


**KWAME NKRUMAH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, KUMASI**

**COLLEGE OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING**

**DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING TECHNOLOGY**

**KNUST**

**CHALLENGES AFFECTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION  
INSTITUTIONS IN GHANA**



**BY  
KINGDOM AMETEPE**

**NOVEMBER, 2014**

**KWAME NKRUMAH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, KUMASI**

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**DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING TECHNOLOGY**

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INSTITUTIONS IN GHANA**

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING  
TECHNOLOGY  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF  
MSC DEGREE IN PROCUREMENT MANAGEMENT**

**BY  
KINGDOM AMETEPE**

**NOVEMBER, 2014**

## DECLARATION

I, **KINGDOM AMETEPE**, do hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my own research work carried out. This work is the true reflection of the task I set out to accomplish and have duly acknowledged all sources from which references were drawn. It has not been presented either in Ghana or elsewhere for any diploma, degree or postgraduate programme. I accept all errors and omissions as my own entirely.

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## ABSTRACT

As corruption becomes increasingly sophisticated, the fight against it demands a well-integrated, multi-disciplinary strategy. Hence the establishment of anti-corruption institutions, agencies or commissions which invariably have one or more of three functions: investigation and enforcement; corruption prevention; and awareness and education. However in Ghana, irrespective of the existence of anti-corruption institutions, the perception of corruption has steadily increased to overwhelming levels. Why this increase in corruption in the face of these anti-corruption institutions? The study aimed at exploring the challenges that affect the effectiveness of these anti-corruption institutions in Ghana in their fight against corruption. A population of nine (9) anti-corruption institutions in the Ashanti Region was sampled and questionnaires administered. Relative importance, frequency and severity equations were used to analyze and rank the challenges affecting the work of these institutions. The study identified; insufficient resources, inappropriate staffing, lack of political will, lack of budget and fiscal autonomy, and unfavourable economic conditions as the top five (5) critical challenges anti-corruption institutions in Ghana face in their work against fighting corruption. It is recommended that government and other relevant stakeholders take the necessary steps to address these challenges so that anti-corruption institutions in the country can work effectively as it is expected.

## **DEDICATION**

To the most high God for the grace granted me to successfully finish this programme. Onto Him alone be all praise.

To my parents and siblings for the immense support in ensuring the successful completion of this programme. I am grateful.

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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
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## ACRONYMS

ACI	Anti-Corruption Institutions
GACC	Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition
NACAP	National Anti-Corruption Action Plan
CHRAJ	Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice
GJA	Ghana Journalists Association
EOCO	Economic and Organised Crime Office
IEA	Institute of Economic Affairs
AS	Audit Service
JS	Judicial Service
AGD	Attorney General's Department
GRA	Ghana Revenue Authority
GPS	Ghana Police Service
FIC	Financial Intelligence Centre
PPA	Public Procurement Authority
GII	Ghana Integrity Initiative
FORB	Forum of Religious Bodies

PEF	Private Enterprise Foundation
CDD	Centre for Democratic Development
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
TI	Transparency International
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WB	World Bank
ICAC	Independent Commission Against Corruption
CPIB	Corrupt Practices Investigation Branch
DCEC	Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime
IMF	International Monetary Fund



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## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 BACKGROUND**

As corruption becomes increasingly sophisticated, the fight against it demands a well-integrated, multi-disciplinary strategy. In this regard, more and more governmental and international actors are creating specialized entities to combat corruption. These entities, usually called anti-corruption institutions (ACIs), come in different forms. However, the mere creation of such entities does not in itself eradicate the source of corruption because ACIs are usually created after corruption is already widespread. Therefore, in order to fight widespread, endemic corruption, there is a need to implement complementary government reforms that address the principal sources of corruption in public sector institutions (Dionisie and Checchi, 2008, Meagher, 2004, Gray and Kaufman, 1998). In this regard, it is important to point out that ACIs are complementary institutions that assist governments in fighting corruption (De Sousa, 2009).

Anti-corruption institutions, agencies or commissions have various names but invariably have one or more of three functions: investigation and enforcement; corruption prevention; and awareness and education (Doig et al., 2006). Anti-corruption agencies are usually created when corruption has spread so widely and the police are so corrupt that offences of bribery are no longer investigated or prosecuted at all (Bertrand, 2008). In a desperate attempt to stop the rot the government and other bodies establish anticorruption agencies, half believing that the problem will then disappear. New laws, new corruption offences, more severe penalties, a new agency but still the problem gets worse. Many of these agencies fail dismally to have any impact. Very few can be said to have succeeded at all (Bertrand, 2008).

Other than anticorruption agencies or institutions established by governments of countries, there are also in most countries anticorruption institutions formed by private, non-governmental bodies with the sole aim to jointly and severally, together with the traditional anticorruption agencies, fight the menace of corruption. In Ghana for instance, as reported by GACC and NACAP (2011) there are governmental anticorruption agencies like the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), Ghana Journalists Association (GJA), Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO), Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Audit Service (AS), Judicial Service (JS), Attorney General's Department (AGD), Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA), Ghana Police Service (GPS), Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), Public Procurement Authority (PPA) and Parliament. The Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII), Forum of Religious Bodies (FORB), Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF), Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana (CDD) and many others forming some of the non-governmental and private anticorruption institutions. Many of these groups are members of the Ghana Anti-corruption Coalition (GACC); a cross-sectorial grouping of public, private and civil society organizations with the sole aim of building a national effort to confront the problem of corruption and devise effective control measures. These groups over the years and currently have together concerted their efforts to fighting and eradicating corruption. It has however seemed that these institutions have not been as effective as they should, in relation to their visions and missions, in their fight against corruption in countries which they operated.

In spite of the institutions of anti-corruption and the many campaigns aimed at curbing corruption, it continues to be a global menace. Within the sub-Saharan African region, corruption has been considered as one of the key factors undermining development (Uneke, 2010).

In the case of Ghana the situation is not any different; the political history of the country shows that corruption got rooted since the early days after independence or even before independence, and since then, it has become systemically entrenched in the politics of Ghana. Virtually any government that takes office tends to use the system of patronage among other things as a way of rewarding its supporters. The situation unfortunately has not changed in spite of the use of several means both radical and civil to address it (NACAP, 2011).

## 1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Corruption is endemic in Ghana, as it is in many African countries. It is as old as the country's modern political history, but in recent times many Ghanaians believe the misuse of public power for private gain has reached an unparalleled level. Across the country, Ghanaians from all walks of life have expressed outrage and disgust as one scandal after another has created the impression that the nation has been overrun by what has been described as 'the impunity of the corrupt'. Corruption has overwhelmed the Ghanaian such that the Ghanaian chooses to now tolerate corruption rather than fight it. It is a habit that has become a culture (Africawatch, p18 & 20).

Nana Kobina Nketsia V, the paramount chief of the Essikado Traditional Area in the Western Region was even more direct in condemning the alarming upswing of corruption in the country. Speaking at a public lecture in Takoradi organized by the Western regional branch of the Old Vandals Association, an alumni group at the University of Ghana said, "we need a revolution in this country and unless we can do that, what is happening will keep on happening and we won't have any future because we have reached a point in our country where people try to lie to make a profit".

In addressing an ecclesiastical meeting in Kumasi, Ashanti Region, the Right Rev. Prof. Emmanuel Martey, moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Ghana, in shaking his head, said, “Ghana has conceived corruption, Ghana has become pregnant with corruption, and Ghana has given birth to corruption. This is who we are”. Jerry John Rawlings, a former president of the Republic of Ghana has blamed the mad upsurge of corruption in Ghana, in current times, partly on the high tolerance level of government (Africawatch, p20 & 21).

The Corruption Perception Indexes (CPI) on Ghana by Transparency International has indicated that Ghana had always performed below average, scoring below 50 out of 100 points over the past years (TI, 2002-2013).

Why has Ghana come this far with corruption in the face of all the anticorruption agencies and institutions? What has made these institutions to be such ineffective in dealing with corruption? Why have they not been able to live to their visions and missions? Is it as though their aims and objectives are not holistic and comprehensive enough to be able to fight the menace of corruption effectively or these institutions have not just been able to achieve their set goals?

### **1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION**

The question this research seeks to answer is:

- a) What challenges affect the effectiveness of anticorruption institutions in the fight against corruption in Ghana?



## **1.4 AIM AND OBJECTIVE**

The aim of this research is to explore the challenges affecting the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana.

The objective of this research is;

- a) To identify the challenges affecting the effectiveness of anticorruption institutions in their fight against corruption in Ghana.

## **1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

In recent times globally, corruption has become a major issue of concern in the international community because of its corrosive impact on economic growth, human rights and poverty reduction (UNDP, 2004). Considerable research has been conducted on the subject of corruption and its impact on development. The World Bank has estimated that each year, over \$1 billion is paid in bribes around the world, enriching the corrupt and robbing generations of the future. Each act of corruption contributes to global poverty, obstructs development and drives away investment (WB, 2004).

Corruption has been a major bane to Ghana's socio-economic and political development since independence in 1957. There is general acknowledgment of the multi-dimensional character of the problem, as well as broad societal recognition that corruption undermines good governance and the rule of law, and erodes public confidence in the merits and rewards system.

Corruption is also understood to foster public sector incompetence and ineptitude, to debase public morality, to promote and sustain inefficient service delivery, to perpetuate poverty and, ultimately, to entrench underdevelopment (NACAP, 2011).

Corruption presents a nation with many very awful consequences. A problem with corruption identified by Søreide (2005) is that it tends to place personal interest of perpetrators, who are mainly public officials, above public welfare. The damage caused by this misuse is in how it distorts choices and priorities in public spending, ending up with inefficiencies (Søreide 2005; Samura 2009). Corrupt officials may ignore projects with real development priorities in favour of projects of less developmental consequence because of their intention to maximise personal gains (Mustapha, 2010; Samura, 2009; Omeje, 2008).

In a public procurement process a giver of bribe sees bribe as cost of business. He therefore normally would inflate price by the cost of bribe and consequently increase public expenditure. On the other hand he may compromise quality to fund the bribe (Søreide, 2005). Moreover, as preference is given to projects more likely to produce opportunities for corrupt practices, allocation of public resources may be dictated by objectives falling outside the public good (Søreide, 2005). According to Kramer (2009) as cited in Osei-Afoakwa (2012), corruption is the most formidable obstacle to development enabling the selection of incompetent contractors, the inflation of cost of contracts, and the poor or non-performance of contracts. From this position, corruption may be despised because of its perceived bad consequences.

All over the world countries have suffered from the negative effects of corrupt practices in public procurement (Wittig, 2005).

In Ghana it has been estimated that as much as 10% of the total expenditure on infrastructural projects is committed annually to bribery and corruption (Short, 2010). The cost of corruption in procurement is, therefore, speculated to be colossal.

Certainly, corruption is a developmental problem, having been presented as “major obstacle to socio-economic growth and political stability affecting all countries” (Mould-Iddrisu, 2010).

To this end countries over the years have adopted strategies and systems to curb this menace of corruption, but many have not chalked significant successes. The apparent successes made by anti-corruption institution such as; the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), Singapore’s CPIB (Corrupt Practices Investigation Branch) and the Botswana DCEC (Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime), which is often used to demonstrate in part the transferability of the model, have attracted the attention of researchers and donors who argue that, subject to certain conditions, the anti-corruption institution is a viable lead vehicle for delivering anti-corruption work (Doig et al, 2007). Anti-corruption institutions have succeeded appreciably in other environments and should also be able to work in Ghana. What are the factors impeding the success of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana and what is the way forward in eradicating corruption by the anti-corruption institution strategy. This research seeks to find answers to these questions as a first step to dealing with corruption.

## **1.6 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH**

The area of the research covers the geographical and political extent of the Ashanti Region of Ghana. In Ghana most successful pilot projects were undertaken in the Ashanti Region.

The Ashanti Region has been identified as a much more suitable representative sample for the population of Ghana.

The research delimits corruption in the simple context of the misuse of entrusted power for private gain, as used by Transparency International.

## **1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT**

The research report consists of five chapters. Chapter one is the Introduction. This include: background to the study, problem statement, aim and objectives of study, justification and the scope of the research.

Chapter two is the Literature Review. In this chapter the research report identifies references from other researchers on the topic, some measurement tools that other researchers have developed and used effectively. It also identifies the challenges affecting the effectiveness of anticorruption institutions as viewed by other researchers.

Chapter three is the Methodology. This outlines in detail the methods and procedures used to achieve the aim and objective of the research.

Chapter four is the Results and Discussion. Here, relevance of the results and findings obtained in the survey are discussed and data or information obtained is analysed and interpreted.

Chapter five is on Conclusion and Recommendations. In this section a summary of the most significant result/findings is given. Also limitations on the study are stated. Recommendations or suggestions for what needs to be done as a result of the findings are listed.

Finally, there is the References or Bibliography used in the research.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter of the study would review several studies conducted by some researchers and academicians in line with the work of anti-corruption institutions in their fight against corruption, their effectiveness in the light of their set goals and objectives and how relevant these institutions have been in combating corruption.

##### **2.1.1 Conceptual Definitions of Corruption**

Søreide (2002) understands corruption as: First, the act must be intentional and in conflict with the principle of objectivity in public service performance. Second, the person who breaks the rule must derive some recognizable benefit for him/herself, his family, his friends, his tribe or party, or some other relevant group. Third, the benefit derived must be seen as a direct return from the specific act of “corruption”.

Corruption is an important aspect of poor governance, and often defined as the abuse of public office for private gain. This is a widely used definition applied by the World Bank among others (World Bank 2007). This definition includes various forms of interaction between public sector officials and other agents. Money is often involved, such as in bribery or kickbacks for public procurement contracts. In other cases, however, the private gain can be non-monetary, as in cases of patronage or nepotism (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006; Chabal & Daloz 1999; Olivier de Sardan 1999).

The definition also covers acts where there is no interaction with external agents or external agents are not explicitly implicated, such as the embezzlement of government funds, or the sale or misuse of government property.

Corruption can also take place among private sector parties. Hence, an alternative definition of corruption used by Transparency International (TI) is the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. In contrast to the former definition which includes only acts involving public sector officials, TI's definition also includes similar acts in the private sector. For example, a subcontractor that bribes an official of another company to obtain a contract would count as corruption under the TI definition. In addition to public sector corruption, the latter definition thus includes private-private corruption. This type of corruption is understudied, despite the fact that it may not reduce private sector efficiency and hence hamper development, nor have the implications for the Bank and donors of this type of corruption been adequately examined.

### **2.1.2 Anti-corruption Institutions**

In this study, an ACI is defined as a specialized entity established by government or non-governmental bodies for the purpose of combating corruption (Tamyalew, 2010). A review of the literature on ACIs indicates that there is no standard model. Some ACIs have been created from scratch, while others have been established based on ombudsman offices, special units within police departments, or justice departments (Johnston, 2004, De Sousa, 2009).

Despite the heterogeneous nature of these agencies, they can be broadly categorized in two types of approaches (Doig et al., 2007, Meagher, 2004): single- and multiple- agency approaches to the anti-corruption mandate.



The single-agency approach, which is the most popular among newly created ACIs worldwide, is a centralized, powerful agency that focuses specifically on anti-corruption responsibilities, but requires interaction with other public bodies, for example line ministries and courts. The Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) and the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) both use this type of approach and are widely viewed as role models for the establishment of successful strong, centralized anti-corruption agencies. Unfortunately, the replication of these models in their entirety, without taking into account countries' specific political, social and economic conditions has not been successful or efficient (Doig et al., 2007).

In contrast to the single-agency approach, the multiple-agency approach spreads anti-corruption mandate and responsibilities among different bodies, agencies, or departments. Under a multiple-agency approach, the anti-corruption authority shares its responsibilities with the Offices of the Ombudsman, Auditors General, or the Comptrollers General, Commissioners for Human Rights, and the Ministry of Education. Those who favor the single-agency approach argue that government agencies that deal with corruption while simultaneously conducting their regular functions may not give the fight against corruption the same importance as other items in their portfolio. The multiple-agency approach is currently used in the U.S., Brazil, France and other countries.

Regardless of whether a single- or multiple-agency approach is adopted, most ACIs have one or more of the following three universal functions: Investigation and prosecution; Corruption Prevention; Public awareness and education on the issue of corruption (Doig et al., 2007, Charron 2008, Meagher, 2004, Quah, 2009, De Speville, 2008).

Not all ACIs integrate all of the above-mentioned functions in their anti-corruption efforts. For instance, while the Hong Kong ICAC model includes all three functions, other ACIs focus on just corruption prevention and education or may include investigation and prevention functions as well. The determination of which functions ACIs include is usually consistent with the country's national anti-corruption strategy.

## **2.2 CHALLENGES THAT INFLUENCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ACIs IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION**

This section will discuss key challenges that affect the effectiveness of ACIs based on a review of the literature. In order for ACIs to be effective, it is crucial that they have strategic partnerships with other government agencies, civil society organizations, the private sector, donors, the media, and other relevant actors. Furthermore, it is important to have an effective legal framework in place as the effectiveness of ACIs is challenged when a government institution underperforms and there is an inadequate legal framework (Doig et al., 2007). In addition, the credibility and effectiveness of ACIs depend on the behavior of the anti-corruption agency itself (IMF, 2000).

However, despite the different characteristics of various ACIs according to the contemporary literature on ACIs, there are certain factors that need to be in place for an ACI to function effectively (Johnston 1999, De Sousa 2009, Quah, 2009, De Speville, 2008, Doig et al., 2007, De Speville 2000, Pope and Vogl, 2000, Dionisie and Checchi, 2007, De Sousa, 2006). These factors can be broadly classified into two categories: exogenous and endogenous factors.



Exogenous factors are external issues that affect the agency's institutional effectiveness, while endogenous factors are internal conditions that affect an ACI's ability to fight against corruption successfully. These factors are discussed below and will serve as the basis to assess the effectiveness of the Anti-corruption Institutions in Ghana.

### **2.2.1 Exogenous Factors**

Exogenous factors include external factors that impede the performance of ACIs. These challenges broadly include lack of political will, unfavourable economic conditions, lack of donor initiatives, lack of public trust and confidence, the media, and ACIs' relationship with civil society actors (Arsema, 2010).

**2.2.1.1 Lack of Political Will** – In order for ACIs to be fully effective, top-level political backing and commitment is critical. If there is political will, an incumbent government can, through legislation, empower ACIs and implement anti-corruption laws. Furthermore, the government can also provide ACIs with regular funding, assist them by working closely through various agencies, grant them access to government data, and continuously give political support to achieve concrete results. At the same time, it is also important to recognize that besides political will demonstrated at the highest levels of government, there are bottom-up sources of political will as well (Arsema, 2010).

In some cases, these sources may be “street level bureaucrats,” who are public officials that actually deliver the final services to the general public and who are strongly committed to controlling, preventing waste, fraud, and abuse (Brinkerhoff, 2010). The role of these groups in whistle-blowing, voicing concerns and demands, and putting pressure on public officials is an important factor in strengthening political will.

**2.2.1.2 Unfavourable Economic Conditions** – This factor has to do with macroeconomic stability and poverty, which can undermine the effectiveness of ACIs. An example of the impact of unfavorable economic conditions on an ACI is the Argentine experience. While the institution began with very good prospects for success, the deep economic crisis in the country caused shortfalls in funding, which resulted in underpaid staff and diminished morale (Meagher, 2004). This situation made it difficult for the Argentine ACI to continue to be effective. The effectiveness of the ACIs of African countries such as Tanzania and Uganda has also been affected by poverty and economic shocks that have contributed to the lack of funding necessary for those ACIs to perform their day- to-day operations (Meagher, 2004).

**2.2.1.3 Lack of Donor Initiatives** – A lack of donor coordination or duplication of efforts can negatively impact ACIs. Given that most ACIs suffer from a lack of funding, donors determine which ACI components to fund mostly based on donors' choices rather than ACIs' needs assessment (Doig et al., 2007). In order to enhance the effectiveness of ACIs, donors should work in partnership with ACIs rather than solely focusing on their own initiatives.

**2.2.1.4 Lack of Public Confidence and Trust in ACIs** – ACIs must command public respect and credibility given that they operate on behalf of citizens (IMF, 2000). In this regard, the public's acceptance and trust in ACIs is a key indicator in their success.

**2.2.1.5 Lack of good Relationship with Civil Society Actors** – An important factor impacting the effectiveness success of ACIs is building cross sectional-sectorial support to create a significant mass of public official, civil society groups, and private firms (Johnston and Kpundeh, 2002). Free media and non-governmental watchdogs play a vital role through their capacity to build public awareness and monitor ACI activities.

Given that gaining public confidence is crucial to ACIs' effectiveness, collaboration between ACIs and non-governmental groups is an important factor in their success.

### **2.2.2 Endogenous Factors**

Endogenous factors are the internal conditions that affect an ACI's ability to fight corruption effectively. Among others, these factors include the ACI's independence in performing its functions, the specificity of its objectives in terms of the context of the country, permanence, sufficiency of financial resources, and staff capacity (human capital). These factors will be discussed in-depth below.

**2.2.2.1 Lack of Independence** – Independence basically refers to the ability of an ACI to carry out its mission without political interference. However, it does not mean the absence of reporting to external control. Rather, it refers to an ACI's degree of independence to freely investigate corruption wherever it suspects that it may be occurring without the punishment being cancelled or modified because of the interests of powerful individuals or groups (Johnston, 1999). In order to function efficiently, the ACI should have a broad mandate without restrictions on its investigation of suspected corruption. However, at the same time, the ACI should also be held accountable for its actions, investigations, and general comportment as a government agency.

In this regard, an independent anti-corruption institution needs to integrate a system of checks and balances in order to maintain transparency and accountability. In addition, the independence of an ACI may be evaluated based on the following:

**2.2.2.1.1 Institutional placement-** A permanent agency, unit, or commission that exists separately and outside of government agencies has greater independence than an ACI established as a unit or department within an institutional structure of a selected ministry, (e.g., Ministry of the Interior, Finance, or Justice).

**2.2.2.1.2 Appointment and removal of the head of the ACI-** The selection process of the head of the ACI should be transparent and based on consensus among different high-level decision-makers, such as the President and Parliament. If the head is nominated by the President and subsequently approved by the Parliament, then the president is not authorized to appoint the head, while the parliament is not authorized to nominate. This creates a system with checks and balances given that there is a separation of the authority to nominate and appoint. The head of the ACIs should also be protected by law against dismissal.

**2.2.2.1.3 Budget and fiscal autonomy-** In the case of ACIs, complete financial independence is not possible given that by and large the budget for these entities is prepared by the parliament and in many cases the government. Nevertheless, there needs to be a law in place that prohibits a decrease in the budget from the previous year's budget. In addition, the budget of the ACI should be reflected separately in the government's budget (OECD, 2007).

**2.2.2.2 Lack of Permanence-** An essential factor in the effectiveness of ACIs is long-term durability. In particular, regular funding and continuous political and popular support are critical (De Sousa, 2009).

Permanence is also an important factor in reducing corruption over time and creating an institution that learns from its mistakes and generates advanced technical capacity to combat corruption (Johnston 1999). Furthermore, it takes time to select and train personnel and, establish both operational and functional systems (De Speville, 2008).

**2.2.2.3 Lack of Country-specific Objectives** – Most ACIs are created by copying “successful models” without taking into account the country’s political environment, social and economic conditions and available resources in the context where the ACI will carry out its functions (De Sousa, 2009). This practice does not always result in success and efficiency, and can result in a gap between expected results and achievements. In this regard, when replicating a model, it is vital to assess the aforementioned factors and establish a country-specific model with realistic and achievable objectives.

**2.2.2.4 Insufficient Resources** – Most ACIs operate with limited financial resources. Without sufficient resources, it is difficult to attract qualified personnel, especially in developing countries, which often results in low-quality outputs. In addition, inadequate budgetary resources can also mean disconnected and inefficient outputs (for instance, partial investigations or the inability to implement planned prevention programs due to a lack of funding). In this regard, a key factor in budgetary consistency is solid political support and an efficient budgetary process.

**2.2.2.5 Inappropriate Staffing** – Deficiencies in recruitment and training procedures are the major causes for a lack of specialization among personnel (De Sousa, 2009). For the most part, staff recruitment is not based on task-oriented or objective-oriented selection.

Furthermore, most ACIs do not have a clearly defined human resources strategy that assesses human capital based on a set of pre-determined criteria. Another factor in the shortage of qualified staff is the lack of funding.

**2.2.2.6 Lack of Well-defined Strategy** – A failure to understand the underlying causes of corrupt practices may lead to misguided strategies in the fight against corruption. For instance, corruption may not be dealt with by law enforcement alone.

However, most countries try to deal with corruption entirely through investigating, prosecuting and sentencing (De Speville, 2008). ACIs should pursue a strategy that fits the cultural context of the country. For instance, in some countries, a robust corruption prevention strategy may be more effective in changing the attitudes and perceptions of citizens about corruption. Consequently, if there is a lack of a clear strategy regarding how to fight corruption within an ACI, the impact of its operation may be minimal.

**2.2.2.7 Insufficient Internal Coordination** – As previously mentioned, most ACIs integrate different anti-corruption functions. Such an integration of functions must be well coordinated in order for ACIs to operate effectively. For instance, the Prevention and Education Department should work closely with the Investigation Department to create techniques to reduce corruption.

**2.2.2.8 Inadequate Leadership and Management** – Weak leadership or an inadequate or lack of a management strategy affects the performance and efficiency of ACIs (De Sousa, 2009). In this regard, ACIs need to have a management team in place to lead day-to-day operations and a technical team to carry out specialized aspects of operations. If there is insufficient leadership, then the institution's results and ability to implement ideas will be compromised, which will ultimately impact the effectiveness of the ACI.



## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

The methodology for this study describes the underlying structure of processes that guide or support the conduct of this study. The study used the analytic descriptive cross sectional design. The quantitative research approach was employed in the study in collecting the data; specifically, through the use of a questionnaire. Data was analyzed descriptively.

#### **3.2 RESEARCH SETTING**

Ashanti Region is an administrative region in Ghana centrally located in the middle belt of Ghana. It lies between longitudes 0.15W and 2.25W, and latitudes 5.50N and 7.46N. The region shares boundaries with four of the ten political regions, Brong-Ahafo in the north, Eastern region in the east, Central region in the south and Western region in the South west. Most of the region's inhabitants are Ashanti people, one of Ghana's major ethnic groups. Most of Ghana's cocoa is grown in Ashanti, and it is also a major site of Ghana's gold-mining industry (GoG, 2014).

#### **3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN**

Research is a systematic method of finding solutions to problems. Chahal et al (2013) emphasize that it constitutes an investigation, a recording and an analysis of evidence for the purpose of gaining knowledge. Research design forms the methodological framework of the thesis.

The paradigm could either be quantitative or qualitative or mixed method involving the combination of the two. Quantitative design gathers large amounts of data on participants that would be generalized to cover the entire population from which the sample of participants was taken. It is often associated with questionnaires or structured interview schedules, and requires large samples.

On the other hand, qualitative design is participant specific and generalization is not possible. In-depth opinions of participants are sought to help understand their feelings or actions that pertain to them only. It is often associated with unstructured interviews and discussions, and does not require large samples. Triangulation combines both qualitative as well as quantitative designs with an objective to generalize certain views as well as obtain vivid opinions. In this regard therefore, this research will make use of the quantitative research design since it is designed to identify factors affecting effectiveness of selected anti-corruption institutions. The research design was descriptive cross sectional. This design is relevant since its observational nature enables researcher to record information about their subjects without manipulating the study environment.

### **3.4 PROFILE OF SOME ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONS IN GHANA**

#### **3.4.1 The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice**

The CHRAJ was established in October 1993 by the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice Act, (Act 456).



Among the principal functions of the CHRAJ is the investigation of “all instances of alleged or suspected corruption and the misappropriation of public moneys by officials”. In addition, by virtue of Articles 218(b) and 287 (1) of the Constitution, the CHRAJ is mandated to investigate “complaints of corruption” as well as non-compliance with the provisions of the Code of Conduct for Public officers (NACAP, 2011).

### **3.4.2 The Economic and Organised Crime Office**

The Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO) was established with the object of preventing and detecting organised crime and facilitating the confiscation of proceeds of crime.

In order to achieve its objectives, the EOCO, among other functions, is to:

- a. Investigate and on the authority of the Attorney-General prosecute serious offences involving: financial or economic loss to the Republic or any state entity or institution in which the state has financial interest; money-laundering; human trafficking; prohibited cyber activity; and other serious offences; and
- b. Recover proceeds of crime (NACAP, 2011).

### **3.4.3 The Financial Intelligence Centre**

The Financial Intelligence Centre was established in the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2008 (Act 769) and started operation in January 2010. The function of the FIC is to receive suspicions transaction reports, disseminate financial intelligence and other information related to money laundering and terrorist financing to relevant institutions for further action to combat corruption and deal with the illicit acquisition of money (NACAP, 2011).

### **3.5 TARGET POPULATION**

The target population of this study includes the heads of the selected anti-corruption institutions. Otherwise, senior officers who head units or divisions within the selected ACIs will constitute the unit of analysis. This will be limited to those who head units whose work related directly with anti-corruption.

### **3.6 SAMPLING PROCEDURE AND SIZE**

The following are twelve (12) public and four (4) private ACIs identified in Ghana. The public ones include; Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), Ghana Journalists Association (GJA), Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO), Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Ghana Police Service (GPS), Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), Audit Service (AS), Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA), Parliament, Judicial Service (JS), Attorney-General's Department (AGD) and Public Procurement Authority (PPA).

Private anti-corruption institutions identified in Ghana include; The Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII), Forum of Religious Bodies (FORB), Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF) and Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana (CDD).

Out of these eight (8) public and one (1) private ACIs have their offices in the Ashanti Region. The population for the study is eight (8) public and one (1) private ACIs. The total population of nine (9) was used for the study.

The views of heads of the institutions were collected for the study. This is aimed at enabling the research to know the position of the various institutions.

### 3.6.1 Population size

The elements that determine sample size selection are its appropriateness and representativeness to facilitate generalizability of the research findings (Kothari, 2004)

The population size was nine (9), one for each head of the ACIs which have offices in the Ashanti Region. The table 3.1 below provides the population size.

Table 3.1: **Population size**

ITEM	NAME OF INSTITUTION	NUMBER SAMPLED	
		HEAD OF INSTITUTION	TOTAL
A.	<b>PUBLIC ACAs</b>		
1	Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ)	1	1
2	Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO)	1	1
3	Ghana Police Service (GPS)	1	1
4	Audit Service (AS)	1	1
5	Judicial Service (JS)	1	1
6	Attorney-General's Department (AGD)	1	1
7	Public Procurement Authority (PPA)	1	1
8	Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA)		
B.	<b>PRIVATE ACAs</b>		
9	<b>Forum of Religious Bodies (FORB)</b>	1	1
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>

**Source:** Author's own construct

### **3.7 SOURCES OF DATA**

Primary data was used in this study. This included data derived from the administration of questionnaires to various relevant respondents.

#### **3.7.1 Data collection instruments**

The researcher use questionnaire to collect data. The questionnaire for this study was largely closed - ended with some response options to all attitudinal questions fully anchored on 5-point Likert scale to determine the relative importance of the challenges affecting effectiveness (i.e., “very unimportant”, “unimportant”, “neither important nor unimportant”, “important”, and “very important”). There was also a 3-point Likert scale to determine the frequency of occurrence of the various challenges.

The questions were designed to enable the participants to identify the challenges affecting the effectiveness of the selected ACIs in their fight against corruption.

### **3.8 DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION**

The data was analyzed using relative importance, frequency and severity indexes equations. The data was presented using descriptive statistical tools such as figures, and tables. The research measured the Relative Importance, Frequency and Severity Indexes of the challenges identified.

A total of nine (9) questionnaires were sent out and sorted using various demographic data. A response rate of 100% was obtained. The results were analysed using descriptive statistical methods.

An ordinal measurement scale, which is a ranking of rating data that normally use integers in ascending or descending order, was used in this study.

The numbers assigned to the importance scale (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and the frequency scale (1, 2, 3) do not indicate that the intervals between the scales are equal, nor do they indicate absolute quantities. The respondents were asked to rank the challenges affecting effectiveness according to the degree of importance (1= very unimportant, 2= unimportant, 3= neither important nor unimportant, 4= important, and 5= very important). For analysing data by ordinal scale, an importance index (I) was used. This index was computed by the following equation:

$$RII = \frac{\sum W}{A \times N}$$

Where;

$\sum W$  is the summation of the weight of each factor multiplied by number of responses

A is the highest weight

N is the total number of respondents

RII is the relative importance index

The respondents were then asked to rate the frequency of occurrence of the challenges affecting effectiveness (1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high). This was analysed using an index computed by the following equation:

$$FI = \frac{3n_1 + 2n_2 + n_3}{3(n_1 + n_2 + n_3)}$$

Where;

$n_1$  is the number of respondents who answered high

$n_2$  is the number of respondents who answered medium

$n_3$  is the number of respondents who answered low

FI is the frequency index

Further analysis using a severity index was used to determine which of the challenges were the most frequent and most important relatively at the same time. The equation below was used to identify the severe challenges that affect the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana.

$$\text{Severity Index (SI)} = RII \times FI$$

### 3.9 ETHICAL ISSUES

The researcher ensured the strictest levels of confidentiality. This was achieved by not revealing any responses to other parties other than for academic purpose for which the data was collected. Additionally anonymity of the research participants was ensured. Respondents were not asked to indicate their names or any identifiers that could reveal their identity. All cited sources were duly acknowledged to make sure that plagiarism or academic dishonesty was not part of this study.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter contains the results and discussions of the responses to the questionnaires that were distributed in order to achieve the aim and objective of this research.

#### 4.2 RESPONDENTS' CHARACTERISTICS

Table 4.1: **Respondents' characteristics**

<b>PRESENT STATUS IN INSTITUTION</b>		
ITEM	DESCRIPTION	PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS
1	Top Management	44%
2	Middle Class Management	56%
3	Lower Class Management	0%
Total		100%
<b>CATEGORY OF INSTITUTION</b>		
1	Public Institution	89%
2	Private Institution	11%
Total		100%
<b>CURRENT EDUCATIONAL LEVEL</b>		
1	HND	11%
2	Bachelors Degree	33%
3	Masters Degree	56%
Total		100%
<b>GENDER</b>		
1	Male	89%
2	Female	11%
Total		100%
<b>YEARS WORKED WITH INSTITUTION</b>		
1	Below 5 years	0%
2	6 - 11	67%
3	12 - 17	0%
4	18 - 23	0%
5	Above 24 years	33%
Total		100%

**Source:** Author's own construct



### 4.3 CHALLENGES AFFECTING EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONS IN GHANA

The aggregate analysis for challenges affecting effectiveness from all the nine (9) respondents is as follows;

Table 4.2: **Relative Importance Index**

CHALLENGES AFFECTING EFFECTIVENESS		NO. OF RESPONDENTS						COMPUTATION		
		1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL	ΣW	RII	RANK
<b>A.</b>	<b><u>External Factors</u></b>									
1	Lack of political will	0	0	0	1	8	9	44	0.9778	1
2	Unfavourable economic conditions	0	0	0	5	4	9	40	0.8889	3
3	Lack of donor initiatives	1	1	2	4	1	9	30	0.6667	8
4	Lack of public confidence and trust in anti-corruption institutions	0	1	1	1	6	9	39	0.8667	4
5	Lack of good relationship with civil society actors	1	1	1	4	2	9	32	0.7111	7
6	Inaccessibility to information	0	1	0	6	2	9	36	0.8000	5
<b>B.</b>	<b><u>Internal Factors</u></b>									
7	Lack of Independence	0	0	0	2	7	9	43	0.9556	2
8	Poor institutional placement	0	0	1	3	5	9	40	0.8889	3
9	Non-constructive appointment and removal process of heads of anti-corruption institutions	0	0	1	4	4	9	39	0.8667	4
10	Lack of budget and fiscal autonomy	0	0	0	5	4	9	40	0.8889	3
11	Lack of permanence	0	1	2	3	3	9	35	0.7778	6
12	Lack of country-specific objectives	0	0	3	3	3	9	36	0.8000	5
13	Insufficient resources	0	0	0	2	7	9	43	0.9556	2
14	Inappropriate staffing	0	0	0	2	7	9	43	0.9556	2
15	Lack of well-defined strategy	0	0	1	4	4	9	39	0.8667	4
16	Insufficient internal coordination/inter-agency relations	0	0	0	5	4	9	40	0.8889	3
17	Inadequate leadership and management	0	0	0	1	8	9	44	0.9778	1

**Source:** Author's own construct

With RII of 0.9778, lack of political will and inadequate leadership and management were identified as the two (2) most important challenges affecting effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana. This to a large extent suggests that government has a very important role to play in the work of anti-corruption institutions. The will of government becomes the will of the people. If government has a good will to combat corruption, then the fight against this menace is largely won.

The top five (5) relatively most important challenges identified are;

- Lack of political will
- Inadequate leadership and management
- Lack of independence
- Insufficient resources
- Inappropriate staffing

Lack of donor initiatives, with RII of 0.6667 was ranked as the least important challenge. The 5 least ranked factors by the respondents in descending order are;

- Inaccessibility of information
- Lack of country-specific information
- Lack of permanence
- Lack of good relations with civil society actors
- Lack of donor initiatives

Table 4.3: **Frequency Index**

CHALLENGES AFFECTING EFFECTIVENESS		NO. OF RESPONDENTS			COMPUTATION	
		1	2	3	FI	RANK
<b>A.</b>	<b><u>External Factors</u></b>					
1	Lack of political will	2	3	4	0.7407	3
2	Unfavourable economic conditions	1	4	4	0.7778	2
3	Lack of donor initiatives	3	5	1	0.5926	8
4	Lack of public confidence and trust in anti-corruption institutions	2	4	3	0.7037	4
5	Lack of good relationship with civil society actors	2	5	1	0.6250	7
6	Inaccessibility to information	2	5	2	0.6667	5
<b>B.</b>	<b><u>Internal Factors</u></b>					
7	Lack of Independence	3	5	1	0.5926	8
8	Poor institutional placement	3	5	1	0.5926	8
9	Non-constructive appointment and removal process of heads of anti-corruption institutions	3	2	4	0.7037	4
10	Lack of budget and fiscal autonomy	1	3	5	0.8148	1
11	Lack of permanence	2	5	2	0.6667	5
12	Lack of country-specific objectives	1	6	2	0.7037	4
13	Insufficient resources	1	4	4	0.7778	2
14	Inappropriate staffing	1	4	4	0.7778	2
15	Lack of well-defined strategy	0	7	2	0.7407	3
16	Insufficient internal coordination/inter-agency relations	1	6	2	0.7037	4
17	Inadequate leadership and management	2	6	1	0.6296	6

**Source:** Author's own construct

The most frequent challenge identified by the respondents is the lack of budget and fiscal autonomy, with an index of 0.8148.

This is due to the dependence of anti-corruption institutions on government, in that the annual budgets of these institutions are vetted and approved by government. By this government dictates the spending options of these institutions. This certainly is a challenge to the effectiveness of their work.

The top five (5) most frequent challenges identified are;

- Lack of budget and fiscal autonomy
- Unfavourable economic conditions
- Insufficient resources
- Inappropriate staffing
- Lack of political will

Here it is observed that although lack of political will is the relatively most important challenge but it is not as frequent as lack of budget and fiscal autonomy, unfavourable economic conditions, and insufficient resources. This highlights that anti-corruption institutions in Ghana frequently are faced with inadequate financial, human and other resources. Thus anti-corruption institutions in Ghana are most often than not under-resourced.

Lack of donor initiatives, lack of independence, and poor institutional placement with FI of 0.5926 was ranked as the least frequent challenges. These challenges are neither very important nor very frequent. This observation suggests that anti-corruption institutions in Ghana do not largely depend on donor initiatives and are also dependent from external influences. These institutions are also properly placed such that they are not departments within institutions of selected ministries.

The five (5) least ranked factors by the respondents in terms of frequency descending order are;

- Inadequate leadership and management
- Lack of good relations with civil society actors
- Lack of donor initiatives
- Lack of independence
- Poor institutional placement

Table 4.4: **Severity Index**

CHALLENGES AFFECTING EFFECTIVENESS		COMPUTATION			
		RII	FI	RII x FI	RANK
<b>A.</b>	<b><u>External Factors</u></b>				
1	Lack of political will	0.9778	0.7407	0.7243	2
2	Unfavourable economic conditions	0.8889	0.7778	0.6914	3
3	Lack of donor initiatives	0.6667	0.5926	0.3951	14
4	Lack of public confidence and trust in anti-corruption institutions	0.8667	0.7037	0.6099	7
5	Lack of good relationship with civil society actors	0.7111	0.6250	0.4444	13
6	Inaccessibility to information	0.8000	0.6667	0.5333	10
<b>B.</b>	<b><u>Internal Factors</u></b>				
7	Lack of Independence	0.9556	0.5926	0.5663	8
8	Poor institutional placement	0.8889	0.5926	0.5267	11
9	Non-constructive appointment and removal process of heads of anti-corruption institutions	0.8667	0.7037	0.6099	7
10	Lack of budget and fiscal autonomy	0.8889	0.8148	0.7243	2
11	Lack of permanence	0.7778	0.6667	0.5185	12
12	Lack of country-specific objectives	0.8000	0.7037	0.5630	9
13	Insufficient resources	0.9556	0.7778	0.7432	1
14	Inappropriate staffing	0.9556	0.7778	0.7432	1
15	Lack of well-defined strategy	0.8667	0.7407	0.6420	4
16	Insufficient internal coordination/inter-agency relations	0.8889	0.7037	0.6255	5
17	Inadequate leadership and management	0.9778	0.6296	0.6156	6

**Source:** Author's own construct

The five (5) most relatively important and most frequent challenges identified by the study are:

- Insufficient resources
- Inappropriate staffing
- Lack of political will
- Lack of budget and fiscal autonomy
- Unfavourable economic conditions

These challenges are severe since they are both important and frequent. These are the challenges that greatly impede the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana. Anti-corruption institutions in Ghana are under-resourced and they also do not have appropriate staffing fit for their tasks, set goals and objectives. Further, the government is said to have a lack of good will towards the fight against corruption, hence government's ill attitude towards partnering the work of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana. The research also identified lack of budget and fiscal autonomy as a challenge affecting the work of these institutions. Anti-corruption institutions, especially the public ones, do have their annual budgets vetted and most often trimmed down before approval by government. For this reason, the institutions are unable to finance projects they have planned to undertake for that year. This eventually will result in ineffectiveness. Unfavourable economic conditions is among the top five challenges. The economic climate in Ghana does not seem to favour the work of the anti-corruption institutions.

The research suggests that the above mentioned severe challenges are those that any government or entity interested in helping anti-corruption institutions in Ghana to become effective in their work should look at and address.

The five (5) least severe challenges identified by the study in ascending order are:

- Inaccessibility to information
- Poor institutional placement
- Lack of permanence
- Lack of good relationship with civil society actors
- Lack of donor initiatives

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## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter outlines the critical results and findings derived from the research data. Here conclusion to the research is made and recommendations are also suggested to interested bodies and institutions on ways to make anti-corruption institutions in Ghana effective.

#### **5.2 CONCLUSION**

The research has identified the following as the five most relatively important challenges that affect the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana.

1. Lack of political will
2. Inadequate leadership and management
3. Lack of independence
4. Insufficient resources
5. Inappropriate staffing

Also the following were identified as the most frequent challenges affect the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana.

- a. Lack of budget and fiscal autonomy
- b. Unfavourable economic conditions
- c. Insufficient resources
- d. Inappropriate staffing
- e. Lack of political will

Ultimately, the research identified the following as the five most severe challenges that affective the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana.

- i. Insufficient resources
- ii. Inappropriate staffing
- iii. Lack of political will
- iv. Lack of budget and fiscal autonomy
- v. Unfavourable economic conditions

These severe challenges are challenges which are at the same time most important and frequent. These challenges are the critical ones which impede largely the work of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana.

As much as the important and frequent challenges are relevant, any stakeholder, institution, government, etc which is interested in addressing the ineffectiveness problem of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana should first look at the severe challenges.

### **5.3 RECOMENDATIONS**

The following recommendations are made on the five (5) most critical or severe challenges that affect the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana.

#### **5.3.1 Insufficient resources**

Stakeholders and government should undertake periodic audit and needs assessment of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana to identify the needed resources for the efficient operationalization of these institutions.

These assessments should look at finances, personnel, office space, vehicle and other office and field monitory equipment, training, etc. When these assessments are done, government and other stakeholder should take dedicated steps to implement the findings so as to make anti-corruption institutions effective in their fight against corruption in Ghana.

### **5.3.2 Inappropriate staffing**

Inappropriate staffing talks of square pegs in round holes. The institutions do have adequate quantity of staff but not appropriate quality of personnel. If the institutions will be effective, it is imperative that qualified staff are employed and assigned the task of anti-corruption. Appointment of heads and other staff of the institutions should be constructive, dispassionate and free from any form of unhealthy influence.

### **5.3.3 Lack of political will**

This refers to lukewarm attitude and disinterestedness of government in the fight against corruption. Due to this attitude of government, anti-corruption institutions do not receive the needed support of government and invariably of the people also. These institutions have become disabled in this regard, hence the overwhelming takeover of this canker of corruption over the country.


Government and other stakeholders should stir up and arise with good willingness towards the fight against corruption and thus rendering the needed support to anti-corruption institutions in Ghana.

#### **5.3.4 Lack of budget and fiscal autonomy**

Due to the fact that anti-corruption institutions in the public sector have to submit their annual budgets to government for vetting, ‘trimming down’ before being approved, the institutions are unable to adequately finance their annual activities. Thus their inability to be effective as planned. It is recommended that government dedicate a fund solely to anti-corruption institutions which shall be autonomous from central government. With this in place, the institutions can now plan holistically and implement fully their set goals without budget and fiscal constraints.

#### **5.3.5 Unfavourable economic conditions**

Due to unfavourable economic conditions, government and other domestic stakeholders are not very able to support financially the activities of anti-corruption institutions in the country. Government should therefore work tirelessly to ensure that the economy is stabilised to aid indirectly the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana.



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## APPENDICES

### QUESTIONNAIRE ON CHALLENGES AFFECTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONS IN GHANA

#### PART 1

##### DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

The purpose of this section is to gather personal information for research only. Please tick (☑) the appropriate column to indicate your response to each question.

1. What is your present status in your institution?

- ☐ Top Management
- ☐ Middle Class Management
- ☐ Lower Class Management
- ☐ Other (please state) -----

2. What is the category of your institution?

- ☐ Public Institution
- ☐ Private Institution
- ☐ Other (please state) -----

3. What is your current educational level?

- ☐ HND
- ☐ Bachelors Degree
- ☐ Masters Degree
- ☐ Other (please state) -----

4. What is your gender?

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female

5. How long have you worked with this present institution?

- ☐ Below 5 years
- ☐ 6 – 11
- ☐ 12 – 17
- ☐ 18 – 23
- ☐ Above 24 years

## PART 2

Below are a number of challenges which affect the **effectiveness** of **anti-corruption institutions** in **Ghana**. From your experience, please express your opinion on how important each challenge is on the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Ghana.

### Relative importance

1 = very unimportant; 2 = unimportant; 3 = neither important nor unimportant; 4 = important, 5 = very important

### Frequency of occurrence

1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high

CHALLENGES AFFECTING EFFECTIVENESS		RELATIVE IMPORTANCE					FREQUENCY		
		1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3
<b>A.</b>	<b><u>External Factors</u></b>								
1	Lack of political will								
2	Unfavourable economic conditions								
3	Lack of donor initiatives								
4	Lack of public confidence and trust in anti-corruption institutions								
5	Lack of good relationship with civil society actors								
6	Inaccessibility to information								

FACTORS AFFECTING EFFECTIVENESS		RELATIVE IMPORTANCE					FREQUENCY		
		1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3
<b>B.</b>	<b><u>Internal Factors</u></b>								
7	Lack of independence ( <i>from political or any other influence</i> )								
8	Poor institutional placement ( <i>being a permanent agency separate and outside of government agencies rather than being a department within an institution structure of a selected ministry</i> )								
9	Non-constructive appointment and removal process of heads of anti-corruption institutions								
10	Lack of budget and fiscal autonomy								
11	Lack of permanence								
12	Lack of country-specific objectives								
13	Insufficient resources								
14	Inappropriate staffing								
15	Lack of well-defined strategy								
16	Insufficient internal coordination/inter-agency relations								
17	Inadequate leadership and management								