement of stakeholders, this research revealed that information and resources do not flow in all directions among stakeholders, with some stakeholders retaining more power under certain circumstances. In terms of education for instance, as revealed in section 4.3.2.2, the relationship between the governmental and non-governmental stakeholders on one hand and individual SFVs on the other hand is characterised by a topdown relationship, with the stakeholders assuming an all-knowing attitude in the education of the SFVs. This was found to be characteristic of the macro educational approach, the most common and preferred form of education. Thus, the individual food vendors often did not have the opportunity to contribute to the nature, form and content of educational programmes. The lack of active participation by individual street food vendors in the educational programmes is a major limitation in the education of SFVs. This is because, since SFVs are themselves important stakeholders in street food regulations (FAO and WHO, 2004), education may be greatly enriched by the experiences of SFVs. According to Horn (2000:1 cited in Skinner, 2008c:239) "*the first principle of appropriate regulation of street trading is the participation of street traders*". This applies to education as well, where the input of street vendors may be essential in forging an efficient partnership between vendors, regulators, and other stakeholders.

Furthermore, transparency through the education of vendors about what regulators are legally allowed to or not to do is essential since such transparency has been suggested as important for the effectiveness of food safety policies and regulations (Bessy, 2009). Nonetheless, this

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research revealed that education of food vendors focuses mostly on the importance of maintaining food hygiene environments and the food vendor health certificate, without teaching vendors about what regulators are legally allowed and not allowed to do. Similarly, Alfers (2011) in a study of informal workers including chop bar operators in Accra, Ghana revealed that the knowledge of study participants regarding the role of specific government departments was poor. Alfers (2011) further confirmed that in Accra, Ghana, laws and policies guiding street foods are not easily accessible and available for the street food vendors. Recio and Gomez (2013) in a study of vendors in Caloocan, Metro Manila in the Philippines also found that the vendors were unaware of government laws governing their work. The focus of food vendor education on hygiene in Ghana may be because, as Alfers (2011) argues, the environmental health and sanitation regulation in Ghana perceive food vendors and traders as a threat to public health. Thus, most of the regulatory policies focus on ensuring health and safety for consumers and the public without giving much attention to the health, safety, and protection of the vendors (Alfers, 2011). The implication of this is that, vendors are left unaware of what may be considered an acceptable and unacceptable action by food regulators, which in itself has power implications, putting street vendors at a disadvantage and often at the mercy of street food regulators. This confirms the argument of Cohen et al. (2000) who indicated that because policies regarding confiscation of goods, eviction, fines, and licenses remain unclear, some vendors who are vending legally end up being harassed. Thus, uncertainty, lack of clarity, and lack of knowledge on the part of vendors about laws promotes harassment of vendors by city authorities and regulators (Cohen et al. 2000). This is because, the superior knowledge of regulators regarding regulatory requirements gives them what

French and Raven (1959) term as expert power[5], which in addition to the legitimate power invested in them as a result of the position they occupy

(French and Raven, 1959) allow them to influence and sometimes harass street food vendors. Education then becomes an important tool of control and coercion and not necessarily as an empowering tool, as has been indicated by Medel-Anonuevo and Bochynek, (1995), Jayaweera, (1997) and Frantzman (2011).

### 5.4.2 Street Vendors, Regulators, and Power Relations in Inspections

The manner in which inspection was done had some power implications. Firstly, like education, inspection was revealed to be focused mainly on health and hygiene of the food and vending environment. However, as already indicated, a focus on this aspect of inspections meant that other important aspects were not given as much attention during inspection. For instance Alfers and Abban (2011) reveals that inspection of food premises by regulators in Accra focuses mainly on health and safety of the food and cooking environment, with the consumer's well-being in mind, without paying too much attention to the occupational health and safety for the vendors themselves. This, according to the authors is an important aspect of regulations that must be included in street food legislation and enforcement. Regarding this research, the exclusive focus of inspection activities on the hygiene of the street vended foods has power implications since it overlooks the role of the government in improving infrastructural facilities for street food vendors. Thus, such a focus fails to consider the lack of infrastructure (running water, provision of covered dust-bins, cleaning of gutters) supposed to be provided by the state as part of its responsibility to vendors (Alfers, 2012). In line with this, Bonner and Carré (2013) reason that because most informal sector workers are not recognised nationally as workers who

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[5] Expert Power emerges from the extent of knowledge or perceived level of knowledge that the person on whom power is being exercised attributes to the person exercising the power (French and Raven 1959).

are covered under labour laws and standards, the infrastructure required to enhance their work has not been adequately provided for them, a situation which increases their cost of compliance with laws. The challenge is that, the government's failure to provide infrastructural facilities raises the cost of compliance for street food vendors and makes it more difficult for them to satisfy food hygiene inspections (Alfers, 2012). Vendors are as a result, made vulnerable to exploitation since, as this research revealed, regulators can always find a lack of hygiene related reason to prosecute vendors. Even though vendors are shown to possess a variety of negotiating strategies to overcome these challenges from regulators, the point still remains that the state will have to do its part to allow street food vendors to fulfil their part as well. In line with this, Alfers (2012) suggests that health regulators must support vendors rather than punish them for operating in an unhygienic environment.

Secondly, this research revealed that inspection was often carried out in a way that left little room for dialogue between regulators and vendors, with regulators often employing hostile methods in their interaction with vendors. This is typical of the relationship between regulators and street vendors, as has been reported in different parts of the world including India, Vietnam, Mexico city in Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa, and in other developing countries especially in Africa ( Drummond, 2000; Anjaria, 2006; Mitullah, 2006; Donovan, 2008; Milgram, 2011). Under these circumstances, the power of regulatory officials over vendors becomes evident. Regulators have the law on their side coupled with ability to network among themselves, to call on colleagues in other sub-metros and to rely on resources from other non-governmental organizations for inspection and enforcement. This networking ability is, in itself, another source of power for regulators, power that goes beyond that prescribed by the confines of their legal mandates. As Edling, Farkas, and Rydgren (2013) suggest, an important source of informal power for actors is when they are able to reach out to and connect to other

actor. With these formal and informal sources of power therefore, regulators often engaged in an unequal power relations with street food vendors which sometimes led to the arrest and prosecution of vendors.

For street food vendors, the power of regulators become more absolute and their own powerlessness become more pronounced at the law courts, after they have been arrested. Vendors indicated that in case of arrest, their voices were not heard during court hearings and they felt powerless as a result. This finding is particularly similar to other research findings conducted among vendors in Accra where cases heard in court often goes in favour of the city authorities (Osei-Boateng, 2012). In a review of case laws brought against street vendors in Accra, the Trade Union Congress (TUC) of Ghana revealed that street vendors are often frustrated and compelled to plead guilty to all offences brought against them by city officials (Trades Union Congress, 2013). Sometimes, vendors are arrested and arraigned before court within an hour of their arrest, making it difficult for them to achieve a fair representation. Sometimes, vendors are remanded in custody and cases are continuously adjourned until vendors eventually plead guilty (Trades Union Congress, 2013). Thus, court appearances are used as an intimidating tool, increasing the power differential between vendors and regulators. This is another sign of structured inequality and a manifestation of the states' power over street food vendors.

The effects of the use of power, according to Boulding (1989) can be either destructive (power to destroy), productive (power to build and create) or integrative (power to bring people together). With regards to regulators and their use of power in relation to vendors, usually the effects were found in this research to be destructive, especially where vendors expressed a feeling of powerlessness in their relations with regulators regarding inspections and

enforcement. This has eventually led to a feeling of suspicion and distrust of regulators, where vendors feel that inspection is simply an attempt by regulators to extort money. Such feelings of suspicion and distrust may negatively affect vendors' willingness to comply with regulatory requirements. This is because, according to the fairness principle of social interaction, sustained interaction between actors may also depend largely on perceptions of fairness (Kornblum, 2003). This may explain some of the cited instances where food vendors attacked regulators. This notwithstanding, this research revealed that food vendors have adopted strategies that have made them gain some power to negotiate the regulatory requirements. Using strategies like appealing to the conscience of regulators, begging, offering of gifts and 'tokens', establishing friendships and drawing on their own social networks, vendors maintain their own source of power, power that allows them to negotiate their regulatory requirements and to continue to work on a daily basis. These negotiating strategies are similar to strategies adopted by street vendors in other parts of the world where the offering of gifts, and the establishment of acquaintances appears to be very common (Anjaria, 2006; Anyimah-Ackah, 2007; Malan and Neuba, 2011; Milgram, 2011; Recio and Gomez, 2013; Stillerman, 2006). The implication is that under these circumstances, the food regulators become part of the social network of food vendors (Marin and Wellman 2011), a network of friends in addition to colleague food vendors who help them negotiate the daily legal requirements involved in vending foods within the Kumasi metropolis. Thus, the laws and regulations guiding street foods establish an ascribed and defined relationship (relationship established and defined by laws or regulations) between vendors and regulators (Bandyopadhyay et al. 2011). Nonetheless, vendors through the establishment of friendships with regulators move the relationship from that of the 'rigid ascribed relationship' to a more 'flexible achieved relationship' (relationships that actors work to establish) modified by normative and cognitive rules which allows for negotiation (Bandyopadhyay et al. 2011). This in itself is a major source of power for street food vendors

because, as Foucault (1982) explains, power is evident when certain actions of an actor modifies the actions of others. In effect, by their actions (giving gifts and tokens) street food vendors exert power, albeit power that differs from that possessed by regulators.

What is evident then from the foregoing is that street food vendors and regulators are not helpless individuals who simply follow laid down regulations. On the contrary, they may be perceived as active participants and powerful agents of change who can modify the social systems within which they function, as agents who are constantly negotiating their situations (Geels, 2004). Subsequently, the actual implementation of rules and regulations emerge from such interpretations and re-interpretations (Ritzer, 2008). In line with this, this research revealed that the personal judgements, interpretations, empathetic understanding of regulators, coupled with the actions and reactions of vendors to regulators and to regulations, play a key role in how regulatory guidelines are implemented. Geels (2004) likens this to a game, where actors (regulators and street food vendors) react to the moves (actions or inactions) of each other since these moves have implications for the outcome of the game (regulations). What this means is that, despite the existence of rules and regulations, the personal interpretations of both regulators and vendors modify how the law is interpreted. Anjaria (2006: 2145) comments: "*one should not assume a direct relationship between the letter of the law and how the law works in practice*". Anjaria (2006) reveals then that there exist a complex relationship between the written law and how this law is actually applied in practice on the streets. How a system works in practice therefore is influenced by both external laws and regulations and internal beliefs and perceptions (Day and Day, 1977). In this instance, the structure of the street food regulatory system becomes less emphasised compared to the 'agency' of the key actors operating within such a system (Geels, 2004). Bessy (2009) also comments that sometimes, the structure and components of a food control system is less important than the nature of

interaction and collaboration among stakeholders within such a system. This is not to claim that the existing rules and regulations of the sector are not important. On the contrary, these rules, regulations and guidelines provide or serve as the context within which regulators and vendors interact and create a negotiated but informal structure: "*actors interact (struggle, form alliances, exercise power, negotiate, and cooperate) within the constraints and opportunities of existing structures, at the same time that they act upon and restructure these systems* (Geels, 2004: 907). This negotiated informal structure, created within the formal regulatory structure then, allows vendors to wield some amount of influence and be able to sustain their livelihoods.

### 5.4.3 Medical Laboratories, Regulators, and Power Relations in Certification

The relationship between two key stakeholders in medical screening (medical laboratories and the EHU) also revealed a power dimension. The strong and on-going relationship between the certified laboratories and the EHU was revealed to be marked by power relations, mostly by an employer-employee relationship. As two of the key stakeholders in this process, the employer-employee relationship may have negative implications for regulations since it does not offer much opportunity for dialogue and deliberation between these two key stakeholders. Thus, this research revealed how laboratory technicians feel incapacitated to question or criticise regulators because of a fear of contract termination. This is an important limitation, given the crucial part that the medical screening plays in street food regulations. It is essential, that stakeholders are able to communicate as partners in identifying weaknesses in the screening process and subsequently eliminating such weaknesses. The power differences between the EHU and the medical laboratories makes the medical laboratories hesitant in pointing out weaknesses in the screening process. This may counter the advantages that can arise from having two or three stakeholders work together. Again, since the laboratories are placed strategically between vendors and regulators, their institution as partners rather than

employees can promote communication between vendors and regulators. Thus, if the relationship between regulators and laboratories is changed from a single directional relationship, where ideas and suggestions flow only from one direction to a dual directional relationship where ideas flow between the two stakeholders, it will help improve regulations.

## 5.5 Gender and its Implications on Regulations

Beliefs, perceptions and expectations of men and women emerging out of the study context were found to affect how vendors and regulators interpreted each other's actions and inactions. This research revealed that gendered perceptions between regulators and street vendors play a role in how regulations are implemented and how vendors react to the regulators. Among the pre-dominant Akan in Ghana, there are strong gendered perceptions regarding how men and women should and ought to behave in public (Ankomah, 1996). As in other patriarchal societies, Ghanaian men are traditionally respected and revered and their word is perceived to have more authority than that of females. This is especially so when the recipient of said instructions is a woman (Ankomah, 1996). Thus, within the Kumasi metropolis, being a man or a woman can affect a regulator's reception by street food vendors and in turn affect the way a particular regulator interacts with vendors and implement street food laws. What was particularly evident from this research was that men, as regulators are more respected and revered and as vendors are treated more leniently and perceived more favourably compared to their female counterparts. These gendered perceptions and attitudes can be traced to the traditional and religious beliefs of the study context. In Ghana in general, traditional and religious beliefs as well as social expectations form the basis that legitimises the dominance of men over women (Ankomah, 1996). Ampofo (2001) further asserts that the social norms in Ghana are often used to exert control over women and children. Consequently, women have been socialised to associate authority with men, than with other women. This is especially so

when culturally and socially prescribed female characteristics include submissiveness, obedience, conformity and empathy while male attributes include authority, power and leadership (Ampofo, 2001). This helps to explain the findings from this research that suggested that male regulators receive more respect from food vendors, majority of whom are female. Thus, the predominantly female vendors adhere to instructions from male regulators who, in addition to the legitimate authority (which bestows on them coercive power), also possess traditional and culturally prescribed authority (Ritzer, 2008). These enhance the male regulator's image as an authority figure and hence an increased probability of being respected. With regards to regulators being more lenient towards male vendors than female vendors, traditional beliefs were also found to play a major role. Thus, the traditional and cultural requirement that prescribes that women should be in the kitchen (Ampofo, 2001), means that those female vendors who are unable to keep prescribed standards of hygiene at their vending stands are judged more harshly than their male counterparts. The male vendors are often treated leniently since they are men and operating in a female arena and so their mistakes are more tolerated and attributed to ignorance. This could explain the perception of regulators that women are less likely to follow regulations than their male counterparts and the finding that male vendors are treated more leniently than their female colleagues. Gender then is an important lens through which regulators and vendors perceive each other and interpret each other's actions.

## 5.6 The Challenges to the Implementation and Adherence to Street Food Laws

This research revealed that a lack of resources (financial, human, logistics), poor collaboration among key stakeholders, lack of access to security during field work and lack of access to transportation were the main challenges to the implementation of street food laws. These challenges are typical of the challenges faced by national regulators in regulating street foods

in Africa (Bessy, 2009; Fellows and Hilmi, 2012). For vendors, lack of knowledge of regulatory practices, harassment and a lack of trust in regulators in general were found to be some of the main challenges to adhering to street food laws. These concerns of vendors confirm the concerns that were raised by chop bar operators and other informal sector workers in Accra (Alfers and Abban, 2011). One phenomenon found in this research and that has gained significant attention in literature is the phenomenon of taking bribes from street food vendors (Anjaria, 2006; Skinner, 2008c and Alfers, 2011). Alfers (2011) asserts that harassment of vendors by regulators persists partly as a result of a lack of any form of institutionalised communication between these two stakeholders. Such an assertion appears applicable to the street food regulatory sector in Kumasi, as officers were found to engage in little or no dialogue with vendors. The lack of good communication between these two key stakeholders, coupled with the suspicion and lack of trust with which SFVs perceive regulators have negative implications on the effectiveness of regulations: "*to help street food handlers change their behaviour, you will need to dialogue with them and build an interpersonal relationship of trust and credibility*" (FAO, 2009: 120). The statement above underscores the importance of maintaining a sustained relationship between street food vendors and regulators. Regulators must (be made to) understand that: "*behavioural change is a long term process. It is neither immediate nor constant. It is gradual and comes from a long period of learning*" (FAO, 2009: 120). One way of improving communication between vendors and regulators is by strengthening the vendor associations. These associations can serve as a link between vendors and regulators, an outlet for implementing street food control measures and for defending vendors against harassment (FAO, 1997).

Significantly, the findings from this research reveal that the challenges that both vendors and regulators encounter in adhering to and implementing street food laws respectively are

interlinked and connected to each other. The interconnectedness of these challenges means that any programme or policy to improve regulations of street foods in Kumasi, that considers and attempts to resolve only the challenges of either vendors or regulators may not achieve its intended purpose. Of particular interest to this research is the low motivation of regulators and how it may affect the effectiveness of regulations. It has been revealed that, because regulators work with limited resources and are of the opinion that other government stakeholders are not working as they are supposed to do, they (regulators) have become less motivated, feel undervalued, and lack a sense of belongingness. This lack of motivation and a lack of feeling of value and belongingness are crucial. This is because, research in Organizational Behaviour and Human Resource Management have revealed that together with extrinsic motivation, the ability of employees to identify with and feel valued in their work is essential for performance (Chalofsky and Krishna, 2009). Employees who perceive that their organizations value, respect and appreciate their contribution are more likely to be loyal and committed to the organization's values than otherwise. Consequently, Chalofsky and Krishna, (2009: 198) concludes that: "*organizations that want to foster affective commitment[6] must in turn show their commitment to the employees by providing supportive work environments*". Thus, regulators' lack of a feeling of belongingness and value may explain their general attitude towards work. The commitment of regulators towards education, inspection and screening is therefore affected negatively by their perceived lack of worth. This may also explain the numerous cases of money taking and harassment that has been reported earlier.

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[6] Affective commitment refers to: "*an affective or psychological bonding that binds an employee to his or her organization*" which is characterized by: "*identification with the organization's goals and values, congruence between organizational and individual goals, and internalization of organizational values and mission*" (Chalofsky and Krishna, 2009: 198)

**CHAPTER SIX**

**SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION**

## 6.1 Introduction

The existing literature on street foods in Ghana has focused largely on the hygiene of street vended foods, with very little knowledge on the regulation of street foods and the involvement of stakeholders in regulations. This research complements the existing literature by investigating how street foods are regulated in the Kumasi metropolis. This research: (1) Described and analyzed the legal and institutional framework for street food regulations in Kumasi (2) Analyzed the practices, interactions and power dynamics among regulators, street food vendors and other stakeholders in regulating street foods (3) Investigated the challenges

of food regulators and food vendors in implementing and adhering to street food laws (4) Examined the implications of the interactions, relationships, beliefs and perceptions of food regulators and food vendors for the effective implementation of street food laws, and (5) Analyzed the implication of gender for street food regulations. A qualitative case study research design was used for this study. Purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used to select 17 Environmental Health and Sanitation Officers, 39 Street Food Vendors and 22 other stakeholders as respondents for this study. Both primary and secondary sources of data were used. Observation, both participant and non-participant and semi-structured interviews were the main instruments for collecting primary data. Secondary data sources included the Public Health Act (2012, Act 851), the Criminal Offences Act (1960, Act 29), the Town's Act and the KMA Bye-Laws of 1995. The data from the field were analyzed using the framework approach to qualitative data analysis as a guide. The results were subsequently presented outlining the government institutions mandated to regulate foods, their interaction and the role of other stake-holders in regulation. The challenges involved in the regulation of foods, from the perspective of both vendors and regulators were also presented. Furthermore, the interaction between regulators and food vendors and how this is mediated by informal relations and norms were discussed. Finally the implications of gender for street food regulations were presented.

## 6.2 Summary of Findings

This research revealed, in relations to the legal and institutional framework for street food regulations, that the existing laws for regulating street foods in Kumasi are not specific enough and does not address the uniqueness, nor capture the diversity of street vended foods and their varying modes of preparation in Kumasi. Even though the FDA, the GTA and the MHD have important roles to play in regulation, it is the EHU that plays the leading role. While this may

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be important, its major weakness is the fact that officers of the EHU are not specifically trained to regulate street foods and that they have several other responsibilities which make the regulation of street foods only one of the numerous responsibilities they have to fulfil. In analyzing the interaction among stakeholders in street food regulations, this research found that while other stake-holders contribute significantly, their contribution was mainly in education, and to some extent, to the medical screening of street food vendors. Consequently, inspection which is an important regulatory activity was mainly carried out by regulators working with limited resources. This research examined the implications of the relationships, beliefs and perceptions between regulators and street food vendors and demonstrated that, the relationship between regulators and vendors is marked by distrust and aggression but mediated also by informal relations and agreements. It was found that street food vendors have access to informal sources of power through the giving of gifts and the establishment of friendships, which they draw on to negotiate with regulators for other opportunities. On their part, regulators were demonstrated as street level bureaucrats who rely on their personal judgements, discretion and interpretations in modifying the law and determining its application in practice.

Perceptions and interpretations, including that of gender arising out of the socio-cultural context of study were also found to have effects on regulations and adherence to regulations in the SFS. Male regulators had more authority and received more respect compared to female regulators, while male vendors were perceived as more hygienic and law abiding compared to female vendors. Finally this research has revealed that regulators face significant challenges in their work, including human and material resource challenges and security risks. These challenges, the research revealed, create an underlying sense of neglect and demotivation among regulators, which in turn affect their approach to work. In order to negotiate these challenges, it was found that regulators adopt strategies that have detrimental effects on the

quality of their relationship with street food vendors. This research also found that the challenges that regulators face in regulating street foods and the problems vendors have with adhering to regulations were interconnected in important ways.

## 6.3 Recommendations

On the basis of the key findings, the following recommendations are made for policy and practice:

**Establish a Separate Street Food Regulatory Body**

Since the main street food regulatory body, the Environmental Health and Sanitation Unit (EHU) also fulfills 14 other responsibilities, this research strongly recommends that in order to enhance the effective regulation of street foods and to improve productivity, efficiency and expertise of street food regulators, the KMA must establish a separate division that will have as its sole purpose, the regulation of street foods in Kumasi. Officers in this new street food division must, in addition to the environmental health training, be provided with street food specific training including safe cooking methods, food handling and storage, as well as preservation practices. These officers must also be trained to acquire expertise in identifying critical points of possible contamination for the various food types prepared and sold in Kumasi. These measures, if implemented, will go a long way in making food regulations effective and ultimately, in enhancing the safety of street vended foods. The training of these street food regulators must also equip them with the knowledge of how their own

perceptions, beliefs and prejudices may affect the quality of their interaction with street food vendors. Street food regulators must also be provided with sufficient resources including uniforms and identification cards, given at least a fixed amount for field expenses and must be well remunerated. This will also have positive implications on regulations and on both the

safety of street vended foods, and the well-being of street food vendors. This is because, the improved resources will motivate regulators, reduce cases of harassment against vendors and impersonation of street food regulators and make regulators immune to the negotiating strategies of street food vendors.

**Collaborate with Stake-holders and use HACCP to Develop Context Specific Laws**

Secondly, the research revealed that the existing laws governing street food regulations were general and not specific to the diverse street foods vended in Kumasi. Consequently, this research recommends that the EHU, the FDA, the GTA and other stakeholders, together with street food vendors, work collaboratively in developing both context (Kumasi) and phenomenon (street foods) specific laws. In other words, using Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) analysis as a guide, stakeholders should come together to develop laws that capture the unique and diverse street vended foods and their differing modes of preparation, storage, and sale in Kumasi. As suggested by the FAO (2009), HACCP analysis of the preparation and sale of particular traditional foods (fufu and banku) can help regulators enact laws to specifically control and guide specific aspects of the preparation and sale of different street vended foods in Kumasi. The FAO (2009) argues that HACCP analysis that are made specific for particular foods helps to make inspection more effective since regulators are equipped with knowledge of the depth of inspections needed for each stage of food preparation and sale.

**Increase the Involvement of Stake-holders in Inspections and in Research**

This research found that even though non-governmental stake-holders play a key role in regulation, their contribution is limited to mostly education and research. Consequently, this research recommends that as a key stake-holder that is already involved in both day and night

time monitoring of some street food vending stands in Kumasi, Nestle Ghana Limited's relationship with the regulators should be strengthened beyond food vendor education to include collaboration in inspection and monitoring. This approach will help complement the human resource potential of regulators in carrying out inspection activities. In addition, it is recommended that public media campaigns should be undertaken to educate the public regarding what is expected of food vendors. This way the general public and consumers, as important stakeholders, can effectively monitor food vendors and help ensure the virtual presence of regulators at all times of the day and all days of the week. Since research as a key duty of regulators has been largely overlooked, international partners such as DANIDA and research institutions such as KNUST must help build the capacity of street food regulators in this area. It is recommended therefore that in the future, street food research in Kumasi must adopt participatory action research approaches with food regulators. This research approach could be used to build the research capability of street food regulators.

**Modify the Form and Content of Food Vendor Education to Empower Food Vendors**

The research revealed that the content of food vendor education focused mainly on health and hygiene, excluding information on regulators and their responsibilities. This research therefore recommends that the content of education must, in addition to health and hygiene, include information about who the regulators are, their responsibilities and what they (regulators) are legally allowed to do. This will empower street food vendors, reduce harassment of vendors by some regulators, reduce impersonation of regulatory officers and increase accountability. If educational content is not improved to include aspects that teach vendors about what they can reasonably and legally expect from the government and from regulators, vendors will perceive education only as a routine way of listening to the demands of regulators and will not take the content as a shared responsibility. This research further argues that for street food hygiene to improve and for vendors to effectively adhere to hygiene standards and regulations, the

government must also play its part by improving infrastructural access and access to services like running water, provision of covered receptacles, cleaning of drainages etc. In this way, vendors will perceive regulators and the government as partners, and their cost of compliance to these hygiene standards will be significantly reduced. It is also recommended that the micro educational approach to education be encouraged alongside the macro approach since the micro approach often promotes dialogue and the exchange of ideas between regulators and street food vendors. Furthermore, macro educational approaches must be made participatory and involve more discussions to improve the exchange of ideas among resource personnel and street food vendors.

**Improve Certification through Effective Collaboration between the MHD and the EHU**

Since medical screening is used as the primary license for street food vendors, the process used in acquiring the license and the stake-holders involved are all crucial aspects of street food regulation. It is recommended therefore that the choice of medical laboratories to engage in the screening should be made more transparent, specific, and systematic. Once chosen, these laboratories should participate as partners whose expertise and knowledge could be tapped and whose position between vendors and regulators can be used to improve communication. The MHD and the EHU should also collaborate on medical screening to produce one certificate for street food vendors. It is recommended that, since the MHD is the Health Directorate in the Metropolis, the MHD should be put in charge of selecting appropriate medical laboratories for the medical screening of vendors throughout the metropolis. Vendors in turn should apply through the EHU for the certificate, after which the EHU will direct the vendors to the laboratories certified by the MHD. Proceeds (monies) from this certification process could then be shared between the EHU and the MHD.

**Improve Communication between Street Food Vendors and Regulators**

Finally, there is a need for improved communication between vendors and regulators. This will potentially reduce feelings of distrust between regulators and vendors. Thus, improved communication has the potential to reduce extortion and harassment and to improve compliance. This research recommends that vendor associations should be strengthened through alliance with international bodies and organizations in order to enhance their ability to represent street food vendors. Linking with international organizations and other informal organizations such as SEWU, StreetNet International and WIEGO will provide vendor associations with information on, for instance, which negotiating strategies have been found to be effective for other vendors in different parts of the world. Such knowledge could be used to increase participation of vendors and to improve the effectiveness of these associations in negotiating with regulators (Bonner, 2013).

## 6.4 Conclusion

The informal street food sector in Kumasi is an important aspect of the livelihood of the people, contributing towards the employment, income and food needs of the city's inhabitants. This research has confirmed the involvement of key government and nongovernmental stake-holders in regulations, revealing the network of relations between and among different stake-holders in undertaking street food regulations. It has been revealed however that the laws governing street foods are neither context nor phenomenon specific. Furthermore, the Environmental Health and Sanitation Unit, the foremost regulatory body with a staff strength of approximately 135, performs other non-street food regulatory activities and yet are expected to regulate the over 20,000 street food vendors operating within the Kumasi Metropolis. The fact that the EHU is understaffed and under resourced, relies on unspecific laws and performs numerous non-street food regulatory activities have negative implications for the safety of

street vended foods. Regulators are unable to effectively regulate vendors in outlying communities and vendors operating in the night and during the weekends. This is a major weakness in the street food regulatory framework of Kumasi that needs to be addressed, especially when the number of street food vendors operating in the night and during the weekends is high.

This research puts a human face on regulators and demonstrates how, as front line officers they are faced with real challenges as they attempt to implement their mandates. They cope with these challenges by devising strategies that allow them to perform their responsibilities within the limited resources available to them. Some of these coping strategies in turn serve to foster vendor harassment and create tensions and distrust between regulators and vendors. The poor and ineffective communication between regulators and vendors, coupled with the lack of motivation on the part of regulators has also been demonstrated as contributing to increase the distrust between vendors and regulators. Such existing distrust between two key stake-holders has the potential of undermining any efforts aimed at improving street food regulations in Kumasi. This research thus, establishes inter-linkages between regulators' coping strategies and the tensions and distrust that have marked the relationship between vendors and regulators. Without justifying some regulators' use of harassment against street food vendors, this research argues that, policies aimed at reducing harassment by regulators against vendors must begin from the starting point of regulators, addressing their needs and thereby improving their sense of motivation and commitment. This will serve as a crucial platform on which any interventions aimed at improving the livelihoods of SFVs may be built. This research further argues that improved communication between these two key stake-holders is an important pre-requisite towards eliminating distrust and hostility and subsequently in reducing harassment and violence between these two key stake-holders.

While the implications of gender for formal sector employees has been well researched, gendered perceptions and their implications in the informal sector and informal sector occupations is still comparatively new. This research makes important contribution to this emerging field of gender studies in organizations. It has brought to the fore the important issue of gender and urban regulations, emphasising that adherence to regulations, especially in patriarchal societies, is strongly affected by the gender of the front line official or regulator. Even within the study context, a matrilineal society such as Kumasi, the effectiveness of authority or power and the extent of adherence to regulations has been demonstrated to be affected by the gender of the frontline regulator or street level bureaucrat. Male regulators of the female-dominated street food sector end up having expert power, legitimate power and traditional power, which together enhances the male food regulator as a figure of authority even within a matrilineal social setting like Kumasi. Here, this study reemphasises the prominence of gendered patriarchal values over matrilineal ideals within the study context of Kumasi, the assertion that gendered attitudes emerging out of patriarchy often transcend lineage type (Ampofo 2001).

Furthermore, this research has revealed how street food regulators use social networks, through internal collaborations to extend the reach and effectiveness of regulations beyond the limitations imposed by the resource challenges within which they operate. This presents an important knowledge base for urban governance and regulations in Africa where resource constraints, not unlike the ones faced by EHOs, limit the effectiveness of urban regulatory authorities. It is argued that by fostering improved relations among different regulators in different jurisdictions, urban governance will become more effective, coherent and coordinated.

This research has confirmed and emphasized that the tools for wielding power need not necessarily be violent or aggressive. Thus, this research has shown how education, which has been promoted elsewhere as essential for enhancing equality and empowerment, may perpetuate inequality by enhancing the power of regulators over street food vendors. By so doing, this research challenges the un-critical use of education as a tool of empowerment of oppressed or disadvantaged groups in society. On the contrary this research argues that for education to be empowering, its content must be critically scrutinised and should be structured in a way that will improve the independence of oppressed groups, in line with the general principles of empowerment.

This research contributes to a further understanding of how power is dispersed and is available to different members of society (vendors and regulators) and how it can be negotiated for in different ways. By so doing, this research challenges the common assumption that, persons in authority, having access to formal power, can simply bend subordinates such as street food vendors to their will. On the contrary, this research has shown that through social networks, informal relations and activities, street food vendors have access to different forms of power that have real implications and consequences for their well-being. Power therefore must not be perceived as residing only with government officials but rather with several actors operating within the street food sector. Consequently, this research makes a strong argument by emphasising that, wherever and whenever attempts are made to improve regulatory policies, these attempts should be made within an understanding that SFVs cannot simply be bullied off the streets and that they should be met and negotiated with, within an approach that fosters inclusive participation in regulatory decisions.

Finally, this research has reviewed the existing literature on the relationship between regulators and street vendors, and through that creates a unified picture of an otherwise fragmented literature and knowledge base. Even though different authors have documented the negotiation strategies of vendors in specific countries, this research presents a holistic and coherent insight by bringing together the various strategies that vendors have used in urban areas across the global south and analyzing them through the lens of relevant theoretical concepts of power, social networks, and social perception.

### 6.3.2 Opportunities for Future Research

In view of the gender implications revealed in this research, future research (a larger survey) should be designed to test the hypothesis that male regulators are more respected and adhered to, than female regulators.

Secondly, since the motivation of regulators has been highlighted as key to their activities, future research could be structured to explore different forms of motivation for street food regulators and its effect on their relations with street food vendors and their commitment to work and to regulations in general.

Finally, some regulators indicated that on the few occasions that they have regulated foods in the night, they were able to avoid confrontation with food vendors by educating consumers at the food stands. These consumers, once educated about the hygiene standards and requirements of food vendors, would in turn put pressure on food vendors to keep better hygiene standards. Future research could therefore be designed to explore the effectiveness of this strategy and the practicality of its application for street food regulations in Ghana and in other countries in Africa.

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**APPENDIX 1**

**Introductory Text for Interview Guides**

Good morning. My name is John Boulard Forkuor, a PhD student from KNUST. I am carrying out a research into the street food sector focusing on food regulators, food vendors and the interaction between them. I am very pleased that you have agreed to participate in this study. I want to emphasise that the aim of this discussion is not to prove or disprove right or wrong answers. I believe you are the expert in your field and your experiences and opinions are important and I will like to hear them all. I will record and at the same time take brief notes of this discussion. This is because I will like to follow the discussions and then go back later to review what you said again so I can accurately convey your ideas and opinions. My role today is to see that we have a productive discussion and to summarize the knowledge and insight emerging from your experiences. At this point, I will like to assure you that the information you provide during this interview will be treated as confidential. However, should you, at any point during this interview feel the need or desire to pull out of the interview; you have the

right to do so without any consequences to your person, occupation or reputation. Do you have any objections, questions, or information for me before this interview begins?

**APPENDIX 2**

**Interview Guide for Food Regulator Interviews**

**Exploratory Questions**

1. Please tell me a little bit about yourself
2. How did you come to work with this organisation?
3. How long have you worked with this organisation?
4. What factors in your life informed your choice of employment?
5. What is a typical day like for you on the job?

**Probing Questions**

Mandates, Duties and Responsibilities

1. What is the main mandate of your organisation in the street food sector?
2. What duties and responsibilities emerge from such a mandate?
3. What are the main activities you engage in in regulating the street food sector?

Laws, Policies and Implementation

1. Which laws and policies inform your work with street food vendors on a daily basis?

2. What are the different licenses and individual needs to have in order to operate fully as a vendor?

3. What are the requirements and steps to obtaining those licenses?

4. What has been your experience implementing these laws and policies with street food vendors?

5. What happens when the rules, policies and regulations regarding a particular street food scenario, event, or situation is not clearly stated or specified?

6. What has been your experience in regulating different groups of vendors (mobile, stationary, male, female etc.)?

Collaboration

1. What is the nature of interaction and communication among regulatory bodies in the metropolis?

2. How and under what circumstances does the FDA for instance interact with the EHU of the KMA?

3. How do power and power influences come to play in the interaction among regulatory bodies and authorities in the Kumasi metropolis? (how are decisions arrived at by interacting organisations? Who has a major or final say in decision making?)

4. How do food regulators in the Kumasi metropolis resolve cases of overlapping mandates and responsibilities regarding food vendors, and which regulatory bodies are directly involved in the regulation of the street food sector? (Who does what and who has precedence or authority over whom and under what circumstances?).

5. What role does other stakeholders like schools, hospitals and private institutions play in regulating the street food sector?

Challenges

1. What are the challenges and constraints faced in carrying out regulatory activities of the street food vending sector?

2. Under what conditions or situations are these challenges and constraints more pronounced?

3. How do these challenges and constraints affect you as an individual, and as a food regulator?

Resolving Challenges

1. What can be done to resolve these challenges?

2. In day to day practice, how do you negotiate and overcome the challenges outlined above?

**Exit Questions**

1. Tell me what you think of the street food sector and the street food vendors? (Their place of work, mode of work, etc.).

1. In an ideal world, how do you think the street food sector should look like?

2. Where do you see the street food sector in the next 10 years?

3. Given the opportunity, what will you change, modify, improve or maintain about the street food sector?

## APPENDIX 3

### Interview Guide for Food Vendor Interviews

**Exploratory Questions**

1. Can you please tell me about yourself? (Ethnic, religious, and educational background, marital status, children and dependents).

2. How did you become a food vendor? (What informed and influenced choice of food, who was the major players and actors in this process).

3. How long have you been operating as a food vendor? (What has informed or influenced duration, has there been opportunities to move into a different business, are you involved in any other activities in addition to food vending?).

4. Which individuals, groups or organisations do you think are crucial for your wellbeing in this line of work; and, how do you interact with them?

5. Please take me through a typical working day for you (begin from early in the morning to the end of the day, distance between home and place of employment, who do you communicate or interact with and under what circumstance).

**Probing Questions**

Formal Rules and Regulations

1. What formal rules and regulations do you adhere to in your operations?
   How did you come to know of these rules and regulations, which organisations, groups, or individuals enforce these regulations?

2. How often do you come into contact with regulators and what has been your experience and feeling from these contacts?

3. Describe your relationship and interaction with regulators; is it one of deliberation between equal stakeholders or is it marked by subordination and instructions between unequal stakeholders?

4. What factors motivate you to adhere to regulations and laws?

5. When served with an abatement or summons, what strategies do you rely on in negotiating with regulators?

6. How do you negotiate with regulators with regards to street food laws?

7. Do you communicate with other food vendors in relation to formal regulation and formal regulators? (Who; when; how often; context and content of communication?).

8. How do these regulations influence your work?

9. Given the opportunity, what will you keep, modify, improve, and or change about the present rules and regulations?

10. In an ideal world, how do you think the street food sector will be set up and organised?

Space Negotiation

1. Tell me about the space  from where you operate your business
   (What informed choice of location? How was location secured?)

2. How long have you operated from this space? (Where were you before? Why did you leave? Do you have any challenges in working in and maintain the space? How do you manage this space and how do you organise yourself within this space?)

Self-Regulation

1. Is there any agreed upon code of practice, or rule of practice among food vendors in your area? (Who ensures that these rules are adhered to? What happens when a fellow vendor goes against these?).

2. Are you a member of any association or groups? (Probe) what role for instance does the association play in the work you do?

Challenges and Constraints

1. What are the main challenges and constraints for you as a food vendor?
   (How and when do these challenges manifest? /which is the most pressing challenge?)
2. How have these challenges been resolved in the past?
3. Do you receive any assistance from any group or individuals, in resolving these challenges?).
4. What motivates you to persevere and continue working in light of these difficulties and challenges?
5. Could you please tell me: access to space, a good space for business; and access to credit, which of these is the most crucial challenge for you and why?
6. How do women vend and satisfy traditional expectations at the same time? What strategies do they rely on in coping with these demands?

**Exit Questions**

1. Tell me about your dreams and aspirations for the future (where do you see yourself in the next 10 years? Which organisations, groups, and individuals do you think are crucial and can play a part towards an achievement of your goals?) Do you have any questions for me before we end this discussion?

**APPENDIX 4**

**Interview Guide for Stakeholder Interviews**

1. How long have you been involved in the street food sector?

2. What has been the nature of your involvement?

3. What role do you play and what motivates your involvement?

4. What is the nature of your interaction with street food vendors?

5. In your work, do you interact or communicate with food vendors directly? (what is the nature of this interaction? How often does this take place? Under what circumstance does interaction take place? What is the duration of such interaction?).

6. Do you communicate in anyway with food regulators during or in the course of your work with street food vendors? (What is the nature of such communication? Under what circumstance do they take place? How long do these interactions or communications last? How are mutual decisions arrived at by both parties?).

7. What has been you main influence in the street food sector?

**APPENDIX 5**

**Areas of Street Food Vendor Concentrations in the Kumasi Metropolis**

**KEJETIA LORRY PARK-ADUM**

The Kejetia lorry park is a large lorry park where one finds transport to all parts of the country. This Lorry Park is close to the Central Market, argued to be the largest open market in West Africa (Adarkwa, 2011), which attracts a high number of people on a daily basis. Together, the lorry park and the market ensure a constant inflow of people, a steady customer base for food vendors and also for food hawkers. At the main lorry park in Kejetia, one finds food sellers (both permanent and mobile) on the inside as well as on the outskirts. On the outer edges of the lorry park, food vendors, operating from permanent stalls line the outer walls. These are mostly traditional caterers, selling traditional foods like Fufu, Banku, Omotuo, among others. Along the entire inner walls are also lined food vendors operating from permanent stalls, also selling mostly traditional foods. On a casual count of the permanent food stalls lining the inner walls alone, 36 permanent food stalls were counted. This does not include the numerous street food hawkers as well as all the other food vendors operating within the inner (central) parts of the lorry park, interspersed among the parked vehicles. Thus, there are several other food stalls scattered throughout the inner parts of the park, as well as several mobile street food vendors operating throughout the park in search of customers. The setting in Kejetia is one of an 'ordered confusion', where one gets the impression on first sight of a disorderly and congested

social setting, but finds, on closer scrutiny an ordered pattern, where mobile food vendors, drivers and motor vehicles, shoppers, and permanent vendors negotiate and renegotiate with each other; with pedestrians; drivers and parked vehicles; and with city authorities for space. Adum forms the core of the central business district of Kumasi. Most of the business establishments, banks and other such institutions have offices in Adum. Placed very close to Kejetia and central market thus, Adum attracts a high concentration of people and street food vendors on a daily basis. In Adum, street food stands can be found along alley ways, in front of office buildings, and at the corners of blocks of apartments. Some of the food vendors operate from movable stands and tables from which food items are placed and sold. These type of food vendors usually have a large 'summer hat' over them to serve as a shade against the rays of the sun. These vendors, depending on the type of foods sold, may place two or three benches along a few tables to serve as eating places for customers who may want to eat at the vending site. Usually, these types of vendors are found in front of or along the walls of institutions where they may not be allowed to erect permanent places for vending. The various types of street food hawkers are also found in Adum as well. Using large umbrellas is typical of sellers of roasted plantain, but it is not unusual for sellers of banku and other foods to have them as well. Adum is a healthy mix of all types of street foods. However, it appears that fast food sellers are in the majority in this area. These food sellers are hardly placed next to each other, with a respectable space usually separating one food stand from the other, each with their own customer base. The high number of fast food sellers may be due to the presence of a high number of formal establishments with formal employees who may find fast foods very convenient for their purposes.

Although most mobile food vendors sell products that are simple to carry (snacks mainly), there are a few deviant cases of street food hawkers who sell foods that traditionally would require at least a stand. Some of these street food hawkers sell Tuozaafi. Such food sellers operate in

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groups of at least two. Sometimes, one hawker may carry the main dish, which is the Tuozaafi while the other carries the soup that goes with the Tuozaafi. Sometimes, there is a third person who carries a coal pot (source of fire) on a wooden tray. This is usually used to heat the food in order to keep it warm throughout the duration of the sale of food. These types of mobile food vendors are found mostly in the Kejetia lorry park, but there are also a few of these vendors in Adum as well.

**ASAFO**

Asafo is a vibrant community that is relatively close to the central business district of Adum and the Kejetia and central market areas. Asafo has a large open market as well as a large lorry station which attracts high concentrations of people and vehicles to the community on a daily basis. In addition, interaction with few food vendors disclosed that many food vendors are found at Asafo because there are a number of businesses.

Most of the street food vendors here are clustered around the main lorry station. Surprisingly, most are traditional caterers with a few fried yam sellers. One would have assumed that there would have been a lot of fast food sellers at such a lorry station where travellers are usually in a hurry. This situation is similar to that of Kejetia, where traditional caterers are predominant as well. This may be as a result of the perception that fast foods are the preserve of the affluent. Observations made at Asafo concerning food vendors proved that dominant food items sold by food vendors at Asafo were Banku, Kenkey, Fufu, Tuozaafi, boiled yam and plantain, Konkonte, rice (jollof, fried and plain), bread and snacks. Most of the food vendors operate on the top of tables with a few operating from metal containers. Vendors of traditional foods like fufu; Tuozaafi; and banku usually operate from chop bars (small-scale roadside restaurants with less than 4 permanent walls usually serving traditional foods). Vendors who operate from

table tops cover their foods with either a glass or a rubber net to prevent flies from stepping on their foods.

There are also considerable number mobile food vendors. Some of the mobile vendors engage in the sale of foods that are usually sold from stationary positions including waakye, banku, and tuozaafi. Mobile food vendors do not sell at places where the stationed food vendors are. They sell around loading and loaded vehicles, mostly the buses. This notwithstanding, mobile food vendors interact a lot with their stationary colleagues and sometimes rest, along with their food at the space occupied by the stationary food vendors. In addition, mobile food vendors here at Asafo interact with the stationary food vendors by going to them to change notes with higher denominations. Mobile food vendors mention the name of the food items they sell in a shout to draw buyers' attention to it. Mobile food vendors who sell same items compete over sales to buyers by way of who reaches the buyer first and who gets around the loaded or loading vehicle first unlike stationary food vendors who hardly call buyers to buy their food items.

Some of the permanent food vendors are closely set up to each other especially those in the sale of banku, fufu, and tuozaafi located just behind the Neoplan bus station. These food vendors vend from relatively permanent structures. They sell all day and at night till day break. A food vendor in a conversation said they run shifts when they are tired. They also indicated that they sell everyday till they get tired when co-vendors takeover for some days whilst they rest. No association for the food vendors was indicated. A larger number of food vendors at Asafo are females (women) with a small number being males (men) who largely trade in fried rice and jollof rice. The male food vendors mostly operate at night. Some of the food vendors here are also interspersed with the market women in the main Asafo market.

**TECH-JUNCTION-AYEDUASE**

This area is defined to include the main tech-junction lorry station, the Ayigya community, and the Ayeduase community, especially along the main Ayeduase road. The high concentrations of people in these areas can be explained by various factors. There is a taxi and lorry station at tech-junction which serves as a transit point for pedestrians going to other parts of the city from the direction of Accra, or going from the main city centre and other parts of the city to communities on the main Accra road. Thus, there is a high number of people passing through this junction at all times of the day. In addition, the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST), located close to the Ayeduase community ensure a high number of students in these communities (Ayeduase and Ayigya) who patronise the foods of food vendors within these communities. Although not covering a wide area, numerous food stands can be identified in and around the lorry station during the day. During the night (6.30pm-9pm), the situation is entirely different. The numerous fruit and vegetable sellers are replaced by more food vending stands. It appears that the food vending stands double during this time of day. The taxi station and the fact that a lot of people go through the area to and from work in the evening means that there are high concentrations of human traffic during the evenings, improving the customer base and attracting food vendors to these areas. Some of the food vendors also operate from the day through the night. The predominant food items sold by vendors at Tech Junction are rice, waakye, banku, tuozaafi, kenkey, bread and snacks. Most of the food vendors are table top operators.

Food vendors are closely setup to each other. Food vendors assign places for setup to themselves by themselves: no one regulates the places for setup. It is regulated by who identified the free space first and did the setup first. Even though some operate, most of the vendors do not work on Sundays. Some food vendors also run shifts on daily basis: some come in the morning to afternoon and handover to others from the afternoon to the evening.

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Mobile food vendors command a small number. Mostly young people engage in mobile food vending. Some food vendors indicated that they sell at Tech Junction mainly because of the University community who come there to buy, mostly students. In an interview with a prospective food vendor who was hoping to setup a food stand at tech-junction, I inquired what attracted her to the area, she argued that unlike selling in schools and near other organisations where your sales suffer on vacations and holidays, lorry stations like techjunction provides an assurance of a constant flow of potential consumers and thus a constant flow of income.

## BANTAMA

In Bantama, food vendors are found on the main high street and on the two side streets immediately east and west of the high street. Like other places of concentration in the metropolis, a high concentration of people during the day largely explains the presence of food vendors. There are whole-sale and retail shops dealing in electronics and electronic appliances (television, refrigerators; iron), banks, insurance companies and other wholesale shops for furniture on the high street. In addition there is a large open market, the Bantama market, which serves as the selling and buying place for a large number of both market and domestic women and thus draw a lot of vehicular traffic through the area on a daily basis. Together these factors attract a large number of people to the high street, which in turn tend to attract a number of food vendors. As emphasised by this food vendor "*there are a lot of people here, and now so many organisations are coming here, banks, insurance companies, etc. which attract people here. When they come to work and they are hungry they must eat, and so we cook for them*). There are table top operators, selling rice, tea and fried yam. Chop bars with more elaborate set-ups (enclosed spaces and eating spaces) may also be found in this area. In the night, Bantama is busy, bustling with pedestrians, Lorries and food vendors. Although the number of street vendors increases during the night, the increase is more prominent and observed about

200 metres from the Okomfo Anokye roundabout towards the Bantama High Street. There are a few table top operators selling kenkey, beverage, among others. The remaining vendors are vendors with more permanent bases (including containers) and others operating within 4 walls (including chop bars and mini restaurants). Unlike other place of concentration however, only a few mobile food vendors were observed. Although there are lots hawkers on the high street towards the Abrepo junction, hawkers of food (rice, yam, banku, tuozaafi) are relatively few).

## SUAME MAGAZINE

Like other places in the Kumasi metropolis, Suame magazine is a densely populated area of mechanics and sellers of auto mobile spare parts and small scale engineering industries that attracts a daily working population of about 200000 people (Adarkwa 2011). As a result of this high concentration of predominantly male mechanic workers, a significant number of food vendors are concentrated here. There are both permanent food vendors and street food hawkers. Permanent vendors may be found interspersed with the mechanic shops and are mostly located in front of the mechanical shops throughout the magazine, selling mostly yam, rice, fufu, banku and other such foods. At Suame, food vendors are not clustered like Tech junction, Asafo and Kejetia. On the contrary, food vendors at Suame are dispersed with reasonable intervals. Few mobile food vendors are found at Suame. Most of the food vendors are stationary. Most of them have places for buyers who want to eat right there without taking the food along. Some food vendors trade in beverages in the morning and trade in rice and wakye in the afternoon. In the evenings, while some food vendors insisted that no significant food sale take place, "if you come here in the evening after 7.00 pm, you will not get food to buy" (Permanent food vendor), other metal workers and consumers insisted that different food vendors vend food in the evenings for those who live and sleep within the magazine.

**TAFO**

In Tafo, the situation is very similar to that at Bantama. Unlike Tech junction and Asafo, few food vendors are found in and around the lorry park. The majority of food vendors are found along the main road at Tafo. This road is the main road that leads from Kumasi to Mampong and as a result has a high vehicular traffic. By the road side are a number of businesses including pharmacy shops, electrical and furniture shops among others. Consequently, the number of vehicular and human traffic that passes through Tafo on a daily basis is very high, attracting also, a high number of food vendors. In addition to those passing through, there is also a high demand for food vendors among the residents of Tafo. This is because, as explained by a native and resident of Tafo:

> "*there are a lot of bachelors here, including a high number of young men who stay here and learn a trade at the magazine. If you want evidence, come and stand at the main junction between 5.30pm and 6.00pm and observe the number of people entering Tafo*".

Thus, the suame magazine, discussed above has got effects on this neighbouring community of Tafo, since some of the workers who work in the magazine by day reside in this community by night. Most food vendors at Tafo operate in containers especially fried rice and jollof rice joints. Nonetheless, there a significant number of table-top operators selling waakye, kenkey, banku, and tea, as well as some chop-bar operators.

**ABOABO**

Within the town of Aboabo, there is a high concentration of food vendors on both sides of the streets. Even on weekends, the situation is not much different. It is quite common to find the same food type being sold on both sides of the same street. Most of the popular foods (waakye; fried yam; fried rice, rice and stew, fufu, tuozaafi, banku etc.) are found in Aboabo as well.

Fast food joints are clustered along the main road to the airport. On some of the main road intersections within the community, one find food vendors mostly clustered on road junctions in groups of three or four. Food vendors here are set up on table tops; in simply constructed structures on road junctions but mostly in front of houses. Thus, on a casual look, these food stands blend well into the environment with the buildings. The high number of Arabic schools which attracts a high number of students and pupils to the community may explain the high number of food vendors within this community. As explained by one food vendor "*there are a lot of Makalanta here. We are surrounded with it; they give us a constant market.*" There is always food around, some sell till early in the morning and at dawn. There are various types of foods including waakye, rice, and fried yam. The Arabic schools also operate over the weekends as well. Thus, a high number of people are assured over the weekend as well. The ethnic composition of the community may also explain the high concentration of food vendors. This food vendor explained:

> "*We northerners are good at cooking. You look at all the food joints and restaurants in the Metropolis, most of the cooking staff are northerners. That is why in our community (communities predominated by northerners) you find lots of food being sold*".

Some of the vendors operate from the same space but from/at different times. Whiles one sells rice in the morning, another sells in the afternoon. In addition to the cluster at junctions, there is some food vendors interspersed among the houses as well.

**ALABAA**

At Alabaa, the main street from Abbey's park are a cluster of shops, both wholesale and retail of a variety of items including bicycles, rice, sugar, electronics, among others. These shops are so closely spaced and congested to the extent that the food stands are almost difficult to spot, especially for a first time observer. Nonetheless, there are both stationary and mobile food vendors vending bread and porridge, rice, tuozaafi among others. In addition, on the Alabaa

main street, towards Amakom- Akwatia line, there is a high concentration of shops' and businesses selling mostly motorbikes, bicycles and plastics. Some of the shops also deal in large plastics; buckets; and bowls. There is a large open market on one side of the main street as well as a large lorry park for both within Kumasi and outside Kumasi travels, which attracts a number of food vendors since there is a ready source of consumers. Thus, "*because of this station, there are a lot of people around to sell to*" for food vendors. This street has a high a concentration of people on a daily basis as a result of the businesses on the street, and as such attracts food vendors to this street as well. Nonetheless, it is extremely difficult to spot the foods here because of the congested nature of the streets. The food vendors are mostly table top operators interspersed among the motor bike sellers and other commercial businesses. Similar to Aboabo, the number of fried rice stands here are few, compared to fried rice stands in places like Bantama and Krofrom. Rather foods like tuozaafi, waakye, and porridge with some plain rice stands are the most common. There are also a lot of mobile food vendors of porridge and also of fruits. There are some fast food joints with allocated spaces for eating. Sometimes, some of these spaces are covered with cloth. There is also a high concentration of mobile food vendors here. Over the weekends, on Saturdays but especially on Sundays, there are not as many people and as many food vendors here. There are most of the major food types from porridge and beverages to tuozaafi, banku and other fast foods here too.

## ASHANTI NEW TOWN (ASH-TOWN)

Like other areas of food vendor concentrations within the metropolis, food vendors here are attracted by the high concentrations of people that pass through the community. Firstly, a steady flow of traffic, in all directions, flow through this area (to Dr.Mensah; Kejetia; Alabaa; Aboabo etc.). Most of the food vendors are concentrated on the Ash –Town road; this street has a cluster of businesses dealing in bags, electrical appliances, plastics and barrels among

others. In addition, there are banks and credit unions. These attract a high number of people to this area, along with a high number of food vendors. (Plastic chairs and tables). This situation is not much different throughout the week except on Sundays where business activities; the number of people; and the number of food vendors reduce considerably.

Generally however, the food vending stands here are fewer than the other areas of vendor concentrations in the Kumasi metropolis. According to an observer (taxi driver), "there are lots of family households here where people cook in their homes for the family and that is why there is not much food selling going on here".

Just like other areas of food vendor concentrations within the metropolis, food vendors here sell just by the road side and on road junctions; operating from simple structures with less than four permanent walls, and others also from table –tops. Some of these vendors have eating places made up of two or three tables and benches. There are a considerable number of mobile food vendors here as well. Some of the vendors, in addition to the road junctions, are also set up in alleyways in between buildings. Some of the vended foods include rice and sauce, and boiled yam and sauce. There are also a few porridge and beverage sellers who operate mostly under umbrellas to prevent the scorching sun. It is difficult to pin point exactly the boundary between Ash-Town and Alabaa and the two communities appear to 'flow' into each other. As a result of the numerous number of shops, it is easy not to notice the food vendors who are well interspersed among the shops. Usually, those operating from table tops have umbrellas over them. Some also use nets and or laze to cover their foods as and when necessary. Most of the food vendors here however, vend fried rice and other fast foods.

**KROFROM**

Krofrom is one of the prominent communities within the Kumasi metropolis. The community is very close to and shares some boundaries with Ash-Town, and Alabaa. The main road at Krofrom leading to Tafo and other important places in Kumasi and many businesses located along this road is supposed to have brought a lot of food vendors to Krofrom. In addition, when asked about what could be the cause of a high concentration of vendors within this community, internal demand was mainly attributed, in terms of a high number of bachelors living and working within the area.

Vendors are clustered on both sides of this main road, and in front of the market under construction vending common foods like fried rice, Kenkey, Fufu, beverages, Tuozaafi, among others. Other vendors are located on various junctions and town routes within this community. Most of the vendors here operate from table tops, even though there are a few who operate from metal containers as well as temporal wooden structures with wood serving as walls.

**PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS**

The Kumasi metropolis has a high number of public and private schools and serves as a central place for education in the Ashanti region, in Ghana, and in the West African subregion as a whole (Adarkwa 2011). Because these schools have high concentrations of people (pupils, students, teaching and non-teaching staff) food vendors are found in these schools as well. Thus, public and private schools in Kumasi are also places of high food vendor concentrations. While some private schools may restrict the number of food vendors operating in their schools, yet, taken together, a high number of food vendors within the Kumasi metropolis are operate in and around public and private schools, making schools in general as one of the areas of food vendor concentrations within the metropolis. Foods sold in schools have a high potential and risk of containing and transmitting bacteria (Mensah et al.

2002).

KNUST