

**‘MEN AT WORK’**

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MASTER OF FINE ART

IN

SCULPTURE

BY

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## CERTIFICATION

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work towards the Master of Fine Art in Sculpture and that, to the best of my knowledge, it contains no material(s) previously published by another person(s) nor material(s), which have been accepted for the award of any other degree of the University, except where the acknowledgement has been made in the text.

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
**‘MEN AT WORK’**

**A Special Study submitted to the Board of Post-Graduate Studies**

**Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology,**

**Kumasi in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the**

**Masters of Fine Art in Sculpture**



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## ABSTRACT

In this thesis /exhibition project, I argue that the creation of the spider web sacramentally serve as a symbolism for connectivity and not necessarily a fabric of bad luck or entrapment. Through studio work, installation and experiment, I investigate metaphorical questions on how the mass is used in search for power. I am engaging metaphorically the often misleading emphasis upon the radical alterity of these spaces in reference to politically what the spider does the web for - where the mass is used in search for authority but does not benefit from the power attained. The initial stimulus for deliberations raises questions about the establishment of order in our culture, or those basic codes that govern perceptions, language and practice. The inventive play produces a different space that at the same time mirrors the issues around us. The space reflects and contests simultaneously. With war, a frightening prospect and fruitful negotiations a still-distant dream, power have become the West's instrument of choice. They are everywhere in the financial arena, barring habitual commercial relations; in the oil sector, choking off Tehran's principal source of currency; in the insurance sector, thwarting its ability to transport goods. Add to this myriad unintended consequences (bolstering the regime's ability to allocate goods; harming ordinary citizens; pushing leaders persuaded the goal is regime change to escalate its own retaliatory steps; and constructing a web of punitive measures harder to unknot than to weave). Confusion on this score has undermined efforts to right the imbalance. My purpose here is to clarify the analytic roles that power and cooperation actually play in this literature, and to argue that a more balanced theory one that brings power from its periphery to its very core is both necessary and entirely possible.



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**Albert Oduro Asante**

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## CHAPTER ONE

### BACKGROUND OF STUDY

#### 1.1 Introduction

Sanctions are not necessarily counterproductive. But, too easily they become a path of least resistance, a tool whose effectiveness is assessed by the harm inflicted, not how much closer it brings the goal. In future cases, policymakers should make sure to constantly re-evaluate their effects. For now, the priority is devising a menu of meaningful, realistic sanctions relief to match meaningful, realistic nuclear concessions.

Not the product of a single policy, the sanctions regime has mutated over three decades, been imposed by a variety of actors and aimed at a wide range of objectives. The end result is an impressive set of unilateral and multilateral punitive steps targeting virtually every important sector of Iran's economy, in principle tethered to multiple policy objectives (non-proliferation; anti-terrorism; human rights) yet, in the main, aimed at confronting the Islamic Republic with a straightforward choice: either comply with international demands on the nuclear file, or suffer the harsh economic consequences.

In my view, sanction also has a parral prisms link to power. This is whereby citizens do not benefit from the achieved authority. Life of an individual changes when he or she attain authority. European and U.S. officials bank on a cost-benefit analysis pursuant to which the Islamic Republic, at some point, will conclude that persevering on the nuclear track will prompt economic hardships sufficiently great to trigger more extensive popular unrest, ultimately threatening regime survival itself.

Governmental and quasi-governmental institutions still dominate the economy, and evidence suggests that groups with superior contacts with the state have been in a

position to weather the storm, circumvent sanctions, exploit new opportunities and thus minimise any damage to their interests. The net effect is to mould the nation's political economy in ways that run directly counter to the sanctioning nations' stated intent as reported by Crisis Group Middle East Report (2013).

By placing all one's eggs in the sanctions basket, failure may appear to leave no other option but war. None of this is meant to indict sanctions as a policy tool. Even in the Iranian case, it is plausible that, in their absence, Tehran might have advanced further along the nuclear path. And they remain an option preferable to military confrontation. But, at a minimum, it argues for exhibiting greater prudence and judiciousness in imposing them; resisting the impulse to pile on more sanctions when those already in place do not succeed; constantly assessing and reassessing their social and economic consequences; and preserving sufficient nimbleness so that they can be used including through their removal to advance negotiations in a diplomatic process where a scalpel, not a chainsaw, is required. Rational choice theory tends to view political institutions as structures of voluntary cooperation that resolve collective action problems and benefit all concerned. Yet the political process often gives rise to institutions that are good for some people and bad for others, depending on who has the power to impose their will.

(Moe 2005)

Political institutions may be structures of cooperation, but they may also be structures of power and the theory does not tell us much about this. As a result, it gives us a onesided and overly benign view of what political institutions are and do. This problem is not well understood, and indeed is not typically seen as a problem at all. There is a widespread sense in the rational choice literature that, because power is frequently

discussed, it is an integral part but at the end it does not allow the achievement of a mutual benefits. Institutions may be structures of cooperation, I argued, but they may also be structures of power. And the theory should recognize as much theory and just as fundamental as cooperation. Confusion on this score has undermined efforts to right the imbalance. My purpose here is to clarify the analytic roles that power and cooperation actually play in this literature, and to argue that a more balanced theory one that brings power from its periphery to its very core is both necessary and entirely possible. And the theory should recognize as much. Power is essential to an understanding of political institutions. Institutions are mainly explained by distributional conflicts and power rather than collective benefits (International Crisis Group, 2013).

Indeed, power is so commonly featured in the literature that is now easy to believe as I suspect most scholars in the field do, that power is an integral part of the theory, on a par with cooperation in explaining political institutions. But it is really not. However much power might be discussed, the fundamentals of the theory have not changed. They take their orientation from the same framework that guides all economic theory: voluntary exchange among rational individuals. They identify the key challenge as one of understanding whether rational individuals will cooperate in the face of collective action problems. And their explanations are built around mutual gains, credible commitments, self-enforcing equilibria, and other concepts that flow from the logic of voluntary choice. This is the analytic core of the theory, the root source of its logic, Language, and formalization.

There are two problems here. The first is that power is a peripheral component of the theory. The rational choice theory of political institutions is really a theory of cooperation that, with elaboration, can be used to say something about power.

As Mancur Olson rightly notes, “We need to understand the logic of power” and the current theory of voluntary exchange is not designed to do that (Mancur, 2006 p33).

The second problem reinforces the first. It is that, because power is so obviously important to politics and so commonly a part of institutional analysis, the literature gives the sense that power is being given equal (or at least appropriate) weight in the overall theory. There is a good deal of confusion about the relative analytic roles of power and cooperation, and this confusion undermines efforts to right the imbalance. I strongly argue to this theory to the sense that the mass that is the ‘weight that initiate the power does not have a full or complete incentive of attain power (Moe, 2005).

While the subject of this work was policy rather than institutions, the overlap was substantial and unavoidable. Policies that create tariffs and quotas in international trade, for example, are essentially just creating institutions rules, agreements, and organizations. Thus, while the rent seeking literature is often portrayed as an interestgroup theory of public policy, it also offers a (nascent) theory of political institutions arguing that they are beneficial to some, harmful to others, and socially inefficient.

## **1.2 Institutions as Structures of Cooperation**

Prior to the 1980s, social choice theory had shown that collective decisions are prone to instabilities, and that voting can easily lead to chaos in which virtually any alternative can beat any other given the right manipulation of the agenda. A puzzle remained, however, because voting processes in the real world of government are usually quite stable. Why so much stability? The answer, “as Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast



so elegantly showed, is that voting typically occurs within a structure of rules that limit the agenda and bring about stability” (Moe 2006, p 216).

Thus began the positive theory of political institutions. The early focus on agenda control was only natural given the dilemmas of social choice. Yet agenda control was regarded as important not simply because it brings stability to chaos, but also because of its clear connection to political power: whoever controls the agenda can engineer voting outcomes to his or her own advantage, and thus gain power over policy. “Indeed, the classic works on agenda control by William Niskanen, Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal were not centrally about chaos and stability” (Moe 2005, p.217).

They were studies of institutionally based power that showed how particular actors, bureaus in the former case, school boards in the latter used agenda control to get their way in politics. By the early 1980s the rudiments of a power-based theory seemed to be in place. The public choice literature was already well developed; and in addition to its work on agenda control, its work on rent-seeking also put the spotlight on power. Rent-seeking focused on the power of interest groups over public policy, and on the social inefficiencies that arise from lobbying and special-interest policies.

Prior to the new institutionalism, then, rational choice theory was already providing power-based explanations for governmental structure. Its analytic center of gravity, however, was about to change. The stimulus was the rise of a new body of theory within economics that sought to explain the existence and properties of economic organization. Once economists trained their sights on issues of organization, their new analytic tools among them transaction cost economics, agency theory, and theories of repeated games transformed the intellectual terrain of their discipline. Political scientists soon began



applying these tools to political institutions, and the new institutionalism was off and running.

As in economics generally, the basic framework in this literature is one of voluntary exchange among autonomous actors. But its distinctive focus is on cooperation. How can individuals who are self-interested and opportunistic overcome their collective action problems to cooperate for mutual gain? The answers take the form of institutions—usually involving rules and other formal structures, but sometimes consisting solely of informal arrangements (rooted in norms, for instance) which allow participants to mitigate obstacles to collective action, commit to cooperative agreements, and realize gains from trade. “As such, institutions emerge as good things, and it is their goodness that ultimately explains them. They exist and take the forms they do because they make people better off”(Shafi 2006, p35).

Consider the familiar principal-agent relationship between an employer and a potential employee. The principal has limited time and knowledge, and he can gain by hiring someone with expertise to do the work. The agent can gain by getting paid. But despite the prospect of mutual gain, it is not easy for them to cooperate.

The spider does the web basically in search of food so as the mass is connected in search of power which at the end initiator (mass) does not benefit much.

The agent has interests of his own for example, in leisure or professionalism that gives him incentives not to do what is best for the principal. Principal does not have, takes actions the agent cannot observe, and has personal qualities his levels of honesty, diligence, and the like that are largely hidden. A bad worker has incentives to use the information asymmetry to pass himself off as a good worker, while a good worker may have a hard time convincing the principal of his true type. As a result, the principal has

reason to distrust his agent, to pay him less than a good agent is worth, and perhaps not to hire anyone at all. Politically, the leaders then become the instructors of all affairs of the state by so doing the principal turns to the leader and the vice versa.

The principal and a good worker could both benefit from cooperation, but the information asymmetry prevents them from fully realizing gains from trade. The way around the problem is for the principal to devise an efficient set of rules, incentive structures, and monitoring mechanisms that by mitigating the information asymmetry and bringing the agent's interests into alignment with the principal's represents a mutually beneficial arrangement to which both parties can credibly commit, and is either self-enforcing or enforceable by a third party such as the courts. This arrangement is an institutional solution (a simplified version of the business firm) that makes cooperation possible.

I have used the principal-agent framework for illustration, but the logic is characteristic of the new economics of organization more generally. Transaction cost economics, for example, leads to the same basic conclusions. Efforts by both actors to strike a beneficial deal are confounded by the same information asymmetry, creating high transaction costs. And efforts to minimize these costs lead to the same sorts of institutional solutions that help them cooperate for mutual gain. All roads lead to Rome. Given this perspective on institutions, how does power fit in. The literature offers no clear answer. In our principal agent example, it might seem obvious that the employer exercises power over the employee. But the institutional solution to their cooperation problem has to be mutually beneficial, and could just as well be designed by the agent.

This is true even of whatever formal authority the employer gains under the new institution; for authority is endogenous to their agreement and beneficial to the agent as

well as the principal. The principal, by this logic, has no special power just because he is on top.

“An alternative view is that the agent actually wields power in this relationship, using his informational advantage to circumvent the principal’s control and pursue his own ends. Such information-based power is well recognized in the study of bureaucracy, going back to Max Weber”(Shapiro, 2006 p 36).

### **1.3 Power and Domestic Institutions**

It might seem easy to argue the importance of power when political institutions are the creations of predatory rulers or international hegemons, with political institutions that are created through democratic politics under constitutional rules of the game. On the surface, these contexts would appear to give cooperationist theories the greatest possible advantage and a power critiques its greatest challenge.

What kinds of institutions do democracies normally create? Political scientists tend to rivet their attention on the key authoritative institutions (legislative, executive, and judicial) set up by the constitution, or on the framework of democratic rules themselves.

The great bulk of government, however, is composed of bureaucratic agencies unexciting as this may sound and they are designed and adopted by public officials who make decisions under prevailing rules of the game. To simplify the discussion, these are the institutions I will be focusing on here.

It is easy to see that these most common of democratic institutions are often not cooperative or mutually beneficial for many of the people affected by them. They involve the exercise of power. This is so even if the democratic rules of the game are assiduously followed in their creation and design. A prime reason is that the public

authority employed to create and design them can be exercised by whatever coalitions gain the necessary support in the legislature (often a majority). Whoever wins has the right to make decisions on behalf of everyone, and whoever loses is required by law backed by the police powers of the state to accept the winners' decisions. This means that any groups that prevail under the formal rules can legitimately use public authority to impose bureaucratic institutions that are structurally stacked in their own favor, and that may make the losers worse off, perhaps by a lot.

In the voluntaristic framework of the new economics, which often makes good sense in competitive contexts of economic choice, people who expect to lose from any proposed institutional arrangement can simply walk away.

This is what guarantees (in theory) that such structures will be mutually beneficial.

The losers don't have to participate. But in democratic politics, they can't leave, at least not unless they are prepared to leave the country, which is typically not a practical option. So when they lose under the democratic rules of the game, they have to suffer the consequences and the winners are well aware of this. The latter can impose the institutions they want. There is nothing to stop them.

### **Alternative views**

There are other ways of looking at institutional politics that put a more positive, cooperationist spin on these issues, and they are worth considering in part because they represent familiar lines of reasoning, and in part because they are sources of confusion that need to be clarified.

### **Two stand out.**



The first is rooted in Coasian models of economic exchange, in which freely bargaining actors can arrive at a point on the Pareto frontier that is efficient and beneficial to all concerned. In a political context, the idea is that, when public policies (and institutions) help some interests and hurt others but expand the size of the pie, the winners can compensate the losers through some form of bargain and both can be better off. When policies are inefficient and don't expand the size of the pie, bargaining will lead to their rejection. The vision is one of cooperation and mutual gain.

This argument doesn't wash, however. Consider the best-case scenario in which a policy (such as free trade) stands to make both sides better off once compensation payments are made, and the support of both sides is needed for passage. The problem is that such bargains tend to involve enormous transaction costs and are difficult if not impossible to arrange. The transaction costs arise not only from difficulties in identifying the relevant actors, amounts, and conditions, but also from difficulties in arriving at agreements that are mutually credible and enforceable despite the uncertainties of democratic politics. As Thrainn Eggertsson notes, In the real world, high costs of negotiating and enforcing such agreements prohibit them: seldom do winners voluntarily compensate the losers. If the losers' support is not necessary for passage of the policy, things are of course brighter for the winners, who do not need to bargain at all. Society is allegedly better off with the new policy and the bigger pie. But the winners now have no incentive to compensate the losers who are worse off, and stay worse off.

Now consider the flipside of the above scenario. Let's assume that a powerful group is in a position to impose a special-interest policy that is inefficient for society, making the size of the pie smaller but the winning group itself better off. According to the



Coasian argument, the losers would prevent this inefficient policy from being adopted by paying off the winners.

The inefficient policy will be enacted, the winners will win, and society as a whole will be worse off. (Even if the bargain does happen, the losers still wind up worse off than under the original status quo, and the winners get a bundle for simply threatening to use the power of public authority.) Note the logic that works here, the argument that bargaining will somehow save institutions from social inefficiency, an argument that essentially defends the cooperationist theme of the new economics, runs smack into the logic of the new economics itself. A political bargain to produce an efficient policy or prevent an inefficient one is only likely to succeed in a Coasian world in which transaction costs are small and unimportant. But the defining claim of the new economics is that transaction costs tend to be large and important.

Indeed, this is the foundation of its analysis of institutions. If transaction costs in politics are large and important, however, then many political bargains are likely to be untenable, compensations are likely to go unpaid, political outcomes are likely to be inefficient, and there are likely to be losers as well as winners.

Now consider a second line of reasoning that also puts a positive spin on democratically created institutions. This one arises from the familiar notion that government is based on a social contract. The idea here is that, while certain groups may be losers when new institutions are created within democratic politics, they are not really losers (or do not expect to be) in the grander scheme of things. They accept the overarching framework of democratic rules; and although they know they may lose on particular decisions, they expect to be better off than they would be outside the framework under some other constitution, say, or no constitution at all. “Thus, particular domestic institutions may

not be to their liking, but this is part of the larger deal, and the system as a whole is good and beneficial”(Shapiro, Skowronek et al, 2006 p 40). This argument might carry some weight if a political system were analogous to what Oliver Williamson calls a “governance structure” in the economic realm.

Centuries of political philosophy notwithstanding, there is no social contract in any meaningful sense that can account for the foundations of government.

In all modern societies, people are typically born into the formal structure of their political systems, do not agree to it from the outset, and cannot leave if they find it disadvantageous (unless they leave the country). This being so, the fact that some groups lose in domestic politics and have new institutions thrust upon them that they do not want cannot be glossed over by saying that they have agreed to the larger system. They haven't.

Another problem with the social contract argument is that it substitutes oranges for apples. A theory of institutions should be able to explain how bureaucratic agencies emerge from the political process and why they take the forms they do. If the theory implies that institutions are cooperative and mutually beneficial, then surely this conclusion should apply to bureaucratic organizations (where it fails). But the social contract argument shifts attention to the democratic framework itself. While it recognizes that bureaucratic organizations may not be cooperative and mutually beneficial, it implicitly contends that the framework is the institution we ought to be focusing on, and that this institution is cooperative and mutually beneficial.

“Even if this claim were true (and it isn't), it does nothing to address the original challenge to the theory that bureaucracies often violate the theory's expectations and nothing to move us toward a theory that accounts for the kinds of institutions that arise

out of democratic politics. Instead, it confuses the issue by creating ambiguity around what we mean by “institution” and what we are trying to explain”(Arrow and Kenneth, 1963).

The idea of free trade comes into play by engaging in foreign materials such as polyester resin, catalyst, accelerator, fiberglass and plaster of paris (P.O.P) in a politics of mutual argument. The composition of these materials form the unit of the compose piece. The use of these materials saw me through a lot of challenges. The composition indulges vividly parallel with the bureaucratic style of doing things.

Free trade is the movement of goods, services, labor, and capital between countries, without government-imposed trade barriers. It also refers to the efforts of the World Trade Organization and various international agreements to liberalize, or reduce barriers to, trade. Free trade’s effect on economic and environmental sustainability is unclear, and trade liberalization methods must balance the needs of developed and developing countries to achieve sustainability.

These early efforts at liberalizing trade sought to promote development and economic growth. They were reactions against the “beggar thy neighbor” economic policies that characterized the 1930s. During that time, countries devalued their currencies and increased import tariffs to give their goods a price advantage over other countries.

“Economists blame such protectionist policies, in part, for exacerbating the Great Depression and the resulting global economic downturn. Under the various negotiations of GATT, more countries began to liberalize trade in the latter half of the twentieth century ”(Berkshire, 2011, p 239).

# KNUST

The logo of KNUST (Kenya National University of Science and Technology) is a large, faint watermark in the background. It features a yellow eagle with spread wings perched on a green shield. Above the eagle is a black mortar and pestle with a red flame. Below the eagle is a yellow banner with the Swahili motto 'WUJ SANE NO BAWENIA' in black capital letters.

## CHAPTER TWO

### 2.1 Social Class

The issue of middle classes in the society benefit on a higher merit than the less privilege in relation to public service rendering. And play role in the question of policy fields and disciplines.

Middle class advantage pop out as a result of the weave that falls between the attitudes and activities of service users, service providers and broader policy and social context.

**How does middle class advantage come about?**



There is strong evidence that the benefits enjoyed by the middle classes are only partially due to the deliberate actions of service users. The evidence points to a more complex scenario in which the actions and attitudes of service providers are key as are the signals arising from the broader policy context, therefore leading to a re-thinking of the role of middle class activism in securing advantage. This comes as a result of the weave between service users, providers and the broader policy and social context.

By breaking down the evidence across a wide range of policy fields and disciplines, as well as evidence from the UK, US and Scandinavia, this research clarifies a set of causal theories which explain this interplay. Four causal theories were derived from the evidence. In Hastings and Matthews (2011b), they detail each causal theory, set out the range of mechanisms, contexts and outcomes associated with each and assess the strength of the evidence base in relation to each element, as provided in outline of each theory.

1. The level and nature of middle class interest group formation allows for the collective articulation of their needs and demands, and that service providers respond to this.

This theory describes pertaining to how middle class are more likely to collectively organize and aim their participation on group with the highest potential for influence

The prior social and professional links between middle class people are important for connecting individuals and for providing access to information which will justify a case or identify pathways of influence. The evidence is strongest in the fields of schooling and land use planning.



## 2.2 Political Sanction

### **Do the middle classes have advantages in public services provision?**

There is evidence that middle class and relatively affluent individuals and groups are often advantaged in their use of local public services compared to poorer social groups.

Normally the poor in the society are not given much attention due their less recognition. Halo effect has it way in societal scenes when one knows somebody therefore making the power of politics the only liable source of surviving. This finding is in itself significant. It is important to briefly summaries the evidence on the nature and scale of middle class advantage as well as account for this advantage.

Middle class advantage has been researched more extensively in the UK than elsewhere.

We can only speculate as to why the scale of the research effort differs, but it is likely to relate to differences between the nature and reach of differing welfare states as well as levels of inequality. That the UK enjoys a universal welfare state and high levels of inequality suggesting class competition over finite resources may be significant.

This issue of middle class in Ghana is very clear but usually with interface hidden The UK evidence is limited as to the scale of middle class advantage and the extent to which it matters for winners and losers. There is some quantitative evidence which demonstrates that resources for environmental services can be skewed to affluent neighbourhoods Within policy there has often been an a priori assumption that middle class complaining drives up standards, for example through mixed communities policies bringing in more affluent residents to improve neighbourhoods. There is little evidence that an influential middle class has wider benefits for service users who are not middle class by driving up service quality for example. This suggests that middle class advantage may be a zero-sum game. “There is clear evidence the middle classes

obtain particular, identifiable benefits from public services in the UK which other social groups do not. There is qualitative evidence from land use planning, schooling, health services and environmental services of decisions being made which favor middle class service users. These include changes to proposals in land use planning and on school closures, gaining access to favoured schools or top streams within schools and accessing quicker or better levels of service from health professionals and environmental service providers” (Yarwood, 2002; Bondi, 1988; Carroll & Walford, 1996; Pell et al, 2000).

Perhaps the evidence is stronger of a generally favorable pre-disposition as a tendency to do something to middle class needs within public services. This means benefits can be more extensive but also more difficult to detect as they are often part of the status quo of service delivery, or reflect a priori assumptions of practitioners. However both qualitative and quantitative evidence does exist. Examples include resource distribution which allows for longer consultations or which provide for more street cleaning capacity in more affluent neighbourhoods. The middle class enjoy benefits derived from policy enactment and all this happens as a result of the initiator of the law. As I forecast all this issues, I intend focusing on the doing of the web produce by the spider. And as initially stated, the spiders do the web in search of food which I link that metaphorically to a symbol of connectivity. And in this case I subject the web to be the catalyst but do not take part in the reaction. There is evidence from all walls of sectors like in politics, education, health, and many more the country the health literature of the existence and impacts of particularly empathetic relationships between middle class health professionals and similar service users

**How does middle class advantage come about?**

There is strong evidence that the benefits enjoyed by the middle classes are only partially due to the deliberate actions of service users. The evidence points to a more complex picture in which the actions and attitudes of service providers are key, as are the signals arising from the broader policy context. The synthesis has therefore led to a re-thinking of the role of middle class activism in securing advantage. The evidence is it accrues as a result of the interplay between service users, providers and the broader policy and social context. Four causal theories were derived from the evidence.

### **2.3 Communal Comparison of Class**

1. The level and nature of middle class interest group formation allows for the collective articulation of their needs and demands, and that service providers respond

to this.

These policy fields encourage this kind of engagement and the evidence for these mechanisms and outcomes is apparent from this. For example, it is clear that collective organising can influence planning decisions and broader planning policies of which the mass p. Persuasion for power accrues as of result of negotiation of class of which the middle class function more in such cases. Where middle class parents dominate parent advocacy groups they influence policies on pupil placing, practices on streaming, special education needs and school closures. Decision making then becomes obvious as a result ruling in in favor of. “There is some indication service providers afford formal engagement more validity than, for example, the campaigning activity associated with working class organizing” (Bondi, 1988).

2. The levand nature of middle class engagement with public services on an individualised basis means that services are more likely to be provided according to their needs and demands.

This theory engages on two factors indulging between service users and providers on an individual basis, which are both used more extensively by the middle classes. The first is co-production which covers a range of behaviours from attending parents meetings at school, commenting on planning policies or sharing medical information with health professionals. Some services, such as health, require more coproduction and this is apparent in the evidence. While the impacts of co-production appear under researched there is evidence in schooling where the involvement of middle class parents is valued as a tool for school improvement of tangible benefits for middle class children. In health, co-production produces longer consultations for affluent groups as well as greater information exchange with health professionals. The second mechanism concerns complaining behaviour. Here the evidence is strong the middle classes complain more often and more In general, middle class group are loud in the society and usually theorizing and empirically testing whether the likelihood of contacting was related to socio-economic status. That complaining makes at least some difference to service received is clear from health, planning and environmental services. This evidences a tendency for service providers to anticipate middle class complaints in policy design and in specific decisions. The efficacy of complaints is undoubtedly supported by a broader climate where the active consumer is encouraged. Finally, the evidence also points to a virtuous cycle in which a sense of personal efficacy is built from successful encounters with public agencies.



3. The alignment in the cultural capital enjoyed by middle class service users and service providers leads to engagement which is constructive and confers advantage and nature of middle class engagement with public services on an individualised basis means that services are more likely to be provided according to their needs and demands.

This theory focuses on two key mechanisms facilitating engagement between service users and providers on an individual basis, which are both used more extensively by the middle classes. The first is co-production which covers a range of behaviours from attending parents meetings at school, commenting on planning policies or sharing medical information with health professionals. Some services, such as health, require more coproduction and this is apparent in the evidence. While the impacts of co-production appear under researched there is evidence in schooling where the involvement of middle class parents is valued as a tool for school improvement of tangible benefits for middle class children. In health, coproduction produces longer consultations for affluent groups as well as greater information exchange with health.

The second mechanism concerns complaining behaviour. Here the evidence is strong the middle classes complain more often and more vociferously. That complaining makes at least some difference to service received is clear from health, planning and environmental services. This evidences a tendency for service providers to anticipate middle class complaints in policy design and in specific. “The efficacy of complaints is undoubtedly supported by a broader climate where the active consumer is encouraged. Finally, the evidence also points to a virtuous cycle in which a sense of personal efficacy is built from successful encounters with public agencies”(Aars and Stromsnes, 2007; Hastings, 2009b; Abram et.al, 1996).



3. The alignment in the cultural capital enjoyed by middle class service users and service providers leads to engagement which is constructive and confers advantage.

People who do not fall within the middle class social group normally does not benefit from non-financial social assets that promote social mobility beyond economic means like education, intellect, style of speech, dress, or physical appearance.

This further explains how and why both middle class collective and individual engagement confer advantages. The importance of cultural capital for securing advantage in the field of education featured prominently in the review. This evidence points to how confidence, educational status and soft knowledge of the system, along with alignment with the cultural capital of education professionals, eases engagement and facilitates the other mechanisms identified. Across policy domains it is clear that the capacity of middle class actors to use “appropriate” language and to access the “right” knowledge often by informal means or tacit channels is vital for securing advantage. And this come to fulfillment as a result of the initiator of the law. In health, the difference which the cultural alignment between middle class patients and health professionals makes to the constructiveness of services received is routinely hinted at, although rarely rigorously researched. Two papers which showed a clear statistical relationship between social status and hospital admission and prioritization (Reid et al, 1999; Pell et al, 2000) suggested the relationship at least partly reflected variations in levels of articulateness across the social gradient. And I debate on such issues, the mass normally do not benefit from the power attain.

4. The needs of middle class service users, or their expectations of service quality, are ‘normalised’ in policy and practice to the extent that policy priorities sometimes favour the middle classes. The normalisation of middle class needs and demands can be explained with reference to the alignment of cultural capital between decision makers and middle class service users. “This theory foregrounds how resource allocation can underestimate differences in need between poorer and affluent groups, facilitating longer, more constructive consultations for affluent patients and higher standards of street cleanliness in middle class neighbourhoods” (Hastings et al, 2009). That such issues are not usually framed as policy problems may be a result of the political need to secure middle class votes and assent, although empirical evidence on this question is not available. This mechanism also highlights how the choice agenda in education and health policy constructs a service user with middle class cultural capital, thus normalizing middle class modes of engagement (Hastings and Matthews ,2012: p 8)

Hastings and Matthews (2011c) is short accessible summary of the evidence which will be disseminated widely to policy audiences in order to provoke debate and reflection.

It seems that the existing research is sufficient to enable theory building in terms of linking middle class service engagement with advantage. As an artist, I scrementally associate the entrapment of the web as a greater advantage to the spider as a means of trapping it prey. However, as Hastings and Matthews (2011b) shows, the causal chains we have derived from the extant evidence include many elements for which the evidence base is at best only adequate. There is a real paucity of direct evidence which links specific contextualized mechanisms to particular outcomes. There is enormous scope for further empirical work designed to explicitly test and develop these theories

across policy domains, particularly the impact on outcomes, and to develop further theorizations of the nature and production of middle class advantage in different contexts.

Perhaps the most elusive of all the social ills confronting us today is the issue of class. It can evade any attempt at categorization or simplistic definition. The issues and problems of class struggle cuts across the social dimensions of race and ethnicity, gender, national and geographic origins, educational background, and even marriage and parental status. Thus, the class issue cannot be merely defined in terms of economic power or social influence. Bearing in mind the initiator of class falls on the lower class of people in the community that is people in the market, farmers and many more. This is scenario where by a farmer vito power to a politician for the him to determine the price of his commodity for the farmer. Capitalism then comes into play. This makes the masses agitate and angry as they are being exploited of their labour on their own property. This system structure releases a high tension of questioning for equality, leading to conflict and agitations thereby making our own case more serious and intense than what Marxist construe in his dialectics. Class may be correctly referred to as the status an individual or group achieves by virtue of its economic strength, the influence among other groups, and the power to affect change in its community of choice. Weber describes class group as sharing one economic common interest and referring the party as political groups whereas the status group are social groups with common values and common life style as a way of belonging together.

**Raw Material components:** Polyester Resin, Catalyst and Accelerator

<u>NAME</u>	<u>COMPONENTS</u>
Dibasic Acids	Maleric, Fumaric

Glycols Triethylene glycol	Ethylene glycol, Diethylene glycol,
Monomers	Styrene, Methyl methacrylate
Catalyst peroxide (lowtemp:<15 degrees)	Benzol peroxide, Methyl Ethylketone
Accelerator	Cobalt naphthanate, Di-methy aniline

These medium are of great potential to the artist because of its dynamic functional multiplicities. I could have had fibreglass and resin from a local refinery but instead I got supplies from a dealer who exports it from United Arab Emirate to Ghana and this where the coasian model of theory comes in by freely negotiating for pricing at a mutual agreement. The material also poses a threat of it being politicised in terms of monopolisation. Although resin is expensive, it is accepted as a safe product and useful for almost all needs. Polyester Resins, when compared to traditional material standards for strength, durability and resistance to corrosion, colour surface quality and relative ease of handling, have a very common balance.

Resin has similar working characteristics to other castable materials such as cement, wax, plaster, to mention a few, but with a great variety of strength and durability. These connections inform the idea of the work in terms of its materiality, content and contextual engagements. The transformations within the myriads of studio methodologies also allow the generation of ideas and concepts in my work.



## CHAPTER THREE

### THE SPIDER AND MATERIALITY OF ARTISTIC CONTENT

#### 3.1 Rod, Fibreglass, Polyester Resins and Pigments

My work has a diverse form of installations with respect the diverse political tactics used by the individual in search of power. The work explore and examine the realities of how power systems are being distributed in our part of the world where authority owned by the people are taken from them by devious means of persuading and do not get benefit from it. Methods engaged in the execution of these compose piece include modeling, casting and welding.

**Plate 3.1: Spider Clay Model**



**Plate 3.2: Spider Clay Model (Front View)**



**Plate 3.3: Rasin Cast Model**





**Plate 3.4: Spider Cast Piece**



**Plate 3.5: Spider Legs**





**Plate 3.6: Arranging of spider legs**



**Plate 3.7: Spider Legs**





**Plate 3.8: Spider Legs**



The exploration of the work has a series of process from modeling of the spiders , casting, welding, painting of the legs and fixing of the legs. Manipulation of the clay allowed the creation of the spiders in multi moulds to aid in high rate of casting. Polyester resin , catalyst, accelerator, fiberglass as the prime material in the casting of the spiders. Black pigment was added to the polyester resin to defect the colour of it as sum were left as transparent. The additive of Plaster of Paris also affected the final cast of the body Painting of the rod (legs) with brown oil paint.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

## **‘THE HOSTAGE’**

### **4.1 Artists, Artistic Form and Content**

This thesis project embodies the narrative responses of spiders reflecting on the power it plays and the artistic responses that inform them and also the relation it has with human behavior at large.

The great importance of the spinning apparatus to the evolutionary success of spiders has inspired several workers (which could be liken to the civil service servants in Ghana) to compose historical narratives in an attempt to explain the evolutionary origin of this unique feature; these notions usually rely heavily on conjecture. For example, Savory (1952) has envisioned the spider ancestor as making brief forays from a burrow while trailing a stream of excrement. At some point, the excrement somehow evolves into silken threads. This crucial transformation, coupled with the ancestral foraging strategy, would then generate the first web. Historical narratives such as this are not uncommon in the scientific literature and continue to crop up as biologists attempt to fill the gaps in evolutionary history. Dissatisfaction with this practice has increased with the general acceptance of the Popperian philosophy which states, in essence, that truly scientific hypotheses must be open to refutation; they must be falsifiable (Shultz, 1987, p.90)

Experimentations are triggered mainly by the narrative ideas and arguments such as the characteristics of the spider and its web and traditionally the beliefs people associate with spiders and the web in relation to human behavior in our society.

I therefore take the opportunity to revive the spirit of connection bestowed in the materials I explored with as they consciously and unconsciously of all walks of life and

bring them to a cohesive and interactive force for my audience to relate with in mass effect.

Am much interested in Rafael Gómezbarros' style of installing hundreds of sculptures representing fifty centimetre long ants take over public buildings. Their bodies are made up by the assembling of two human skull casts as if the Santa Marta-born artist were attempting to summon death in life.

Rafael Gómezbarros' work makes visible the overlooked. His intention is to address the plight of millions of displaced people who constitute the invisible but pervasive mass of immigrants crossing the planet. His installation, "buried in the narrative of diaspora lays a tribute to thousands of Colombians who suffered internal displacement and violent deaths as casualties of the armed conflict that wreaked havoc in the country for the most part of the last fifty years" (Salgado. 2013).

Ants being usually associated with hard-labor and complex social organization are turned into phantasms of the disappeared, ghost like figures that have acquired the capacity to take over national monuments. Gómezbarros previously deployed his legion of ants onto historical buildings such as Quinta de San Pedro Alejandrino the hacienda where Simón Bolívar spent his final days as well as Barranquilla's customs building. In Bogotá, he invaded a commercial gallery with one thousand polyester cast creatures and covered the National Congress's stone façade, his most meaningful attempt to address the national security policies that endorsed a violent status quo for decades.

Entitled Casa Tomada, the work makes a very particular reference to a short story by Argentine writer Julio Cortázar, in which the inhabitants of a large mansion become invaded by elusive presences announced solely by muted sounds. In the context of these public art interventions, the metaphor reminds the viewer what Cortázar himself

declared shortly before passing away: unless a country buries its dead, they will always be remembered as ghosts in the attic.

My work normally took the form of custody, hostage, possession, as a means of installation in the various exhibitions to depict the link power plays in our daily activities, unconsciously, to create interactions. The production of 700 pieces of spider in a composition really inspired thoughts of spiders not normally seen together in such scene. Individually the spider does the web in search of food, greater result is achieved when such mass come together in search of food. Metaphorically, I mount my work on a live tree to predict the realness of being been captured by spider is basically in search of power (food, wealth, authority)





**Plate.4.1: Casa Tomada 2013**



Sources: [http://www.saatchigallery.com/artists/artpages/aife\\_rafael\\_gomez\\_ants.htm](http://www.saatchigallery.com/artists/artpages/aife_rafael_gomez_ants.htm)

**Plate 4.2: Casa Tomada (Detail) 2013**






Sources: [http://www.saatchigallery.com/artists/artpages/aife\\_rafael\\_gomez\\_ants.htm](http://www.saatchigallery.com/artists/artpages/aife_rafael_gomez_ants.htm)  
**Plate 4.3** Casa Tomada (Frontage) 2013








Sources: [http://www.saatchigallery.com/artists/artpages/aife\\_rafael\\_gomez\\_ants.htm](http://www.saatchigallery.com/artists/artpages/aife_rafael_gomez_ants.htm)

**Plate 4.4: Exhibition**





Photograph by Bernard Akoi-Jackson (Old Tech Sec.)

**Plate 4.5: The Hostage**





**Plate 4.6: Exhibition**



Photograph by Bernard Akoi-Jackson (Old Tech Sec.)



**Plate 4.7: Exhibition**



**Plate 4.8**



Photograph by Bernard Akoi-Jackson (Old Tech Sec.)



**Plate 4.9:**



**Plate 4.10: Habitation**





**Plate 4.11: Habitation**



Photograph by Ibrahim Mahama Mohamed (MFA)

**Plate 4.12: Habitation**





**Plate 4.13: Habitation**



**Plate 4.14: Habitation (front view)**





**Plate 4.15: Habitation**



**Plate 4.16: Habitation**





**Plate 4.17: Habitation**



**Plate 4.18: Habitation**





**Plate 4.19: Habitation**



**Plate 4.19: Habitation**





**Plate 4.20: Habitation**



I titled this particular exhibition ‘ THE HOSTAGE’ which was held at the sculpture garden to show the habitation of the spiders. I compose the spiders in a funny but serious works to reflect on social issue.the issue of space and the kind of communication it provokes space in this sense is puzzled and at the same time linked.

The concept of connectivity is very prominent in political environment and influences the I display my work.



**Plate 4.21: Hostage**



**Plate 4.22: Hostage**





**Plate 4.23: Hostage**



**Plate 4.26: Hostage**





This particular exhibition format was adopted to interrupt the real uses of the space (car park) and this was done to show the real owners of the space. Roadsigns like 'MEN AT WORK', 'SLOW DOWN', 'POLICE ORDER', 'EXHIBITION CHECKPOINT' etc as users approach the space. In this case I change the parking space of the lecturers as a result of the spiders possessing the said space.

**Plate 4.27: Hostage (Peace Pole Commercial Area)**





**Plate 4.28: Hostage (Peace Pole Commercial Area- Close View)**



**Plate 4.29: Hostage (Peace Pole Commercial Area- Side View)**





**Plate 4.30: Hostage (Peace Pole Commercial Area- Students Interacting with Works)**



**Plate 4.31: Hostage (Peace Pole Commercial Area- Students Interacting with Works)**



The peace pole at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology has a significant role in this institution. The spiders were strategically enorff on the peace pole from the root of the mounted pole to half the height of it. This particular exhibition



format was adopted to interrupt the intended purpose of the pole and also to observe how viewers will interact with the work. The spiders were mounted on a work create state of power leading to the new trend of art ( contemporary art ).

The issue of middle class, coasian theory comes into play when one attain power or authority and freely negotiation of power is made derieved at a mutual benefit respectively but does not occur in real sense as I connect this to the doing of the spiders in using the web in search of food as I metaphorically associate the individual in search of power by the mass. The connectivity of the web play a major role in the construction of my work.


**Plate 4.31: The Invading (Old Tech Sec.)**



Photograph by Albert Oduro Asante (MFA)



**Plate 4.32: THE INVADING (Old Tech Sec.)**



Photograph by Albert Oduro Asante (MFA)

**Plate 4.33: THE INVADERS (Old Tech Sec.)**



Photograph by Albert Oduro Asante (MFA)



**Plate 4.34: THE INVADERS (Old Tech Sec.)**



Photograph by Albert Oduro Asante (MFA)

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

## 5.0 Summary

As much as I have been interested in exploring power with regards to the emerging power relations of class, I also think it is necessary to engage more seriously the sensitive issues based on the continues persuasion of man and resource property exploitations in search of power in our part of the world “Africa”, structures of power by looking at some of Foucault’s works on power and knowledge. It has been the cause of colonial and neo-colonial capitalist ideology to subvert economical potentials for absolute greed and poverty. This is to artistically engage the power relations and how it’s engaging the Ghanaian crisis pertaining to authority and practical interpretation of my work. The work serving as a simulation also created possible and engaging discourse posed to power politics and power bestowed on emerging intensifications disengaged by conflict. Relative reviews on artist works, especially Rafael Gomez, Installing hundreds of sculptures representing fifty centimeter long ants take over public buildings. Their bodies are made up by the assembling of two human skull casts as if the Santa Marta-born artist were attempting to summon death in life. The modifications employed by the exploration of fibre-glass and resin medium for artistic expressions to engage the concepts of repetition, interrogated views and notions of power with its related issues and knowledge. Nevertheless, given that repetition and color speculate the classification categories of ethnicity, individuality and rank in the generality of the work. This is coupled with the structural uniformity and consistency of organic form in relation to the minimalist idea of orderliness. The spider structure also commands a thought provoking captivation thereby drawing the viewer to engage what holds the promises and the sceptic impressions of the outcome result. Although the work became more flexible and play its role by camouflaging the form within the divers social and political power relations and narratives.



The concept of connectivity is very prominent in political environment and this influence the way I display my work.

### **5.1 Conclusion and recommendation**

I made very critical and interesting discovery and observation through this artistic project. This research is open up for a further exploration since others were discovered and for that matter I will still embark on a similar project in the near future as a contemporary artist.

Things of the environment take form of the photo-shots simply to depict the realness of the spiders. As the audience interact with the works take the aesthetic appeal to them. 'Audiencing' issues were mostly based on traditional believes of the bad luck aspect of the web entanglement, its aesthetic and how the works appear.



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